

**Defending a castle under siege:**  
**A critical examination of the British counter-extremism in  
schools strategy**

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*'And so, castles made of sand,  
Fall in the sea, eventually'*

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## Abstract

This thesis offers a critical analysis of the underlying logic of Britain's counter-extremism in schools strategy. It begins with a foundational concern regarding the emphasis placed on countering ideology in countering extremism, and the challenge facing educationalists to both promote a consensus around moderate values, while also promoting value diversity and pluralism. The thesis finds the strategy contested and contradictory - how can a school develop critical thinking while also promoting a fixed set of values? The thesis deconstructs these contradictory components of counter-extremism education, in order to critically examine the political realms of extremism and counter-extremism: what is the world *after* extremism that the strategy is hoping to bring about? Through exploring the lessons plans, PowerPoint presentations and worksheets used in classrooms, and deploying a method of critical discourse analysis, this thesis asks: ***how do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?*** Adopting a deconstructionist, discourse analysis approach, and through the lenses of ideograph theory, securitisation theory, critical race theory, and the theory of agonism, this analysis uncovers what I term a 'siege mentality'. The moderate centre is painted as being threatened and under attack from a poorly-defined notion of extremism, and must be defended at all costs. This *securitisation* of education, tasked with securing the moderate centre from attack, leads to a realm of exceptional politics in which the very values that are being defended - those of liberal democracy - are being suspended for their own protection. Values that stray too far from a moderate consensus are portrayed as 'extreme', and the modes of subjectivity deemed permissible within the 'moderate' are narrow, restrictive and racialised. The thesis finishes by asking how else this siege mentality could be conceptualised. Through replacing the consensus central to current conceptualisations of counter-extremism (that once everyone agrees with the moderate, there will be no extremism), with a pluralistic acceptance of diversity and conflict, the thesis sets out how a conceptual framework of agonism can offer new ways of, not countering, but *encountering* extremism.

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*This work is dedicated to every peacemaker big and small, young and old, brave and fearful, for the tireless efforts they give to make this world a better place.*

# Contents

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Contents	iii
List of figures and tables	iv
List of abbreviations & style notes on the thesis	viii
Prologue	ix
1. Introduction: liberal education and ideological counter-extremism	1
2. Literature review: the ideological emphasis of counter-extremism	13
3. Contested and contradictory: an analysis of Britain's counter-extremism in schools strategy	48
4. Methodology: developing a discourse theory approach	83
5. Building the outsider: constituting the threat of extremism	104
6. The vulnerable under siege: the racialised, neoliberal governmentality of fundamental British values	143
7. Selectively critical: critical thinking, Islamophobia and the post-racial	177
8. Exploring agonism: from countering extremism to encountering extremism	214
9. Conclusion: looking beyond the castle walls	253
Reference list	270
Appendix	305



## List of Figures and Tables

### Chapter 2

#### Figures

- 2.1 Competing counter-extremism objectives (source: author) 26

### Chapter 3

#### Figures

- 3.1 Britain's counter-extremism in schools strategy (source: author) 59  
3.2 The contradictory education strategy (source: author) 80

### Chapter 4

#### Figures

- 4.1 Research pyramid (source: author) 88  
4.2 Journey from strategy to classroom (source: author) 99

#### Tables

- 4.1 Writers of corpus materials (source: author) 102

### Chapter 5

#### Figures

- 5.1 T429, slide 15 108  
5.2 T286, slide 18 108  
5.3 T109, slide 9 109  
5.4 T37, slide 5 109  
5.5 T409, slide 5 110  
5.6 T409, slide 6 110  
5.7 T389, slide 13 113  
5.8 T400, slide 1 121  
5.9 T413, slide 10 122  
5.10 T112, slide 4 124

5.11	Tweet by @LTAIPrevent	136
5.12	T384, slide 1	138
5.13	Universalising the threat of extremism (source: author)	140

#### Tables

5.1	Types of extremism in the corpus (source: author)	126
5.2	Predicate analysis of extremism (source: author)	132
5.3	Predicate analysis of extremist traits (source: author)	137

### **Chapter 6**

#### Figures

6.1	T400, slide 4	146
6.2	T401, slide 3	148
6.3	T419, slide 10	151
6.4	T392, slide 5	152
6.5	T391, slide 7	154
6.6	T403, slide 2	157
6.7	T383, slide 9	163
6.8	T383, slide 10	163
6.9	T390, slide 2	163
6.10	T390, slide 3	163

#### Tables

6.1	What things are British? (source: author)	161
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### **Chapter 7**

#### Figures

7.1	T110, slide 5	183
7.2	T429, slide 8	183
7.3	T268, slide 9	184
7.4	T419, slide 23	184

7.5	T111, slide 11	184
7.6	T45, slide 14	185
7.7	T425, slide 4	185
7.8	T39, slide 7	188
7.9	T42, slide 8	191
7.10	T109, slide 9	191
7.11	T387, slide 4	191
7.12	T387, slide 6	192
7.13	T418, slide 8	194
7.14	T426, slide 8	195
7.15	T398, slide 6	196
7.16	T398, slide 4	197
7.17	T397, slide 17	197
7.18	T398, slide 10	198
7.19	T430, slide 13	198
7.20	T412, slide 24	199
7.21	T19, slide 3	203
7.22	Clockwise from top left - T254, slide 12; T112, slide 18; T397, slide 36; T426, slide 15	208

#### Tables

7.1	Critical thinking's associated words (source: author)	180
7.2	Topics approached critically (source: author)	181

### **Chapter 8**

#### Figures

8.1	T389, slide 13	234
8.2	T413, slide 5	239
8.3	T414, slide 6	240
8.4	T112, slide 7	241
8.5	T24, slide 2	241

8.6	T263, slide 2	241
8.7	T32, slide 4	243
8.8	T263, slide 5	243
8.9	T31, slide 1	243
8.10	T263, slide 15	244
8.11	T389, slide 8	244
Tables		
8.1	Principles of agonistic education to encounter extremism (source: author)	251

## **List of Abbreviations**

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CTS	Critical Terrorism Studies
CTS Act	Counter-Terrorism and Security Act
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCSF	Department for Children, Schools and Families
JCHR	Joint Committee on Human Rights (House of Commons, House of Lords)
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
RAN	Radicalisation Awareness Network
TES	Times Educational Supplement
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

### **Style notes of the thesis**

The majority of the thesis is written in a conventional APA citation style. Two alterations have been made to this. Firstly, direct quotations from the teaching materials of the corpus have been presented in **Tahoma** font, rather than Times New Roman, to ensure clarity for the reader. Secondly, references to teaching materials, school counter-extremism policies, and school British values audits refer to the appendix, which can be found at the end of the thesis.

## Prologue

*Men of Harlech, march to glory,  
Victory is hov'ring o'er ye,  
Bright-eyed freedom stands before ye,  
Hear ye not her call?  
At your sloth she seems to wonder;  
Rend the sluggish bonds asunder,  
Let the war-cry's deaf'ning thunder  
Every foe appall.*

John Oxenford (1873)

The defiant, stony remains of Harlech Castle dominate the coast of the Welsh county of Gwynedd, overlooking the Irish sea. Built over twelve years between 1283 and 1295, it is of little surprise that this sturdy castle remains to this day. The castle is so strongly fortified that the siege of Harlech Castle lasted seven years until 1468 before the Lancastrians within surrendered to the Yorkists without. The siege, set in cultural memory in the song, *Men of Harlech*, would go on to become a rallying cry for Welsh and British vigilance under attack. Famously sung in defiant defeat in the 1964 film *Zulu*, the song remains a popular march of Welsh regiments of the British Armed Forces. Britain's pride is strongest, it seems, when under siege.

Life under siege is hard, and it is boring. Between intermittent fighting, a siege serves the purpose of a waiting game. Will those inside the castle walls, or the encamped attacking armies run out of food, water and willpower first? As important as tactics of combat were in both conducting and defending a siege, a primary mode of attack was in the form of blockade, starving those inside the castle of precious resources.

A vital mode of defence was, as Bachrach (1994) notes, ‘stripping the countryside to deprive the besiegers of the opportunity to forage’. It is a grinding, attritional mode of warfare.

While siege warfare these days is rare, siege mentalities abound. A siege mentality is a constructed psychological siege - the walls built in the mind, not out of stone. As Bar-Tal and Antebi define it, a siege mentality is a ‘mental state in which members of a group hold a central belief that the rest of the world has highly negative behavioural intentions towards them’ (1992, p. 634). Yet, its effects can be as profound, and as long lasting, as any castle siege. The besieged builds boundaries between themselves and the attacker. Bar-Tal and Antebi define certain common characteristics of a siege mentality, including a belief that ‘there is a threat to their existence’ and ‘that all means are justified for group defense’ (ibid.). Violence plagues the besieged mind, whether hiding behind figurative walls or ones made of stone.

The virtue of a siege mentality is that while the siege itself can be as attritional, bloody and brutal as a physical siege, the castle under a siege mentality is more akin to the sand castle built with buckets and spades, than to the stony remains which attract visitors to Harlech. A sand castle resembles a castle, but never loses the traces of what is really is: a human-constructed image, a manufactured shape. A sand castle is fragile, malleable and temporary. While Harlech’s walls last 800 years, a sand castle rarely outlives the change in the tides. While still a distinct and profound challenge, the castle of a siege mentality can be reshaped and rebuilt.

*And so Castles made of sand,*

*Fall in the sea, eventually.*

Jimi Hendrix (1967)

# 1

## Introduction

### Liberal Education and Ideological Counter-Extremism

I can still remember where I was when I first heard about the 2001 attacks in the US. I was ten years old. I had just finished an after-school sports session. With a more serious face than usual, our coach left the gym with the mysterious words: ‘Now go home and watch the news’. Confused by this apparent politicisation of our sports coach, I headed out to the car where my Mum told me what had happened that day. The ride home was full of uncertainty, questions, confusion and intrigue. Opening the front door, I could hear the TV was on, and my Dad’s eyes were glued to it.

For the next weeks and months this event took over our school. It was, like for so many teachers around the world, a ‘teachable moment’ (Hess & Stoddard, 2011, p. 175). We talked about it in class, we held a vigil in our school chapel, and the art students memorialised the attacks in paint. These paintings hung in the school chapel in September 2002, when we commemorated the attacks one year on. That this event should be something to be tackled in school appeared the right thing to do. The world seemed to radically transform overnight, and it was vital that, as a school community, we came together to reflect upon it. As examined throughout this thesis, this idea that school classrooms and assembly halls should tackle the issues of terrorism and extremism has remained to this day.

These weeks were not just full of quiet reflection, moments of silence, and classroom discussion, but of seismic shifts in political agendas too. The fresh and hopeful face of Tony Blair, elected to lead a New Labour government in a wave of optimism in 1997, was increasingly replaced by a more serious, statesman-



like figure. Blair would, having already sent British troops to Kosovo, Iraq and Sierra Leone, support two controversial wars, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. For Blair, the question was not one of quiet reflection, but of urgent need for justice, and the need to point the finger of blame. Speaking at the Labour party conference, less than a month after the attacks, Blair said:

It was the events of September 11 that marked a turning point in history, where we confront the dangers of the future and assess the choices facing humankind. It was a tragedy. An act of evil... Be in no doubt: Bin Laden and his people organised this atrocity. The Taliban aid and abet him. He will not desist from further acts of terror. They will not stop helping him. (Blair, Oct. 2, 2001)

Here, Blair sets out quite clearly the threat facing the world. He isolates the threatening group: 'Bin Laden and his people'. This focus on Bin Laden catalysed Operation Enduring Freedom, the invasion of Afghanistan, overthrowing the Taliban and driving Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to retreat towards the mountains along the Pakistan border. Yet, as the Global War on Terror continued, and as Britain itself was attacked in 2005, this focus on Bin Laden and on foreign threats took a noticeable back seat. In a speech after the attacks in London in July 2005, Blair suggests that the threat this time is different. This time the threat is a set of ideas:

The greatest danger is that we fail to face up to the nature of the threat we are dealing with... What we are confronting here is an evil ideology... It is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds. (Blair, Jul. 16, 2005)

It is this shift to a focus on ideologies, hearts, and minds that presents the focus of examination within this thesis. The promotion of a moderate ideology to protect those vulnerable to extremist ideologies presents a novel approach to countering political violence that has transformed Britain's security approach over the past thirteen years. This thesis asks what the implications might be of a counter-extremism strategy that

seeks to place boundaries on the realms of permissible moderate opinion, and demands that schools play a key role in these boundaries' curation. This introductory chapter seeks to locate the discussion of the thesis through exploring the issues and questions guiding the thesis, the approach taken, its location within existing literature, and the central findings.

### **Countering Extremism in Schools**

While many sectors of social life have been impacted by various counter-extremism measures since 2001 – from getting on a train, to visiting your doctor – the education sector has been particularly impacted. As it stands, Britain's schools have an extraordinary level of responsibility and regulation regarding countering extremism and radicalization in schools. In 2015, what is known as the 'Prevent Duty' came into force; a statutory obligation for teachers and other education professionals to be trained in how to spot 'signs of radicalisation'. The 'Channel Programme' offers an opportunity for those deemed 'vulnerable' to radicalisation to be 'de-radicalised', and monitored. Alongside this, teachers and schools must promote what are termed 'fundamental British values', while also developing critical thinking skills and teaching young people about the threats and dangers of extremism and terrorism. Already, reports from human rights organisations amongst others are revealing shocking (if not altogether unsurprising) results (e.g. Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; JUST Yorkshire, 2017). Young Muslim students are far more likely to be considered 'vulnerable' to radicalisation than any other students. In particular, the combination of political activism and Islamic identity appears a toxic cocktail ripe for the securitisation of a young person's identity.

This thesis begins with a desire to better understand the implications of such a counter-extremism strategy. This thesis aims to contribute to the growing body of literature offering critical approaches to the current counter-extremism in schools strategy (see Martin, 2018; Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Ford, 2017a; Miah, 2017; O'Donnell, 2017; 2016; Arthur, 2015). O'Donnell (2016), for example, has explored the negative consequences of this securitisation of the classroom space under the Prevent duty. Miah (2017), amongst others, has built a solid critique around the promotion of fundamental British values and inclusion in the

context of the fallout from the ‘Trojan Horse Scandal’. The novel approach of this thesis entails not just examining each element of the strategy in isolation, but instead in combination. Adopting a holistic approach to the strategy seen as a whole, this thesis examines the wider questions as to the nature of extremism and counter-extremism engendered within the counter-extremism in schools strategy.

Crucially, the counter-extremism in schools strategy is riddled with tension, antagonism and contradiction. Chapter two of the thesis builds a picture of the existing scholarship on extremism and radicalisation. Such subjective terms can be understood in myriad ways, and as such, differing understandings of extremism will lead to different pathways to counter such extremism. The counter-extremism in schools strategy operates as an embodiment of such a lack of coherence surrounding the very concept the strategy seeks to counter. The study isolates three educational components to the strategy, alongside the surveillance aspect of the Prevent duty, and argues that each component is *contested* and *contradictory*. They are contested in that they sit atop an unstable body of research, awash in assumption and lacking in evidence. They are contradictory in that each component seeks to achieve a competing outcome.

The first component asks teachers to disseminate knowledge to students regarding the threat and dangers of extremism and radicalisation. How a teacher should do so, when the UK government itself cannot find a coherent, legally-useful definition of extremism (JCHR, 2016, p. 32) is a question educationalists must face. This thesis is located within the field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). As chapter four explains, CTS grew out of a frustration with more ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies, which were embedded within state-centric practices that did not seek to challenge the scale of legitimated state violence in the context of the Global War on Terror of the new millennium (Gunning, 2007; Jackson 2007a). This thesis builds on the back of this body of literature, and wider literature that has critically deconstructed and undermined the very logics on which counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies are based (e.g. Jackson 2005, 2007; Kundnani, 2015; Ford, 2017a). It seeks to understand how teachers navigate their way through such boggy terrain, producing an understanding of extremism with which students can engage.

The second component demands schools promote Fundamental British values. Scholarship has to date profoundly critiqued these values, and particularly the impact that an ethnocentrically white understanding of what ‘British’ entails would have on ethnic minorities in schools (Keddie, 2014; Farrell, 2016; Maylor, 2016; Miah, 2017). A key question to examine is how the strategy promotes a particular notion of Britishness to students. The third component explores the development of critical thinking skills. Studies have struggled to offer any positive correlation between an increase in education and a reduction in extremism (e.g. Krueger & Maleckova, 2003), and yet teaching critical thinking skills remains a core component of tackling the problem. Importantly, little scholarship has yet examined what is here termed ‘the weaponization of critical thinking’, within the context of deploying critical thinking to counter extremism.

As mentioned above, the thesis builds on this wide-ranging body of critical scholarship through exploring not just the contestation surrounding this strategy, but the contradiction. How can a teacher promote critical thinking alongside a fixed set of fundamental values? How can a teacher promote the value of tolerance and inclusion when scholars have clearly demonstrated that the body of knowledge surrounding extremism and radicalisation is divisive and securitises Muslim communities? The research project at the heart of this thesis examines these contradictions in the strategy, exploring how they emerge across a large set of teaching materials that have been produced to fulfil the strategy’s objectives.

### **Research Question, Method and Approach**

This thesis is built around the following research question:

*How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?*

Teachers, educational charities, police forces and local councils around the country have produced dozens of materials for schools to help them fulfil their counter-extremism objectives. The materials offer rich data to examine how the counter-extremism strategy has, in quite a literal sense, *materialised* in the classroom. These resources offer narratives regarding historical instances of terrorism, label certain groups as meriting a critical thinking approach, and delineate between those groups who are dangerous and threatening, and those who are not. Through examining these PowerPoint presentations, worksheets and lesson plans, the study was able to capture a sense of the realms of extremism and counter-extremism envisioned within.

The study adopts a deconstructionist, critical discourse theory approach, building on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (2001) in particular. Through examining text as a contributor to knowledge and discourse, the research seeks to examine the political realm that is envisioned within the texts used to teach students about extremism. The thesis explores each component in turn: the dissemination of knowledge regarding extremism, the promotion of fundamental British values, and the development of critical thinking skills. Through such an examination, how the extreme are defined, how the moderate are conceived, and how the two should relate to one another can be explored, and an image of the world conceived within counter-extremism discourses can be constructed.

In essence, the thesis compiles three concurrent discourse analyses, one examining each component of the strategy in turn. In so doing, a wider, more holistic picture of the machinations of the strategy can be developed. The thesis builds a picture of the ‘siege mentality’ that governs the counter-extremism strategy. The extremists are painted as a looming threat encircling the castle walls. Inside the castle, citizens are governed through narrow modes of permissible Britishness. Pluralism, though a value at the heart of democracy, is put on hold while the threat of the looming extremist is managed. Finally, like arrows shot from the battlements, critical thinking is weaponised into a tool of defence, defending the included inside the castle, from the excluded outside.

To achieve analytical depth in illustrating this analogous castle under siege, each discourse analysis draws on a wide range of social and political theories, reflecting on the wide range of scholarly and political issues that this study both draws from, and contributes to. When examining the construction of a universalised threat of extremism, the analysis draws from securitisation theory as well as Carol Winkler's (2006) work on ideographs to explore the engendering exceptional politics. When discussing both the discourse surrounding tolerance as a British value, as well as exploring why Islamophobia is so heavily leant on as a realm in which to critically think, the broad field of critical race theory is investigated and utilised. Scholarship critical of liberal notions of tolerance and multiculturalism (e.g. Hage, 2000; Lorde, 2010; hooks 2014) is deployed to expose uncomfortable power dynamics between those already considered to be British and the diverse Other offered narrow modes of permitted Britishness in service to that original white British subjectivity. Theories of the post-racial (e.g. Sian, 2015) and New Racism (e.g. Saeed, 2007) offer valuable contributions to explore how emphasis placed on countering Islamophobia in one arena, serves to shield and perpetuate structural Islamophobia within the counter-extremism strategy itself.

Lastly, in building its arguments, the thesis relies heavily on the work of Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe's (2005) concept of the 'post-political' is emblematic of the problematic consensus that emerges around the virtues of liberal democracy within the resources. Mouffe offers stern warnings regarding the erosion of democratic debate around the virtues of liberal democratic mechanisms and offers, through her theory of agonism (Mouffe, 2005), a way forward. The thesis explores this theory to examine this dynamic at the heart of the counter-extremism strategy: a reliance on consensus: once everyone agrees with the moderate, there will be no more extremism. Mouffe's theory reveals such an assumption to be doomed to fail. Not only can there never be a state in which everyone sits within the realm of the included moderate, but such an approach renders extremist violence more, not less, likely. Importantly, agonism, a theory predicated on transforming conventional exclusionary approaches to political differences into inclusive approaches, offers a way forward to reshape the problem of extremism.

## **Research orientation and social justice**

Mouffe's theory of agonism thus offers an opportunity to develop a constructive alternative out of a deconstructive research project. Such an opportunity sits well with the research orientation and social justice approach adopted by the thesis, and of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) in particular. As well as offering methodological frameworks, and a substantial body of literature on which to construct a thesis, CTS entails an ethical approach centered on Critical Theory's conceptualisation of 'emancipation', understood here to refer to the deployment of research in service to maximising human freedom and well-being (Jackson, 2007, p. 249). Within this broad notion of emancipation, CTS aims to deploy research as a contribution to social change and social justice. While key to this thesis, as well as to CTS more broadly, emancipation is evidently a diffuse and contested term. This thesis supplements an understanding of emancipation with an approach derived from Peace Studies to set out its ethical stance and emancipatory approach.

The work of Peace Studies, and its understandings of peace and violence, can offer a conceptual contribution to the critical and emancipatory approach of CTS. As Lindahl (2017) notes, peace can be defined as more than just the cessation of hostilities and direct violence. Galtung (1969) delineated between positive and negative peace, the latter being the cessation of direct violence, the former being the cessation of structural violence too. Structural violence, according to Galtung, refers to the harm caused not directly by an actor, but harm caused that has no agentic actor or cause. Galtung's example is that of starvation caused by poverty (*ibid.*). Engendering positive peace entails the removal of all forms of violence and bringing about what Galtung referred to as social justice - a key overlap with the emancipatory agenda of critical scholarship.

As such, the emancipatory agenda of CTS can be framed as the rendering visible of multiple forms of violence. While this approach has brought about a significant body of work within CTS that has exposed the very many ways in which counter-terrorism practices have engendered injustices and human rights abuses, Jackson (2017) has also noted that CTS has yet to engage fully in a project of replacing such violent

approaches to counter terrorism with nonviolent alternatives. This thesis seeks in part to take this criticism forward, exploring approaches to extremism that can engender a more positive peace.

Yet, more recent peace scholarship has however highlighted the dangers of imposing particular forms of peace onto a population (Cremin, 2016; Shinko, 2008). Imposing a peace can involve the violence of enforcing certain hegemonic structures and euro-centric ontologies (Gur-Ze'ev, 2001). As chapter eight examines, through the inclusion of the concept of agonistic peace (Shinko, 2008), this danger of an emancipatory approach is mitigated. Agonism seeks not to enforce a particular peace onto a population, but to value pluralism at the heart of any peaceful future. This thesis is emancipatory in that it seeks to highlight the ways in which British counter-extremism approaches may contribute to structural and direct violence, and seeks to promote ways in which a more emancipatory or human security-focused counter-extremism could occur.

### **Outline of the Thesis**

Following this introductory chapter, chapter two examines research that explores questions regarding the nature of extremism, and the importance of education in countering extremism. It explores the uncertainty and contestation in definitions of extremism, and raises questions regarding the nature of counter-extremism. If, as many definitions do, ideology is placed at the heart of extremism, then must counter-extremism itself be a counter-ideological project? How might this counter-ideology sit with other aspects to countering extremism, such as the promotion of democratic pluralism in the face of anti-democratic fundamentalism?

Chapter three examines these debates and challenges at the level of school counter-extremism strategy. It isolates three core components to the strategy: developing skills of critical thinking, promoting fundamental British values, and disseminating knowledge regarding extremism, terrorism and more legitimate forms of political participation. The chapter argues that each is contested, in that scholarship has profoundly



challenged the assumptions on which the strategy rests, and contradictory in that the counter-extremism in schools strategy appears to want to achieve contradictory objectives. Noting these contestations and contradictions, this thesis sets out to examine the political and social world constructed within teaching materials designed to fulfil schools' responsibilities regarding countering extremism. Through exploring teaching materials designed to introduce students to the problem of extremism, and to develop the skills and values required to build resilience to extremism, the conceptualisation of the realms of the 'extreme' and the 'moderate' can be examined. The thesis centres around the following investigative research question: *How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?*

Chapter four sets out the methodological and ontological approach taken within the thesis. The chapter builds a method of critical discourse analysis with which to tackle the corpus of teaching materials analysed in the thesis. The following three chapters aim to do just that. In so doing, they depict how this mode of countering extremism constructs moderate Britain as a metaphorical castle under siege, facing attack from extremism(s) threatening its walls. Such a depiction of the problem of extremism, it is argued, is not only a threat to the welfare of pluralist democracy, but produces a realm of insecurity for individuals caught in the web of being 'extreme'.

In chapter five, the nature of that extremist threat is explored. Through exploring the vast array of examples of extremism - from graffiti to genocide, from anti-abortion to anti-fracking - the chapter examines how the threat of extremism appears to come from all directions. In so doing, the threat of extremism is *universalised*; it is seen as a threat that comes from all angles. This then places the moderate in a defensive mindset. This produces a *securitisation* of the education system: a process of threat construction which engenders exceptional politics to manage such a problem (Abrahamsen, 2005). In so doing, counter-extremism constructs a securitised politics in which certain values (and democracy in particular) must be suspended for their own protection.

Chapter six explores that which is threatened and vulnerable, namely, the moderate centre. It examines the discourse around each of the ‘fundamental British values’: democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and tolerance and mutual respect. This chapter examines the modes of subjectivity that are permitted (or excluded) within the moderate centre, and the practices of power that work to shape those subjectivities in particular ways. Three such subjects emerge. Through exploring the fixed and narrow modes of permissible political participation based within incontestable bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy, here the ‘post-political subject’ emerges. Secondly, the ‘entrepreneurial subject’ is examined. Here, the discourse of individual liberty is critiqued, exploring the embeddedness of neoliberal modes of being within counter-extremism. Lastly, the ‘racialised subject’ is explored. This explores the discourses of tolerance and mutual respect, exploring how two particular subjects emerge: an originary British subject, and a diverse, racialised Other which is challenging that subject. Such a depiction of tolerance and diversity thus serves to create particularly narrow channels through which diversity can be permitted, and a problematic power dynamic in which the diverse Other is placed in service to the originary British subject.

Chapter seven examines how the skills of critical thinking have become ‘weaponised’ within counter-extremism education. While students are encouraged to develop these skills of critical thought, these skills are always deployed ‘outwards’: critically examining the problems of extremism, but never turning those critical thinking skills back onto the self or the moderate. As such, this chapter strives to emphasise the problematic consequences of such mono-directional critical thinking, and in particular, the way it masks, and perpetuates, certain discriminatory practices at the heart of counter-extremism itself.

This thesis argues that the political and social realm engendered in the counter-extremism discourses of teaching materials designed for students to learn how to counter extremism is a violent, defensive, and securitised realm. It is one that is designed with a protective, defensive mode of thinking at its core. The consequences of such defensive thinking are grave. For those within the narrow walls of the moderate

castle, governmentalities function to limit modes of political expression and being; ironically, such governmentalities serve to undermine the very values which are being defended. For those outside the walls, the violence of this exclusionary strategy engenders a space of profound insecurity.

While education has been deployed as a tool of *defence*, this thesis posits that, in fact, an educational approach to extremism could be quite different. Chapter nine contextualises this siege mentality through exploring the need for counter-extremism to achieve consensus: once everyone agrees with the moderate centre, there will be no extremism. Through exploring agonism as a theory of pluralist democracy which challenges such consensus-based logic, an alternative mode of deploying education in the context of extremism – encountering extremism – can be constructed.

As such, this thesis presents a profound critique of contemporary framings of the problem of extremism. It problematizes the reification of ideology in understanding why non-state political violence emerges, and asks searching questions of the centrality of consensus to understanding the world desired after extremism has been eradicated.

# 2

## Literature review

### The ideological emphasis of counter-extremism

*'extremism is a lot to do with having views which doesn't [sic] actually represent the majority of society'*

*'extremism to me is where you have a belief, either a political belief or a religious belief, in a cause, which consumes you to the point where all you think about is a mission to change your world or society for your beliefs even to the point of using violence'*

*'extremism for me is when somebody goes too far, because of something that they believe in'*

*'I believe extremism is an intolerant belief that affects other people, or harms them in some kind of negative way'*

(The Respect Programme, Sept. 11, 2018)

What is extremism? That is the question to which the above individuals responded, and it is one with no easy answer. It is a term that seems to mean different things to different people. After all, it is a subjective term - what might seem 'extreme' to one person might seem perfectly normal to another. *Extremism*, also, appears more than simply taking things to extremes. No government has yet developed a policy against extreme sports, or extreme ironing, though they do have policies for extreme weather and extreme poverty. Extremism, then, perhaps refers to beliefs taken to extremes. But are they always a bad thing? Is not the liberty to hold onto unusual, fundamentalist, or unpopular ideas and beliefs a fundamental human right? Alternatively, does extremism imply acting on those beliefs and harming others? But what then might distinguish extremism from *violent* extremism?

Despite these profoundly challenging questions, *countering* extremism and countering violent extremism (CVE) in particular, are emphasised around the globe as vital priorities for governments to tackle. Kundnani and Hayes (2018, p. 2) identify CVE policies ‘from Finland to the Philippines’. In 2015, the UN Secretary General introduced a ‘Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism’ (UN General Assembly, 2015), which included encouraging member states to incorporate educational strategies within national prevention policies (UNESCO, 2017). Britain sets itself apart from other states however, in developing a strategy that counters not only violent extremism, but extremism more broadly, defined in the Prevent strategy as ‘opposition to fundamental British values’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107). The definition of extremism as a set of values - beliefs rather than actions - radically transforms the nature of work to counter such an apparent threat. What happens for instance, when a state mandates the ‘normal’ from which extreme views should be measured?

It is from this departure point that the investigation of this thesis begins. This chapter starts by asking two foundational questions: how is counter-extremism defined, and why is education seen to be a legitimate venue in which counter-extremism should take place?

The chapter notes the lack of a comprehensive definition of counter-extremism within academic literature, and explores how extremism and radicalisation are defined in governmental and academic literatures, in order to define their opposites, counter-extremism and counter-radicalisation. As such, the chapter argues that counter-extremism has three intentions: the promotion of hegemonic values; a promotion of pluralism in the face of fundamentalism; and the promotion of non-violent methods of political engagement. The chapter notes the immediate antagonisms within these definitions of counter-extremism, and in particular, the tension between promoting consensus around moderate values, and promoting pluralism. Furthermore, through examining both how central the concept of ideology is to understandings of radicalisation, and the discursive linkage between ideology and violence, the chapter examines how diverse ideas are constructed

as being threatening. Moreover, the chapter notes how narratives of vulnerability to radicalisation transform young people and Muslims in particular into ‘risky subjects’.

Lastly, the chapter examines the problematic relationship between extremism and education. While education is presented as a panacea to extremism, no correlation between a lack of education and extremism exists. Moreover, through painting a picture in which education prevents extremism, young people are problematically conceptualised as both helpless victims of threatening propaganda requiring an education that will ‘safeguard’ them, and as threatening idealists ready to resort to violence to change their world.

Overall, the chapter presents a critique of the emphasis made within countering extremism on limiting the realm of permissible ideas, suggesting that such a counter-ideological understanding of counter-extremism appears to sit at odds with core tenets of education and liberalism, such as the freedom of ideas. The chapter exposes the need to critically examine the foundational contradictions and paradoxes at the heart of current conceptualisations of counter-extremism education, and how such core antagonisms translate into the teaching delivered to students. Through presenting the notion of a counter-extremist educational strategy as contested and problematic, the chapter provides the conceptual groundwork from which a critique of the UK’s current counter-extremism in schools strategy can begin.

### **Defining Extremism to Define Counter-Extremism**

The exploration begins by attempting to define counter-extremism. Aside from the tautological response that counter-extremism counters extremism, there are three core concepts that must be distinguished from one another: counter-extremism, countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE).

Differentiating CVE and PVE tends to be achieved through distinguishing between responding to immediate threats of violent extremism, and from developing societies in which violent extremism is less

likely to arise. As the UNESCO report *Youth Waging Peace* suggests, ‘The CVE measures that institutions or governments undertake respond to specific threats, violent actors or organisations, and known quantities. Conversely, PVE is concerned with changing the course of events to prevent the violent actor from emerging in the first place’ (Nash & Nesterova, 2017, p. 45). The German civic education organisation, *ufuq.de*, makes a similar distinction: ‘Prevention is “education in democracy”. It is proactively directed at “completely normal” youths and young adults in schools and youth centers, for example, to make them resilient to ideologisation and radicalisation’ (*ufuq.de*, 2016, p. 17). Nordburch (2016), writing for the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), makes the distinction also between generic prevention (here focusing on developing citizenship skills and so on) and secondary prevention (deploying schools as locations for recognising early signs of radicalisation). CVE might also be considered a more overarching term, within which PVE plays a component part. Harris-Hogan et al. (2016), for instance, deploy a model translated from a public health context, and explore how CVE can be conceived of in three contexts: primary, secondary and tertiary. Such a trifurcation delineates between those strategies that physically intervene to stop acts of violent extremism (tertiary), those that target ‘at risk’ communities (secondary), and those strategies directed towards the general population (primary). CVE here encompasses everything from preventative citizenship education (PVE) through to counter-terrorism operations.

CVE and PVE both frame the problem they wish to solve in terms of *violent* extremism. Kundnani and Hayes trace the emergence of the term ‘violent extremism’ back to 2005. This was a time when the US needed to respond to the failure of regime change as a central tactic within the Global War on Terror, and broadened its focus: ‘In doing so, the “shock and awe” that had failed in Iraq would be complemented by new programmes aimed at winning “hearts and minds”... the “battle of ideas” would be engaged alongside the battle for territory’ (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 4). Strategists therefore acknowledged that ideas and ideologies were as important in the war on terror as any other form of counter-terrorism. In so doing, certain conceptual issues were created that are yet to be ironed out. While ‘violent extremism’ acknowledges the ideological component to terrorist violence, how are scholars and policy-makers alike to distinguish

between terrorism and violent extremism? As Kundnani and Hayes lament, ‘Today, the terms “radicalisation”, “extremism” and “violent extremism” are bandied about with such frequency and abandon that they have become synonymous with terrorism itself, despite their quite different meanings, and the lack of clarity as to how these concepts relate to one another’ (2018, p. 2).

UNESCO offers one solution to this dilemma, stating that ‘the conceptual core of violent extremism is that it is an ideologically motivated resort to the use of violence’ (2017, p. 19), while defining terrorism as ‘a particular strategy adopted to achieve a political goal, which is singularly the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear’ (ibid.). The organisation attempts to cement its distinction: ‘While terrorism is a form of violent extremism, and terrorism is also often motivated ideologically, the conceptual underpinning of terrorism that distinguishes it from violent extremism is the creation of fear or terror as a means to an end’ (ibid.). As such, UNESCO suggest that terrorism is one tool in a toolkit available to violent extremists that might perhaps include non-terroristic tactics too, though it is hard to think of many forms of ‘ideologically-motivated violence’ that exclude the use or exploitation of fear. Nor does this definition escape from a problem, as explored below, that scholars remain unsure about what relationship there might be between ideology and violence, or if there is even one at all.

Definitions of violent extremism are far from stable. Harris-Hogan et al. concede: ‘many CVE approaches cannot define the specifics of what they are preventing, let alone how or whether they have prevented it’ (Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 6). The challenge becomes even more complex when, as in the British case, it is not just violent extremism, but extremism more broadly that is being countered. When you take away the violence of violent extremism, what is left? As the JCHR concluded in a recent evaluation of Britain’s counter-extremism strategy: ‘it is far from clear that there is an accepted definition of what constitutes extremism, let alone what legal powers there should be, if any, to combat it’ (JCHR, 2016, p. 4). To understand what countering extremism might entail, one first must examine the nature of extremism itself.



That one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter might be clichéd. Yet, such an adage clarifies the central contestation surrounding extremism: extremism refers to attitudes or actions that appear at a distance from one's own (UNESCO, 2017, p. 19) and, as such, the term is definitively subjective. The parallels to Sageman's remarks on terrorism are pertinent: 'of course, most people know what they mean by terrorism, but it is a little like obscenity: people believe they know it when they see it, but cannot define it' (Sageman, 2008, p. 15). Sara Khan, the UK's Lead Commissioner for Countering Extremism made a similar argument: 'People know extremism when they see it – and they want it to stop' (Khan, Sept. 12, 2018). The challenge of building a strategy as a nation-state to counter such a subjective concept is immense indeed, as it requires negotiating a hegemonic position at the centre of the compass from which the extremes will be measured.

Definitions of extremism are, however, more nuanced than this singular definition. Three understandings of extremism dominate the literature: one that focuses on non-hegemonic values, another on absolutism, and a third on violence (Ford, 2017a; forthcoming). While these three definitions or interpretations of extremism can be isolated from one another, in practice, these definitions are often deployed in conjunction with one another. For example, Schmid deploys all three definitions of extremism when trying to distinguish extremism from radicalism: 'While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first [radicalism] tends to be open-minded, while the second [extremism] manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians' (Schmid, 2013, p. iv). Interestingly, when one then attempts to build a foundational definition of counter-extremism from such understandings of extremism, a number of challenges and antagonisms emerge, as each definition seeks to achieve diverging goals.

The first definition of extremism labels the attitudes or behaviours of extremists as 'deviations from the norm' (Borum, 2011a, p. 9). Lake describes extremism in terms of a bell curve: 'extremists hold political preferences that, in any distribution of opinion, lie in one of the "tails"' (Lake, 2002, p. 18). Bartlett and Miller suggest that extremism 'expresses significant dissent from prevailing norms,' adding, interestingly, 'It is not necessarily a bad thing' (Bartlett & Miller, 2010, p. 21). Backes examines how 'the idea of the

political extreme is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation’ (Backes, 2010, p. 175). In my own research, I argue that ‘such an understanding of extremism cements hegemonic liberal attitudes at the centre of understandings of what constitute legitimate attitudes’ (Ford, 2017b, p. 128). Or, as Kundnani puts it, ‘Extremism is a term peculiarly amenable to naturalising the status quo’ (2015, p. 68). Extremism, in this first iteration, thus comprises those values beyond a boundary of hegemonic attitudes. Stray too far from the moderate centre and you become extreme. Some authors are concerned that this definition of extremism is in danger of becoming so broad as to include all alternative political visions outside of liberal democratic norms as threatening (Ford, Jul. 26, 2017; W. Jackson, 2012).

The distinction between the extreme and the moderate is developed through the deployment of the term ‘ideology’. Indeed, as William Jackson notes, the fight between liberalism and extremism has been depicted as one between liberal *values* and extremist *ideology* (W. Jackson, 2012). This is particularly the case when one examines understandings of extremism as deployed by the UK government. As the then Prime Minister David Cameron said in 2015, ‘It begins – it must begin – by understanding the threat we face and why we face it. What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an extreme doctrine’ (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015). Moreover, eight years earlier, when he was Prime Minister, Tony Blair wrote in an article entitled *A Battle for Global Values*, ‘We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we did not. We chose values... we knew that you cannot defeat a fanatical ideology just by imprisoning or killing its leaders; you have to defeat its ideas’ (Blair, 2007, p. 79). As the previous chapter examined, the 2011 review of the *Prevent* strategy set out the core definition of extremism as the antithesis of ‘fundamental British values’ (HM Government, 2011a). While extremists are governed by ideology, liberalism denotes a set of values. Radicalisation, explored in depth later, is the process of becoming drawn towards the extreme ideology, and losing faith in liberal values. As Lindekilde argues: ‘if spelled out, modern conceptions of radicalisation typically refer to core Western liberal values as the benchmark of radicalisation’ (Lindekilde, 2016, p. 249; see also Elshimi, 2015).

Turning this definition of extremism on its head, one can begin to uncover what a counter-extremism strategy might entail: the promotion of the hegemonic moderate values, and the policing of the borders between the moderate and the extreme. Such an idea of counter-extremism seems to antagonise the centrality of pluralism to ‘moderate’ values, and challenges the open-mindedness that characterises the moderate in contrast to the fundamentalist extremist.

The second definition of extremism argues that extremism relates not to the values themselves but, somewhat synonymously to a definition of fundamentalism, to the way one holds onto those values. An extremist is absolutist or fundamentalist, whereas a more moderate voice is open to new ideas (Davies, 2008). Interestingly, in adopting this understanding of extremism, Davies dismisses the first iteration of counter-extremism, the promotion of moderate values: ‘The answer to extremism is not moderation, but highly critical and informed idealism’ (Davies, 2016, p. 16). In a debate on extremism, Archbishop Desmond Tutu argued, ‘extremism is when I think you do not allow for a different point of view, and when you hold your view as being quite exclusive, when you don’t allow for the possibility of difference’ (Tutu, 2006, cited in Davies, 2008, p. 4). Robert Kennedy wrote: ‘What is objectionable, what is dangerous, about extremists is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their cause, but what they say about their opponents’ (Kennedy, 1965, pp. 68-69). Davies mirrors this argument, describing extremism as an ‘uncritical acceptance of single truths’ (Davies, 2008, p. 2). Moreover, Liht et al. contrast liberal value-pluralism with the extremist value-monism (Liht, Savage & Williams, 2013). Lastly, the head of MI5, the UK’s intelligence service argued in a speech: ‘The ideology underlying Al Qaida and other violent groups is extreme. It does not accept the legitimacy of other viewpoints. It is intolerant, and it believes in a form of government which is explicitly anti-democratic’ (Evans, Nov. 5, 2007).

Yet, whether such ‘moderates’ are in fact open-minded is questionable. For example, Aly and Green note that ‘moderate Islam’ entails ‘a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of

the nation state' (Aly & Green, 2008, p. 1), suggesting a more closed and uncritical mind than an open one. Furthermore, it is evident that this moderate pluralism does not extend to a toleration of the extremes. How should this definition of extremism sit with the one above which is characterised through a policing of the borders of that which is permissible?

Lastly, the third definition views extremism as concerning political violence. As Kundnani and Hayes (2018) make clear, extremism is often deployed as a synonym of terrorism. Oftentimes, in the contemporary context of the threat posed by organisations such as so-called Islamic state, the 'battle' against extremism is illustrated as one between moderates and extremists. This is certainly the case in the context of so-called 'Islamic extremism' being depicted as between moderate Islam and extremist Islam. As Rabasa describes, this binary presents 'a spectrum that has, at one end, moderates who advocate democracy and tolerance and reject violence as a means to attain political goals and, at the other end, radicals who oppose democratic and pluralistic values and embrace violence' (Rabasa, 2005, p. 2).

These theories of extremism that equate extremism with violence do so because of a belief in the inherently violent and threatening nature of the ideas behind an extremist movement. David Cameron argued in a speech during his time as Prime Minister, when addressing the grievances of extremists:

Now let me be clear, I am not saying these issues [grievances] aren't important. But let's not delude ourselves. We could deal with all these issues – and some people in our country and elsewhere would still be drawn to Islamist extremism. No – we must be clear. The root cause of the threat we face is the extremist ideology itself. (Cameron, Jul. 20. 2015)

Cameron here indicates that even if all grievances were addressed, the ideology of Islamist extremism would remain a threat. The ideology itself threatens.

Such an argument - that extremists are inherently violent and threatening - ignores a large volume of work on political violence. Selma Gregg, for instance, delineates three groups of theories behind what she terms religious violence: social movement theory, fundamentalism and apocalyptic war (Selma Gregg, 2016). Social movement theorists focus on inter-group dynamics as a catalyst of violence, not ideology. Della Porta, for example, explores the impact of group dynamics on violence amongst left wing militant organisations in Europe in the 1960s (Della Porta, 1992). Sageman's network-oriented approach also emphasises interpersonal relationships in exploring how violence becomes more legitimised within extremist groups (Sageman, 2004; 2008). Fundamentalists, Selma Gregg argues, perceive their faith or way of life to be at risk, and deploy violence instrumentally (Selma Gregg, 2016). Research by Neumayer and Plumper (2011) and by McCormick (2003) contributes to this idea, examining rational and strategic explanations behind the use of non-state violence respectively, both of which conceptualise violence as a means not as an end. It is only the third category of apocalyptic warriors who attempt to express violence as an end in itself (Selma Gregg, 2016). As such, arguing that extremists pose an inherently violent threat appears narrow-minded in ignoring other explanations.

The inherent violence of extremism is furthermore embedded through the conceptual distinction between violent and non-violent extremism, the former concerning ideologically-motivated violent behaviour, and the latter, a set of ideas which do not in themselves threaten violence. There is substantial debate regarding whether non-violent extremism is benign or threatening. Some scholars argue that non-violent extremism is not always problematic (Bartlett & Miller, 2012), while others, including Lowe (2017), and indeed the current UK government (HM Government, 2011a), suggest that non-violent extremism is very problematic indeed due to the role non-violent extremism plays in inciting violence in others.

The argument that non-violent extremism is threatening relies on a conviction in the role non-violent extremists play in inciting others to engage in violence. This understanding of 'non-violent extremism' was particularly emphasised in the 2011 review of the Prevent strategy, in which the policy to work with non-

violent extremist organisations was overturned (HM Government, 2011a). Earlier iterations of the *Prevent* strategy saw non-violent extremist groups in terms which Schmid characterises as a ‘firewall’ (Schmid, 2014, p. 2) against extremism – that by supporting groups that might disagree with hegemonic attitudes or ideologies but who do so through non-violent means would disincentivise those who might be considering joining violent organisations.

The decision to refuse to work with non-violent extremist organisations was heavily influenced by the report, *Choosing our friends wisely*, written by the centre-right think tank Policy Exchange, which challenged the ‘firewall’ argument, arguing that non-violent extremists play a key role in radicalising others towards violence (Maher & Frampton, 2009). The 2011 Prevent strategy notes ‘the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused by apparently non-violent organisations very often operating within the law’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 50). The notion of a non-violent ideological support network on which violent extremists rely builds on scholarship within the extremism and radicalisation literature. Malthaner and Waldmann describe this support network as a ‘radical milieu’ (2014, p. 979; see also Kundnani, 2012). Della Porta strengthens this idea of a support network, noting how ‘future terrorists can be described as small minorities within larger political subcultures or countercultures’ (Della Porta, 1992, p. 12). Such an assertion presents a crucial conceptual shift. Non-violent extremism therefore does not refer to groups who hold onto extreme views but who reject violence. Instead, it refers to groups who do not actively engage in violence themselves.

Yet, when it comes to countering non-violent extremism, such a definition provokes further questions and uncertainty. For one, it seems to suggest that any ‘extreme’ idea (and here one could refer back to the UK Government’s definition of any idea that challenges ‘fundamental British values’), threatens violence, because someone at some point could deploy violence to further that idea. Suggesting that diverse values might therefore threaten potential violence seems to promote a crackdown on the diversity of ideas in the name of security. Such tensions between countering extremism and democracy are noted more widely

within the literature. Neumann notes the logic that ‘democracy is fragile, and that it needs to be defended long before its enemies break laws or resort to violence’ (Neumann, 2013, p. 887). There is a clear antagonism here, acknowledged by the Prevent strategy, between the democratic values and freedoms celebrated by the UK, and its desire to tackle radicalisation at as early a stage as possible: ‘We remain absolutely committed to protecting freedom of speech in this country. But preventing terrorism will mean challenging extremist (and non-violent) ideas that are also part of a terrorist ideology’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 23).


Acknowledging this confusion, Lowe has suggested making a distinction between ‘non-violent extremism and not-violent activism’ (2017, p. 923). Here, Lowe attempts to divorce the baggage of the term extremism from the alternative political ideals of activists. In so doing, Lowe reasserts his conviction in the threat of non-violent extremism: ‘justifying violence of extremist groups by glorifying their actions, promotes hatred and division, encourages isolation, offers alternative systems of law and rejects the democratic system’ (Lowe, 2017, p. 923). This distinction appears to suggest therefore that while activism that might wish to make more incremental change is permissible, more radical change should be seen as a threat.

Non-violent extremism, a set of ideas that could always possibly be taken up by violent actors, thus presents a perpetual future risk of violence. One wonders of course whether violent actors could not also take up non-extreme ideas, values or ideologies. Should *any* idea that could conceivably be promoted through political violence (neoliberal regime change, for instance) be considered a violent, or extreme, threat? It is important to note that the legitimacy of violence is itself not an extreme idea. Nation states have militaries, and engage in acts of violence - often to counter the violence of extremists. This very fact presents one challenge to understanding what counter-extremism should entail. If extremists are violent, then countering extremism would entail promoting nonviolence. Yet, nonviolence itself is not in fact a moderate value. As I have argued elsewhere, nonviolence, and in particular pacifism, are in fact extreme ideas themselves, due to their rejection of the legitimacy of state violence (Ford, forthcoming).

This definition of non-violent extremism as providing the supporting foundations for violent extremism has faced criticism from scholars too. Schmid (2014) notes the confusion, suggesting that if extremism is inherently violent, then non-violent extremism is a contradiction in terms (see also Richards, 2015). Furthermore, if extremism equates to the holding of violent-legitimising attitudes, counter-extremism must go right to the core of the ideology. Richards (2015) challenges this, arguing that getting an extremist to no longer see the legitimacy in employing violence is a far easier task than getting an extremist to no longer hold onto their particular ideology or set of values. Furthermore, the distinction between non-violent extremism and violent extremism, when applied to real world examples, is rarely clear or distinct. Baran's description of Hizb ut-Tahrir, described by Baran as 'Sunni Islamism's ideological vanguard' (2005, p. 68), is a case in point. Baran argues Hizb ut-Tahrir 'occupies a grey zone of militancy, with its activities involving more than mere expression of opinion but less than terrorism, regulating its activities poses a unique challenge to liberal democracies' (2005, p. 70).

Thus far, this section of the chapter has delineated three core groups of definitions within the literature on extremism: one that emphasises non-hegemonic values, a second that emphasises absolutism, and a third that emphasises violence. While these understandings of extremism are widely disseminated across society, they provide a profound challenge for conceptualising counter-extremism. I would argue that in fact, countering the three separate components of extremism would entail a contradictory and antagonistic process, as each element of countering extremism hopes to achieve different things (see figure 2.1).





*Figure 2.1: Competing counter-extremism objectives (source: author)*

The first definition (promoting hegemonic values) builds discursive fences at the boundaries of legitimate opinion, which appears to endanger the open-mindedness of liberalism, as extreme ideas themselves cannot be tolerated. This open-mindedness is also questioned, particularly if one wanted to bring into question the hegemony of liberal democratic norms. Moreover, the emphasis of violence within extremism would suggest counter-extremism should promote nonviolence, yet the legitimacy of violence is something that appears to be shared by moderates and extremists alike. Counter-extremism appears torn between fundamentally contrasting objectives.

The following section examining scholarship on the specific issue of radicalisation explores how theories of radicalisation compound this uncertain link between extremist thought and violence. As will be explored below, the emphasis in radicalisation literature on the 'process' of radicalisation intensifies this securitisation

of diverse belief, as extremist attitudes appear to signify a distinct threat of future violence. Moreover, the impact that narratives of radicalisation have on Muslim communities in particular raises questions of how counter-radicalisation education might impact different communities in different ways.

### **Stages of Radicalisation**

In the aftermath of the attacks in the US in September 2001, explanations for why terrorists commit their atrocities were relatively few and far between. Some theorists even worried that seeking explanations for terrorism was synonymous with seeking justifications for the attacks (Neumann, 2008; see also HM Government, 2006, p. 10). Dutch Intelligence agents were the first to develop a theory of radicalisation as early as 2002 (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 5). In a UK context, the term ‘radicalisation’ emerged in particular after the 2005 bombings in London, offering theorists an opportunity to explore the explanation of terrorist attacks in a language devoid of any risk of justification (Sedgwick, 2010). Radicalisation theorists conceptualise radicalisation as the process by which someone becomes more extreme (e.g. Sieckelinck, Sikkens, van San, Kotnis & de Winter, 2017; Borum, 2011a). However, beyond such a simple position of consensus on the idea of *process*, there is little agreement as to what radicalisation entails. Schmid lists thirteen definitions of radicalisation, each different from the next (Schmid, 2013); Baker-Beall et al. argue radicalisation ‘can be identified as an “essentially contested concept” in the sense that the term generates such debate about its actual meaning that no objective or neutral definition is possible’ (Baker-Beall, Heath-Kelly & Jarvis, 2015, p. 6). Hoskins and O’Loughlin even go so far as to dismiss radicalisation as a ‘myth’ (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2009).

In brief, scholars have typically drawn the process of radicalisation into various shapes or models: Moghaddam (2005) speaks of a staircase; Leuprecht et al. (2010), and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) write about pyramids; Baran (2005) employs the metaphor of a conveyor belt; and Borum (2011a) talks of ‘action pathways’. Such models have certain homogeneous features – in particular, there is linearity to the

process, and there is a reduction in population size as one goes 'along' the process (this is particularly clear when the model is illustrated as a pyramid, with the 'terrorist' population at its apex).<sup>1</sup>

The location of violence in the radicalisation process is contested, contributing to the wider debate about the role of violence in conceptualisations of extremism. For example, Sedgwick claims, ““Radicalisation” is at present the standard term used to describe “what goes on before the bomb goes off”” (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 479). Sedgwick, therefore, infers that violence – in this case, a bomb explosion – is a necessary component of radicalisation (see also Della Porta & LaFree, 2012). Yet, Borum contrarily defines radicalisation as ‘the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs’ (Borum, 2011a, p. 9). Cragin acknowledges this complexity thus:

Most experts understand radicalisation as a process through which individuals become persuaded that violent activity is justified and eventually determine to engage in violence themselves. Radicalisation, in this sense, encompasses both mindset and action. (2014, p. 338)

To address this question of ideology or action, some scholars argue there are different stages or types of radicalisation. Neumann (2013) offers perhaps the clearest description of these stages of radicalisation, dividing radicalisation into two processes: cognitive radicalisation – the adoption of extremist beliefs; and behavioural radicalisation – the adoption of violent extremist behaviour, to bring such beliefs into reality. Moreover, Neumann argues that cognitive radicalisation is a necessary component of behavioural radicalisation. Borum (2011a) dismisses this claim arguing that many terrorists are not as ideologically (and here Borum infers theologically) literate as theories of cognitive radicalisation would imply. Moreover, Sageman's social network approach to radicalisation leads him to argue that ‘social bonds came before any

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<sup>1</sup> Theories of radicalisation are certainly numerous. Christmann’s (2012) report for the Youth Justice Board cited the above studies along with six further studies: four that discuss radicalisation processes (Sageman, 2007; Silber & Bhatt, 2007; Taarnby, 2005; Wiktorowicz, 2004), one that discusses a pyramid (Audit Commission, 2008), and one that characterises radicalisation as a multi-dimensional process (Gill, 2007).

ideological commitment' (Sageman, 2008, p. 70), rather than the other way around. Despite this opposition however, the majority of the academic and practitioner community adopt Neumann's perspective (e.g. Bartlett & Miller, 2010), drawing a two-stage process: an ideological or belief radicalisation occurring as a prior and necessary component of a secondary radicalisation to violent extremism. As the 2006 UK Countering International Terrorism strategy notes: 'It is important to see this as a two stage process. An alienated individual who has become highly radicalised is not necessarily a terrorist. Only a tiny minority of radicalised individuals actually cross over to become terrorists' (HM Government, 2006, p. 10).

A question remains however as to what 'cognitive radicalisation' might entail. Cragin, cited above, describes it as being 'persuaded that violent activity is justified' (2014, p. 338). Yet, a key tension is evident here, namely, that in common speak, one would not describe a belief in the legitimacy of state military violence (the just war theory, for example) as evidence of radicalisation. Radicalisation therefore appears to be a theory isolated to the realm of non-state violence. Could radicalisation be better characterised as a shifting away from a 'moderate' understanding of the legitimacy of state violence and the illegitimacy of all other violence? However, here a tension emerges in that counter-radicalisation, rather than being a process of promoting nonviolence, instead appears to be little more than a claim for hegemony on whose violence is permissible. Yet, to add further confusion, in the 2018 review of Britain's counter-terrorism strategy, extremist behaviour is characterised as more than just acts of violence, but 'the wider social harms beyond terrorism caused by extremism. This includes tackling the promotion of hatred, the erosion of women's rights, the spread of intolerance, and the isolation of communities' (HM Government, 2018, p. 23). It is unclear as to whether one must be 'radicalised' in order to promote such 'extreme' behaviours, as radicalisation literatures appear far more focussed on terrorism and violence, than these broader forms of extremism (Christmann, 2012).

What is more certain is that the result of this delineation of two radicalisation processes, and the perception of a requisite *a priori* ideological component in committing acts of violence, is a reification of the centrality

of ideology in the context of radicalisation. The head of MI5, the UK's intelligence service, Jonathan Evans argued: 'The violence directed against us is the product of a much wider extremist ideology, whose basic tenets are inimical to the tolerance and liberty which form the basis of our democracy' (Evans, Nov. 5, 2007). Ideology, and its sister construct, narrative, are core components of understanding the threat of radicalisation. This extremist narrative is depicted as manipulative, persuasive and attractive. Bartlett and Miller describe the 'vitriolic and engaging narrative based on the notion of Muslims under attack all around the world from evil, scheming Western interests' (Bartlett & Miller, 2012, p. 13). Schmid isolates three core elements of extremist narrative: a 'basic grievance', 'vision of the good society,' and a 'path from the grievance to the realisation of the vision' (Schmid, 2014, p. 6). Moreover, the ideological emphasis provides a key tie between education and extremism. Schmid, for instance, notes how the narrative is learned by extremists: 'The narrative incorporates pre-existing elements of 20<sup>th</sup> century anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism, which have been nurtured by official educational materials prepared by some Arab governments, Soviet Cold War propaganda, anti-Western sermons by Muslim clerics...' (Schmid, 2014, p. 7). This ideological focus has a profound impact on the construction of an educational counter-extremism strategy, as Davies argues: 'If one learns to be a terrorist, one can unlearn it' (Davies, 2008, p. 54).

This reliance on the importance of ideology in violent extremism and radicalisation persists however, despite the lack of evidence to support the theory. The following quotation from Sageman's work is fascinating here, indicating both the reliance on ideological explanations and their lack of support: 'There is no doubt that ideology, including global neo-jihadi ideology, is an important part of any explanation in the turn to political violence, but we still don't understand how' (Sageman, 2014, p. 567). A number of scholars lament the endemic lack of empirical data to support theories behind radicalisation, including on the issue of ideology (Della Porta, 1992; Borum, 2011a, 2011b; Bouhana & Wikstrom, 2011; Schmid, 2013). In particular, Briggs challenges the emphasis on so-called non-violent extremism, resulting from the linkage between ideology and violence: 'There is no empirical evidence of a causal link between extremism and violent extremism' (Briggs, 2010 p. 975). Schmid admits, 'the popularity of the concept of

“radicalisation” stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 1).

Scholars have raised substantial concern as to what a counter-radicalisation process, born from such a conceptualisation of radicalisation, might look like. Describing radicalisation processes in such linear ways ensures that counter-radicalisation work engages ‘upstream’ in order to prevent radicalisation at the earliest stages possible (Briggs, 2010). This emphasis on reducing non-violent extremism as a tool to reduce the likelihood of later terrorist acts has been criticised for securitising and criminalising thoughts and ideas of those yet to break the law. Sedgwick likens attempting to counter extremism through promoting a more moderate ideology to countering anarchist terrorism at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century by attacking socialism – an ideology shared by those who went on to found the UK Labour Party (Sedgwick, 2012). Richards adds his concerns: ‘The concern is that counterterrorism, rather than focussing on the threat from terrorism, has itself become increasingly ideological – that it has gone beyond the remit of countering terrorism and has ventured into the broader realm of tackling ideological threats to the state’ (Richards, 2015, p. 380). Stanley and Guru question this apparent level of ‘social conditioning’ (2015, p. 361). Edwards describes the Prevent strategy as ‘the progressive delegitimation of broad swathes of opinion and a decrease in the political pluralism of British society’ (Edwards, 2016, p. 305). Moreover, some authors voice concern that repressive measures against groups not breaking the law could isolate communities, and provoke further radicalisation as a result (Coppock & McGovern, 2014; Malthaner & Waldmann, 2014; Stevens, 2009). Such criticisms of radicalisation models compound a concern raised regarding definitions of extremism - that countering extremism and radicalisation appears ideological in its approach, and could endanger political pluralism. The dangers of this mode of countering radicalisation are further intensified when examining the individualised approach that an ideologically focused understanding of radicalisation engenders.

## **Individualised indicators**

Sageman argues that there are three broad approaches to studying terrorism and its perpetrators – a 'biographical' focus at the micro level, searching for causes at the individual level, a more macro focus, examining root social and political causes, or (the focus Sageman advocates) 'a middle way, concentrating on how people in groups influence each other to become terrorists' (Sageman, 2008, p. 13; see also Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Ideologically-focused radicalisation thinking, dominant in a UK context, tends to assume that an ideology sits at the root of extremism and terrorism, and thus focuses on the micro level, examining causes and indicators of individual *vulnerability* to the radicalising ideology. As such, the strategy plays down the role of social and political factors (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, p. 12).

The Prevent strategy isolates three factors in radicalisation: an ideology, people to drive that ideology, and vulnerabilities or social factors that render someone able to take on that ideology (HM Government, 2011a). That young people are *vulnerable* to the manipulation and persuasion of extremist ideology is a common narrative of counter-extremism policy and scholarship. The Prevent strategy describes vulnerability as 'the condition of being capable of being injured; difficult to defend; open to moral or ideological attack. Within Prevent, the word describes factors and characteristics associated with being susceptible to radicalisation' (HM Government, 2011a, p. 108). Being young is a key factor or characteristic of this vulnerability. Sageman describes this as 'The "ignorance" theory of terrorism (a variance of the "weak mind" theory) [which] is based on the idea that young people join because they do not know any better' (Sageman, 2008, p. 58). Education, an obvious remedy to ignorance, would thus appear to be a vital counter-extremism tool. Moreover, educational institutions are vital spaces in which to identify signs that a young person may be undergoing a radicalisation process (Nordbruch, 2016). The emphasis on micro-level factors is most clear within the key document in building the UK's counter-extremism education strategy, *Learning to be Safe*, which outlines that:

The decision by a young person to become involved in violent extremism:

- May begin with a search for answers to questions about identity, faith and belonging
- May be driven by the desire for “adventure” and excitement
- May be driven by a desire to enhance the self esteem of the individual and promote their “street cred”
- Is likely to involve identification with a charismatic individual and attraction to a group which can offer identity, social network and support
- Is likely to be fuelled by a sense of grievance that can be triggered by personal experiences of racism or discrimination (DCSF, 2008, pp. 17-18).

Interestingly, despite offering this large range of factors, the report later concedes: ‘there is no obvious profile of a person likely to become involved in extremism’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 19). This denial of a ‘terrorist profile’ and concurrent construction of such a profile is mirrored in both academic and policy literature. Borum, for instance, argues, ‘one size does not fit all’ (Borum, 2011a, p. 8), and later examines the multifarious factors that *might* indicate or model a process of radicalisation. Such a narrative is mirrored in school policy documents on extremism and radicalisation. For example, Wildern School, a secondary school in Hampshire in the south of England, have in their ‘Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation’ policy a list of ‘indicators of vulnerability to radicalisation or extremism’ which include ‘identity crisis... personal crisis... personal circumstances... unmet aspirations... experiences of criminality... special educational need’ before then clarifying: ‘However, this list is not exhaustive, nor does it mean that all young people experiencing the above are at risk of radicalisation for the purposes of violent extremism’ (P6, p. 2). The policy infers that at times such factors would indicate radicalisation, and at other times, it would not. This was mirrored in government policy above, cloaked in language of *may* or *might*.

It remains unclear whether these ‘indicators’ are of any practical use at all. A foundational source for the various indicators mentioned is a classified study completed for the National Offenders Management Service, a study heavily criticised in a report by the human rights organisation, CAGE (Qureshi, 2016). The



study listed the ‘Extremist Risk Guidance 22+’, which includes a list of 22 indicators of vulnerability to radicalisation. Despite being a widely cited and influential piece of research, the lack of scientific credibility is deeply concerning: there was no peer review process, no replication studies have been completed, and the factor of ‘political grievance’ was ignored by the researchers (Qureshi, 2016).

Despite this empirical uncertainty, indicator factors remain a key component of counter-radicalisation strategies. Scholars critical of this approach tend to focus on how such an indicator-based approach draws certain identity factors into the realm of ‘signs of radicalisation’. In the current political climate, many argue simply being Muslim makes you suspicious. That radicalisation and extremism policies impact negatively on Muslim communities is a dominant theme amongst critics of radicalisation (Ali, 2015; Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011; Jarvis & Lister, 2013; Lynch, 2013; McDonald, 2015; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2009). In particular, many scholars argue that such language transforms Muslim communities into ‘suspect communities’ (Breen-Smyth, 2014; Nickels, Thomas, Hickmann & Sylvestri, 2012; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Ragazzi, 2016). This is perhaps most clearly indicated in what appears to be a verbal slippage in Leuprecht et al.'s description of their four-tiered pyramid model of radicalisation, in which they describe the bottom 'neutral' layer of ‘Muslims who *currently* do not accept any of the Global Jihad narrative’ (Leuprecht et al., 2010, p. 43, emphasis added), inferring that the adoption of the narrative is forever a future possibility. In particular, the emphasis on ideology in searching out ‘root causes’, in Heath-Kelly’s words, ‘produces the British Muslim population as both “risky” and “at risk”’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 405; see also Martin, 2018). The combination of a risky Muslim subject, with narratives of vulnerability, leads, as Coppock and McGovern argue, to ‘the construction of the “vulnerable young Muslim other” as “would-be terrorist”’ (2014, p. 243). These problems are compounded by schools being at times already racist environments. As Miah argues: ‘stories about “us and them” drawn principally from the War on Terror have created a hostile cultural environment within the confines of the school... the pupils provided countless examples of anti-Muslim racism by teachers and fellow pupils’ (Miah, 2013, p. 156). Such subject constructions appear to endanger core notions of both democracy and liberal education.

Thus far, this chapter has established a definition of counter-extremism that emphasises a need to promote a set of values to counter the danger of a fundamentalist ideology that threatens violence. Moreover it has explored how theories of radicalisation, despite a profound lack of empirical evidence, compound this reification of the threat of ideology. As such, the chapter has begun to infer how education can offer a vital venue for counter-extremism – through promoting values and skills to counter the ideological threat of extremism. The chapter now moves on to explore facets of the extremism and radicalisation discourses that compound this educational emphasis. Through exploring the relationship between education and extremism, as well as the emphasis placed on both education and young people in the radicalisation discourse’s emphasis on catalytic factors of radicalisation and vulnerabilities to radicalisation, the chapter begins to build a picture of what a counter-extremist educational strategy might entail.

### **Education and Extremism: Why Counter Extremism in Schools?**

That education should be the solution to extremism is something of a truism within the extremism discourse. For instance, only three months after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001, a group of Nobel Peace Prize winners gathered to discuss the problem of terrorism and its solutions; education was often top of their list. The Dalai Lama suggested this solution to violent extremism: ‘If the mind is more open, that will automatically bring less fear. Education can narrow the gap between appearances and reality’ (Jai, 2001, Dec. 10). Elie Wiesel, winner of the 1986 prize, added: ‘What is it that seduces some young people to terrorism? It simplifies things. The fanatic has no questions, only answers. Education is the way to eliminate terrorism’ (ibid.). As cited in chapter one, Ed Balls wrote in the introduction of the key UK counter-extremism in schools document, *Learning to be Safe*, ‘Extremists of all persuasions try to paint the world as black and white, accentuating division and difference, and exploiting fears based on ignorance or prejudice. Education can be a powerful weapon against this’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3).

This section examines why it is that education is so often relied upon when it comes to finding solutions to the problem of extremism. It uncovers an unstable relationship between education and extremism: despite it often being relied upon to counter-extremism, no correlation between an increase in education and a decrease in extremism exists. The links made between extremism and education do however paint young people in a particularly negative light, suggesting that they lack agency and are vulnerable to extremism. Such a depiction has the ironic consequence of rendering education less effective in fighting extremism, as teachers are less comfortable exposing young people to seemingly dangerous ideas.

### ***Assumptions about the Education of Extremists***

It is presumed that terrorists are poor, that they are brainwashed by either their cultures or their schools, that they are naïve young people who do not know any better, that they lack responsibilities such as a job or family, which leaves them open to join terrorist organisations, or that they are so sexually frustrated that they turn to terrorism to seek their reward of seventy-two virgins in paradise. Or they are just criminals, or simply crazy. (Sageman, 2008, pp. 47-48)

Commonplace narratives surrounding extremists suggest that they are unlikely to be well educated. That an extremist could, in fact, be educated appears to be impossible (Ford, 2017b). This assumption comes in multiple forms: that an educated extremist is *de facto* an oxymoron, that an extremist has received an evil, extremist education, or that extremists studied academic subjects that cognitively prepared them to take on extremist narratives.

The argument that education can solve the issue of global terrorism relies heavily on expectations that extremists are lacking in education. For example, only days after the US attacks in September 2001, Jessica Stern wrote in *The Washington Post*, ‘We have a stake in the welfare of other peoples and need to devote a much higher priority to health, education and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise’ (Stern, 2001, Sept. 15). Stern here appears to have forgotten that Osama Bin Laden came from an

enormously rich and well-educated Saudi background. Similarly, Leiken writes ‘in the September 11 attacks, the educated tend to form the leadership cadre, with the plebians providing the muscle’ (Leiken, 2005, p. 127). Leiken here ignores the fact that many of the hijackers in fact had PhDs (Gambetta & Hertog, 2009). Alternatively, a depiction of the terrorist might suggest, rather than lacking in education, extremists might in fact have been indoctrinated by a conservative religious education. Donald Rumsfeld, as US Defence Secretary in 2003, asked: ‘Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’ (Rumsfeld cited in 9/11 Commission, 2011, pp. 374-5). Yet, such a fear of Islamic schooling has been shown to be unfounded. Bergen and Pandey’s (2006) study explored the flaws behind the emphasis placed on *madrassas*, places of Islamic learning, after the US attacks in September 2001, examining how few known terrorists have ever visited a *madrassa*. However, Bergen and Pandey did note two factors relating to extremism and education: that young Muslims might feel alienated in Western education systems, and that terrorists tend to have studied technical subjects.

Interestingly, one key study has examined the fact that many known terrorists have studied engineering. Gambetta and Herzog (2009) found that 44% of their sample of 178 known terrorists had studied engineering. They attribute this link between studying engineering and joining an extremist organisation to two reasons, one being the economic precariousness of being an engineer in many countries within the Middle East which might leave someone with strong grievances, the second being the synergy between the ‘mindset’ that might attract someone to becoming an engineer, the ‘mindset’ developed during one’s engineering studies, and an extremist ‘mindset’:

We can conjecture that engineering as a degree might be relatively more attractive to individuals seeking cognitive ‘closure’ and clear-cut answers as opposed to more open-ended sciences... Engineering is a subject in which individuals with a dislike for ambiguity might feel comfortable. (Gambetta & Herzog, 2009, p. 221)

Interestingly, the field of psychology has turned to the question of the cognitive differences between conservatives and liberals (though not including extremists): ‘conservatives have been found to be more structured and persistent in their judgements and approaches to decision-making... liberals, by contrast, report higher tolerance of ambiguity and complexity’ (Amodio, Jost, Master & Yee, 2007, p. 1246). That extremism may require or feed from an alternative form of cognition to liberalism does suggest that education that attempts to open up minds to complexity might advantage those attempting to counter extremism, as long as the depiction of extremism as closed-minded holds true.

Yet, the argument rests on an unsubstantiated claim: that terrorists are closed-minded. The argument is reliant on the second of the three iterations of extremism examined earlier: the fundamentalism of extremism. However, such an argument falls if one accepts, as research has shown, that violence is used at times instrumentally or strategically by terrorists, rather than for its own sake (McCormick, 2003; Neumayer & Plumper, 2011). The argument falls because the strategic use of violence indicates a cognitive process of evaluating various choices, and estimating the relative impact of a number of options. The notion of a closed-minded extremist relies on the idea of a ‘critically thinking extremist’ to be an impossibility. Yet, that perhaps might not be the case. Links between extremism and a lack of education are far more discursive than they are empirically supported. Where empirical research has taken place, it has predominantly disproved the link between education and extremism.

Krueger and Maleckova (2003) investigated the links between education, terrorism and poverty, and concluded: ‘any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is, at best, indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak’. Sageman studied a sample of 172 known terrorists, finding 62% had attended university (2008). Schmid notes that ‘many rebellious young Muslims – not just drifters, misfits and losers but also men and women with an advanced education and a middle class background – appear to be susceptible to al Qaeda's diagnosis of the source of problems in the Muslim world’ (2014, p. 8). Berribi’s

study of Palestinian terrorists drew similar conclusions: ‘If anything, the findings suggests that those with higher educational attainment and higher living standards are *more* likely to participate in terrorist activity’ (Berrebi, 2007, p. 4). Berrebi offers a number of reasons for this correlation, including that education might increase awareness both of global injustices and the ideologies of extremist organisations such that their enthusiasm to join such groups would increase.

Bueno de Mesquita offers a nuanced model to understand two seemingly contradictory narratives within the terrorism literature – that support for terror organisations is greatest amongst the least well-off and least educated, but terrorists themselves tend to be well-educated and middle-class. The author suggests that these narratives are a product of a recruitment and selection process: the ‘supply’ of enthusiastic recruits is greater than the ‘demand’ for recruits and as such, only the better qualified ever become terrorists: ‘This is because higher ability, better educated people are more likely to succeed at the demanding tasks required of a terrorist operative’ (De Mesquita, 2005, p. 515). Barro contributes here too: ‘one likely explanation is that the poorest, least-education persons make relatively ineffective terrorists’ (Jun. 10, 2002, p. 26). What de Mesquita’s research does not attempt to prove however, is whether an overall increase in education levels would therefore lead to an overall reduction in the recruitment pool available for terrorist organisations, an argument often made in global politics. Moreover, Berrebi, Barro and de Mesquita’s work concerns a particular idea of a terrorist organisation that fits an insurgency context (Berrebi’s work, for instance, is located in a Palestinian context) but which appears not to address the nature of homegrown terrorism – the independent ‘self-radicalising’ extremist. Here, the explanation of recruitment appears less valid, as ‘homegrown terrorists’ are seen to recruit themselves, are devolved from fixed network structures, and are much more independent.

However, that is not to say that the education of such ‘homegrown terrorists’ is of any less interest to authorities. Indeed, much effort has been made by the UK government to crack down on the radicalising role of the Internet, including asking schools to monitor students’ internet use (BBC News, 2015, Dec. 22).

The educational or brainwashing role that YouTube videos and such like can have on young people has been examined in academic scholarship (Conway & McInerney, 2008). Moreover, while fears of young people being radicalised in foreign *madrassas* are less prominent than in the immediate aftermath of the US attacks in 2001, the UK government has put in place efforts to regulate the religious teachings of religious institutions (to the dismay of many Sunday school leaders) (Bingham, Dec. 11, 2015), alongside the regulations that ensure that UK schools do not undermine ‘fundamental British values’ (Department for Education, 2014). Such measures indicate that the narrative around brainwashing and indoctrination remains dominant in policy circles.

Literature surrounding education and extremism paints a particular picture of extremists and their education that suggests that extremists have received either not enough, or the wrong kind, of education, and that therefore the right kind of education can offer a solution. These assertions however, do not hold up to scrutiny. Empirical research demonstrates that the relationship between extremists and their education is complex. Yet, this complexity does not appear to translate into a policy context, which continues to place more and more regulatory pressure on schools to engage in counter-extremist education. Theories of radicalisation compound this pressure on educational institutions, through the theories’ emphasis on catalytic factors that might initiate or accelerate processes of radicalisation, and an emphasis on ‘vulnerabilities’ that position young people, and Muslims in particular, as at risk of becoming radicalised.

### ***Assumptions about young people and radicalisation***

The ignorance theory of extremism examined above relies on a series of assumptions concerning young people’s vulnerability to being ‘captured’ by ideology that must be critically explored. This vulnerability appears to rely on three aspects: an understanding of children as *tabula rasa* with no agency, assumptions regarding young people, identity and security, and lastly, assumptions concerning the nature of young people’s idealism. Yet, the three conceptions paint contradictory images of the nature of youth, with both agency and passivity being emphasised. This constructs a ‘model’ risky youth that is both, as Sieckelinck

et al. note, 'victim' *and* 'villain' (Sieckelinck, Kaulingfreks & de Winter, 2015). This section of the chapter notes concern at the lack of clarity over the nature of the problem with which counter-extremist education is designed to address.

Radicalisation is a phenomenon most prevalent amongst young people. Demographic studies of terrorist or extremist groups or individuals are relatively rare, though trends do emerge. First, extremists can be of any age: Conway and McInerney's (2008) study examined those who upload 'Jihadist' videos to YouTube and noted an age range of eighteen to seventy-two; Benmelech and Berribi's (2007) study into suicide bombers noted an age range of between twelve and forty-eight. Yet, within these two studies, the average age was 27.9 and 21.1 respectively. Ghosh et al. support this finding: 'those most susceptible to adopting extremist religious ideologies continue to be young people between the ages of 15 and 25' (Ghosh, Chan, Manuel & Dilimulati, 2016, p. 3; see also Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009). That young people form the backbone of extremist networks provides ready evidence to focus countering radicalisation at young people. Della Porta, in attempting to uncover a profile of terrorists suggests, 'Youth is perhaps the only characteristic "terrorists" share' (1992, p. 10). Roy (2008) goes as far as to describe Al Qaeda as a 'youth movement'. Furthermore, such an assessment is supported in the 2011 review of the Prevent Strategy: 'Statistically, it is clear that in this country and overseas most terrorist offences are committed by people under the age of 30. We therefore regard it as vital that Prevent engages fully – though in different ways – with schools, higher and further education' (HM Government, 2011a, p. 64). Some authors, including government policymakers, thus see counter-extremism as a core component of the safeguarding of young people (Evans, Nov. 5, 2007).

Nevertheless, while a focus on young people would appear an appropriate counter-extremism response, the ways in which counter-extremism strategies appear to respond to this demographic factor reveal a number of problematic assumptions. This is especially pertinent considering how counter-extremist education approaches young people. In particular, the agency of young people is both underplayed – the idea that young people might rationally choose to join an extremist organisation as a political choice plays second



fiddle to explanations that downplay agency and emphasise vulnerability or susceptibility – as well as being over-exaggerated: young people are painted as risky through undergoing a rebellious identity-seeking phase in adolescence.

The radicalisation discourse appears to have a particularly low impression of young people. Van San et al. speak of the ‘increased susceptibility to radical ideas during puberty’ (van San, Sieckelinck & de Winter, 2013, p. 286), citing Gemmeke who describes adolescence as the ‘impressionable years’ (Gemmeke (1995) cited in van San et al., 2013, p. 286). Radicalisation narratives appear to present young people as *tabula rasa* for extremist ideologues to mould and manipulate. Durodie (2016) notes the paradox of such an understanding of the nature of young people, writing with a sense of frustration at how the perceived fragility of young people leaves teachers too scared to discuss controversial issues with students for fear of upsetting them. This is particularly ironic as the discussion of controversial issues is seen as a core component of counter-extremism education. Durodie adds: ‘the notion that an individual upon hearing somebody speak of coming across ideas on the internet, then begins to alter their behaviour suggests a fairly diminished view of human nature. Unfortunately, this projection of people as fragile is becoming more mainstream today’ (2016, p. 28). Sieckelinck et al., while offering young people more agency than other writers, still describe those vulnerable to radicalisation as ‘political agents in spiritual and educational need’ (Sieckelinck et al., 2015, p. 338).

One reason for this characterisation of young people is that adolescence is depicted in the literature as a time of identity construction and questioning. This process of identity building is seen to be risky when radicalisation is also seen in terms of ‘the quest for personal significance... to be recognised, to matter’ (Kruglanski et al., 2013, p. 559). Young people, so the argument goes, are more likely to radicalise, as they are engaging in this ‘significance quest’, rendering them more vulnerable to the ‘captive power’ of ideology. Van San et al., for example, describe a group of individuals who ‘fell under the spell of radical Islam’ (2013, p. 285). For Kruglanski et al. (2013), the solution to this facet of radicalisation, is to promote ‘self-love’.

Yet, these assumptions regarding the nature of adolescence are rarely questioned or critiqued. It is fascinating that, immediately after providing multiple references and citations regarding definitions of radicalisation and extremism, Bhui et al. offer the following description of adolescence with no support from previous scholarly literature:

Radicalisation is thought to occur during adolescence or shortly afterwards among young adults who are impressionable and seek to resolve personal negotiations of identity. Typically adolescence is a period of maturation in which young people experiment with their identity, group relationships, political ideologies and their place in the world. Becoming involved in visible and distinct counter-cultures is a part of maturation. (Bhui, Dinos & Jones, 2012, p. 1)

The argument follows then that young people might join extremist groups as a seemingly natural result of identity quests, unless something to stop this happening is enacted. Education can help to stem this inevitable flow of adolescent radicalism. Yet, the lack of scholarly citation by Bhui et al. should be of profound concern.

One way in which this identity quest narrative manifests itself is in what I term the ‘lost middle’ thesis. This theory argues that young British Muslims are stuck between two identity groups to which they do not quite fit: the traditional cultures of their parents’ generation, and majority British society (Schmid, 2014). Sageman notes this when describing the background of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, convicted of the kidnap and beheading of a US journalist. Sageman highlights ‘Omar’s sense of alienation, of being caught between two cultures, Pakistani and British’ (2008, p. 6). According to Liht et al, British Muslims ‘require more cognitive resources to successfully resolve the dissonance between religious and secular-rational value systems’ (2013, p. 36). As such, some authors argue, young British Muslims are threatening: ‘They are the latest, most dangerous incarnation of that staple of immigration literature, the revolt of the second generation’ (Leiken, 2005, p. 127).

Not all research agrees here, however. Lynch's (2013) ethnographic research into identity construction amongst young British Muslims found that incorporating Britishness alongside a religious identity was a key component of these young people's identities; that the two identities were mutually constitutive, rather than exclusive of one another. Such a study challenges these dominant narratives around this identity clash that play prominent roles not only in academic scholarship, but also in political discourse. As David Cameron said in 2015, speaking directly to young British Muslims: 'I know that at times you are grappling with huge issues over your identity, neither feeling a part of the British mainstream nor a part of the culture from your parents' background' (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015). It is a concern here, that this 'lost middle' thesis compounds the transformation of the young British Muslim into a risky subject.

Lastly, young people's idealism is added as a third factor of risk, compounding the riskiness of youth central to conceptualisations of radicalisation. Interestingly, when emphasising idealism, these descriptions of young people present youth as active agents in their own commitment to violence rather than passive victims. As Wessells argues: 'youth are not passive pawns in armed conflict but are actors who find meaning and identity in what they see as a struggle for justice' (2005, pp. 365-6). The role of education to counter this idealism is emphasised most comprehensively by Stijn Sieckelinck and colleagues. Sieckelinck et al. (2015) recognise the synergy between the idealism at the heart of extremism, and the idealism central to adolescence (van San et al., 2013), focussing educational responses to extremism to channel this idealism in more reasonable and less violent ways.

The idealism of youth has been central to youth scholarship for some time. The notable American sociologist, Kingsley Davis, in a paper examining parent-youth conflict published in 1940, noted 'the conflict between adult realism (or pragmatism) and youthful idealism' (1940, p. 526). Moreover, youthful idealism, Davis argued, could lead to conflict: 'youth is likely to take action designed to remove inconsistencies or force actual conduct into line with ideals, such action assuming one of several typical

adolescent forms – from religious withdrawal to the militant support of some Utopian scheme’ (1940, p. 528). Davis’ assertion that militancy might be typically adolescent is interestingly mirrored in conceptions of radicalisation amongst youth. As Wessells argues, writing in the context of the recruitment of child soldiers: ‘Ideology and political socialisation exert strong influence over youths’ decisions to join armed groups. In many countries, opposition groups recruit successfully by playing on youth’s sense of victimisation, social injustice, and disaffection, as well as their sense of idealism and commitment to their religion’ (2005, p. 365). Davis (1940) also offers an argument that moving away from idealism is a natural part of maturation. Liht et al. argue something similar: ‘We propose that fostering the natural development process of increasing value complexity can serve to create resilience to radicalism and thus prevent processes of radicalisation since radical groups are intrinsically value-monist’ (2013, p. 36).

In exploring how to handle this idealism, Sieckelinck and Ruyter do not however shun this idealism outright, examining how: ‘One reason ideals are important is related to the increased range of options in contemporary society that seems to make it more difficult for young people to choose the life they really want and be satisfied with their choice’ (2009, p. 185). Thus, rather than an entirely negative phenomenon, ideals can offer a life raft in a sea of uncertainty. Yet, it is the role of education to channel these ideals appropriately. Sieckelinck and Ruyter argue that young people need to learn to be ‘reasonably passionate’ (2009, p. 187), mirroring the ‘critical idealism’ advocated by Davies (2008).

This section has attempted to examine why education is seen as a crucial venue for counter-extremism strategy. It has done so through exploring the plural relationships discursively produced in the discourse regarding extremists and education. The section examined how extremists are depicted as lacking an education, or having received the wrong sort of education. These arguments were challenged however by scholarly literature that questions any correlation between education and a reduction of extremism. Despite the lack of supporting evidence, the argument that education reduces extremism persists. Yet, the section also examined the consequences of this argument through examining how such an argument discursively

produces young people. The chapter examined how narratives of catalytic factors of radicalisation and vulnerability to radicalisation place young people in positions of being both ‘at risk’ and suspicious. This dual role thus creates a conundrum for educators who must balance exploring extremist ideas with students to build their resilience, while also recognising that such exposure might present a risk. Overall, the section has sought to muddy the waters regarding a seemingly common-sense attitude that education reduces extremism. It has replaced this simplicity with complexity, presenting questions that need answers.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter sought to examine the current state of the literature on extremism and radicalisation, in order to define counter-extremism, and to understand why education is seen as a crucial venue in which counter-extremism strategies should operate. It built upon an initial concern regarding the wide range of strategies, policies and laws that UK schools must now follow with regard to extremism and radicalisation. From this departure point, the chapter sought to explore how the problem of extremism was conceptualised and the theories upon which such a concept relied. In so doing, it uncovered, amongst a poorly defined and conceptually confused terrain, a heavy emphasis on, and reification of, ideology in the radicalisation process by which someone engages in extremism. This emphasis on ideology is not only poorly supported by empirical evidence, and based on a series of problematic assumptions (such as the dismissal of alternative theories of political violence from social movement theory), but leads to a series of problematic consequences, of profound interest in the context of this thesis. In particular, the chapter questioned the implications of a counter-extremism strategy that appeared in nature to be counter-ideological, and the dangers countering ideology poses to democratic pluralism. Furthermore, the chapter examined the problematic dualism present within the literature concerning ideology and its relationship to violence. It was suggested that the discursive linkage between a set of ideas and the motivation to use violence was in acute danger of criminalising and stigmatising the holding of non-hegemonic values, and transforming what might be considered alternative views into threatening views.

Overall, the chapter has examined a literature around extremism and radicalisation that is both riddled with conceptual and practical issues, and yet is extremely popular amongst policy makers. Within the literature, a core antagonism is clearly present between the objectives of countering extremism and the objectives of democratic pluralism. The literature appears confused, and unstably positioned atop a heavily contested body of scholarly work. That this body of literature also places great emphasis on education as a tool in countering extremism thus places heavy burdens on teachers and school leaders. As such, this thesis is motivated to engage in further depth to explore how these antagonisms and uncertainties at a conceptual level play out at a pedagogical level, when these issues start to be taught in the classroom. The next chapter moves on to examine the UK's counter-extremism in schools strategy, examining the various responsibilities school hold, exploring how these contestations and antagonisms only escalate when contested scholarship becomes government policy.

# 3

## Contested and Contradictory

### **An analysis of Britain's counter-extremism in schools strategy**

Teachers play many roles. As well as educating young people in their chosen subjects, they may find themselves in roles as diverse as: sports coach, personal tutor, lunch hall monitor, even director of the school play. Teachers also play the role of caregiver or guardian, and safeguarding is an increasingly important aspect of a teacher's responsibilities. Teachers are often the first to spot that a student might be suffering from neglect or abuse, from bullying or from physical illness or injury. It is under this realm of 'safeguarding' that teachers have become actors in the widely dispersed surveillance regime to spot signs of radicalisation. While a teacher may well have expected when training to become a teacher to take a football practice, to talk to a parent about bullying, or direct a school play, they may well not have expected to play a key role in countering terrorism or extremism.

This chapter explores this curious new role that teachers must play. First, the chapter traces the journey from 2001 to the present day, examining how a strategy of countering terrorism abroad has transitioned into one countering extremism in schools. From here, the chapter draws from the antagonisms already highlighted within this thesis, taking the investigation another step further, through an exploration of the UK counter-extremism in schools strategy. The strategy can be subdivided into two core components: a surveillance component that ensures teachers are trained to be able to identify students who are at risk of being radicalised, and an educational component that ensures students are equipped with the skills, values and knowledge required to increase their resilience to radicalisation. The chapter examines how the vast majority of the critique of the UK's counter-extremism in schools strategy has been levelled at the surveillance aspect of the strategy, or at the so-called 'fundamental British values'. This thesis argues that

while lessons have clearly been learned exploring each aspect in isolation, it is in the interrelationships between the components of the strategy where deeper lessons can be learned regarding how the antagonism between consensus and pluralism at the heart of counter-extremism impacts teaching on the subject.

The chapter then analyses the three core aspects of the educational component of the strategy: skills development, values promotion and knowledge transmission. Through such an examination, it is argued that these three aspects are both *contested* and *contradictory*. They are contested in that they are each based on a number of assumptions and unstable claims challenged by scholarly literature. They are contradictory in that the three aims of counter-extremism in schools, rather than complementing each other, in fact work against each other. From here, the chapter develops the core research question of this thesis: how do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?

### **From Countering Terrorism Abroad to Countering Extremism in Schools**

The events of July 7 2005 radically transformed the UK's understanding of the threat posed by terrorism. The attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 catalysed a UK counter-terrorism strategy, which, through domestic security policy and overseas military intervention, emphasised a foreign threat. The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 caused controversy due to the inclusion of a clause allowing for detention without trial of 'foreign terror subjects' (BBC News, Dec. 14, 2001). The threat was distinctly external – an evil force emerging from the rural and mountainous region bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan (Jackson, 2005). When four young men, Yorkshiremen born and bred, attacked the London transport network in 2005, that threat was no longer something foreign and distant, but internal and domestic. This re-conceptualisation of the terrorist threat led to the growth of the term 'homegrown terrorism'. Homegrown terrorism focuses on two core features – that the terrorists 'belong' to the country in which the attack takes place, and that the terrorists are autonomous from international terrorist organisations (Crone and Harrow, 2011). The curious phenomenon of young people wanting to commit



acts of violence within their home country perplexed academics and policy makers alike. Moreover, it prompted an examination of the backgrounds of the four bombers: what within their upbringing could have been altered in order to prevent this violent outcome? These questions shifted the emphasis in counter-terrorism strategy away from foreign terrorism towards a more domestic emphasis on extremism, radicalisation and ideology.

Contrasting Blair's two speeches to the Labour party conferences in 2001 and 2005, both coincidentally about two weeks after the respective attacks, offers insight into this transition. In 2001, Blair uses the words 'terror' or 'terrorism' nineteen times in his speech, and fails to mention extremism once (Blair, Oct. 2, 2001). By 2005, Blair uses the term 'terror' three times, 'extreme' or 'extremist' four times, but 'ideology', nine times (Blair, Jul. 16, 2005). Moreover, this shift to an emphasis on extremism and ideology exposed education as a potential tool in countering this threat. As Blair argued: 'In the end, it is by the power of argument, debate, true religious faith and true legitimate politics that we will defeat this threat... Moderates are not moderate through weakness but through strength. Now is the time to show it in defence of our common values' (ibid.). These themes of 'debate' and 'values' place the role of education prominently under the spotlight with regards to countering extremism. Ever since, the role the education sector has been asked to play in countering extremism has grown.

This understanding of an *ideological* threat of extremism, rather than a violent threat of terrorism, was prominent in the 2006 review of the CONTEST strategy – the UK's counter-terror strategy first introduced in 2003 (Martin, 2018). CONTEST broke down the UK's counter-terror strategy into four components: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. While the latter three components concern the threat of acts of terror, Prevent was concerned with preventing terrorism at as early a stage as possible, and thus concerned itself with challenging extremism. Since its inception, Prevent has had an ideological emphasis, as the 2006 strategy outlines: 'This is a battle of ideas in which success will depend upon all parts of the community challenging the ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence' (HM Government, 2006, p. 3).

If extremism was ideological, then counter-extremism needed to be counter-ideological. Education became an increasingly important tool in the fight against global terror as a ‘battleground’ for this fight for hearts and minds (Payne, 2009). Such an educational approach was cemented with the introduction of the cornerstone document, *Learning to be Safe* in 2008, a guide for how to incorporate counter-extremism into the classroom – a document still used to this day (Department for Children, Schools and Families, 2008). The document, building heavily on the influential work by Lynn Davies, *Educating Against Extremism* (2008), sets out the justification for education’s role in countering extremism. Ed Balls, then secretary of state for children, schools and families makes note of this in the introduction:

Extremists of all persuasions try to paint the world as black and white, accentuating division and difference, and exploiting fears based on ignorance or prejudice. Education can be a powerful weapon against this, equipping young people with the knowledge, skills and reflex to think for themselves, to challenge and to debate; and giving young people the opportunity to learn about different cultures and faiths and, crucially, to gain an understanding of the values we share. (Balls, 2008, p. 3)

Education appears to offer the antidote to extremism. It offers freethinking, open questioning and knowledge in the face of absolutism, falsity and myth. Yet, to fulfil its counter-ideological objectives, British counter-extremism requires education to not only open up minds to new ideas, but also to close off dangerous and threatening ideas. As Payne notes, the ideological nature of counter-extremism appears akin to propaganda (a word, interestingly, used by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown in a TV interview in 2007). However, Payne notes, ‘Propaganda is a troubling concept for a democracy, whose political elites must negotiate the difficult terrain between message control and liberalism’ (Payne, 2009, p. 110). This negotiation presents the nub of the core question at the outset of this thesis: how can an educational process negotiate two seemingly competing educational frameworks: one, of a liberal,

democratic education that emphasises debate, and another that seeks to counter extremism through promoting a fixed set of values? This question became even more profound after the review of the Prevent strategy in 2011.

In 2010, the Labour party was ousted from power, replaced by a coalition government led by the Conservative party, which commissioned a review of the Prevent strategy. Three key changes took place with regards to education and counter-extremism in this review: a cementing of the definition of extremism, the prioritisation of challenging extremist ideology, and an emphasis on tackling so-called ‘non-violent extremism’. Such changes placed ever-increasing levels of emphasis on challenging ideas and values in countering extremism, and continued to emphasise the importance of an educational strategy.

The 2011 Prevent strategy defined extremism as:

Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107)

Such a definition placed ‘values’ at the centre stage of understandings of extremism, alongside provoking contestation and debate regarding who was able to define what was fundamentally ‘British’ (Allen, 2015; Miah, 2017). Promoting these fundamental values is central to the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy.

Second, the role of countering ideology within the counter-extremism strategy was given the highest priority. In 2006, this ‘battle of ideas’ was the third component of a three-strand Prevent strategy that also comprised ‘tackling disadvantage and supporting reform’ and ‘deterring those who facilitate terrorism’

(HM Government, 2006, pp. 1-2). Yet, by 2011, when the review of Prevent was published, the centrality of ideology to counter-extremism was firmly in place. This newly shaped strategy set out its three objectives of Prevent: to ‘respond to the ideological challenge... prevent people from being drawn into terrorism... [and] work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 7). Ideology was now the number one Prevent objective. Moreover, education had become a key sector in which radicalisation was seen to be a genuine risk (Department for Education, 2015). The locus of radicalisation had shifted from the community – with the 2006 strategy’s emphasis on disadvantage – to the individual – with the 2011 strategy’s emphasis on ideology and vulnerability to being ‘drawn into terrorism’.

The last key alteration of the strategy within this review was to demand that more be done to challenge so-called ‘non-violent extremism’. Attention should no longer be given purely to those who pose an immediate violent threat to UK interests. The strategy argued that extremist groups, individuals and ideas that were not in themselves violent play a catalytic role in the violence of others and must also be challenged (HM Government, 2011a, p. 19). That ideas that did not incite violence could influence violence in others ensured that ideas or values that challenged hegemonic ideas or values were considered threatening and needed to be challenged. Fixing the boundaries on legitimate ideas appeared to be a core feature of the counter-extremism strategy, once again raising the key question: how can an educational process negotiate the duality of both opening up and closing down the realm of free debate of ideas?

In 2014, a scandal hit the headlines turning attention onto education and extremism once more. The so-called ‘Trojan Horse Scandal’ involved the publication of a letter in a national newspaper, the authenticity of which remains in doubt (Miah, 2017; Mogra, 2016). This letter supposedly reveals a plot by a group of conservative Muslims who were aiming to take control of a group of schools in the Birmingham area in order to promote an extremist ideology. The affair catalysed two separate investigations, one by the police, and the other by Birmingham City Council, neither of which uncovered concrete evidence of extremism or

radicalisation, though both concluded the schools promoted culturally conservative values (Arthur, 2015). The conclusions of the investigations into the scandal remain mired in controversy and debate (Habib, 2018; Miah, 2017). Moreover, the affair catalysed alterations in schools' professional responsibilities with regards to so-called 'fundamental British values'.

Guidance was published by the Department for Education in November 2014 that set out advice that schools should 'actively promote fundamental British values' (Department for Education, 2014, p. 3). This was secured in school regulatory mechanisms. In 2011, Teachers' Standards (the rubric against which teachers are evaluated) had already incorporated 'not undermining fundamental British values' (Department for Education, 2011, p. 14) as a facet of professional conduct. The 2015 edition of the school inspection handbook published by Ofsted, the schools inspectorate, included four references to 'fundamental British values' (Ofsted, 2015), references that were absent in the previous year's edition (Ofsted, 2014). Schools must now not just *not undermine*, but rather, *actively promote* these values (Elton-Chalcraft, Lander, Revell, Warner & Whitworth, 2017, p. 30).

Schools' requirements to promote these values have been critiqued by school leaders and teachers' unions. Michael Goodwin, the head of an independent Quaker school, asked in *The Guardian*, 'should we really promote an unquestioning adherence to the rule of law?' (Goodwin, Nov. 11, 2014). The National Union of Teachers questioned whether the values would promote 'cultural supremacy' (Harding, Mar. 29, 2016). Scholars have examined the impact of these values, exploring how they provide a racialised understanding of Britishness (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Miah, 2017), and how they engender 'an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty' (Revell & Bryan, 2016, p. 352).

The next chapter in school counter-extremism policy came in July 2015 when the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 came into force. This law was the seventh edition/addition to the UK's terrorism laws

since 2001.<sup>2</sup> This law, known more colloquially as the ‘Prevent duty’, ensured schools have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’ (Department for Education 2015, p. 4). In practice, this law requires schools to train their staff in order that they are able to recognise any students displaying signs of vulnerability to radicalisation, and to notify relevant authorities. As the government advice to schools notes, ‘schools and childcare providers are expected to assess the risk of children being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideology’ (Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). Such a measure has been met with harsh criticism, as teachers feel unable to compromise their role as educators with a new surveillance role (Bubsy, Mar. 25, 2016). Academics have contributed criticism too. O’Donnell describes the trap in which teachers are placed to both respond to the needs of the students and of legal compliance, as ‘pedagogical injustice’ (2017, p. 179). Martin (2018, p. 14) examines how the Prevent duty transforms students into ‘new subjects of risk’. In both the Prevent duty and the values promotion, at least for some, the strategies of counter-extremism felt at odds with the core foundational principles of education itself. Despite this, many schools ensured compliance by publishing school counter-extremism and radicalisation policies setting out their school strategy and procedure for managing the risk of extremism (see appendix for examples).

Lastly, in January 2016, the then education secretary, Nicky Morgan, launched a key website, [www.educateagainsthate.com](http://www.educateagainsthate.com), as a platform for advice and resources for schools, teachers, and school leaders regarding extremism and schools (Hughes, Jan. 19, 2016). The website not only offers advice but resources that teachers can use in their classrooms to help teach about the issues of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. The website intends to increase awareness of the issues at hand and better equip teachers to fulfil their responsibilities.

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<sup>2</sup> Since the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act in 2001 there has been the following subsequent acts of parliament: Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; Terrorism Act 2006; Counter-Terrorism Act 2008; Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010; Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011; Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

Now eight years since the 2011 Prevent review introduced a definition of extremism to the UK political sphere, what extremism might entail is still far from certain. The UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), investigating Britain's counter-extremism strategy, argued that the definition of extremism is 'couched in such general terms that they would be likely to prove unworkable as a legislative definition' (JCHR, 2016, p. 3). The government, since 2015, has wanted to introduce a Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill, including civil orders to prohibit extremism. Delays have plagued this process (JCHR, 2016). In 2017, a new Commission for Countering Extremism was established to support the government to counter extremism. As a House of Commons briefing paper concluded, 'Unless a consensus can be reached as to what constitutes extremism in the first place, the development of effective measures will continue to prove problematic for the proposed Commission' (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 54).

As such, since the events of July 2005, schools have been burdened with an ever-increasing number of counter-extremism responsibilities, at a time when counter-extremism itself has proved contested and poorly understood (Dawson & Godec, 2017; Ford, 2017a; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle & Zammit, 2016). Moreover, such regulations have been introduced during an era in which curriculum, schools and teaching practices have become ever increasingly scrutinised, and accountability measures ever increasingly dominant.

Since the introduction of the National Curriculum in 1988, under the Education Reform Act, the state has played an increasingly active role in the governance of the classroom. Schools today operate within an environment of surveillance, accountability and market-like competition, dramatically impacting what goes on inside the classroom (Winter, 2018). Ball (2003, p. 216) refers to this state-led regime of teacher behaviour control using the term 'performativity':

Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons, and displays as a means of incentive, control, attrition and change – based on rewards and sanctions.

It is hardly surprising in this context therefore that post the 2015 legislative changes so many schools have produced policies that clearly demonstrate their adherence to the counter-extremism strategy, alongside schools producing ‘audits’ to provide easily-consumable documentation to inspectors demonstrating their compliance in promoting fundamental British values.

Such a performativity regime has a profound impact on the teaching itself. As Winter (2018, p. 458) notes:

These pressures of performativity, under such a high-stakes regime, lead, inevitably, to teachers teaching to the test; avoiding innovative and challenging teaching strategies and deploying reductive, low-risk subject knowledge and technical assessment approaches.

Importantly therefore, in the context of these various counter-extremism activities that teachers must include within such a policy-heavy environment, one must ask the question of how a teacher is capable of critically encountering a body of knowledge that, as the previous chapter demonstrated, is far from soundly evidenced or objectively secure (Winter, 2018, p. 459).

Furthermore, the Trojan Horse affair added a further politicisation to these accountability measures (Arthur, 2015). Ofsted inspectors have taken on increasingly political roles in the wake of this scandal, and are keen to inspect not just the teaching practices of a school, but the values and principles held by its student body. Arthur (2015, p. 323) revealed one instance of an inspection at a Jewish girls’ school where ‘Inspectors questioned the girls on whether they knew any gay people and whether they had a boyfriend and whether they had friends from other religions.’ This demonstrates an increasingly ideological aspect to the accountability regime, and a further injection of control by the state over the thoughts and beliefs, or the ‘hearts and minds’ of the nation’s school students.



Thus far, the chapter has explored how schools must promote debate, develop skills, transmit values, and monitor their students for signs of radicalisation, alongside their primary roles as educators. Their responsibilities are regulated through teacher standards and inspection guidelines. Yet, these responsibilities have been met with a level of resistance that merits investigation. In particular, the surveillance aspect of the Prevent duty and the teaching of fundamental British values have provoked criticism from educational professionals and academics alike. Yet, other aspects – such as the development of critical thinking skills – have been left under-examined. The strategy seems to emphasise both inclusion, in the safeguarding of children, and exclusion, in the identification and isolation of extremists and their ideas. How a strategy of counter-extremism in schools might negotiate these seemingly contradictory objectives – both in theory and in practice – provides the subject on which this thesis bases its examination.

### **Britain's Counter Extremism In Schools Strategy**

The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS Act) ensures that a school's responsibility to protect young people from extremism is enshrined in law. Specifically, this law ensures that a school 'must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism' (CTS Act, 2015, section 26). In order to comply with what is commonly known as the 'Prevent duty', as UK Government guidance reports, 'it is essential that staff are able to identify children who may be vulnerable to radicalisation, and know what to do when they are identified' (Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). Students identified as vulnerable are then potentially referred to the Channel programme, a government-run intervention programme intended to deradicalise vulnerable individuals. Yet the Prevent duty not only entails such a surveillance aspect, but also an educational one. The advice continues: 'Schools and childcare providers can also build pupils' resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values and enabling them to challenge extremist views' (ibid.). This second, educational, arm of counter-radicalisation strategy can then be further subdivided into three core components: the development of skills, the promotion of values and the dissemination of knowledge.

Students’ resilience to extremist propaganda, according to policy makers, can be developed through improving critical thinking skills. An awareness of plural perspectives, and an ability to assess lines of logic and reasoning, will equip students to be able to see through the false argumentation of extremist narratives (DCSF, 2008). The promotion of ‘fundamental British values’ follows an increasing dominance of assimilationist ideas central to the Government’s policies and strategies regarding integration. That radicalisation is more likely when common and shared identities are weaker is a commonly-held belief by policy makers and as such, a school’s promotion of common, fundamental British values, reduces a student’s vulnerability to radicalisation (Department for Education, 2015). Lastly, schools are also required to develop a knowledge base on the issues of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. This knowledge concerns not only knowledge about the threat of terrorism, but also about the nature of democracy and political systems in the UK too. As such, I argue, a school’s responsibilities with regard to countering radicalisation and extremism can be graphically represented thus (figure 3.1):

### Counter-Extremism in Schools Strategy




Figure 3.1: Britain's counter-extremism in schools strategy (source: author)

Existing research into the counter-extremism in schools strategy has tended to focus on two independent aspects of the strategy: the ‘Prevent duty’ (e.g. O’Donnell, 2016; 2017; Davies, 2016) or ‘fundamental British values’ (e.g. Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Revel & Bryan, 2016). Where this thesis aims to offer an innovative perspective is to examine the inter-relationships between the three educational components of the strategy. Rather than examining each element in isolation, the thesis focuses on how the elements work with and against each other, using such tensions to examine the nature of the political realms of extremism

and counter-extremism. In so doing, the thesis focuses its examination on the educational component, with less emphasis on the inter-relationships between the surveillance and educational components. Each analysis chapter, chapters 5, 6, and 7, takes one such component in turn, and critically analyses the discourses therein. Chapter 5 addresses the knowledge of extremism developed in the materials, chapter 6 addresses the British values discourse, and finally chapter 7 explores the discourse around critical thinking skills.

However, this is not to say that the educational-surveillance relationship is not a vital one. In fact, it is quite clear that the Prevent duty is having a noticeable impact on knowledge development in schools. Commentary on the Prevent duty in schools has tended to focus on the impact that the duty is having on the ability to engage in free and open debate in schools. Ahmed, an education professional noted after the duty was introduced: ‘Increasingly, I hear young people talking about not saying anything in school on current affairs in case they are labelled as “extremist”’ (Ahmed, Apr. 28, 2015). Coppock asks: ‘How is it possible for Muslim children and young people to “air their grievances safely” when giving voice to their experiences of injustice runs the risk of teachers interpreting this as an indicator of potential involvement in “extremism”?’ (Coppock, 2014, p. 122). Sian’s research has examined how training in preventing extremism has caused teachers to have ‘uncritically internalised the Muslim “threat” logic’ (Sian, 2015, p. 191). Richardson (2015) notes that the emphasis on radicalisation has left schools and teachers unwilling to engage in controversial debates for fear of exposing young people to extreme attitudes. Quartermaine (2016) even goes so far as to suggest that teachers are in fact nervous of exposing young people to the extremist attitudes of others within the same classroom. O’Donnell warns, ‘Making *Prevent* a statutory duty risks damaging relations of trust and openness in institutions by silencing and marginalising students and staff who might otherwise wish to engage in the exploration of difficult questions and ideas’ (O’Donnell, 2016, p. 54; see also Reed, 2016).

The so-called ‘chilling effect’ (Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015) of the Prevent duty has been well aired. This research looks to take these criticisms one step further, and understand them within a wider context of the various responsibilities of teachers to counter extremism. Quartermaine emphasises these tensions: ‘teachers are torn between adhering to political discourses, protecting children from violence, as well as the dynamics of “good” RE [religious education] teaching that encourages critical thinking’ (2016, p. 25). The pressures of the counter-extremism in schools strategy appear to be in direct conflict with a dominant understanding shared between teachers and education researchers regarding what values are relevant to critical, democratic education. Such tensions are visible when examining how each component of the strategy seems to have competing aims. How, for instance, can a teacher approach ‘fundamental British values’ critically without endangering their fundamentality? Furthermore, the last chapter examined the problematic and shaky empirical basis on which knowledge of extremism and radicalisation is based. The way these discourses stigmatise Muslim communities appears to endanger the fundamental value of tolerance. Lastly, would critical thinking not equip students to destabilise this unstable knowledge base, placing the fundamental logic of the strategy - that shared, common values would defend ‘moderates’ from extremist ideology - in jeopardy?

Through such an analysis, and through placing the analysis in the context of current research on the issues at hand, the chapter outlines the key questions of this thesis. The thesis seeks to examine how such tensions are operationalised in the classroom. It takes this strategy and asks: what appears to be working through this not working? What are the implications of such a strategy, and what can these tensions teach us about the nature of counter-extremism itself?

### **Skills of Resilience: Critical Thinking and Extremism**

The first aspect of the educational strategy concerns the teaching of ‘skills of resilience’ – the label used in the literature to refer to the teaching predominantly of critical thinking skills. From an international governance level to an individual school level, the importance of this loosely-defined notion of critical

thinking to fighting extremism appears ubiquitous. UNESCO asks teachers to ‘help learners develop their critical thinking to investigate claims, verify rumours and question the legitimacy and appeal of extremist beliefs’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 15). The European Commission’s Radicalisation Awareness Network writes, ‘Critical thinking is a key element in building resilience against extremism. As such, activities should promote dialogue and exchange – not closing down discussions to avoid addressing issues’ (RAN, 2018, p. 252). At a UK level, ‘teaching and learning strategies’ are promoted ‘which explore controversial issues in a way which promotes critical analysis and pro social values’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 9). As one school wrote in their *British Values & Challenging Radicalisation, Extremism and Terrorism Policy*, ‘Education is a powerful weapon against this; equipping young people with the knowledge, skills and critical thinking, to challenge and debate in an informed way’ (P4, p. 2).

Academic literature on extremism and education mirrors this argument that critical thinking appears an efficacious tool in the context of extremism. As Davies explains: ‘Cognitive dissonance is essential in learning, whether about religion or anything else. Comparing what one thought one knew against new and different information or ideas is the essence of education – that’s what it’s for’ (2008, p. 134). As a result, Davies argues that education must involve exposure to the other, allowing students to develop an ability ‘to extend potential legitimacy to “otherness”’ (2008, p. 44). Elsewhere, Davies argues that ‘dialogue and dissent’ (2014, p. 453) are vital; that it is not conflict or disagreement that promote extremism, but an unwillingness to accept the validity of another’s point of view. Davies deploys the term ‘interruptive democracy’ to describe the ““excuse me” reflex, the hand shooting up to raise questions or concerns, the habit of never taking things for granted’ (2014, p. 453). Sieckelinck and de Ruyter marry this argument by promoting that young people be ‘reasonably passionate’:

First, a reasonably passionate person is rational in embodying fidelity to reasoning. Second, a reasonably passionate person is prudent: such a person is passionate but not at his or her own expense; he or she is able to take into account other interests as well. Finally, a reasonably

passionate person is at least a minimally moral person, for being reasonable involves that one is able to take into account the interests of the other and weigh these against one's own interests. (Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 187)

Alongside these arguments which champion critical thinking is the argument that schools are appropriate spaces in which such thinking should take place. This 'critical openness' is developed in the 'safe space' afforded by an educational venue: 'democratic classrooms are places where offensive views can be aired and picked apart in a relatively safe setting' (Davies, 2014, p. 454; see also Nordbruch, 2016). This safe space rhetoric is mirrored in policy literature also (DCSF, 2008, p. 24). However, as has been demonstrated above, this safe space appears endangered by the surveillance component of the counter-extremism in schools strategy.

### ***Contested: Unstable definitions of critical thinking***

The emphasis on critical thinking in both policy and academic literatures raises a number of concerns that need to be addressed. The first concern regards how 'critical thinking' is defined in the literature. The second concerns how the aims and intentions of critical thinking can marry the aims and intentions of resilience-building, a second dominant narrative within the literature on counter-extremism skills. The third concern examines a leap made in the literature between the development of critical thinking skills, and the development of liberal democratic values.

'Critical thinking' is poorly defined, though heavily used, within counter-extremist educational literature, producing a somewhat nebulous definition through its various deployments: reflective thought practices (Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 193); acceptance of plural perspectives (Davies, 2008, p. 33); open dialogue (O'Donnell, 2016, p. 63). Yet, references to the academic literature on critical thinking itself are very rare. Such an examination raises a number of key questions that counter-extremist education has yet to answer.

A core debate within critical thinking literature concerns whether critical thinking denotes a set of skills, a set of values, or both. This is a particularly relevant question in the current context, as critical thinking in counter-extremist literature is often deployed as a tool in the development of liberal democratic values. Ed Balls sets out the intention of the *Learning to be Safe* document as both developing ‘skills and reflex [for students] to think for themselves’ and ‘an understanding of the values we share’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). One school policy even suggested the school will ‘give pupils a positive sense of identity through the development of critical thinking skills’ (P3, p. 5). Critical thinking skills are thus imbued with a daunting task of catalysing values and self-esteem. Yet, the relationship between these two ideas and critical thinking is far from certain.

Siegel (1988) notes how when Robert Ennis first outlined a definition of critical thinking in 1962, Ennis’ emphasis was purely on skills: ‘on a person’s ability correctly to assess or evaluate certain sorts of statements’ (Siegel, 1988; see also Burbules & Berk, 1999). Siegel acknowledges that in Ennis’ later work, Ennis added a set of ‘tendencies’ that made a good critical thinker, alongside skills. Siegel himself argues that reason should be ‘the guiding ideal of educational endeavour’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 8), and that critical thinkers ‘recognise the *value* of critical thinking’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 9, original emphasis). Critical thinking should therefore be of value as an ethic for thinking. This is however, very different from suggesting that critical thinking will lead to the adoption of a certain set of values – an assumption dominant within counter-extremist education literature. This false causation is often achieved through the linguistic coupling of ‘skills’ and ‘attitudes’ within policy and academic literatures alike (DCSF, 2008, p. 9).

Nevertheless, writers do note the importance of critical thinking for citizenship: ‘critical thinking is a crucial aspect in the competence citizens need to participate in a plural and democratic society’ (Ten Dam & Volman, 2004, p. 360). Davies emphasises critical thinking in a way that strongly links critical thinking to democratic values in what she terms ‘critical civic education’ (Davies, 2008, p. 161). A school presents an

opportunity to model a society or community that one would like to see in the world at large, ‘where one learns the skills and attitudes for living together in a democracy, a democracy in which a plurality of different conceptions of the good will be allowed to flourish’ (Davies, 2008, p. 75). It is not about developing a fixed list of values to which one must subscribe. Instead, ‘there has to be a set of values which is inclusive and yet open to scrutiny and change’ (Davies, 2008, p. 161). Davies perhaps offers a warning here to proponents of ‘fundamental British values’. The presence of fundamentalism in both definitions of extremism and strategies of counter-extremism suggests a core, foundational tension within the literature. Davies argues, ‘the potential for positive peacebuilding change seems to be in the *clash* of values’ (Davies, 2014, p. 457). The question remains whether the UK’s educational counter-extremism strategy affords any space for values to clash.

The notion of a government or state promoting critical thinking appears problematic due to the common assertion made by scholars of critical thinking that critical thinking is inimical to the support of orthodoxy. Siegel notes, ‘critical thinking is no rubber-stamp friend of the *status quo*’ (Siegel, 1988, p. 54). Indeed, the independence of critical thinkers to reflect on values is vital, suggesting that any causal link between critical thinking skills and liberal democratic values is highly problematic. There is no guarantee, indeed there simply *cannot* be a guarantee of the values one would critically uphold, as Veugelers and Vedder comment: ‘Acquiring skills to reflect on values is necessary for keeping a critical distance with regard to values, observing different perspectives, and making judgements on one’s own behaviour and others’ behaviour’ (Veugelers & Vedders, 2003, p. 381). The deployment of critical thinking within the context of a state’s counter-extremism strategy appears therefore problematic. Critical thinking challenges the status quo, yet critical thinking is often described as a skill of ‘resilience’ (e.g. Nordbruch, 2016), and ‘resilience’ is a term with demonstrably defensive and conservative tendencies.

Hardy describes resilience as ‘the ability of an individual community or ecosystem to overcome adversity – to absorb the impact of a shock or disturbance and then to recover effectively’ (Hardy, 2014, p. 77). Hardy



is critical of the language of resilience for a number of reasons. Perhaps the most important at this juncture being its inherently conservative nature: an education set to the task of resilience is one designed to protect that which currently exists, transforming education into a tool of the status quo (Hardy, 2014). This understanding of resilience appears to contradict critical thinking. Ghosh et al. (2016) do not share this concern for an apparent tension between critical openness and resilience however, seeing criticality instead as a core component of resilience. Their writing paints a picture of vulnerable young people susceptible to the persuasion of an extremist narrative, and as such, sees critical thinking as a vital skill in seeing through this myth.

Constructive here, is Richard Paul's delineation between 'weak' and 'strong' critical thinking:

Conceived of in a *weak sense*, critical thinking skills are understood as a set of discrete micro-logical skills ultimately extrinsic to the character of the person; skills that can be tacked onto other learning. In the *strong sense*, critical thinking skills are understood as a set of integrated macro-logical skills ultimately intrinsic to the character of the person and to insight into one's own cognitive and affective purposes. (Paul, 1984, p. 5)

Weak critical thinking is deployed to support preconceived ideas; strong critical thinking is deployed as an ethic with which to approach all ideas. Siegel interprets this distinction by suggesting that weak critical thinkers are 'adept at manipulating argumentative exchanges in such a way that they can always "demonstrate" or at least protect from challenge, those deep-seated beliefs and commitments which they are not willing to explore or reject' (Siegel, 1988, p. 11). In the context of countering extremism through critical thinking, therefore, a key question must be: is critical thinking being deployed simply to demonstrate the virtues of liberal democratic values? What happens if this criticality is deployed solely at extremist ideology, but is never reflected back on liberal thought?

Interestingly, Thayer-Bacon examines the origins of critical thinking in an American context. Thayer-Bacon suggests that these antagonisms have been present since the birth of the concept. Thayer-Bacon examines how critical thinking as a discourse arose in the context of the US's fight against communism. Here, critical thinking was seen as a tool in the fight against indoctrination. Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, Thayer-Bacon also notes the argument that was made, arguing 'how important it is to teach students to be critical thinkers so that America can compete in the global economy and remain the wealthiest nation' (Thayer-Bacon, 1998, p. 124). This tense relationship between critical thinking and power is thus not novel to the concept of critical thinking against extremism. Nevertheless, the deployment of critical thinking in order to challenge an extremist ideology and strengthen 'common' and 'fundamental' values appears particularly problematic. As Mulnix warns: 'Any model of critical thinking that asserts that there are definite ends at which critical thinking aims – in terms of what we should or should not believe, or how we should or should not behave – is deeply suspicious' (Mulnix, 2012, p. 466).

### **Promoting 'Fundamental British Values'**

It's great to be here at this outstanding school, Ninestiles School. Your inspiring teachers and your commitment to British values means you are not just achieving outstanding academic success, but you are building a shared community where children of many faiths and backgrounds learn not just with each other, but from each other too. (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015)

This section examines the origins of Fundamental British Values in debates around citizenship, multiculturalism and security since the beginning of Tony Blair's leadership of the UK in 1997. Over the twenty years of examination, notions of citizenship have been transformed through a lens of security, as multiculturalism has been transformed and abandoned, as new forms of assimilationist policies overshadow integration debates. In many ways, the narratives around multiculturalism, diversity and common values have mirrored the conceptual debate regarding counter-extremism as the production of boundaries on

diverse opinion. These common values provide the boundaries within which diversity is permissible, containing the risk that diversity brings.

According to Pykett (2010), a link between citizenship and security has been present since the late 1990s, when the idea of a specific curriculum of citizenship education for schools was introduced. Pykett argues that the reasons for promoting citizenship education were numerous. Alongside issues such as voter apathy, and pressures for devolution from Scotland and Wales (see also Maylor, 2016), pressures also included an understanding of the ‘alleged threats to “British values” from an increasingly multicultural society’ (Pykett, 2010, p. 622). Such questions of citizenship and security centre on the question of integration.

Since the outset, narratives around citizenship and values have offered double standards for ethnic minorities and the white majority. A key government-commissioned report on the issue, known as the Crick Report, published in 1998, provoked substantial criticism. Critics focused on one key quotation within this report. The report writes: ‘Majorities must respect, understand and tolerate minorities and minorities must learn and respect the laws, codes and conventions as much as the majority – not merely because it is useful to do so, but because this process helps foster common citizenship’ (Crick, 1998, pp. 17-18). Such a distinction between demands made of the majority and minorities attracted criticism, such as from Audrey Osler who argues that the report ‘characterises minorities as having a deficit’ (2008, p. 13). In parallel to discussions surrounding citizenship, Banerjee and Linstead (2001) describe the problematic hierarchy between majority and minority cultures developed in narratives of multiculturalism. These racialised imbalances are present within the UK’s relationship to citizenship, multiculturalism, security and diversity up to the present day with regard to ‘Fundamental British values’.

Two events in 2001 sent shockwaves through the UK establishment, bringing into question the status of integration and diversity in the UK. First, in May, riots occurred in a number of towns in the North of England. Second, in September, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington sent shockwaves around

the world, catalysing the so-called 'Global War on Terror'. As a result of these events, the Muslim population within the UK came under the spotlight.

The riots in the northern English towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, saw predominantly young British Asian men clash with police officers, as well as right-wing English nationalists. While reports on the riots focused on a lack of social and community cohesion (Cantle, 2001), such responses have drawn criticism. Amin argues that the riots catalysed 'a culture of unashamed questioning of the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims' (Amin, 2003, p. 460). Kundnani describes the rioters as a group of people 'deprived of futures, hemmed in on all sides by racism, failed by their own leaders and representatives and unwilling to stand by as, first fascists, and then police officers, invaded their streets' (Kundnani, 2001, p. 105). The institutional response to the riots was to blame 'self-segregation' (Kundnani, 2007)<sup>3</sup>. David Blunkett, then Education Secretary, argued that the riots demonstrated the need for 'core values' (Kundnani, 2002), offering the first of many references between common values and security. Instead, Amin argues, 'the rampage of the Asian youths should be seen in terms of a counter-public making a citizenship claim that cannot be reduced to complaints of ethnic and religious mooring or passing youth masculinity' (Amin, 2003, p. 462). Such claims challenge the establishment response, which focuses on a lack of citizenship, seeing the riots as precisely a claim for citizenship instead.

September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 catalysed a 'crisis in multiculturalism' for many academics and journalists (Kundnani, 2002). Hugo Young, writing in *The Guardian*, is emblematic of this when he wrote: 'The problem is no longer just one of hoisting oppressed communities into membership of a colour-blind majority, but, it now turns out, of establishing the terms on which a religious minority is prepared to acknowledge prime loyalty

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<sup>3</sup> Self-segregation is a recurring theme. Miah examines how this theme emerged later in the context of the 'Trojan Horse scandal': "Muslim Spatial segregation and the 'Trojan Horse' discourse are underpinned by the idea that Muslims self-consciously construct *physical* barriers between Muslims and non-Muslim communities of Birmingham' (2017, p. 19).

to the society in which it lives and works' (Young, Nov. 6, 2001). The question of loyalty frames continuing attitudes towards the British Muslim population: the problematic demand that within supposedly competing identity labels, 'loyalty' to Britain takes priority (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2015). Interestingly, Young's article offers one of the earliest mentions of an attempt to strictly define British values: 'Liberalism is betrayed by other people who put the comfort of immigrant minorities before the insistence of an irreducible list of British civic values: democracy, mutual tolerance, equality of liberty, the rule of law. Let's hear it from the mullahs, right and left' (Young, Nov. 6, 2001).

Four years later, July 2005 proved an equally defining moment in the history of British multiculturalism. Falcous and Silk (2010) examine how discourses of multiculturalism changed in the UK across a 24-hour period. First, London won the competition to host the 2012 Olympics, a bid which rested heavily on narratives of a diverse, united London, and a beacon of multicultural living. The very next day, bombings on the London Underground and bus networks by so-called 'home-grown terrorists' placed multiculturalism immediately in a position of renewed crisis. For many, the attacks signalled the final 'death' of multiculturalism in the UK (Allen, 2015; 2010). Falcous and Silk describe these two events as having 'a contested rhetoric deployed across the political spectrum [with multiculturalism] as both the "cure" for national unification (...) and the "problem"' (Falcous & Silk, 2010, p. 168).

The attacks of July 2005 signalled for the UK leadership a need to reassess the question of identity and diversity in British communities. As Meer and Modood write, it was a 'coupling of diversity and anti-terrorism agendas that has implicated contemporary British multiculturalism as the culprit of Britain's security woes' (2009, p. 481). In January 2006, Gordon Brown, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, argued that the bombings signalled a need to re-evaluate 'the balance between diversity and integration' (Brown, 2006), as if the two were mutually exclusive. What was required, Brown argues, was the promotion of shared values, which 'define what it means to be British in the modern world... liberty for all, responsibility by all, and fairness to all' (Brown, 2006). In evoking Britishness, Jerome and Clemitshaw (2012) note that

Brown made a concerted effort to grapple issues of patriotism and nationalism away from right-wing nationalists, through the preferred language of citizenship. Furthermore, Osler (2009) notes how it was education that was asked to play a key role in realising these values. Kundnani notes: ‘The new conventional wisdom is that a set of “core values” is the glue that must hold Britishness together... these core values would also be the mechanism by which limits could be set on multiculturalism’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 25). Such limits, Kundnani argues, result from a fear of multiculturalism that was confirmed in the 2005 bombings. Kundnani summarises this argument: ‘Multiculturalism has encouraged Muslims to separate themselves and live by their own values, resulting in extremism, and ultimately, the fostering of a mortal homegrown terrorist threat’ (Kundnani, 2007, p. 26).

This notion of limits on multiculturalism, interestingly picked up by Young in his article in 2001, appears to set the boundaries within which diversity can be managed, offering fascinating synergy with the definition of counter-extremism, examined in the previous chapter, as the setting of limits on permissible attitudes and opinion. Banerjee and Linstead trace the origins of multiculturalism within the context of discourses of globalisation, and the need for ‘*managing the consequences* of cultural diversity’ (2001, p. 702, original emphasis) resulting from increased migration. They argue that ‘globalisation produces a tension between sameness and difference, between the universal and the particular’ (ibid., p. 696), and employ the term ‘multicultural nationalism’ (ibid., p. 703) to describe the production of limits on diversity within national boundaries. A consumption of diverse cultures and cultural artefacts is produced: ‘This celebration of cultural pluralism is predicated on an established hierarchy of cultures and multiculturalism consolidates these hegemonic relations without challenging the hierarchy of the majority and the minority’ (Banerjee & Linstead, 2001, p. 704). Later, they add: ‘As long as we do not threaten the dominant ideology, we can be as multicultural as we like’ (ibid., p. 707).

The election of the Conservative-led coalition government in 2010 saw an intensification of the discourse of Britishness, through both speech and policy. The 2011 review of the Prevent strategy saw ‘fundamental

British values' enshrined within the definition of extremism. Furthermore, a series of key speeches by Prime Minister David Cameron, most notably in Munich in February 2011, set out a renewed policy of assimilation, and so-called 'muscular liberalism'. From the point of Cameron's leadership, the discursive linkage of British values and security really began to grow stronger, as did the demands made of schools to promote such values.

The so-called 'Trojan Horse Scandal' cemented the need for both schools to promote fundamental British values, as well as for greater scrutiny over what schools were in fact teaching with regard to national identity and citizenship. The government responded to the scandal by intensifying schools' responsibility towards fundamental British values from one of needing to 'respect' the values, to needing to 'actively promote' them (Long, 2016). Furthermore, the school inspectorate, Ofsted introduced, in their November 2014 Inspections Handbook that they would inspect schools on their ability to promote these values (Ofsted, 2014).

### ***Contested: Exclusionary values defining the 'really' British***

In academic scholarship, the discourse surrounding the values has been challenged on a number of fronts: scholars have challenged the foundational assumption that diversity poses a threat to social cohesion; scholars have challenged the values themselves; and scholars have examined how problematic it has been to attempt to introduce these values into schools.

Writers have challenged the links made between diversity and security. Edyvane, for example, writes that 'the Britishness agenda... takes far too much for granted in its presumption that disagreement about core values tends inexorably to the failure of society, that the flourishing society is a broadly harmonious society' (2011, p. 90). Kundnani notes that 'the thesis of a slippery slope from segregation to extremism to terrorism... was widely accepted despite its inconsistency with the actual biographies of terrorists' (2007, p. 27).

The values themselves have also been challenged. Goodwin (Nov. 11, 2014) challenges whether respecting unjust laws was a value in a democracy. Others examine the label 'British'. Allen (2015, p. 3), Healy, (2018, p. 10), Maylor (2016, p. 315), and Osler (2009, p. 86) all challenge whether the values are uniquely 'British'. Busher et al. found that teachers felt unsure how labelling these values as British could comprise a component of an 'inclusive curriculum' (Busher, Choudhury, Thomas & Harris, 2017, p. 6). Similarly, Habib found teachers 'wary about promoting patriotic agendas' (2018, p. 57), adding that it could lead to racism (ibid., p. 59). Karlsen and Nazroo argue that the discourse surrounding Britishness presents the country as 'superior, successful and dominating' (2015, p. 763). Arthur (2015), Lander (2016), and Maylor (2016) criticise the emphasis the discourse makes on ethnic minorities, and Muslim communities in particular, to change to meet the values criteria, whereas other communities are not asked to. Miah (2017, p. 5) argues that the 'values discourse constructs Muslims as racial outsiders'. Elton-Chalcraft et al. conclude that 'no amount of superficial flag-waving will enable BME [black and minority ethnic] pupils to be more British because the notion is implicitly racialised' (2017, p. 42). Winter and Mills (2018, p. 6) argue that 'these policies contribute to racial governance under neoliberalism through the continued targeting of certain racialised community groups for surveillance, management and containment'. Arthur destabilises the discourse's inference that ethnic minorities lack these values:

The Muslim community's focus is largely local with an emphasis on religious faith, traditional family and community values. Much of this virtue positive response would have not been out of step with the values of an older British generation. It can be difficult to see who better reflects traditional British values, conservative Muslim communities or secularised materialist youth groups. (Arthur, 2015, p. 315)

Keddie (2014) associates the values with 'whiteness', criticising the emphasis placed on minorities to assimilate (see also Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017, p. 33). Moreover, not only are these values described as



‘white’, supporters of the values, including then Prime Minister David Cameron, have described them as ‘Christian’: ‘They are Christian values and they should give us the confidence to say yes, we are a Christian country and we are proud of it. But they are also values that speak to everyone in Britain – to people of every faith and none’ (Cameron, Mar. 27, 2016; see also Peterson & Bentley, 2016). Wemyss explores how this disparity in expectations of different ethnic groups, in relation to wider narratives of tolerance, creates a ‘hierarchy of belonging’, explaining how ‘those who are at the top of a hierarchy of belonging have the power to grant or withhold tolerance from those at the bottom’ (Wemyss, 2006, p. 235). Worryingly, Lander suggests that these problematic components of the British values discourse are compounded by a lack of teacher training, which transforms teachers into little more than ‘instruments of the state within a liberal democracy’ (Lander, 2016, p. 276). Lander continues:

This positioning has been cemented by the lack of training in how to teach about British values and the diminution of critical spaces in which to trouble and disrupt their positioning. So teachers and student teachers rely on nostalgic imperialist constructions of Britishness thus re-inscribing not only the whiteness associated with this national identity... (Lander, 2016, p. 276)

Other scholars have examined how teachers have responded to their requirement to promote British values. Jerome and Clemitshaw conducted research at an early stage in the introduction of Britishness to the classroom. They found that teachers

were overwhelmingly sceptical about being asked to deliver what they considered to be propaganda-like messages through their teaching, and on the whole they were much happier with the idea of teaching practices which model democratic values, rather than seeking to inculcate them through direct didactic teaching approaches. (Jerome & Clemitshaw, 2012, p. 38)

Maylor (2016) observed teachers nervous to teach British values for fear of excluding ethnic minorities. In conversation with pupils, Maylor also noted that pupils suggested that in class, when discussing these values, they tended to focus on what made people *different* rather than on what people had in *common*. Additionally, as Farrell (2016) discovered, not all teachers were entirely against the idea of promoting these values, seeing them as universal values and believing there was room to critically appropriate them. Two factors appear uncomfortable to teachers therefore: the ‘British’ label, and their didactic teaching.

This section has examined why fundamental British values have come to be valued as a key component of a counter-extremism in schools strategy, exploring how they have become seen as a key tool in providing a foundational level of common values to challenge the insecurity brought about by increasing levels of segregation and poor social cohesion in society. However, the section has also explored just how contested this value component is. In particular, the lack of empirical support to prove the link between segregation and insecurity was emphasised, alongside an examination of how the values discourse perpetuates low levels of social cohesion. The values discourse clearly nominates a group who are already British and a group who need to integrate or assimilate in order to be accepted. Lastly, the section explored the various studies that have examined how the values teaching component of the counter-extremism strategy has been implemented in schools. In particular, the clear antagonism between values promotion and promoting tolerance and diversity became evident.

### **The Knowledge Base: Extremism, Citizenship and other Cultures**

That schools should expand the knowledge of their students is perhaps obvious, and in the context of countering extremism, this is certainly no different. Yet, unlike ‘fundamental British values’, which are spelled out clearly in government documentation, or critical thinking, which is discussed at length in both the education and extremism literature as well as in its own field, what this knowledge should be is far less clear. Instead, the word ‘knowledge’ is normally deployed with little explanation or clarification: ‘young people need relevant and timely learning opportunities to develop the knowledge, skills and attitudes that

can help them build their resilience’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 9). Alternatively, clarifications of what this knowledge might entail are shielded behind the phrase, ‘a broad and balanced curriculum’ (P1). As such, insight and clarity is required in order to ascertain what such ‘knowledge’ actually entails.

Yet, within government guidance and school policies, three aspects to this knowledge can be spelled out. First, there is knowledge of extremist narratives, and the risks involved in terrorism; second, there is knowledge about other cultures, faiths and values; and third, there is knowledge of political systems, citizenship and political engagement.<sup>4</sup>

RAN suggests a key objective of counter-radicalisation education is ‘to enhance knowledge, awareness and critical thinking on the nature of terrorism, the phenomenon of radicalisation, and the radicalisation process leading to violent extremism’ (RAN, 2018, p. 55). Some schools focus more explicitly on countering extremist narratives. As one school policy put it, ‘we will all strive to eradicate the myths and assumptions that can lead to some young people becoming alienated and disempowered’ (P3, p. 5). The 2008 toolkit, *Learning to Be Safe*, demands ‘a curriculum adapted to recognise local need, challenge extremist narratives and promote universal rights’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 9).

Second, schools must develop knowledge and awareness of other cultures, faiths and ways of life. *Learning to be safe* argues that ‘the role of religious education (RE), citizenship and history will be particularly critical in developing a stronger shared understanding of and respect for culture, belief and heritage’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 28). The National Union of Teachers (NUT) promotes teachers ‘helping students develop knowledge of religion, history, geography, citizenship’ (NUT, 2016, p. 4). UNESCO suggests students

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<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, when it comes to teaching materials that are designed specifically to fulfil schools’ counter-extremism obligations, the knowledge component focuses far more heavily on teaching about extremism and terrorism than the other two elements mentioned here. While some knowledge of political systems is disseminated within materials discussing the British value of democracy, these latter two components tend to be tackled through wider school curricula.

‘acquire knowledge and understanding of local, national and global issues and the interconnectedness and interdependency of different countries and populations’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 20). Such a proposal appears to rely on an understanding of extremism that emphasises an intolerance of others. Through being exposed to other cultures and other ideas, young people will become more willing to accept alternative values and ideas as being legitimate.

Third, schools should improve students’ knowledge of political structures, and the mechanisms through which political engagement is both possible and permissible – often through their citizenship lessons: ‘In Citizenship, pupils learn about democracy, government and how laws are made and upheld. Pupils are also taught about the diverse national, regional, religious and ethnic identities in the United Kingdom and the need for respect and understanding’ (Department for Education, 2015, p. 8). Moreover, such knowledge, the UK Government argues, can help promote fundamental British values. The Government asks schools to enhance students’ awareness of democratic decision-making processes, laws, law-making, and the reasons why laws exist, as well as the fundamentals of the UK political systems such as the separation of the executive and judiciary (Department for Education, 2014, pp. 5-6). This appears to deploy education to meet the third aspect of counter-extremism explored in the previous chapter: the promotion of non-violent forms of political engagement. In this regard, the literature suggests that education can offer alternative routes to political engagement, rather than violence. Davies argues that ‘it is about opening up, presenting *alternatives* to understandings and actions’ (Davies, 2008, p. 60, original emphasis). Sieckelinck and de Ruyter’s examination of ‘reasonable passion’ is emblematic here. They do not aim to change the ideals which young people hold on to, but ‘what is required, rather, is awareness of and guidance regarding the manner in which individuals dedicate themselves to their ideals’ (Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009, p. 183).

***Contestation: what do we really know about these issues?***

The previous chapter examined just how unstable knowledge of extremism and radicalisation is at an academic and policy level. That teachers should be able to transmit this unstable, contested and poorly

supported knowledge to their students appears a particularly daunting challenge. The chapter also explored how knowledge around extremism and radicalisation contributes to the transformation of Muslim communities into ‘suspect communities’. There is a real danger therefore that teachers, when developing classes on the risks of terrorism, build on and further embed, such alienating narratives. Lander (2016), as explored above, fears that the promotion of British values will lead to teachers deploying problematic and colonial notions of Britishness as a result of poor levels of training, and it is not unlikely that such narratives could equally be deployed when teaching about extremism.

Furthermore, the uncertainty over the body of knowledge extends also to the component regarding legitimate political engagement. This was made clear when a police officer delivering training to teachers about the Prevent duty in West Yorkshire suggested that non-violent direct action was a form of extremism. The officer cited a recent case of the Green Party MP Caroline Lucas’ arrest at an anti-fracking demonstration as an example of extremism (Bloom, Sep. 4, 2015). That teachers will, whether through fear or lack of adequate training, promote a particularly narrow understanding of legitimate political engagement is a real concern.

Beyond a question of whether the uncertain and unstable body of knowledge that will be taught may lead to the transmission of deeply problematic and divisive narratives, other studies have examined the issue of teacher training. Peterson and Bentley for example, conducting research into the parallel introduction of ‘Australian values’ to the Australian counter-extremism in schools strategy, warn that ‘it is likely to be the case that many teachers are not confident or comfortable enough to teach explicitly about representations of Islam in a balanced and informed manner’ (Peterson & Bentley, 2016, p. 242). Alternatively, Ahmed (Apr. 28, 2015) expresses how Muslim teachers are nervous about broaching the topic for fear of being labelled extremists themselves.

Overall, the challenge of teaching the topics of extremism, world faiths, and democratic systems is an enormous one that teachers must face. Teachers must cope with problematic and contested bodies of knowledge, a lack of training, and pressures from regulators and government bodies that promote narrow understandings of democratic engagement. Scholars suggest that these challenges faced by teachers, could well lead to problematic messages directed to students. Teachers may well fall back on stereotypical narratives that could prove more divisive than inclusive, working against the objectives of the strategy.

### **Contradictions: three components pulling a strategy in opposite directions**

It is clear that the three components of the UK's counter-extremism in schools strategy are heavily contested. The 'developing skills' component relies on a poorly defined notion of critical thinking, which when deployed in the task of 'building resilience' to extremist narrative, belies a core component of critical thinking: a reflexive openness to one's own beliefs. The 'promoting values' component assumes that 'shared values' will lead to social cohesion, yet the very language within the term 'fundamental British values' has been shown to be so exclusionary as to make that aim of social cohesion even harder to reach. Lastly, the 'disseminating knowledge' component demands that teachers transmit a body of knowledge on the issues of extremism and radicalisation to their students. Yet, as the last chapter examined, that body of knowledge is based on weak empirical support, is divisive, and is heavily contested. Whether teachers are equipped to transmit that knowledge, and whether that knowledge alienates ethnic minorities and Muslims in particular, are two key questions that are of profound concern.

Yet, these components are not just contested, they are also contradictory (see figure 3.2). That is, each of the three components intends to take the counter-extremism in schools strategy in different directions. As a whole, combining these vastly different frameworks, the strategy appears confused and unproductive. This section briefly outlines these contradictions, before building the core research question of the thesis, which aims to examine how this contested and contradictory strategy manifests itself in discourses within teaching materials on the topic.




Figure 3.2: The contradictory education strategy (source: author)

While skills and values are, as examined above, so often combined together within the literature, and causal relationships are often inferred between skills and values, these two components of the strategy demand vastly different things of teachers and students. It was demonstrated above that critical thinking is a skill that puts the status quo in a position of uncertainty, as a key component of critical thinking is to reflect and analyse the current common sense answer to a question. Yet, the ‘fundamental British values’ are definitively *fundamental*. The strategy appears to demand that students discover a predefined set of fundamental values through a critical process of discovery. Such a paradox appears impossible. How can one engage critically with fundamental values?

There is more room for synergy rather than contradiction when examining the ‘skills development’ and ‘disseminating knowledge’ components of the strategy. The knowledge component, unlike the values

component, does not rely on fundamental truths to be transmitted. One could conceive of teachers developing a critical approach with students to this body of knowledge. Students are required to develop knowledge of terrorism and extremism, its risks, and the ways in which its propaganda operate. There is nothing to suggest that teachers could not express the uncertainty and contestation of this knowledge to their students; in fact, it appears a ripe venue for students to practice key skills. Moreover, the body of knowledge to be transmitted also includes knowledge of UK political systems and practices of democratic engagement. Teachers could well plan a lesson (or series of lessons) that aimed to critically explore current UK political practices – it could examine claims of elitism, explore debates around political reform, and even examine issues regarding human rights law and the deportation or detention of terrorist suspects in the UK.

However, to do so would appear to undermine the fundamental logic of counter-extremism within the Prevent strategy, namely, the promotion of a set of moderate values, and resilient defence against extremist ideology. Schools must also promote ‘fundamental British values’. Crucially, when examining the regulatory mechanisms by which schools and teachers are evaluated, such critical practices could demonstrate the undermining of, rather than active promotion of, the values. As such, there is a very real danger that in examining the knowledge that is required to be transmitted, critical thinking might be applied only in a ‘weak’ sense. That is, narratives of extremism might be explored critically (in order for students to develop the skills of resilience to see through propaganda), but that critical perspective might not be reflected back onto the core tenets of liberal democracy, so as to not endanger a school’s commitment to promoting ‘fundamental British values’.

There is a further tension between the knowledge and values components. The promotion of fundamental British values is designed to extend to students an understanding of the commonalities that are shared by all citizens of the UK. Yet, research has shown that this objective is undermined by the fact that lessons on these values emphasise differences rather than similarities. Moreover, the clear dualism of teaching about



‘us’ and teaching about ‘them’ within the knowledge component appears in danger of further undermining a sense of togetherness. Such an emphasis appears in danger of contradicting the pluralism at the heart of the ‘fundamental British values’. The question exists therefore as to what extent transmitting knowledge about extremism and terrorism to students is endangering the togetherness that shared values intend to engender.

In sum, this chapter argues that the aims and objectives of the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy are contested and contradictory. This thesis will present a deep, critical analysis of these tensions, by examining how this contestation and contradiction manifests itself at a classroom level. As Smith notes, ‘the exact nature of how such changes have been interpreted by schools is not yet known’ (Smith, 2016, p. 306). Thus far, critical research into the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy has tended to focus either on the surveillance aspect of the Prevent duty, or on ‘fundamental British values’. Moreover, this research has examined each of these aspects in isolation from the other components of the strategy. This thesis argues that there is need for research that examines how each of these component objectives interrelates with one another. This thesis will achieve this, as the next chapter examines in detail, by analysing teaching materials used to fulfil school’s counter-extremism obligations, in order to explore how these objectives translate into a classroom context.

The intentions of the analysis are two-fold. Firstly, it intends to explore the ways in which the apparent not working of the strategy presents challenges when writers produce teaching materials to fulfil the obligations of the strategy. Secondly, it attempts to go beyond this in developing a critical analysis to examine what is working through this apparent not-working. Through placing teaching materials under the critical microscope, much wider implications of counter-extremism can be examined and deconstructed. As such, the thesis develops the following exploratory research question: *How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest themselves in a classroom context?*

# 4

## Methodology

### Developing a Discourse Theory Approach

Without language, the social world, full of objects to which we ascribe particular meanings, and between which we ascribe particular relationships, would not exist. The material world would; it is not that the objects themselves disappear. The social world, however, is a product of meaning-making, and thus a product of language. It is in this sense that every utterance of language contributes to the continued construction of that social world. Newspapers, for example, construct political events, deciding which events we label as ‘important’, which events are ‘tragic’, and whose private lives are deemed ‘public’.

For young people, school teaching materials play a vital role in constructing the social world in which they grow up. They tell teachers and students alike not only stories about the past, building images of proud nation-states, and battles which defended freedom, but also they tell teachers and students what kinds of knowledge are to be valued, and what kinds of intelligence are the most worthy. As such, teaching materials are valuable artefacts for research. They can tell researchers enormous amounts both about societal discourses on particular issues, as well as the implications of particular educational policies and strategies.

The goal of this thesis is to use a set of teaching materials as a prism through which to examine how the political realms of extremism and counter-extremism are constructed, as well as how the world *post*-extremism is envisioned to look, once extremism has been dealt with. The research takes the contradictions, tensions and antagonisms at the heart of counter-extremism education and asks, not just what does this apparent not-working look like when it is translated into teaching materials, but what is working through its apparent not-working?

This chapter explores how the thesis aims to achieve its goals. It will do so through developing a post-structuralist discourse theory approach. In so doing, the thesis aims not to adjudicate whether the aims and objectives of the strategy are *met* in a classroom context, but instead to examine the ways in which the aims and objectives are *built and conceptualised* within a classroom setting. Moreover, it aims to explore the significance of such constructions through a process of critique.

This chapter intends to first outline the paradigm in which this research is located. As Guba and Lincoln note, ‘questions of method are secondary to questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways’ (1994, p. 105). As such, before examining the method of this thesis, it is vital to explicitly express its paradigm. Guba and Lincoln delineate three components to this paradigm: ontology, epistemology and methodology, asking, ‘what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be known about it?’ ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?’ and ‘How can the inquirer (would-be knower) go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?’ respectively (ibid., p. 108). This chapter then seeks initially to answer these questions, through building the post-structuralist/social constructionist paradigm in which this thesis is located. Guba and Lincoln (ibid.) acknowledge, however, that in social constructionist/constructivist<sup>5</sup> paradigms, the distinction between ontology and epistemology becomes somewhat blurred as one so strongly feeds off the other. As such, the chapter first begins by, in combination, exploring the ontological and epistemological assumptions at the heart of post-structuralist thought, before examining Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory – the framework shaping the research in question. From

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<sup>5</sup> In many social sciences, including political science and international relations (e.g. Heath-Kelly 2016) the term ‘constructivism’ is used synonymously with the term ‘social constructionism’, a term more popular amongst social psychologists (Gergen 1999, p. 30). This thesis will employ the term social constructionism to encompass both terms.

here, the chapter then moves to examine the methodology and methods deployed to answer the research question.

### **The research paradigm: social constructionism, discourse and deconstruction**

At its broadest level, the thesis adopts a social constructionist paradigm. Adopting this paradigm of social constructionism has both epistemological and ontological consequences, offering both an understanding of what reality is around us, and how we have access to knowledge of that reality. The social constructionist paradigm has been deployed in both educational settings (Lather, 1992), and in work on terrorism and extremism (Heath-Kelly, 2016). Social constructionism offers an epistemological framework, which challenges empirical and positivist truth claims by exploring how all claims to truth and knowledge are derived within social contexts (Gergen, 1999). Yet, social constructionism is ontological also, in that it offers a framework through which scholars come to understand language as being constitutive of the world around us, not just our knowledge of it.

Social constructionism builds from a structuralist account of language (Burr, 2003), which challenges what Frowe terms a ‘representational’ account: the idea that ‘language is “anchored” in the world... language is connected with something else, an extra-linguistic reality’ (Frowe, 2001, p. 176). Instead, structuralists argue that a word’s meaning is neither derived from a relationship of representation to reality, nor something intrinsic to the word itself, but through its relationship to other words. As Heath-Kelly explains: ‘you know what any given word represents because it is situated within a structure of other words, and it obtains its meaning through contrast and juxtaposition. Simply put, you know what *cat* is because it isn’t *dog*’ (Heath-Kelly, 2016, p. 61). These words, or ‘signifiers’, bear no actual relationship to that which they label, the ‘signified’. Bearing on relationships to other signifiers, they are *arbitrary* labels. Rather than there being a relationship between a label and its object, there is in fact a gap. Any notion that our understanding of the world is tethered to the material world is thus broken. Instead, our known world is constructed in the social

contexts in which we operate, and is perpetually re-constructed through the deployment of language, constituting the world.

Structuralists argue that while this network of meaning-giving signifiers may indeed be arbitrary, it becomes fixed in a web of meaning, and it is this network-structure of meaning that allows us to ‘know’ the world around us (Burr, 2003). *Post*-structuralists challenge the structuralist account on two counts. First, they argue that relations of *power* run through the web of contrasting relationships between signifiers. Drawing from Jacques Derrida’s critique of logocentrism – ‘the belief in orders of meaning, reason or logic that exist independently of language or text’ (Burman & MacLure, 2005, p. 285) – post-structuralists argue, akin to structuralists, that language is defined by its opposite, existing in dichotomous relationships (Edkins, 2007). However, these ‘conceptual oppositions are never simply neutral but are inevitably hierarchical’ (Devetak, 2009, p. 195) – white/black; good/evil; man/woman – each opposition having a dominant term. Every labelling act is thus an expression of power, of dominance or resistance; all language is political, either reinforcing or challenging relations of power in the world. Take labelling someone as an ‘extremist’ for instance. Instantly, such a claim also conjures up someone as the ‘moderate’, and a hierarchy between them is formed, with moderate being the dominant term.

Second, post-structuralists argue that the network of signifiers is not fixed but instead permanently contested and in flux, contested both by its linguistic opposite, and by alternative labels excluded in the signification process. ‘Deconstruction’, is the label post-structuralists offer to the process of exposing these contestations and the power relations attempting to hide them. As Devetak notes, ‘Deconstruction attempts to show that such oppositions are untenable, as each term *always already* depends on the other. Indeed, the prized term gains its privilege only by disavowing its dependence on the subordinate or debased term’ (2009, p. 195). The reliance of the dominant term on the subordinate term leaves the terms in perpetual contestation, unable to permanently mask that arbitrary nature of its dominance. Deconstruction renders these hierarchies visible and seeks to expose ‘aporias’, ‘points of impasse – where the integrity of the


opposition is fatally compromised' (Burman & MacLure, 2005, p. 285) – those moments where the linguistic hierarchy becomes untenable.

Furthermore, not only are terms themselves reliant on their opposite, they are reliant on continued dominance of excluded, yet competing, terms or labels. As such, 'post-structuralism's focus is on the remainder, all that is left over after the systematic categorisations have been made' (Lather, 1992, p. 90). As Edkins notes, the arbitrary notion of labelling suggests that the chosen label is but one of innumerable labelling options, and as such the labelling process is a *political* process of exclusion – what she terms the 'excess' or 'lack': 'the lack or the excess can be explained by noting that once something has been named, that something both *never lives up to* the name it is given and is *always more than* the name can encompass' (Edkins, 2007, p. 93). A 'mother' both can never fulfil the perfect expression of 'motherhood' and concurrently is not just 'mother' but also 'sister', 'dancer', 'engineer' or 'activist'.

If all labelling is political, then the objectivity claimed by empiricism and positivism is cast in doubt. While empirical scientific accounts of the world may lay claim to authoritative truth claims, the very fact that those claims can only be made through linguistic mechanisms means those claims will be imbued with relations of power, and normative claims of the ways in which the world should be or operate (Gergen, 1999). Not only is this challenge vital to recognise in the context of research, but also in the classroom context, where every teaching moment is a normative claim and a moment of contestation in the perpetual re-constitution of our social reality. It is within this contestation that the criticality of post-structuralist research emerges, as Burr explains: 'With the poststructuralist view of language we are drawn into a view of talk, writing and social encounters as sites of struggle and conflict, where power relations are acted out and contested' (2003, p. 55). Critical, deconstructionist scholarship for Edkins (1999) thus entails bringing the political 'back in', through horizontalising the process through which one label is prioritised over another. The centrality of a 'critical' approach to post-structuralist and deconstructionist research is recognised in this thesis. By adopting a critical approach, this thesis acknowledges the impossibility of an

objective theory, and instead examines the power relations underlying the continued support of particular theories over others (Cox, 1981). The thesis moreover acknowledges the historical roots of social constructionism in critical scholarship. As Gergen notes: ‘The central hope of social constructionist practitioners is to bring forth new and more promising ways of life’ (1999). It is this process of rendering visible the political and exclusionary nature of labelling that this thesis terms ‘deconstructionism’, done so in the hope that through rendering visible the hidden lines holding the fragile state of current knowledge together, new forms of knowledge can emerge.

## A social constructionist research pyramid



*Figure 4.1: Research pyramid (source: author)*

Having stated the theoretical assumptions at the heart of the thesis, the chapter can now build its ‘research pyramid’ (see figure 4.1). As such, a post-structuralist or social constructionist paradigm is relativist in its ontology. Guba and Lincoln express relativism as an understanding that ‘realities are apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature (...), and dependent for their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the

constructions' (1994, pp. 110-111). If the world is built from a set of multiple potential realities, and these realities compete for dominance, then it becomes the post-structuralist researcher's task to uncover how and why one reality comes to dominate. It is important to note here, that while the social constructionist framework offers a relativist ontology, it remains at a distance from the philosophical school of idealism, in that it does not deny the existence of the material world.<sup>6</sup> Edley (2001) negotiates this challenge by suggesting that social constructionism offers an epistemological, rather than an ontological claim, yet, social constructionists, and here post-structuralist accounts in particular, are making claims on the nature of reality and what can be known about it.<sup>7</sup> In particular, as shall be explored in the context of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, this relativist account argues that while the material world may exist *a priori* to language, the *social* world, and the subjects within it, does not.

Within both a post-structuralist and social constructionist framework, the thesis acknowledges 'discourse' as the core epistemological framework for understanding how language structures our world and our knowledge of it. Within the context of a web of signifiers, built in relationships of contrast and juxtaposition, a discourse provides a key building block through which those linkages between signifiers are made; a building block that not only provides discursive links between different ideas (the terrorism discourse for example links together 'terrorism' with 'illegitimacy'), but also constructs the world (of 'states', and 'militant groups'), and the subjects within it ('victims', and 'villains'). While discourse, and its multifarious forms of analyses, has been deployed under numerous ontological or epistemological paradigms (Milliken, 1999), this thesis adopts the post-structuralist discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,

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<sup>6</sup> See Edwards et al. (1995) for a robust (and entertaining) response to the criticism that social constructionists are arguing the material world does not exist.

<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, Zulaika (2016) does in fact question the ontology of terrorism, through exploring the numerous cases in which terrorism *does not* exist in the context of empty threats or bluffs, and thwarted attacks. Zulaika explores whether the fear or fantasy of the terrorist attack are enough to suggest that terrorism exists without in fact a material act occurring.



offering a robust and detailed theory through which to transform a discursive mass (a corpus of data) into components prone for analysis and critique.

Laclau and Mouffe share a number of the assumptions outlined above, beginning from the assumption, as Leurs articulates, where ‘meanings are differential in nature; they are established in relation to other meanings, without a fixed reference point in the “real”’ (2012, p. 34). Moreover, these phenomena are never fixed, as in a structuralist account, but perpetually contested (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). From this foundation, Laclau and Mouffe offer a unique vocabulary in their exploration of how discourses are constructed. Language is built up of a number of different ‘signs’. These signs begin as ‘elements’ – ‘signs whose meanings have not yet been fixed’ (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 27). Through the process of ‘articulation’, a process ‘establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 91), a ‘discourse’ emerges. These elements are thus changed into ‘moments’ when ‘articulated within a discourse’ (ibid.), contested by the remaining elements excluded in the articulation – what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as a ‘surplus of meaning’ (ibid., p.97) floating, as they describe, in a ‘field of discursivity’ (ibid., p. 98). As I argue elsewhere, ‘discourses are but temporary homes for these free-flowing elements, stuck in a temporary moment, perpetually threatened by alternative conceptualisations of phenomena’ (Ford, 2017b, p. 124). The deployment of the term ‘moment’ illustrates a discourse’s impermanence, as Laclau and Mouffe note, ‘the transition from the “elements” to the “moments” is never entirely fulfilled’ (2001, p. 97).

Two further features of this theory of discourse are vital for the current research: no reality exists outside of the discursive realm, and subjectivity does not precede discourse.

Laclau and Mouffe reject a distinction made in other forms of discourse analysis (e.g. that of Norman Fairclough) – that there are two realms: the discursive and the non-discursive. Instead, they argue, ‘every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive

condition of emergence' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 93). In other words, no object can be understood outside of the context of a discourse. A friendly wave for example can only be understood through the discourse of gesture, and the discursive relationship between the subjects giving and receiving the wave; a chair can only be understood within the discourse in which it is placed: an office chair, a 'naughty chair', a 'throne'. Outside of that discourse, while a material object may exist<sup>8</sup>, understanding of that object persists within and constitutes discourse. Laclau and Mouffe do not deny the material world nor suggest the world is purely discursive, but instead argue that discourses are themselves material (2001, p. 94) – in this context, 'materialised' in a series of activities presented in teaching materials.

Secondly, akin to other post-structuralist thinkers such as Jenny Edkins who argued that 'language speaks the subject' (1999, p. 41), Laclau and Mouffe reject the notion of an *a priori* subject, existing outside of the discursive realm. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe refer to 'subject positions': 'Whenever we use the category of "subject" in this text, we will do so in the sense of "subject positions" within a discursive structure. Subjects cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense of being endowed with powers that render an experience possible – as all "experience" depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 101). A subject only exists *within* a discourse. This notion of subjectivity appears akin to that developed by Louis Althusser in his discussion of 'interpellation'. That, in acknowledging the call of 'hey you there' from a police officer in a crowded street, the individual called turns around: 'By this mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*' (Althusser, 1971, p. 163). The social order in which those subject positions are designated, are (re)constituted in that very moment of articulation. This distinction is particularly key in the context of this

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<sup>8</sup> As in the discussion above, Laclau and Mouffe are at pains to distance themselves from the realism/idealism debate: 'The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of "natural phenomena" or "expressions of the wrath of God", depends upon the structuring of a discursive field' (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, p. 94).

research, as it asks at various moments how the subject position of ‘student’, ‘citizen’, ‘terrorist’, ‘critical thinker’ or ‘Briton’ may be constructed and constituted.

### **Methodology and Method: Deconstruction and critical discourse analysis**

While this thesis allocates deconstruction the label ‘methodology’, it is something notoriously difficult to define, and certainly is antithetical as a school of thought to the notion of ‘method’ (Burman & MacLure, 2005; Thomassen, 2010). There is not one method of deconstruction; such a notion of a closed, unitary process would be inimical to the very theoretical foundation on which deconstruction stands. Furthermore, deconstruction challenges the idea of ‘analysis’. While in more positivistic settings, analysis would entail the distant calculations and assessment of a set of data, deconstructionist analysis is seen to play a part in the construction of knowledge: ‘Deconstruction as method is not given *to* the individual deconstructions but partially articulated and, hence, constituted *through* them’ (Thomassen, 2010, p. 44). While deconstruction as method(ology) appears somewhat contradictory, Burman and MacLure do helpfully offer three principles by which to guide a deconstructionist research process: ‘see the world, your data and yourself as *text*, with all that that implies... look for the binary oppositions in texts... challenge the taken-for-granted’ (2005, p. 286). As such, in developing both a method and a form of analysis, the thesis acknowledges the constitutive role played by this research in producing knowledge on the subject, and of the role of the researcher in being both a product of, and contributor to, discourse. The method taken in this research attempts to take these principles on board, in combination with the analytical tools offered by the field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS).

During the first decade of the new millennium, in which counter-terrorism strategies and laws became more and more expansive, research on the threat of terrorism was being produced in vast quantities not before seen (Gunning, 2007; Breen-Smyth, Gunning, Jackson, Kassimeris & Robinson, 2008). CTS began from an evident frustration among some terrorism scholars that the bulk of this terrorism research was both not addressing a series of empirical and methodological flaws, nor was it capable of addressing the wide range

of human rights abuses and injustices engendered by the Global War on Terror (Gunning, 2007; Jackson, 2007a). CTS extends from two foundational perspectives. One is a critique of ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies, the second is a set of commitments or approaches relating to epistemology, ontology and ethics (Jackson, 2007a).

As Jackson (2007a) makes clear, CTS’ critiques of orthodox terrorism studies are extensive, and include: its empirical weakness and lack of primary research, its state-centric nature, and its embeddedness in an industry surrounding counter-terrorism that reproduces hegemonies such as the legitimacy of state violence (see also Breen-Smyth et al., 2008, and Gunning, 2007). Gunning (2007) suggests that orthodox and critical terrorism studies can be distinguished through deploying the distinction Robert Cox (1981) makes between critical and problem-solving theory. Orthodox terrorism studies might be characterised as the latter. Problem-solving theory ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Critical approaches begin from Cox’s oft-cited perspective that ‘theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose’ (ibid.), and seek to understand who that someone and purpose are, and why the world has been constructed in such a way. CTS presents itself as an alternative approach to the study of terrorism. In Jackson’s words ‘CTS refers to terrorism-related research that self-consciously adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs’ (2007a, p. 246). Importantly with regards to this thesis, while CTS is now an established body of work, the concept of extremism remains under-examined from this explicitly critical framework.

The epistemological commitment of CTS stems from a post-positivist framework for understanding the socially-embedded and contextual nature of knowledge production (Jackson, 2007a). Knowledge surrounding terrorism or extremism is collectively produced in a cultural context and is thus an expression of power. CTS seeks to examine such expressions of power. ‘CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism

knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?’ (Jackson, 2007a, p. 246). As such, a great deal of CTS work entails various modes of discourse analysis (Jackson, 2005 offers one of the earliest examples of this). It is important to note that not one model of CDA has been employed throughout CTS, with each scholar offering unique interpretations of a broad methodological approach. Jackson, for example, notes that within CTS there have been studies from ‘light constructivist studies of political rhetoric’ to ‘poststructuralist and Foucault-inspired genealogical and deconstructive analyses’ (2016, p. 78).

CTS’ ontological commitments begin with the claim that terrorism does not exist as such, but is a label deployed to position certain forms of violence as illegitimate, and as such, works to legitimise other forms of (predominantly state) violence (Jackson, 2007a). Lastly, CTS is committed ethically to what within Critical Theory has been termed ‘emancipation’ (Breen-Smyth et al., 2008; McDonald, 2009). There is much diversity in how CTS scholars might define this term. Jackson defines emancipation as ‘the realisation of greater human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social actualisation and well-being’ (2007, p. 249). Lindahl appears to limit emancipation more than Jackson, restricting it to the maxim ‘that one’s own security cannot come at the cost of another’ (Lindahl, 2017, p. 6). McDonald (2009) contributes to a security focus of emancipation (drawing from Critical Security Studies) in emphasising a shift from state security to human security (see also Gunning, 2007). McDonald (2009) also adds the idea of empowering marginalised voices to this increasingly multi-faceted notion of emancipation.

Jackson’s analyses of terrorism discourses offer robust opportunities to develop a method of analysis to be deployed in the thesis. The first process required in such a method is then to collate together the various linguistic mechanisms and constructs that are deployed within a text. Jackson, for instance, analyses the ‘themes, labels, assumptions, narratives, predicates, metaphors, inferences, and arguments [the discourse] deploys’ (Jackson, 2016a, p. 82). This seemingly exhaustive list is more limited within other CDA studies. Gulliver and Herriot, for example, analyse ‘actors and actions... arguments and assumptions... authority

and attributions' (Gulliver & Herriot, 2015, p. 211). Previous research by this author examined 'arguments and assumptions; actors and actions; labels, and metaphors' (Ford, 2017b, p. 125).

This study divided the analysis and critique into three independent analyses, each focusing on one of the three educational components of the strategy: knowledge, values and skills. For each separate analysis different linguistic components emerged from the inductive process of reading and re-reading the materials. The thesis adopted what Jackson refers to as a 'grounded theory approach,' in that 'the analysis was assumed to be completed or validated when it was found that adding new texts generated no new categories or insights beyond those developed through the examination of earlier texts' (2007b, p. 396). In chapter five, where the knowledge component is examined, the discourse of extremism itself is extensively analysed, exploring the labels, predicates, actors and examples associated with the term. Chapter six examines the discourse surrounding each of the fundamental British values. Here, the linguistic components examined were predominantly themes, labels, assumptions, and subject positions. The last analysis – on the discourse surrounding critical thinking skills – focuses on the (contradictory) narratives that emerge through the discourse's central presupposition that critical thinking should be deployed 'outwards', away from the moderate centre.

This identification of these linguistic components is complemented with a robust process of critique. Jackson (2005) notes the importance of analysing a text not only in isolation but also within its social context. As such, Jackson's (2005) analysis of the discourse surrounding the War on Terror incorporated both an analysis of structural or linguistic elements of texts, and placed these texts within the context of social analysis and theory.

Jackson's (2007b) study into the discourses of 'Islamic terrorism' offers further help through offering techniques and approaches for engaging in such critique. His study involved a two-phase process (see also Jackson, 2016a). The first of these stages involves what Jackson refers to as an 'immanent critique' – a

form of critique that internally examines a discourse (Lather, 2004, p. 6). Jackson examines the arguments and assumptions of a discourse, using ‘a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to criticise it on its own terms’ (Jackson, 2007b, p. 397). It is a form of critique that seeks out ‘aporias’, what Derrida refers to as those gaps in logic, reason or labelling that cannot be reconciled (Burman & MacLure, 2005). The second stage or ‘order’ of critique ‘entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences – the ideological effects – of the representations enabled by the discourse’ (Jackson, 2007b, p. 397).

A similar approach is drawn here, as in each chapter of analysis, the findings are critiqued both to uncover internal contradictions (first-order critique), and through a lens of appropriate social theory, to understand the implications of the discourse, embedded in a social context (second-order critique). Through exploring each key finding, and deconstructing the various linguistic and contextual aspects of that finding, my critical analysis was guided by a series of core questions:

- do these claims stand up to scientific scrutiny? are the claims consistent across the discourse? are there contradictions that are important to note?
- how are different subjectivities constructed in the discourse? what (power) relationships are developed between different subjectivities? what characteristics are afforded to different subjectivities?
- who benefits from constructing the discourse in this manner?
- how else could this material be presented?
- what are the political and ideological implications of this discourse?
- what practices/activities are (de)legitimised through this discourse?
- are there texts that challenge common trends within the discourse? do these challenges present modes of resistance, or aporias that reveal the inconsistency of a discourse?

(these questions are adapted from Jackson, 2005, p. 25).

Furthermore, exploring what *is not* in a discourse is as important as exploring what is. Jackson (2008) examined silences in discourse in the context of state terrorism. Jackson explored the ideological effects of excluding examples of state terrorism from wider discourses of terrorism, exploring the reasons behind, and impact of, a sole focus on non-state terrorism. In so doing, Jackson highlighted the many functions that silences can have within a discourse:

Silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-legitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed against certain actors. (Jackson, 2008, p. 379)

Throughout the analysis, the question of what is missing from the discourse remains as important as exploring what is there. Why, for instance, do some resources choose *not* to offer a definition of extremism to students or teachers? Why are critical thinking skills so often practiced on one particular topic, whereas other topics are repeatedly ignored? When discussing the meaning of 'Britishness', why are the less positive aspects of British history missed out? In combination, examining what is within the discourse, and what is not, the ideological implications of such a discursive construction can be examined in full.

Each chapter thus employs various social and political theories to examine and deconstruct the linguistic elements of each discourse. Recognising that each of the three discourses (knowledge, values and skills) leads to an examination of different linguistic components, the research project draws on a wide range of social and political theorists to achieve its critique. Chapter five's examination of the discourse surrounding extremism draws heavily from ideographic analysis, alongside the work of securitisation theorists to examine the engendering of exceptional politics through the construction of extremism as a universalised threat. Chapter six employs Mouffe's theory of the 'post-political' alongside social theorists critical of liberal notions of tolerance such as bell hooks, Wendy Brown, and Ghassan Hage to best understand how the discourse builds a neoliberal, racialised governmentality. Chapter seven, finally, draws heavily on



critical race theory in its exploration of how critical thinking is so often deployed to tackle the issue of Islamophobia.

### **Research Design: The corpus and data collection**

The thesis is guided by the following research question:

How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?

The chapter now turns to the question of data collection. The research question names ‘counter-extremism education’ as its target of analysis. By this, the thesis refers to the deployment of education to achieve counter-extremism objectives. While the strategy might include the deployment of wider sections of curricula (such as the history, PSHE or citizenship curricula more generally), the focus of this research is on lessons and assemblies delivered specifically to address an aspect of the counter-extremism education strategy. These lessons may have been developed for delivery in any school subject. In limiting the scope of the research, the corpus was limited to resources produced for a secondary school audience (ages 11 to 18).

Thus, to be included in the initial corpus of the research, a document must fulfil two criteria:

1. Be considered a ‘teaching material’
2. Be specifically connected to the UK’s counter-extremism strategy

The research focuses on ‘teaching materials’. By this, I refer to materials that are used in a teaching context. These may be produced for teachers (lesson plans, resource handbooks etc.), or they may be produced for students (e.g. worksheets), or they may be produced for students and teachers (e.g. a PowerPoint presentation to be delivered in class). Teaching materials here are distinguished from guidance material –

documentation intended to inform teachers of their duties and responsibilities with regards to countering extremism. Such materials were excluded from the analysis.

A later set of documents - fundamental British values audits - were added to the corpus. These documents are developed by schools when inspected by Ofsted in order to demonstrate to inspectors their promotion of the values. As such, they offer ripe opportunity to glean insight into how schools promote these values not only in moments where they specifically teach the values (such as in a school assembly) but throughout their curricula and extra-curricular practices.

The research attempts to capture how the contestation and contradiction that has been shown to exist at a theoretical and strategic level translates into a classroom setting. In so doing, it is important to reflect on the journey that is implicitly being constructed; the journey taken by an objective from the strategy, through to the classroom (figure 4.2).




Figure 4.2: Journey from strategy to classroom (source: author)

It is important therefore to clarify at this stage what is termed here the ‘point of capture’ – the stage in the process at which materials were collected, and the analysis focused. The ‘data’ of this research consists of the teaching materials produced by various organisations and individuals to contribute to the achievement of the counter-extremist education strategy. The above diagram (figure 4.2) attempts to express how this teaching material is influenced both by the strategy itself, but also by external influences on the material writer – the interests of the organisation for which the material is written for instance, as well as wider discourses on terrorism and extremism (that may well be influenced by a localised context). Furthermore, it clarifies how the research is not attempting to capture the ‘student experience’ of the strategy, influenced as this is by their particular teachers, who themselves filter a particular understanding of both the strategy, as well as any interactions they may have had with school inspectors.

In attempting to explore the discourse across a wide range of materials, exploring the commonalities and themes that are shared across the discourse as a whole, it is important to recognise that each material is written for a unique context. In examining themes across these materials, the research attempts neither to assess causality between the strategy itself and the findings of the research, nor to provide generalizable claims for all teaching on this subject. Instead it attempts to garner a depth of understanding of how the particular materials within the corpus appear to address these objectives, and how these materials are located within wider discourses of extremism and counter-extremism.

In including the school audits to supplement the analysis of the discourse around British values, it is important to note that these documents are not teaching materials *per se*, though they include plentiful references to teaching activities. They are however documents that, like the teaching materials, are designed to meet the needs of the strategy, exist within the context of the wider discourse, and are designed to influence teachers and demonstrate adherence to the strategy for inspectors.

It is also important to explore the question of where the ‘classroom context’, as mentioned in the research question, is within the linear process outlined above. Is it at the point of reception by a teacher, or of the students? This research is not attempting to explore how classes are delivered, a research process that would require classroom observation in multiple settings, but instead to explore what resources are offered to teachers and students to deploy in their delivery. By addressing the ‘stage’ at which the material has been produced, the research is able to glean more efficiently a wider picture of how messages are communicated, as well as a deeper picture afforded by the exploratory depth of documentary analysis. The field of school textbook research acknowledges these limitations and opportunities. Ide (2017, p. 46) notes how textbooks offer an opportunity to examine society-wide discourses; Otto (2013, p. 14) refers to textbooks as an ‘autobiography of the nation’. While it remains contested the extent to which a textbook or a teacher is more influential in transmitting values to a student (Ide, 2017), textbooks have the ability to transmit elite values to students (Laessig, 2009). Within research examining the impact of a strategy on discourses received in classrooms, such value-transmission thus presents teaching materials as particularly valuable data sources.

For a document to be included in the corpus, the first criterion was that the document must be a teaching material. The second was that the material must be linked to the UK’s counter-extremism in schools strategy. This can be proven in a number of ways. The primary source of materials for the corpus was the government-run website, [www.educateagainsthate.com](http://www.educateagainsthate.com), which provides a platform collating various resources into one space. Not all of the resources linked to on this site were considered relevant for the corpus due to their not being teaching materials; they provide links for school visits programmes, for example. Furthermore, materials for primary schools were excluded. Alternatively, some of the resources were only tangentially linked to countering extremism, such as a website with resources that encourage debating in schools. To be included, these resources needed to explicitly mention either the Prevent strategy, the topics of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, or British values.

On top of these resources, documents were sourced from local councils or police forces who had produced resources for the purposes of countering extremism. These materials were included if they fulfilled the criteria of being a ‘teaching material’ and if they explicitly address one of the three aforementioned themes: the Prevent strategy, the topics of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, or British values. Lastly, resources published on teaching resource platforms such as that provided by the Times Educational Supplement, which made direct references to Prevent, extremism or British values were also included.

At this point, the corpus was compiled, and the number of teaching units calculated. A teaching unit was considered to be the collection of resources to be deployed within one class or assembly. For instance, one teaching unit might comprise a lesson plan, a PowerPoint presentation and a number of student worksheets, or it might comprise simply one PowerPoint presentation. The following table records the numbers of teaching units and their respective sources (eighteen school values audits were also included in the analysis - see appendix):

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Number of teaching ‘units’</b>
Prevent for Schools	3
Gloucestershire Safeguarding	2
Centre for Urban Education	5
TES Online Resources	19
Since 9/11	29
Hammersmith & Fulham Borough Council	4
Extreme Dialogue	7
Tower Hamlets Borough Council	27
PSHE Association	4
Geography Association	1
Hampshire County Council	1
Stockton City Council	11
Miriam’s Vision	37
Tony Blair Faith Foundation	8
Association for Citizenship Teaching	35
<b>Total</b>	<b>193 teaching units</b>

*Table 4.1: Writers of corpus materials (source: author)*

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has set out both the research paradigm and the research design in which the current research takes place. This thesis intends to answer the following question:

*How do the contested and contradictory objectives of counter-extremism education manifest in the teaching materials designed to fulfil the strategy?*

The chapter first outlined the research paradigm in which this research is set: the ontological and epistemological framework that scaffolds this investigation. The chapter explored the theories of social constructionism and post-structuralism, exploring how the development of a particular understanding of language and labelling promotes a form of research that critiques the linguistic hierarchies that dominate logocentrist thought. From here, the chapter explored ‘deconstructionism’ as a methodology for such a critique, as well as exploring how Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory offers a structure through which to understand the ways in which language constitutes the political realm and the subjectivities within it. From here, the chapter turned to the research design, exploring each stage in turn, laying out clearly how the research question will be answered within this theoretical framework.

The following three chapters present the analysis completed using this methodology. Taking one of the three elements of the educational counter-extremism strategy in turn, the chapters lay out and deconstruct the various discourses surrounding counter-extremism, and examine the political and ideological implications of the particular discursive constructions.

# 5

## **Building the Outsider: Constituting the Threat of Extremism**

This chapter reports the first of the three discourse analyses within the thesis, this time focusing on the knowledge component of the education strategy. Engaging in this analysis, I was keen to examine the types of knowledge developed in the materials, exploring also how these elements of knowledge operate within wider discourses and discursive networks. Through the multiple readings of the materials, one label emerged as the dominant term developed within the materials. Unsurprisingly perhaps, that was extremism.

This chapter examines the multiple ways in which extremism as a label is defined and deployed within the materials, and the ways in which this discourse of extremism is constructed. First, the ways in which the term is defined, and elsewhere is left undefined, is examined. In particular, through exploring how readily materials lean on government definitions, one can examine how the discourse begins to build certain subject positions around who is the moderate and who is the extreme, and how the term sits within a discourse legitimising certain politics and delegitimising others.

Having explored the label itself, the chapter further contextualises how this term sits within wider discursive networks. The beliefs, actions and groups described as ‘extreme’ in the materials are collated, and predicate analyses are deployed to locate the term ‘extremism’ within other terms, labels and ideas. Through the identification of these linguistic elements, weaved throughout the chapter, the analysis of the political consequences of the discourse can begin.

It is the intention of the three analysis chapters, through examining the inter-relationships between the three aspects of the educational counter-extremism strategy, disseminating knowledge, promoting values, and developing skills, to justify the argument that the UK's counter-extremism in schools strategy holds a 'siege mentality', hiding behind defensive walls from the oncoming attack of extremism. This chapter begins the justification of this argument through exploring the knowledge component of the strategy, and in particular, how the threatening outsider is constructed within the analysed teaching materials. A core opportunity for the resources to develop this sense of the outsider is through defining extremism and the extremist. This chapter focuses on this particular construction within the discourse. Chapter six examines the extremist's opposite, the moderate centre, through exploring the discourses surrounding fundamental British values. Chapter seven then examines the relationship between these two subject positions of moderate and extreme, through examining how critical thinking skills are weaponised as mechanisms for the moderate to defend itself from the extreme.

In examining the ways in which teaching materials frame the challenge posed by the problem of extremism, I argue that counter-extremism education is securitised. I argue that this form of education is constitutive of a realm of existential threat, and a need to deploy exceptional politics in order for that threat to be managed (Abrahamsen, 2005; O'Donnell, 2016). This chapter examines how that threat is constructed, with later chapters (six and seven) examining the consequences of exceptional realms of politics. Through exploring how beliefs, values and opinions that differ from that of the 'moderate' centre are painted as a threat through the depiction of 'extremism', and in particular through its association with violence within the teaching materials, the chapter explores how both the threat and the exceptional politics materialise.

The chapter notes a certain synergy between securitisation theory and the work on cultural markers and ideographs by Carol K. Winkler (2006): that both a securitisation and the deployment of cultural markers catalyse exceptional politics - to defeat a threat in the former, and to defend a cultural value in the latter. The chapter examines the construction of the cultural markers surrounding extremism to uncover the ways



in which both the threatening outsider and the threatened insider are constructed, and the type of politics to defend the ‘insiders’ that such a conceptualisation engenders.

The findings within this chapter are divided into two major sections. The first section examines definitions of extremism, exploring how the label extremism has become a ‘negative ideograph’ – constituting an understanding of moderate Britishness through identifying that which it is not - the extreme. The second section examines the vast array of examples of extremism within the materials; it explores how this definition of extremism universalises the threat being presented to moderate Britain, and explores how this securitises values and beliefs that challenge the moderate hegemony.

### **Letting students define the ‘extreme’**

The first port of call is to examine the label extremism, exploring definitions of extremism that are developed within the teaching materials. As Winkler argues, ‘the process of labelling is not neutral. Each use of a term is a choice (...) that emphasises certain aspects of what is being described, while de-emphasising others... By happenstance or by design, labelling necessarily entails perspective taking’ (2006, p. 8). Through analysing the corpus of teaching materials, it is argued that there are three broad groups of definitions of extremism. The first definition does not define extremism at all, the second defines extremism tautologically, relying heavily on a dictionary definition, and the third relies upon the UK government’s definition. Through exploring these definitions, it is revealed how little is offered to students to aid them in constructing an understanding of the ‘extreme’ - raising the question of on what wider discourses and knowledge students might rely in order to aid their understanding of the problem of extremism.

The first group of resources appears to not define extremism at all, but explores the topic of extremism as if what extremism might be is apparent and obvious; the definition is assumed. In one example, for instance,

a lesson begins by asking ‘why do people become extremists?’<sup>9</sup>, stating the ‘learning objective: to explore why extremism happens’ (T384, slide 1). The question of what an extremist is, is assumed to be already answered or known. In another example, a presentation explains: ‘In the last decade, terrorism based on religious extremism has become more prominent across the world’ (T398, slide 3), yet the term ‘religious extremism’ is never unpacked or explored. A third example asks teachers to ‘show definition on board of extremism, clarify with understanding’ (T51, p. 4), yet does not offer that definition to teachers - assuming that teachers themselves are capable of providing one without assistance.

Secondly, extremism is often described in a tautological fashion. Take for example, this definition of extremism deployed in one presentation: ‘Extremism: The holding of extreme political or religious views’ (T397, slide 21). Another presentation describes an extremist as ‘a person who holds extreme political or religious views and supports illegal, violent, or other extreme action’ (T112, slide 13). The resource does not then explore what ‘other extreme action’ might be. This definition in fact originates in the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of extremism: ‘the holding of extreme political or religious views; fanaticism’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018). Not all examples of this tautology, however, follow the same definition word-for-word. Stockton Council commissioned a resource that first describes extremism as ‘extreme behaviour which can lead to excessive action’ and then described violent extremism as ‘extreme behaviour which leads to excessive violent action’ (T375, p. 1)<sup>10</sup>. Interestingly, the use of tautological definitions is not restricted to teaching resources. Wildern School for example, also define extremism within their ‘Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation’ school policy as ‘the holding of extreme political or religious views’ (P6, p. 1). Moreover, Mythen, Walklate and Peatfield (2017, p. 184) note the tautological definition of radicalisation in the UK Government’s CONTEST strategy of 2006: ‘the

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<sup>9</sup> The use of **Tahoma** font indicates a quotation directly from the corpus of teaching materials.

<sup>10</sup> It is interesting to note the emphasis placed on violence in these definitions also. The importance of violence to extremism definitions will be explored in more depth later in this chapter.

process whereby certain experiences and events in a person's life cause them to become radicalised' (HM Government, 2006, p. 27). In the case of both extremism and radicalisation, what 'extreme' or 'radical' entails, is never clarified.

Thirdly, when resources did seek greater clarity regarding the meaning of terms such as extremism, radicalisation and terrorism, they turned to UK Government resources. While the UK Government's definition does not hold great authority within academic literature on extremism (it is one definition amongst a chorus of hundreds), it is interesting to note just how prevalent the definition constructed within the 2011 review of the Prevent strategy, alongside the government's definition of terrorism, has become within the corpus (see figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3).

LO: Understand what is meant by British values and how these impact our actions

### So what is radicalisation and what is extremism?

**Extremism:**  
*"Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including **democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.** Also calls for the death of members of our armed forces whether in this country or overseas."*

**- Home Office Definition of Extremism**

The Home Office is the government department for immigration and passports, drugs policy, crime policy and counter-terrorism and works to ensure visible, responsive and accountable policing in the UK.




Figure 5.1: T419, slide 15

SINCE 9/11

## Definition of terrorism

**The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism as follows:**

**An act of terrorism is**  
"...an act or threat of act that is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public which is made to advance a political, religious or ideological cause".

Such acts may a) involve serious violence against a person; b) involve serious damage to property; c) endanger another person's life; d) create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public; and e) seriously interfere with or disrupt an electronic system.

**The key features of the definition are:**

- use or threat of violence
- members of the public (civilians)
- political, religious, ideological gain.

**British Values:- Democracy and the Rule of Law**

Citizenship  
How do we deal with terrorism?




Figure 5.2: T286, slide 18




Figure 5.3: T109, slide 9

In the following example (figure 5.4), this slide incorporates both the dictionary and government definitions. What is particularly interesting to note is not only the presence of the definitions, but also the activity students are asked to complete. These definitions are not to be debated, but instead merely copied down.





Figure 5.4: T37, slide 5

The prevalence of the UK Government’s definition of extremism is curious given that it does not hold a position of dominance within the academic literature at large. Chapter two argued there were broadly three groups of definitions of extremism that focused on non-hegemonic values, on fundamentalism, and on violence, placing the UK Government’s definition within the first group, with its emphasis on values. Yet, it is by no means the only definition, nor the most complete. Nevertheless, it is the only definition offered to schools by the Department of Education’s literature advising schools on fulfilling the Prevent duty (Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). It is also the dominant definition offered within the corpus.

What it does achieve, importantly, is placing the UK Government into a subject position in which they are able to arbitrate what is ‘extreme’ and what is ‘moderate’. It has been argued that conceptions of extremism place neoliberal hegemony as the moderate (Ford, 2017b). This is further embedded here by presenting the government themselves as the moderate. For instance, the following example (figure 5.5), defines extremism according to the government’s definition before getting students to examine a series of examples of extremism using that definition (figure 5.6), ensuring that the students frame the question of ‘is this extremism?’ within the context of ‘does this oppose fundamental British values?’.



Now try to come up with a definition for the following word:


**Extremism:**

*“Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including **democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.** Also calls for the death of members of our armed forces whether in this country or overseas.”*

**-Home Office Definition of Extremism**

On the following slides and on your worksheets you will see pictures. Decide in pairs which are the most concerning.

Figure 5.5: T409, slide 5



Using the definition you've just seen, decide which, if any of the following images are showing extremism.

Which of these images do you find the most worrying and why?

Figure 5.6: T409, slide 6

It is a concern that in all of these three groups of definitions very little has actually been offered to students to aid their understanding of what extremism, and in particular what ‘extreme’, entails. As mentioned in chapter four, the silence within the discourse surrounding definitions of extremism is important to examine. Yet, this is not to suggest that these definitions have not achieved a level of epistemological groundwork. Through this silence, students are either called upon to offer their own understanding of ‘extreme’, or ‘extreme’ is defined in negation, through exploring ‘fundamental British values’. What is certain is that extremism is a concept that is tangible, can be grasped, and can be known.

### **Epistemological effects of the extremism discourse**

The first thing that these definitions achieve is to produce extremism as knowable. In inferring that definitions of extreme are so obvious as to not require defining, or to cite definitions from authoritative sources such as dictionaries or governments, the discourse is governed by the presupposition that extremism *can be known*. Presupposition refers to ‘an important textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognised as true’ (Doty, 1993, p. 306). Often resources achieve this known world through developing seemingly ‘simple’ definitions, such as that from a dictionary. Yet in attempts to offer simplicity, often the contestation and complexity of definitions is ignored, in favour of creating an easy, comprehensible extremist. Yet, this desire for simplicity has profound implications in terms of the construction of the known world. By offering teachers and students simple definitions, the discourse brings ‘extremism’ into existence as something knowable and definable, and masks the contestation regarding what extremism might entail. Moreover, as shall be demonstrated within the chapter, these definitions then engender a set of ‘knowledgeable practices’ - actions rendered (im)possible by the knowledge constructed around particular subjects (Milliken, 1999, p. 229). Extremism exists, argues the discourse, and must be managed.

Fitzgerald (2016), in his exploration of the philosophical foundations of Critical Terrorism Studies, is keen to point out the epistemological assumptions on which orthodox terrorism studies is founded: that terrorism

is 'essentially knowable' (p. 49). Fitzgerald locates these assumptions within Cox's (1981) exploration of 'problem-solving' as opposed to 'critical' theory - an approach which takes the given world for granted, rather than examines the frameworks by which that world is constructed. One can see the ways in which these teaching resources equally adopt a 'problem-solving approach'. One presentation on extremism for example states: 'Extremism in its broadest sense is an individual or group of individuals who take an extreme position from that of the norm, or take an extreme action' (T17, slide 6). While this slide does not define either the 'extreme', nor the 'norm', it offers a presupposition that both terms exist as fixed concepts to be grasped. Furthermore, it places the author and the reader (akin to the resources which cite government-authorised definitions) in a subject position as the norm from which the extreme would be measured. Another example gives students the lesson objective 'to be able to identify examples of extremism and violent extremism' (T368, slide 2), yet offers students neither definitions of either term nor the understanding that the terms are contested. Furthermore, the seven examples it offers to students appear all to concern either victims or perpetrators of acts of political violence, thus offering students little opportunity to distinguish a violent form of extremism from any other. Yet, importantly, the students take away an understanding that both terms have real examples that one can 'identify'. Instead, a critical approach might begin to examine on what basis the notions of 'extreme' and 'norm' have been developed, highlighting the term's subjectivity.

On the one hand, attempting to 'simplify' complex issues in order to render the topic accessible to students is commendable. On the other hand, the discourse then shields students from the contestation at the heart of debates regarding what extremism in fact might be. Through absence, simplification, or tautology, or through masking contestation behind a government's definition, the lacuna of meaning within the signifier 'extremism' is hidden. While a few resources expressed the complexity and contestation around the definitions, for instance, through citing the adage 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' (T389, slide 8), or making a note for teachers that 'extremism is contested definition [sic]'

(T109, slide 9), the majority did not. Moreover, even those that did hint at this contestation, continued to ask how it is that someone becomes an extremist, offering ideas such as being manipulated or brainwashed, thus constructing the ‘norm’ from where the voice of the teaching material projects (figure 5.7).




Figure 5.7: T389, slide 13

Such confidence in an ability to define extremism is not mirrored within academic and policy literature. Chapter two indicated just how diverse definitions of extremism are. Moreover, substantial critical literature highlights the high level of contestation concerning such definitions (Baker-Beall et al., 2015, p. 6; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016, p. 6; Nasser-Eddine, Garnham, Agostino & Caluya, 2011, pp. 1-2), and the highly subjective nature of what one might term extremism (Ford, 2017a, p. 145; Guiora, 2014, p. 1). Classroom resources could therefore have noted that it is not possible to have one singular definition of extremism, to mirror the conclusions of the academic literature. That these resources contest this through offering seemingly neutral, and indeed ‘simple’, definitions is noteworthy, in that this apparent quest for simplicity is shielding students from a level of contestation that is present in the academic literature, producing a particular world around extremism, and how it should be understood.



In a similar vein to how terrorism discourses rely on the marginalisation of state terrorism (Jackson, 2008), so too do extremism discourses appear reliant on the marginalisation of the contested, subjective nature of extremism. In this sense, the lack of a universal definition of extremism can be seen to be an ‘aporia’. A counter-extremism strategy cannot cement the very thing it aims to counter, but to acknowledge this is to undermine the viability of the entire project. Do so, and as Burman and McClure (2005, p. 285) suggest, ‘the integrity of the opposition [moderate/extreme] is fatally compromised’ when this inability, or aporia, is recognised.

### **Searching for the meaning of extremism**

Despite the confidence with which the resources presuppose the existence of extremists, it appears that what ‘extreme’ entails is left for students to work out for themselves. It is important to take note of the implications of this lacuna within the resources. On what basis are students assumed to be able to *know* what might be considered ‘extreme’? Without direction from these resources as to what extremism might entail, students and teachers are left to rely on other sources of information in their lives from which to construct the term: media narratives, elite discourses, or popular culture, alongside their everyday experiences of the counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy. Exploring this broader body of knowledge, and how that might feed into students’ understanding and experience of extremism, profoundly challenges the ‘simplicity’ of definitions of extremism as drawn in the teaching materials.

A crucial source of information for young people in gaining an understanding of extremism and terrorism is popular culture. A substantial body of work examines the mutually supportive relationship between depictions of terrorism and extremism in popular culture, and political discourses of terrorism and extremism (e.g. Boggs & Pollard, 2008; Brereton & Culloty, 2012), and the relationship between popular culture and national security more broadly (e.g. Loefflmann, 2013). Pears notes how, after the events of September 2001, ‘terrorism was not just on the news, but it was at the cinema, on our televisions, and in our video games’ (Pears, 2016, p. 79). Moreover, Pears concludes that popular culture typically supports

dominant narratives within the terrorism discourse, rather than resisting them - although individuals may offer some resistance themselves (Pears, 2016; see also Jackson & Hall, 2016). Jackson (2005) examined how aspects of the discourse surrounding the 'War on Terror' were supported by, and also influenced, depictions of terrorism in popular culture, and the various influences popular culture therefore had, to give two examples, in producing a culture of patriotism in the United States, or in the justification of the use of torture. One class presentation within the corpus of teaching materials even recommended using a YouTube video in class called 'War on Terror Explained in Minutes', part of a 'History Cinematically' series in which video footage from September 11, 2001, through to the assassination of Osama bin Laden was compiled to dramatic music (T17, slide 1). This video offers no audio or written commentary, but depicts the War on Terror only through the imagery of American soldiers, or threatening imagery of militants. By not offering students critical tools to examine definitions of extremism, these resources are likely to allow for the reproduction of dominant narratives that stem from cultural and political sources. Yet it is crucial to also recognise that many of these tropes within dominant narratives have been challenged in academic scholarship.

The field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) has for the past ten years expended great energy in critically examining the ways in which knowledge regarding terrorism, extremism and radicalisation has been conceived in multiple arenas - political, academic and cultural discourses alike. CTS has moreover exposed a number of problematic aspects of dominant discourses: the production of the terrorist as irrational (Lyness, 2014) or evil (Jackson, 2005, pp. 66-89; Naseem, 2012; Richards, 2017); the over-emphasis on the role of religious ideology in understanding contemporary terrorism (R. Jackson, 2007b; 2012); the problematic depiction of Muslims as threatening or risky (Heath-Kelly, 2013); or the justification of violent responses to terrorist threats including the use of torture (Jackson, 2005), to offer some examples challenged within this literature. Furthermore, CTS has focussed on forms of knowledge actively ignored or dismissed as idealistic within the literature, such as non-violent approaches to countering terrorism (R. Jackson, 2012; 2017). Yet, it is apparent that such contestation, regarding both the definitions of terms such as extremism

and the wider bodies of knowledge on which they rely, is not being communicated to students within these classes. It is instead being hidden. That students in a class on extremism might need to rely on an incomplete picture of contested knowledge to fill the gaps in the assumed or tautological definitions offered in the teaching materials, not only misleads students, but also appears to undermine the desire to develop critical thinking skills in students - as will be examined in more depth within chapter seven.

Not only do students receive knowledge regarding extremism from wider discourses surrounding extremism, but they also develop an understanding of extremism, and are interpellated into various subject positions, through counter-extremism practices including the Prevent strategy itself. This means people of different ethnicities and backgrounds will bring very different knowledges of extremism into the classroom. In particular, it is important to note how counter-extremism and counter-terrorism narratives have impacted the Muslim communities of the UK since September 2001. Lynch describes these common conceptualisations, 'whereby Muslim youth in the United Kingdom were constructed as threatening, different, untrustworthy and dangerous' (Lynch, 2013, p. 242). Miah argues that, 'in recent years the caricature of Muslims as intolerant, violent, misogynistic suicide bombers has become a dominant iconography in the media representation of Muslim communities' (Miah, 2013, p. 157). Drawing from research that first explored the experience of Irish communities in the UK at the height of the conflict in Northern Ireland (Hillyard, 1993), that the Muslim communities are considered a 'suspect community' gains substantial consensus amongst literature critical of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy (Bonino, 2013; Breen-Smyth, 2014; Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Ragazzi, 2016). Other research explores how Muslims have been deemed 'at risk' or 'securitised', particularly through the radicalisation discourse (Brown, 2010; Croft, 2012; Gutkowski, 2011; Mavelli, 2013; Mythen, Walklate & Khan, 2013). Heath-Kelly notes how this dual narrative of vulnerability and risk means Muslims are 'always already rendered as dangerous' (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 408). Students will bring to a class, therefore, not only knowledge they have received from dominant discourses, but also knowledge built through experience and, in this

case, encounters with counter-extremism practices. As such, students of different ethnicities or backgrounds will bring different understandings of what ‘extremism’ is to the class.

These wider experiences of ‘othering’ felt by Muslims in the context of extremism and terrorism are then further compounded in a school environment, which is both an agent of the UK’s counter-extremism strategy, and also a venue for the wider discourses to flourish. Sian’s research concluded that teachers themselves have also ‘internalised the Muslim “threat” logic’ (Sian, 2015, p. 191; see also Coppock, 2014). Miah’s research examines the prevalence of Islamophobia in Britain’s schools:

It is important to note how micro narratives or stories that are told informally through various school activities play a crucial role in essentializing the ‘other’. Muslim pupils are able to pick up these narratives to inform their understanding of hostile spaces within the school environment. (Miah, 2013, p. 155)

Scholars have argued that the Prevent duty in schools has securitised both education and young Muslims - transforming young Muslims into a ‘threat’ that must be managed by the increasing emphasis on surveillance in schools (Durodie, 2016; O’Donnell, 2017; Thomas, 2016). Reed suggests that the Prevent duty is ‘inviting teachers to profile students based on their race and religion’ (Reed, 2016, p. 1). As mentioned in chapter two, both Ahmed (Apr. 28, 2015) and Coppock (2014) note the challenges for young people - and young Muslims in particular - to discuss controversial issues because of their awareness of the threat of their being reported by teachers who might think they are at risk of radicalisation. As such, it becomes very apparent that young people, and young Muslims in particular, are not coming to these classes on extremism afresh, but drawing from their wider experiences and exposure to narratives through various sources. These varying understandings muddy the waters when teaching materials then attempt to present a ‘simplified’ definition of extremism that all students are expected to approach uniformly, as O’Donnell notes when describing how young Muslim men respond to the Prevent strategy:

Their descriptions of self-censorship and of their efforts to present an outwardly safe identity, as well as their tendency to curtail their speech because of fears of being labelled a terrorist sympathiser, remind us that when reflecting on strategies like Prevent, one cannot pretend that the school is divorced from wider society or that students will remain unaffected by being positioned as ‘suspect’ or ‘risky’. (O’Donnell, 2017, p. 183)

The definitions of extremism in the teaching materials, despite attempting to simplify a complex issue, offer students vague notions of what extremism might entail. Through examining wider research on the experience of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategies of ethnic minorities, and the dominant narratives that persist within popular culture, it is evident the knowledge and experiences students will be bringing to the classroom will impact their understanding of such concepts. These definitions of extremism are not ‘simple’, instead sitting within a complex network of knowledge/power relations. In particular, such relations function to locate the norm from which extremes are to be measured. More often than not, it is the state that then sits in this position of the norm. It is to these power relations that the chapter now turns. As explored below, the discourse of extremism contributes as much to a sense of the ‘us’, as it does to a sense of the ‘them’.

### **Ideographs and Securitisation: moderate Britain and its existential threat**

Extremism plays an important role as a cultural marker in its ability to construct an ‘us’ and a ‘them’, and as such, these definitions function to not only construct the extreme, but also the moderate. Lucaites and Condit (1990) argue there are three functions to a cultural marker (see also Winkler, 2006): a label, a narrative and an ideograph. Extremism’s purpose as a label has already been demonstrated, through the UK Government’s definition, to function as a descriptor for anything other than British values. Furthermore, this label relies on core narratives, and can be seen to be a ‘negative ideograph’. As Winkler explains: ‘Negative ideographs contribute to our collective identity by branding behaviour that is unacceptable (...).

American society defines itself as much by its opposition to tyranny and slavery as it does by a commitment to liberty and equality' (2006, p. 12). The construction of extremism builds 'moderate Britain', by defining what moderate Britain is not. Winkler (2006), and here citing the earlier work of McGee (1980), argues that there are four components to an ideograph: it is an ordinary term, it is flexible and poorly defined, it facilitates exceptional politics in its defence, and it is culturally specific in that 'a willingness to accept a given interpretation of the term becomes a virtual litmus test for membership within the collective' (Winkler, 2006, p. 14). Here, one might refer to acceptance of the fundamental values in order to be a member of the British collective, as a key indicator of the way in which extremism functions as a negative ideograph.

This theoretical work on ideographs holds a good deal of synergy with the work of securitisation theorists. Securitisation theory examines the linguistic construction of threats (Buzan, 2006). Moreover, this theory explores the political consequences of such a construction, in particular, the production of exceptional politics (Abrahamsen, 2005; Huysmans, 2011). While the foundational thinkers of 'Copenhagen School' securitisation theory focused their theoretical underpinning within speech act theory and the 'performative utterances' of security (Stritzel, 2007, p. 361), later thinkers, such as Stritzel (2011) have argued that discourse theory can usefully supplant speech act theory as a theoretical-linguistic foundation for securitisation studies. It is salient that the conceptual work on both ideographs and securitisation theory argue that, through their construction, a realm of exceptional politics is engendered. Furthermore, ideographical analysis has proven a useful tool for critical analysts examining discourses of terrorism (Jackson, 2007b). Contemporary educational approaches to countering extremism have also been labelled as securitisations (O'Donnell, 2016; Mattsson & Saljo, 2018). Given the synergy between securitisation theory, discourse analysis, and ideographical analysis on exceptional politics, this chapter examines this construction of threat and exceptional politics, and the implications thereof.

McGee explores the impact of ideographs on policy: ‘It warrants the use of power, excuses behaviour and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behaviour and belief into channels easily recognised by a community as acceptable and laudable’ (McGee, 1980, p. 15). Winkler adds that ‘the public accepts extreme measures due to a belief that a threat exists to the continued existence of a culture’ (2006, p. 14). In the context of security responses within the global war on terror, scholars such as Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) and Agamben (2005) have examined the normalisation of illiberal and exceptional practices such as detention without charge, the prison at Guantanamo Bay, or the militarisation of domestic policing. This chapter argues that extremism is presented as a universalised threat that moderate Britain must defend itself from. The following chapters explore how such a threat requires the suspension of a set of values, and democracy in particular, for their very protection.

Narratives are vital for the construction of ideographs, as well as the engendering of politics and policies that otherwise might be considered unfathomable. As Winkler notes, ‘narratives are public stories that provide coherence and consistency to the scenes, characters, and themes that guide the moral conduct of a society’ (Winkler, 2006, p. 9). One such narrative, within which extremism is placed in the teaching materials, is the story of how the West, and the UK, has always acted to defeat the perpetual threat of evil violence.

This narrative suggests Britain has consistently throughout history confronted evil threats. The teaching materials present the threat of extremism as a somehow timeless threat to Britain. Teaching resources contextualise current security threats to moments in history such as the French Revolution, Second World War, Guy Fawkes, or Apartheid South Africa (e.g. T109; T263), or through constructing narratives regarding various groups or individuals who have engaged in political violence over a historical time period (e.g. T368). Moreover, the teaching materials exist within an existing political discourse in which a narrative paints Britain as a key figure in countering extremism. Writing as the then Secretary for State for Children, Schools and Families, Ed Balls historicises this popular narrative: ‘Dealing with violent

extremism is nothing new. Throughout history there have been groups prepared to use violence to achieve their aims' (Balls, 2008, p. 3). David Cameron, in a speech concerning extremism, makes Britain's role quite clear: 'So as we talk about the threat of extremism and the challenge of integration, we should not do our country down – we are, without a shadow of doubt, a beacon to the world' (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015). Britain is thus here presented within a narrative as the obvious subject to 'deal with violent extremism'. There is an absence of any critical approach to Britain's historical record of using violence. Indeed, the strength of Balls' claims above regarding violence in history would be profoundly undermined by listing any number of 'non-extremist' violent histories. One resource compounds this synergy between Britain and countering extremism through deploying the union jack on the opening slide of a presentation:



*Figure 5.8: T400, slide 1*

Britain and extremism are presented as polar opposites, as much a binary opposition as moderate and extremism. One resource does this explicitly through contrasting life in the UK with life under the control of Islamic State (see figure 5.9):



**LO:** Identify and discuss 'British values' / Explain why the government thinks these are important / Evaluate whether British values are better than an alternative

**Information**

### The differences between our system and the system Daesh want

Britain	IS Caliphate
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Democracy (people vote for who they think should be the leader)</li> <li>- All people irrespective of their religious beliefs have the same rights</li> <li>- Alcohol and cigarettes are legal</li> <li>- You can voice your opposition to your leader</li> <li>- A woman has the same rights as a man</li> <li>- Punishments for breaking the law include: community service; fines; prison.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ruled by a political and religious leader (was not voted in)</li> <li>- Only Sunni Muslims who support ISIS are treated well</li> <li>- Alcohol and cigarettes are banned</li> <li>- If you speak out against the leadership you will be executed</li> <li>- Women should only go outside when absolutely necessary and they must wear full Islamic dress</li> <li>- Punishments for breaking the law include: public beatings; amputations; public executions (including beheadings and crucifixion).</li> </ul>

Figure 5.9: T413, slide 10

Other resources are subtler in creating that sense of togetherness. Resources by police forces encourage students to become agents of counter-extremism. As one resource notes: ‘The Police hope that this DVD will help to stop young people from getting involved with extremist groups and help young people to identify and possibly prevent acts of extremism’ (T372, slide 3). Another material writes that ‘Hampshire Constabulary is committed to working with local communities to divert people away from any form of extremism’ (T112, slide 2). These resources encourage young people to engage themselves in countering extremism. The resource by Hampshire Constabulary asks: ‘What can you and society do about it?’ (T112, slide 5). Other resources encourage students to ‘be part of the solution, not the problem’ (T398, slide 14), or ask, ‘How can we help prevent people from becoming extremists?’ (T389, slide 15). These materials contribute together to create a sense that the UK police, the UK government, and individual citizens and school students are coming together to collectively defeat extremism, creating an ethical proximity between what might otherwise be dispersed subject positions. This negative ideograph of extremism functions, as Winkler describes as ‘collective terms of political allegiance that embody a society’s ideals’ (2006, p. 12).

Furthermore, materials are keen to ensure that students believe that extremism poses a significant threat to them. For example, one presentation notes ‘there is extremism in almost every country’ (T17, slide 3). The organisation *Since 9/11* argues that, ‘in the UK, there have been many thousands of terrorist incidents’ (T287, slide 3).<sup>11</sup> Elsewhere, the same organisation emphasises that

It is very important that students understand that terrorism is, sadly, not unusual. They should not emerge from this study believing that 9/11 was the only significant act of terrorism. At some point you may wish to use *Wikipedia – List of terror incidents* to make this clear... there is no need for detailed work to be done on this, but simply scrolling down the very long list for one year then one or two others should establish the point. (T302, p. 7)

*Extreme Dialogue*’s resources also encourage teachers to display to students lists of recorded terrorist attacks (T92, p. 20). The discourse fails to contextualise this risk and threat in the context of the primary causes of death in the UK (such as ill health, road deaths etc.), instead presenting terrorism and extremism as looming threats. As one presentation described the threat: ‘It’s closer than you think’ (T398, slide 8). The following slide, full of images of terror attacks, ensures students are fully aware of what the strategy is attempting to prevent (figure 5.10):

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<sup>11</sup> Statistics can perhaps mute the strength of this claim. The Global Terrorism Database records that between 1970 and 2015 there have been 5008 incidents, the vast majority taking place in Northern Ireland in the period 1970-2000 (Global Terrorism Database, 2018).




Figure 5.10: T112, slide 4

These resources put considerable effort into painting a clear picture of the threat faced by British society, through conceptualising this ‘other’, the extremist. In this sense, the issue becomes *securitised*. The chapter thus far has examined how school students, counter-extremism officials and Britain, as a group of subject positions are collected together through the use of the negative ideograph, extremism. This poorly defined term operates to define that which threatens this moderate collective, presenting extremism as a knowable threat to be countered.

The chapter now moves on from definitions of extremism to examples of extremism. Through exploring that which is described to be ‘extreme’, as well as examining the predicates of extremism within the discourse – the words and labels that the discourse associates with extremism and extremists – the location of the term extremism within the wider discursive network can be examined. This following section expands on its understanding of what ‘moderate Britain’ is not. In so doing, it raises alarm at the breadth of the examples offered as ‘extreme’ within the teaching materials. The vague nature of the term ‘extremism’ that is developed in the resources open up the opportunity for extremism to be universalised. By this, the chapter argues that the examples of extremism offered by the corpus of teaching materials appear

dangerously broad, developing an understanding that moderate Britishness is threatened by a great diversity of ‘extreme’ values.

### Examples of an ‘extremist’

To illustrate this universalisation of extremism, I examined all the teaching units to explore and record the ways in which certain groups, causes or ideas were being described as ‘extreme’. I recorded labels as constructed by the resources themselves, and as such, included types of extremism, extremist organisations or given hypothetical examples of extremist views. I recorded when a teaching unit made mention of a given type of extremism. Naturally, many resources cited more than one type of extremism and one type of extremism many times, and many resources cited none at all. Where appropriate, I have attempted to group some together, and as such produced the following table:

Type of extremism	Number of teaching units making mention of this type of extremism
Islamic Extremism, ISIS, Al Qaeda	50
Right wing extremism, Far right extremism, White Nationalism, English Defence League, Ku Klux Klan	27
Animal Rights Extremism	11
The IRA	10
The Holocaust/the Nazi Party	7
Extremism in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict	4
The Red Army Faction/Baader-Meinhof Gang	2
Rwandan genocide	2
Nelson Mandela/the ANC	2
ETA in Spain	2
Eco-extremism, environmental extremism	2
Guy Fawkes	1
The French Revolution	1
The French Resistance	1
Kosovo	1
Somalia	1
Buddhists in Sri Lanka	1
Hindu Nationalists	1

Sikh extremists in India	1
Timothy McVeigh	1
The Ulster Volunteer Force	1
Anti-abortion Activists	1
Westboro Baptist Church	1
“Far left groups like Unite Against Fascism”	1
The Lord’s Resistance Army	1
The Symbionese Liberation Army	1
A fictional “anti-capitalist group” who plan to break into a bank and spray graffiti	1
“Anarcha-feminism”	1
Student fees protesters breaking windows and throwing fire extinguishers	1
Presentations argued extremism <i>could</i> also apply to the following issues:	
Rights for Fathers	2
Nuclear Power	1
Whale Hunting	1
Vegetarianism	1
Nuclear Weapons	1
The following attitudes were also described as extreme:	
“A gay couple should not be allowed to have kids”	
“People can be really extreme about socio-political issues”	
“You cannot be British and Muslim”	
“All English people are lazy, they just like to claim benefits”	
“Multiculturalism is bad for Britain”	
“Last month, we chained ourselves to our local school’s gates and refused to eat or drink until a member of the government agreed to listen to us”	
“people who hunt whales should be killed with harpoons”	
“I believe that all women should cover their heads and should raise families rather than getting jobs. I also feel that all the laws in our country should be based upon the bible, so I hate the fact that shops open on a Sunday and that divorced people are allowed to have relationships. Blasphemy should be punishable by a fine.”	
“I think that there should be cities where only white people are allowed to live. I also feel that it should be against the law for white people to have children with non-white people.”	
“God does not exist. People who believe in God are mentally ill and are a danger to society. Teachers who talk to children about religion should be sacked. I have taught my daughter to laugh when adults talks about God. “	
“Every Saturday and Sunday I stand outside McDonalds and try to persuade people about the moral benefits of veganism.”	
“Anything that doesn’t obey the law of the land is extreme”	

Table 5.1: Types of extremism in the corpus

It is important first to note how many resources (of the total 193 teaching units) make no direct reference to extremism at all, despite being part of a counter-extremism educational package. This apparent omission is often due to the particular focus on one topic (say, critiquing narratives in the media) in the context of a wider scheme of work that approaches extremism. At other times, the word extremism appears to be consciously omitted – the organisation *Miriam's Vision*, despite producing 37 teaching units all focusing on the death and legacy of Miriam Hyman, a victim of the July 2005 bombings on the London transport network, makes rare mention of extremism, referring predominantly only to the 'London bombings'.

The second thing to note is that most often resources mentioned what might be (problematically) termed 'Islamic extremism' – this may have been a direct reference to al-Qaeda, ISIS, Islamic State and so on, or to the type, 'Islamic extremism'. It is of little surprise that such an emphasis is made in the corpus considering the position of this type of extremism in the discourse, media, or other dominant narratives more broadly. That this corpus may thus contribute to the problematic components of those narratives (as mentioned above, see also Jackson, 2007b), and contribute to the development of an understanding that terrorism is an issue predominantly within Islamic communities is of some concern, though perhaps of no surprise.

This concern perhaps appears mitigated, however, due to the high number of mentions of right-wing extremism in the corpus, particularly given how much academic literature critical of the Prevent strategy focuses on Prevent's disproportionate emphasis on Islamic communities in the UK (e.g. Bonino, 2013; JUST Yorkshire, 2017, p. 14). Moreover, as will be explored in more depth in chapter seven, the topic of Islamophobia (and its role in the radicalisation of both young Muslims and white nationalists) plays a prominent role within the teaching materials. This appears to somewhat 'balance' the emphasis of the discourse - through emphasising as a number of resources do, that extremism is *not just a 'Muslim' issue*: 'It is important to remember that radicalisation does not just happen to Muslims. A person who becomes involved with any extremist group can be said to be radicalised' (T400, slide 8). Hampshire

Constabulary's Safe4Me project encourages facilitators to 'address the stereotypical misconception: "all Muslims and people from Syria, Afghanistan or Iraq are terrorists". Emphasis: NOT TRUE – good and bad, fair and extreme in all cultures' (T113, p. 1). The organisation *Since 9/11* notes 'it is estimated that only around two percent of all terrorist attacks in the UK over the last five years were committed by Islamic groups or individuals' (T286, slide 4). The irony perhaps is that, despite the corpus making sure to emphasise that extremism is 'not just a Muslim issue', the corpus itself heavily employs examples of this very kind – far more than 2% of the examples within the corpus concern 'Islamic groups or individuals'.

Furthermore, this narrative has problematic consequences in that the 'threat' of extremism is painted as coming from all directions - not just a minority of Muslims – and thus contributes to the threat being universalised. For instance, the corpus makes reference to how extremism can occur in any community, and radicalisation can happen to any individual. A Stockton Council resource reinforces students 'to be aware that extremists can come from any community' (T368, slide 2). The organisation *Extreme Dialogue* 'recognise that violent extremism is not synonymous with one nationality, creed or colour' (T92, pp. 20-21). This ties into another sub-narrative regarding there being numerous 'types of extremism': 'the focus throughout the lessons is on extremism of all kinds, including far-right groups, far-left groups, animal rights extremism, eco-extremism and religious extremism' (T252, p. 1). Yet, what this achieves is an understanding that extremism can come from both *anywhere*, and *everywhere*, heightening its threat.

The sheer vastness of the term extremism, and the great number of groups, agendas and views that are considered 'extremist' within the literature, illustrates this universalisation. Reporting the results of a survey on people's attitudes to extremism, Guiora writes, 'It is important to note that respondents did not have difficulty offering a definition of the term; rather, their struggle was in articulating a narrow and circumspect

definition that avoids unnecessarily infringing on individual rights' (Guiora, 2014, p. 1). Heath-Kelly and Strausz (2018, p. 3) found similarly broad understandings when exploring how workers in the NHS understood the notion of radicalisation: 'NHS staff strongly identified hate speech, the possession of radical Islamic/Anarchist philosophy, and anger at foreign policy as indicators of radicalisation'. While the corpus of teaching materials did mention most often groups that are most prominent in the literature – Al Qaeda, Islamic state, the IRA<sup>12</sup>, the English Defence League etc – a great number of other issues appeared under the extremist umbrella: cases of ethnic cleansing or genocide, civil war, violent resistance movements, the direct action of social movements, and a number of political opinions that, while being far from the hegemonic attitudes, do not appear to pose an immediate threat, and are certainly not necessarily linked to the threat of violence. It appears the corpus, taken as a whole, struggles to place limits on a definition of extremism. That the breadth of the term extreme appears to include everything and anything that contrasts hegemonic norms is a profound concern. It portrays anything that strays from this narrow realm of moderate values as threatening and dangerous. It places democratic pluralism under threat, instead promoting value-monism under the signifier of 'moderate values'.

Examined as a whole, the breadth of examples of 'extremism' within the materials suggests that there is not a clear understanding of what is, and what is not, an example of 'extremism'. Searching for a line of commonality, and aside from those examples of 'Islamic' or 'right-wing' extremism, three broad groups of examples appear to emerge. Firstly, many violent groups or acts of violence are labelled as 'extreme'. Secondly, many examples appear to stray into the realm of illegality. Thirdly, the only thing the examples appear to have in common is that they include holding onto a view that differs from the hegemonic, suggesting extremism and diversity might be uncomfortably similar in meaning.

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<sup>12</sup> There is not the time to examine this in detail, but it is interesting to note that while the republican and anti-British IRA was mentioned ten times, the unionist and pro-British Ulster Volunteer Force was mentioned only once.



### *Extremism and Violence*

It is evident that confusion persists regarding the relationship between extremism and violence within the teaching materials. As mentioned above, as well as in previous chapters, the notion of ‘non-violent extremism’ emerged following the review of the Prevent strategy in 2011, to encompass those groups that provide an ideological catalyst for those groups who go on to engage in terrorism. As such, the Prevent strategy is keen to distinguish between terrorism and extremism – the former being ‘an action that endangers or causes serious violence to a person/people’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 108), the latter being ‘vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107).

The relatively high occurrence of the Holocaust as an example of extremism appears emblematic of the strong relationship between extremism and violence, but unclear relationship between extremism and terrorism. On one level, it appears a relevant example: contemporary far-right extremist organisations take ideological inspiration from Nazism, and the Holocaust relied on an ideology that sits contrary to many of the values that are held by the vast majority of people today. Yet, that the Holocaust was enacted by a state appears to contradict dominant conceptions of extremism, and in particular, extremism’s relationship to terrorism. The Holocaust was the violent result of a path that began (in the paradigm of radicalisation) with an extreme ideology of white supremacy, yet one would not term the Holocaust terrorism, but genocide. The Rwandan genocide is another interesting example. The perpetrators of the genocide are often termed ‘Hutu extremists’ (Orth, 2001, p. 76), in particular in relation to the killing not only of Tutsis, but also of ‘moderate’ Hutus. Yet, undoubtedly, the moniker of ‘genocide’ is far more commonly used to describe the events of 1994 than terrorism.

Moreover, it is clear that the corpus does not believe that all extremism is violent, but that the risk of non-violent extremism transforming into violence is too great to allow it to persist. This example argument written as a prompt for a debate sums up the argument quite well: ‘Extremism can lead to violence and so it is never OK because we can’t predict what will become of extreme views and innocent people

don't deserve to suffer' (T61, p. 1). This notion is compounded by examples where violence and extremism are linked discursively, with many resources mentioning transitions taking place, either between extremism and violent extremism/terrorism or between activism and extremism. For example, eight resources used examples such as Anders Brevik to examine 'when extremism becomes violent extremism', (e.g. T409, slide 15). Another resource asked the question 'when does protest cross the line?', inferring that protest becomes extremism if a protest turns violent (T48, slide 1). Furthermore, through a predicate analysis, it becomes evident that such distinction between extremism and violence at a conceptual level is not mirrored in the teaching materials.

A predicate analysis entails 'extracting from the documents the descriptive characteristics, adjectives, adverbs, and capabilities attributed to the various subjects' (Doty, 1993, p. 310; see also Milliken, 1999, p. 232) - in this case, the subject of extremism. To achieve this, I examined every utterance of the term extremism within the corpus, taking note of the accompanying words to analyse the language and inferences made by the texts (see table 5.2). Overwhelmingly, 'violence' emerged as the top accompanying word, with 195 instances. The second most common word was 'radicalisation' with 100 instances. Extremism was linked to terrorism 85 times. By contrast, 'non-violent extremism' was mentioned seven times. This demonstrates that the linkages between extremism and violence are clearly drawn within the resources. For example, one resource used the Paris attacks of 2015 as an example of 'extremism', rather than of 'terrorism' (T37, slide 9).

<b>Predicate</b>	<b>Number of Occurrences</b>
Violent	195
Radicalisation	100
Beliefs	91
Terrorism	85
Actions	70
Holding extreme thoughts is not a crime	15
Distinction between extremism and violent extremism	8
Transition from extremism to violent extremism	8
Nonviolent	7
Not all extremism is violent	6
Extremism is not the same as terrorism	4
Are extremism and terrorism the same thing?	2
Extremism that isn't violent, but can still be dangerous	1
Many extremists are not terrorists	1

*Table 5.2: Predicate analysis of extremism*

These predicates aid the construction of a discursive narrative that links all forms of violence together. The following quotation from a lesson plan is useful to examine at this point: ‘Discuss briefly some other examples of extremism and the consequences; these might include Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia and Animal Rights Campaigns and the learners may suggest examples of their own either from knowledge or experience’ (T67, p. 18). What is fascinating is how the notion of extremism is capable of drawing such diverse examples under one umbrella. In particular, it groups together the vague notion of an ‘animal rights campaign’ (and in the context of discussing violence, one assumes that the author would be referring to the violent campaigns of the Animal Liberation Front for example, rather than the work of animal charities) with genocide. The danger of these discursive linkages is that it transmits a message that political activism brings with it the threat of profound violence, and this, in turn, securitises political diversity: the ideas behind animal rights activism themselves become to be seen as threatening.

Moreover, it is vital to examine how the conflation of extremism with violence does not then produce a realm of non-extremist non-violence. Instead, it produces a realm of legitimate violence. As cited above,

Ed Balls writes that ‘Throughout history there have been groups prepared to use violence to achieve their aims’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). Yet, clearly Balls is not referring to British military events such as the Amritsar massacre in 1919 in which the British army killed a conservative estimate of 379 non-violent protesters. As I have written elsewhere: ‘Through the utterance of the term “extremist violence”, its mirror image of “non-extremist violence” is produced; violence currently thought acceptable, legitimate, or unfortunate: the violence of a state military, of misogynistic cultural attitudes, of global inequality’ (Ford, 2017a, p. 148). Perhaps the most notable silence within the discourse as a whole concerns what could be framed as ‘moderate violence’; the violence of states, militaries and colonial powers. There are certain forms of violence that are noticeably absent from this long list of violent acts: wars started by Western nations, invasions of sovereign territories, imperialism, or ‘collateral damage’ caused by bombing campaigns. Indeed, the marginalisation of theories of nonviolence and pacifism (and the label of ‘domestic extremism’ that has been placed by the British state on various nonviolent activists) suggests that pacifism and nonviolence could be construed as extremist beliefs (Ford, forthcoming).

### ***Extremism and the Law***

In the second of the three groups of extremism examples, extremism is linked to illegality. An educational video linked within one resource argued ‘anything that doesn’t obey the law is extreme’ (The Respect Programme, Sept. 11, 2018, cited in T17, slide 6). Yet, is burglary extremism? The same video included as an example of extremism the protests in London by students when in 2011 the UK government chose to treble tuition fees, protests which included violent clashes with police. Yet, the video does not mention that the majority of the individuals present did not engage in violence. In another material, a play that students were instructed to act out in a lesson incorporated as an ‘extremist’ group an ‘anti-capitalist’ organisation that wished to break into and graffiti a bank. It is debatable whether graffiti should constitute extremism. Moreover, it is fascinating that, within the play, the teacher apprehended the student after they had handed out leaflets - itself an act inferred to be ‘extreme’ – rather than after having broken into the bank. In a similar vein, a police officer training teachers in how to spot signs of radicalisation used the example of Caroline

Lucas (a British MP) being arrested at an anti-fracking demonstration as an example of extremism (Bloom, Sep. 4, 2015).<sup>13</sup> While the ‘line’ to extremism appeared to be drawn at using violence, another ‘line’ is constructed here - when one opposes the fundamental British value of the rule of law. Indeed, it was the inability to contest an unjust law that was challenged by the school head teacher, Michael Goodwin (Nov. 11, 2014), in a newspaper column in response to schools’ new responsibilities regarding such values. The conflation of civil disobedience with extremism appears to offer substantial challenges to the notion of political dissent, further limiting the realm of permissible political opinion.

### *Extremism and unpopular beliefs*

Both the meaning of extremism and its relationship to terrorism are again destabilised by the inclusion of the third group of extremism examples, ideas that in themselves pose no threat but are merely diverse or unpopular. One presentation confirms this depiction of extremism as being something at a distance from the hegemonic centre: ‘Extremism in its broadest sense is an individual or group of individuals who take an extreme position from that of the norm, or take an extreme action’ (T17, slide 5). One example included standing outside a fast food restaurant to campaign for veganism (T18, p. 6). Another class involved discussing the ‘extreme’ attitude that ‘multiculturalism is bad for Britain’ (T109, slide 16). What is fascinating here is that not only was this argument often made in the press in the wake of the attacks in the US in 2001 (Young, Nov. 6, 2001), and reiterated after the London bombings in 2005 (Allen, 2010; 2015; Falcous & Silk, 2010), but it was also an argument made by David Cameron during his time as UK Prime Minister when he argued in a key speech, ‘Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream’ (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). Yet, one would be hard-pressed to argue that the former Prime Minister is an extremist.

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<sup>13</sup> This is not the only occasion of anti-fracking campaigns being labelled as extremist. In a more recent instance, a counter-extremism report changed the details of a case study to ensure anonymity and in so doing suggested this individual had been ‘groomed’ into extremism by anti-fracking activists (Pidd, Jul. 30, 2018).

One resource emphasises this threat of extremist ideas in the teacher notes: ‘Even when violence is not used, extremism can still be dangerous... There is a fine line between intolerance and violent extremism. Should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance?’ (T109, slide 10, notes). The resource infers a strong link between intolerant views and the use of violence, a link that has been demonstrated already to be unsupported by research. The counter-extremism emphasis here becomes ensuring students do not take their views ‘too far’; the line delineating the moderate and the extreme is clear to see. This metaphorical line is indeed often used in educational resources. The resource ‘Cross the Line’ for example, is an app that allows young people to explore radicalisation with the by-line ‘How far would you go?’ ([www.crosstheline.co.uk](http://www.crosstheline.co.uk)). Here it is implied that the closer you stay to the moderate centre, the better. Emphasising rationality and prudence, Sieckelinck and de Ruyter propose that children should be encouraged to be ‘reasonably passionate’ (2009, p. 187) about their ideals. In this context, anchoring one’s passions to the moderate centre, and not straying too far from that fulcrum, might perhaps entail a barrier to social change. The inclusion of a whole host of issues that might be considered ‘non-hegemonic’ but that do not immediately pose a threat of violence, demonstrate just how wide this understanding of what extremism entails has become.

Such an understanding of extremism extends beyond teaching resources also. The organisation *Let’s Talk About It* aims to offer help and guidance to counter terrorism and extremism. A regular contributor to Twitter, the organisation tweeted that a ‘desire for social change’ may increase one’s vulnerability to becoming an extremist (figure 5.11):



Figure 5.11: Tweet by @LTAIPrevent

Such an example demonstrates the danger of this particular construction of extremism – that a desire to alter the moderate centre should be considered threatening.

### ***The threatening extremists***

Extremism threatens from all directions. The moderate centre is depicted as being under siege, defending itself from this threat. This sense of needing to protect the moderate centre is compounded by the ways in which extremists themselves are depicted within the discourse. Not only does the discourse paint a picture of extremists as being violent, criminal, and holding minority views, the discourse also paints a negative picture of the character traits of extremists. That extremism is decidedly negative is clear to see. Alongside examining the predicates of extremism, and noting the heavy emphasis on violence, it was possible to analyse the predicates deployed around ‘extremist’, to examine the traits of extremists as painted by the discourse. In the following table, I have taken all these predicates, and placed them in six groups: threatening, abnormal/deficient, religious, political, in contrast to..., and ‘other’ (table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Predicate analysis of extremist traits

Threatening	(cont.)	Abnormal/Deficient	(cont.)	Religious	Political	In contrast to...
Violent (195)	Butchered (2)	Intolerant (7)	Fanaticism (1)	Islamic (41)	Grievance (10)	reasoned/reasonable (5)
Dangerous (9)	Hatred in their heart (1)	Alienated (4)	Lost (1)	Not just Muslims (4)	Activist (2)	Human rights (3)
Risk (6)	Influential (1)	Ignorance (4)	Low self-esteem (1)	Following God's instructions (3)	Reject the status quo (2)	Freedom of choice (2)
Illegal (4)	Contagion (1)	Position from the norm (4)	Misalignment (1)	Fundamentalist (3)	Resentment (1)	Equality, justice, democracy and human rights (1)
Intimidating (4)	Radical (1)	Misguided self-interest (3)	Myth-making (1)	Claiming to be part of a religion (2)	Social disadvantage (1)	Peaceful (1)
Racist (4)	Recruiter (1)	Prejudice (3)	Unwilling to compromise (1)	anti-Muslim (1)		Democratic society (1)
Target susceptible young people (3)	Anti-social (1)	Manipulated (2)	When someone goes too far (1)	Islamic hate preacher (1)		Fair (1)
Acting provocatively (2)	Antipathy to the West (1)	Apathy (1)	Disengaged (1)	Muslims scholars (1)		Middle ground (1)
Angry (2)	Criminal (1)	Based on opinion not fact (1)	Distorted worldview (1) Absolutist (1)	Only a handful involved Muslims (1)		
Sink to new depths (2)		De-humanise (1)	Emotional (1) Delinquency (1)	Religion hacked by (1)		
<p><b>Other:</b> perpetrated (5); minority (4); afraid (2); can flourish (2); arab nationalists (1); exciting (1); from all backgrounds (1); gang (1); hate groups (1); interpretation (1); motivated (1); rhetoric employed by (1); sensitive (1); spread (1); teachers (1); unquestioning consensus (1).</p>						



The primary finding of this analysis is to note how often extremists are painted with threatening language. Words such as ‘violent’, ‘risk’, and ‘dangerous’ contribute to build up a ‘barbaric other’ – the existential threat against which education is poised. Secondly, the predicates surrounding extremists are dominated by a sense of abnormality or deficiency. Language such as ‘ignorant’, ‘manipulated’, ‘misguided’, or ‘lost’ add further layers to the construction of both the extremist, and by negation, the moderate centre. This contrast with the moderate centre is cemented with occasional references to moderate values such as human rights or freedom of choice.

Moreover, there were examples where extremists were ridiculed within the materials. This ridicule further embeds a notion of extremist as deficient. In one lesson to combat far right extremism, a video is shown to students in which a supporter of the English Defence League is shown to lack basic knowledge regarding Islam and the Middle East. The lesson plan instructs teachers to ‘show students the video that highlights the idiocy of far-right supporters’ (T386, p.1). To take another example, examine the anecdote within the green box on this slide (figure 5.12):

The slide is titled "Why do people become Extremists?" in a purple box. Below the title is a blue box with the learning objective: "Learning Objective: to explore why extremism happens". At the bottom left is a green box containing an anecdote about a book by Jason Burke on Al-Qaeda. At the bottom right is a pink box with a question: "What does this story tell you about the kind of people who become extremists?"

**Why do people become Extremists?**

**Learning Objective: to explore why extremism happens**


I was reading a book by Jason Burke on Al-Qaeda, and I came across an example of a bunch of people from Yemen who wanted to blow up a U.S. warship on Millennium Eve. They went down in the middle of the night, 3 a.m., they filled up a boat with explosives, and it sank. I thought, "Ah." I laughed out loud when I read that. I wasn't expecting to laugh when I was reading that book

What does this story tell you about the kind of people who become extremists?

Figure 5.12: T384, slide 1

Here, the purpose is to paint extremists as ignorant and to dissuade students of any desire to take their politics seriously (not that students have many opportunities to address those politics). Any hints at the political values of extremists are few and far between, with only ten instances of extremists' grievances being addressed in the corpus of materials. Despite the relatively common recitation of the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of extremism as 'extreme political or religious views', the religiosity of extremism was more likely to be expressed than its political nature.

When examined as a whole, the corpus paints an enormously diverse range of values, beliefs and actions as extreme. These are ideas which contradict the values, beliefs and actions of the hegemonic 'norm' or the moderate centre. In this sense, extremism performs the role of negative ideograph, which through its negation, constructs the moderate British centre. Yet, this process of negation not only constructs a binary, but also does so in a way that universalises this threat. The threat of extremism comes from those that challenge the hegemony of the moderate in numerous ways – Islamic extremism, right-wing extremism, as well as groups that challenge the hegemony of violence, or the rule of law, or moderate ideas. These groups of extremes are all poised ready to threaten the moderate centre (see figure 5.12). It can thus be argued that the discourse *securitises diversity*. By this, I mean that the discourse paints diverse (predominantly political or religious) views as a *threat*. It is through this securitisation that the 'out-group' can be contrasted with the 'in-group' and the wall that defends the fortress of liberal democracy under siege from extremism can be constructed.



*Figure 5.13: Universalizing the threat of extremism (source: author)*

### **Conclusion: exceptional politics against the universal threat**

This chapter began by arguing that the definition of extremism within the corpus of teaching materials indicates a securitisation. Moreover, it argued that extremism could be seen to be a ‘negative ideograph’, aiding contemporary Britain in understanding its identity through negation. Britain is the non-extreme. The materials attempt to bring students under this non-extreme wing, encouraging a collective identity to counter extremism through incorporating narratives of good defeating evil. This securitisation engenders a sense of threat, of being under siege. In so doing, it renders exceptional politics more possible and permissible. Through exploring how extremism appeared to be coming from all directions, the chapter argues that this paints the moderate centre as being under siege.

The chapter has exposed this securitisation, first by exploring definitions of extremism in the corpus, before moving on to examine examples of extremism. The chapter argued that there were three broad groups of definition of extremism: one that failed to define extremism at all, assuming recipients of that material could

define extremism themselves; a second that relied on tautological dictionary definitions which suggest extremists are extreme; and a third that relied on the government's definition of extremism as being in contrast to fundamental British values. It was argued that these definitions failed to offer concrete assistance to students in order to define extremism, and instead left students reliant on wider discourses surrounding extremism bringing with them the dangers of Islamophobia, and on their own experiences of counter-extremism practices which are likely to affect ethnic minorities negatively. The chapter explored critical research that challenged the simplistic definitions of extremism offered to students, thus challenging the governable and knowable construct of extremism depicted within the corpus: a vague and ill-defined but threatening construct that must be managed.

The chapter then explored examples of extremism. Within this second major section, it was argued that extremism has become a universalised threat - a threat that could come from anywhere and everywhere. Through exploring how there were five major groups of threatening extremist - the Islamic extremist, the right-wing extremist, the violent extremist, the illegal extremist, and the holder of extremist views - the chapter argued that moderate Britain was being painted as being under attack from extremism from all directions.

The chapter aimed to contribute to the overall argument that counter-extremist education appears to be dominated by a 'siege mentality', and that such a mentality brings with it a threat to pluralist democracy, and insecurity to those labelled as extreme. This chapter has contributed to the argument that moderate Britain is painted as being distinctly under attack - and under attack from all directions. Such a mentality has profound implications for the form of education that can take place in this context. Moreover, as the next chapter examines, the sense of being perpetually under attack contributes to the picture of contemporary Britain and its values as being vulnerable and in need of vehement defence. Placing education on such a footing threatens to undermine the values on which such an education appears to have been placed.

It is in the next two chapters that the exceptional politics engendered by this securitisation begins to emerge. Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) describe exceptionalism as the ‘illiberal practices of liberal regimes’. It is argued that in securitising the realm of counter-extremism education, democratic values must be suspended for their own protection. The dismissal of political views that stray too far from the hegemonic centre appears to be one such illiberal practice. While democracy champions the tolerance of diverse views and values, the conflation of diversity with threat appears to negate this. The following two chapters explore this in far more depth, first, through exploring how power is executed to govern the behaviour of those within the moderate centre, offering narrow modes of permissible behaviour, and second through exploring how practices of critical thought mask the discriminatory structures that govern a political system dividing the moderate and the extreme, and the insecurity felt by those caught in the web of ‘extremism’.

# 6

## The Vulnerable Under Siege

### The Racialised, Neoliberal Governmentality of Fundamental British Values

*It shouldn't take any intervention from my department to say that young people should be learning the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, tolerance and respect – because these British values are fundamentally a good thing.* (Morgan, Jan. 27, 2015)

Nicky Morgan, speaking as the Secretary of State for Education, here engages in a fascinating tautology. She answers the implied question of ‘why are these values fundamental?’ with the answer, ‘because they are fundamentally good’. Like ‘motherhood and apple pie’, these values appear untouchable in their virtue, and self-evident in their worth. Yet, there is a danger here too. While democracy, liberty and tolerance all *sound* like good ideas, how they might operate in practice is up for debate. The danger emerges when one particular practice of that value is presented as being the fundamentally good practice, and challenging that practice is presented as undermining that fundamentally good value. This chapter examines the discourses around the promotion of values component of the educational strategy. Exploring the practices and discourses within which each of the values is located within the corpus offers an opportunity to examine the particular ways in which these values are being promoted. The promotion of these values entails a normative commitment to a particular kind of Britain. In examining the discourse surrounding fundamental British values, the chapter seeks to investigate the idealised political realm that is constructed within the materials. What is this idealised moderate space?

As chapter three examined, the values themselves, as well as the school being the space in which such values should be promoted, have been questioned. Scholars and school leaders alike challenged whether

they were contradictory (Goodwin, Nov. 11, 2014), whether they were ‘white’ values (Keddie, 2014), or whether they made unjustified demands of ethnic minorities (Miah, 2017). Moreover, scholars made note of the poor training offered to teachers to achieve the new requirement that they teach such values (Lander, 2016). Teachers have shared their fears with scholars of excluding ethnic minorities through teaching such values (Maylor, 2016) and Farrell (2016) noted students also tended to focus on difference not commonality when exploring these values - something noted by civil liberties groups also (JUST Yorkshire, 2017). This chapter seeks to put flesh on the bones of these critiques, examining the ways in which the teaching materials develop a particular notion of what it means to be British.

Having first ascertained that the materials present fundamental British values as fixed to the definition offered by the British government, the analysis takes each ‘sub-discourse’ of each value in turn, analysing the linguistic components within. Democracy is presented as a process rather than a value, and moreover one that sits in binary opposition to dictatorship. The discourse of the rule of law is presented within a narrative of historical improvement to the point of present perfection, and through the metaphor of protection. Individual liberty operates through a discourse solely located within the world of work. The discourse around tolerance and mutual respect builds a set of narratives around Britishness ripe for deconstruction. The chapter takes these linguistic components, and holistically analysing how they both contradict and operate with one another, builds a particular picture of the way Britishness is constructed within the teaching materials.

The chapter will argue that the discourse surrounding fundamental British values produces a *racialised, neoliberal governmentality*. In so doing, the chapter depicts the limits on diversity and deviance that govern the threatened moderate centre, sitting within the castle walls. The chapter examines both the political realm and the modes of subjectivity permitted and produced within the discourses surrounding each fundamental British value. As such, the chapter explores three such subjects produced under this racialised, neoliberal mode of governmentality: a post-political subject, an entrepreneurial subject, and a racialised subject.

Examining the discourses surrounding both democracy and the rule of law, the chapter explores the narrow modes of permitted political participation embedded within bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy.

Through exploring the synergy with Chantal Mouffe's (2005) work on the 'post-political', here, the 'post-political subject' is examined. Mouffe critiques the way in which contemporary liberal democracy is presented as the only virtuous mode of democratic governance. Such closure to the debate around diverse notions of democracy has, argues Mouffe, ushered in the post-political era. Through examining how the teaching materials envision a limited notion of representative democratic governance, how civic engagement is restricted to moments of voting, and lifetimes of following existing laws, the 'post-political subject' emerges. The level to which this subject is produced as submissive and de-politicised will be critiqued. The neoliberal aspect to the governmentality developed within the resources is further embedded through discourses of individual liberty. Through exploring the embeddedness of discourses surrounding individual liberty within neoliberal frameworks, the 'entrepreneurial subject' emerges, and labour itself becomes transformed into a mode of countering extremism.

Lastly, through exploring discourses of tolerance and mutual respect, the racialised subject emerges. Here, two subjectivities are constructed. One, the original White British subject, who plays host to the second, diverse, racialised Other. This Other is welcomed in, but only as long as it performs within certain preordained parameters. The particular ways in which these two subjects develop unbalanced power dynamics, where the racialised Other performs in service to the White British subject, will be explored through examining scholarly work critical of liberal notions of tolerance, multiculturalism and the embrace of difference, such as bell hooks' essay *Eating the Other*.

The exceptional politics of a securitised education strategy emerges in this chapter through exploring how certain values have been suspended for their own protection. The rationality of government that is developed through the discourse on fundamental British values appears to present a very narrow frame



within which the moderate can operate. In this sense, the chapter challenges the lack of plurality at the heart of this particular vision of democracy. As Mouffe notes, the ‘unchallenged hegemony of neo-liberalism represents a threat for democratic institutions’ (2000, p. 6). The chapter explores the dangers that such narrow governmentalities pose to the value of democracy; moreover, it explores the dangers of such governmentalities for ethnic minorities in particular - individuals who are more likely to be excluded into the realm of the extreme, and face the insecurity that such exclusion entails.

### Fixed Fundamental British Values

It is important to begin this examination by first clarifying how the values are defined within the discourse. Despite the common criticism that fundamental British values appear poorly defined (JUST Yorkshire, 2017, p. 14), in a school context the very opposite appears to be the case. Overwhelmingly - both within the school values audits, and in the lessons being taught to students - fundamental British values are defined as being fivefold: democracy, the rule of law, mutual respect, individual liberty and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. The values have been copied directly from the Prevent strategy’s definition of extremism (HM Government, 2011a, p. 107), and appear fixed. The initial suggestion within the Prevent strategy that the values might *include* these five, rather than be limited to, has in practice been ignored. This example slide demonstrates how materials reinforce this fixed nature (figure 6.1):

**Can you unscramble the British Values?**

1. EOMCRCYAD	1. DEMOCRACY
2. HET ULER FO AWL	2. THE RULE OF LAW
3. IDIVDAULIN ILBETYR NDA MTUALU RSPEETC	3. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND MUTUAL RESPECT
4. OTLEACNER OF HOEST WITH IFFEINRGD AITSHF NDA ELIESFB	4. TOLERANCE OF THOSE WITH DIFFERING FAITHS AND BELIEFS



Figure 6.1: T400, slide 4

Another school developed a set of materials to be used in ‘British values week’, with one assembly each day devoted to each of the five values (T401-T405). School values audits were similarly rigid in their interpretation of the values. As one school notes: ‘Curricular subject matter is appropriate for the ages and aptitudes of the girls and does not undermine the fundamental British values of democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs’ (A7, p. 1). The teaching materials and corpus documents clearly produce what we might understand to be a ‘field of visibility’. The ‘field’ of values is set. The boundaries are limited, and anything that does not fit within these five set constructs is excluded to the shadows. The values are fixed, and it is to a critical examination of how these five values are taught that this chapter now turns, and in particular, to the three dominant modes of subjectivity permitted: the post-political, the entrepreneurial and the racialised subjects.

### **The Discourses of Democracy and Rule of Law and the Emergence of the Post-Political Subject**

In the context of the discourse surrounding democracy and the rule of law, liberal democracy and its associated political and economic mechanisms are presented as being incontestable, irrefutable and self-evident. The imposition of liberal democracy replaces contestation with a particular consensus surrounding the ways in which democracy and the rule of law should be conducted and practiced. As shall be examined, there are profound implications of this imposition of consensus on political agency, as the discourse offers only a select and proscribed number of channels for political participation.

Within the materials, and within definitions of democracy offered therein, the value of democracy has been reduced to the electoral system, and definitions of democracy are reduced to representative democracy:

- ‘government by elected representatives’ (T387, slide 3).
- ‘a government which is elected by the people. Everyone who is eligible to vote has a chance to have a say in who runs the country’ (T391, slide 3).

- ‘government by the people or their elected representatives’ (T417, slide 11).

The implication of this is that a great deal of the educational content regarding the teaching of democracy then focuses on teaching about Britain’s electoral system. Presentations discuss the various political parties in the UK, the first past the post electoral system, the bicameral parliament and so forth (e.g. figure 6.2).



Figure 6.2: T401, slide 3

Democracy is reduced from a political *value* into a system of *processes*. In figure 6.2, democracy is reduced to a general election. Similarly, schools might demonstrate that they are promoting democracy, by facilitating elections for positions such as school council, emphasising how they are promoting the democratic process:

- ‘we have two student councils which meet regularly’ (A4, p. 2).
- ‘our student parliament allows students to explore and understand the democratic process’ (A8, p. 1).
- ‘We promote democratic processes, fostering the concept and application of freedom of speech and group action to address needs and concerns’ (A12, p. 1).
- ‘the principle of democracy is consistently reinforced with the democratic process being employed for important decisions’ (A7, p. 1).

The rule of law is equally systematised, and reduced to a process. One lesson on fundamental British values had the following learning objective: ‘Understand that there is a separation of power between the government, parliament and the law courts’ (T393, slide 1). Similarly, a different presentation offers little more than a question and answer session regarding the various law courts of the UK (T402). A related learning objective discussed: ‘the nature of rules and laws and the justice system, including the role of the police and the operation of courts and tribunals’ (T102, p. 2).

That Britain is a democracy is obvious according to the discourse; it is an incontestable fact. In this regard, it is interesting to note that no teaching materials endeavoured to explore the justifications for each value being a British value, and no material explored arguments for or against democracy. The closest that materials came to such an examination was that one class asked students ‘would you keep Britain as a democracy?’ (T413, slide 7), and a second explored the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative vote system, but did not examine democracy more broadly (T391). Only one lesson that tackled the value of democracy also explored other forms of democratic engagement aside from voting, such as certain forms of protest (T417).

It is interesting to note how often the present tense is used, reinforcing this self-evidence for all the values, not just democracy and the rule of law:

- ‘The UK is a democracy, of course’ (T390, slide 7);
- ‘In Britain we have individual liberty’ (T403, slide 2);
- ‘Mutual Respect is a key British value. In Britain we have a tradition of mutual respect’ (T404, slide 2).

These self-evident values then become systems to learn, rather than values to which one can aspire. One such discursive mechanism to reinforce this self-evidence was deployed in a set of resources which stated

that Britain's democratic and legal systems had been 'copied by countries around the world' (T401, slide 3; see also T402, slide 2). In so doing, the resource reinforces a notion of the virtue of Britain's political systems, while ensuring the erasure of Britain's colonial legacy.

Through exploring how the discourses surrounding the values of democracy and the rule of law are developed, an understanding of the 'post-political subject' emerges – a subject for whom political participation has been reduced to voting in elections, and obeying the laws of the land. Understandings of what the post-political entails are varied and diverse. Yet, as Wilson and Swyngedouw argue:

they all refer to a situation in which the political - understood as a space of contestation and agonistic engagement - is increasingly colonised by politics - understood as technocratic mechanisms and consensual procedures that operate within an unquestioned framework of representative democracy, free market economics, and cosmopolitan liberalism. (2014, p. 6)

Discussions of the post-political rely upon a distinction being made between 'the political' and 'politics', a distinction made most prominently by Chantal Mouffe (2005). Built on a post-foundational ontological framework (indeed, the very same on which this thesis is built) that emphasises the contingent and contestable nature of all social order (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), 'the political' refers to the core and perpetual antagonism at the heart of social order. 'Politics' refers to the institutions and bureaucracies we might associate with contemporary liberal democratic hegemony. Wilson and Swyngedouw continue: 'Mouffe equates "politics" with the contingent construction of hegemony, and "the political" with a we/they antagonism that she claims is the necessary condition of all political identities... the post-political names a hegemonic order in which the antagonistic dimension of the political has not been sublimated, but repressed' (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014, pp. 11-12).

Within the discourses of democracy and rule of law, one can see how the discourse functions to repress the political, through presenting liberal democracy as the self-evident manifestation of these values. A second mode through which this incontestable nature of the values is reinforced is through the ways in which the values are introduced through binary frameworks. This structure presents the values as not only incontestable, but also perpetually threatened. The values are presented within a binary: democracy/non-democracy; rule of law/anarchic chaos; liberty/oppression. Democracy is often presented in a binary with dictatorship. One presentation, for instance, fails to define democracy itself at all, merely presenting dictatorship as the one threatening alternative (figure 6.3):

LO: Understand what is meant by British values and how these impact our actions

**According to Ofsted, 'fundamental British values' are:**

- democracy. ★
- the rule of law.
- individual liberty and mutual respect.
- tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs.

**But is there actually anything wrong with promoting these?  
Don't most of us support these principles anyway?**

**Probably the most famous dictator at the moment is Kim Jong-un. The media is always reporting on atrocities he commits and the horrifying poverty that people in North Korea live through. Imagine if we were ruled by a despot we couldn't remove.**




Figure 6.3: T419, slide 10

Similarly, the rule of law is often contrasted with anarchy and lawlessness (e.g. figure 6.4):

Imagine this scenario...

Helicopters appear above this classroom and announce the following news:

*"There are no more laws. Repeat: all laws have been abolished. Any action you perform will have no legal consequence as there are no laws. There will be no police or military as there are no laws to enforce. This applies as of now and applies throughout the world."*

All over the world similar announcements are being made. There are no more laws, no legal systems, no courts, no police, no parliament, no crimes – as of now!

British Values

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Figure 6.4: T392, slide 5

A consequence of this is that the values are presented as vulnerable. One lesson painted them as ‘the precious liberties enjoyed by the citizens of the United Kingdom’ (T102, p. 3), suggesting that these are liberties that could quite feasibly be lost.<sup>14</sup> This vulnerability places the values in a defensive mode. Neumann highlights the logic of this argument: ‘democracy is fragile, and that it needs to be defended long before its enemies break laws or resort to violence’ (Neumann, 2013, p. 887). The implications of this defensive mode of thinking becomes clear throughout this chapter. The *fundamentality* of fundamental British values leaves the values incontestable, and any criticism thereof is silenced. Through the production of this post-political space, as Mouffe argues: ‘Every opposition is automatically perceived as a sign of irrationality and moral backwardness and as being illegitimate’ (Mouffe, 2005, pp. 84-5).

<sup>14</sup> Interestingly, this expression of ‘precious liberties’ is a direct quotation from the UK’s national curriculum for citizenship education (Department for Education, 2013, p. 2).

These resources appear to tap into what Mouffe calls ‘the very deeply entrenched conviction in Western democracies that they are the embodiment of the “best regime” and that they have the “civilising” mission of universalising it’ (2005, p. 83). The ‘political’ era is over. Democracy has been achieved, and we now operate within the ‘post-political’ era, with fixed liberal democratic institutions of representative democracy (see also Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2014; Mouffe, 2009). Yet, Britain’s democracy could be easily challenged. The unelected House of Lords or the lack of representation of women, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, the LGBT community, the working class and so on within both Houses of Parliament all draw criticism, as does the first-past-the-post electoral system. Nevertheless, when teaching the value of democracy, these critiques are rarely addressed. This lack of critical examination of democracy is curious considering the Department for Education includes ‘advantages and disadvantages of democracy’ (Department for Education, 2014, p. 6) as an example of a topic schools could use to promote the value.

These discourses produce a fixed and narrow mode of political participation, developing a particular subjectivity: a mode of citizen that fulfils certain functions, and in particular is submissive and unchallenging of authority. These post-political subjects participate in politics only through elections, and never challenge the rule of law.

The resources develop a sense of what a democratic citizen looks like. Democracy is about institutions and systems of elections, and therefore democratic citizens are *voters*. Take the following slide as an example (figure 6.5):



**The UK is a democracy, of course.**

**Voters must be aged 18 or over and have UK citizenship (people in prison at the time of an election are not allowed to vote).**

**The UK parliament is the legislative body of the country. It is made up of the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Members of the House of Commons (MPs) are elected using a voting system. There are 650 MPs in total.**

**In a democracy there are a number of political parties who have their own ideas about the way their country should be run. MPs are the elected representatives of these parties.**

Before an election each party puts their ideas together in what is called a manifesto. This tells the public how they want to control things such as hospitals, prisons, schools, taxation, laws and the country's relationships with other countries. Voters then decide.

The party which wins the majority of seats usually forms the government and can claim to have a mandate to implement the policies set out in their manifesto.

Create a glossary of terms for the underlined words above. Add to them as you progress through the lesson.

Figure 6.5: T391, slide 7

Democracy here is defined, for those who are not members of parliament, as being a 'voter'. Aside from voting, no other modes of democratic subjectivity are offered. The realm of politics described in the materials exemplifies the nature of the post-political.

The discourse surrounding the rule of law also indicates the nature of the governmentality that sculpts the law-abiding political subject within the materials. Citing the 2014 advice published by the Department for Education, schools often express how their students demonstrate 'an appreciation that living under the rule of law protects individual citizens and is essential for their wellbeing and safety' (Department for Education, 2014, p. 5). One teaching material presents to students the following argument: 'Rules and laws create order and harmony in society. They protect and safeguard people' (T392, slide 6). Such an argument dissuades students from criticising the law - arguing that the law must be there for a reason. The school audits paint a similar picture:

- ‘We help pupils to understand the law and living under the rule of law and its effects upon individuals and groups’ (A1, p. 6).
- A second school also offers ‘chances to look at why our laws are in place and how they protect us’ (A11, p. 2).
- Another communicates ‘the reasons behind rules’ to students (A7, p. 1).
- A fourth expresses ‘the necessity for rules’ (A13, p. 1).

Two issues are important to raise here. The first was raised by Michael Goodwin, a secondary school head teacher, in a newspaper article (discussed also in chapter two). Goodwin (Nov. 11, 2014) argued of the danger in promoting the rule of law if certain laws were evidently unjust. Goodwin cited the legality of the arms trade, despite the use of British-manufactured weapons in conflicts (such as the Saudi Arabia-led campaign in Yemen) that have broken international laws, and suggests that he could not promote the rule of law in this setting. Moreover, the narrative of ‘law as protection’ dismisses the important role that civil disobedience has played in making UK laws *more just*, the suffragettes movement being one example. In chapter five, I noted the mechanisms through which challenging various laws and engaging in civil disobedience is being framed as ‘extreme’. Here, this idea is reinforced through further cementing the fixity and justness of Britain’s laws. In so doing, the narrative creates a picture of a just set of laws that are there for our own good.

Second, there is a therapeutic quality to this discourse, through coupling law with security and protection. The language deployed here is cloaked in the language of safeguarding. The rule of law is painted as a protecting and caring mechanism designed to promote safety. The language of safeguarding also permeates the literature on counter-radicalisation and young people. As chapter two argued, discourses surrounding radicalisation emphasise vulnerabilities to ideology. The Department of Education (2015) argues that schools’ counter-extremism responsibilities should be seen as a core component of their wider safeguarding

role. Such an emphasis on safeguarding is reminiscent of what Foucault termed ‘pastoral power’ - a political relationship akin to a shepherd and their flock: a relationship of care, and responsibility (Dean, 2010). The impact of this particular governmentality is two-fold: one, it de-politicises the historical construction of law and the legal system within the UK, and two, it conceals the importance of holding that legal system to account.

The rule of law contributes to the production of a political realm in which virtuous laws protect and serve out interests. Within this realm, a subject is developed, one who abides by the law and does not challenge them. In the case of democracy, it is argued that the discourse produces a subject as voter. Here, it is argued that the rationality of government promotes a narrative of lawmaker as protector, and as such, promotes a submissive subjectivity. In the sense that Althusser’s (1971) fictional police officer hails the subject and thus interpellates that subject into a particular position in relation to the state, so too do the teaching materials hail school students into a form of subjectivity in which they receive protection from the law. The law no longer is a political force that can be altered; rather, it is emaciated and de-politicised to a protective device.

At the heart of this concern is a question of agency. Reduced to the role of voter, political agency is permitted only once every few years. Where then can agency emerge? Through exploring the discourses surrounding individual liberty, the entrepreneurial subject appears: a narrow channel of permitted, neoliberal agency.

### **Individual Liberty and the Entrepreneurial Subject**

Relatively little attention, within both the teaching materials and the audits, is given to the value of individual liberty. Interestingly, only *one* teaching material approached individual liberty as a topic to teach, though all school audits do explore how they promote individual liberty throughout school life. Within this solitary presentation, individual liberty is defined thus (figure 6.6):



*Figure 6.6: T403, slide 2*

Having developed this definition, the presentation goes on to use the example of the shooting of Malala Yousafzai as an illustration of the denial of individual liberty and the right to an education. This appears to achieve a number of things. First, the example places the value of liberty with both the rule of law and democracy as being binaries that are threatened. In this case, it is terrorists who threaten. Second, it places liberty at the heart of the fight against terrorism and extremism. Liberty is something you have or you do not, and extremists want to take it away from you. Third, it masks the political nature of this definition of liberty within a very neoliberal framing. Threatened by extremists, the nature of what liberty might mean is not in a position to be debated, the existential crisis of liberty being too profound a risk. The fight against extremism is reframed as a fight between neoliberalism, and the absence of all liberty. Within this slide, liberty is defined in terms of ‘rights’ and government is designated as a controller of freedoms. As shall be seen below, the synergy between the discourse of individual liberty and neoliberal thinking is notable indeed.

There were three core narratives that emerged through the discourse analysis: independence, rights and responsibilities, and lastly, a focus on careers and the world of work. First, liberty is interpreted as independence, emphasising individual responsibility. One school explains that students are ‘Encouraged to make their own decisions where they have the appropriate level of maturity’ (A13, p. 2). Another cited activities where ‘students have a strong ownership of the group’ (A6, p. 13). A third promotes ‘independent thinking and learning’ (A8, p. 2). Often citing government advice on countering radicalisation, a number of schools make a note that ‘we support all pupils to develop positive self-esteem, self-confidence’ (A1, p. 5). The liberated subject is an independent subject.

Second, individual liberty appears to be protected through the promotion of an understanding of rights. ‘The rights of every student are at the centre of our ethos’ (A8, p. 2), argues one institution. ‘Pupils explore themes including rights and responsibilities’ (A14, p. 10) argues another, with a third school noting their ‘Year 11 Human Rights module’ (A15, p. 3). Rights are often linked both to responsibility and liberty. Students are ‘educated about responsibilities and rights’ (A13, p. 2). Lastly, ‘girls are encouraged to know, understand and exercise their rights and personal freedoms’ (A7, p. 2).

Third, this discourse on rights and independence is complemented by an emphasis on students’ futures, and in particular, linking individual liberty with the world of work. One school argued that ‘developing individual aspirations is key to the life and ethos of the school. Whether our students are to be found excelling on stage... or developing new ideas across their academic studies, we instil in them all a belief in the limitless potential of their own dreams, ambitions and talents’ (A16, p. 2). This school promoted this through organising ‘aspiration visits to universities... careers days... work experience placements’ (A16, p. 2). Another school committed to ‘Promoting success in subject areas leading to a worthwhile career... discussion about job roles within subject areas... use of successful professionals linked to subject areas are used as inspiration’ (A11, p. 3). Ensuring that

these opportunities were available to all, ‘students are encouraged to consider and develop an understanding of how women fit into the world of work’ (A11, p. 3).

These three core narrative operate to develop a particularly neoliberal understanding of how liberty could be constructed. Davies and Bansel (2007) note the emphasis neoliberalism puts on increasing capacity for individualised responsibility and decreasing capacity for government-level intervention. The promotion of liberty appears to have been swept up into a broader promotion of individualised, neoliberal agency. The discourse surrounding the individual liberty component in school audits tends to emphasise the role that schools play in producing certain forms of individualised subjectivities. Here, it is argued that the discourse surrounding individual liberty produces a neoliberal subject, or as Davies and Bansel put it, ‘the citizen as active entrepreneur of the self’ (2007, p. 252), what this chapter will term the ‘entrepreneurial subject’. Such a subjectivity develops a fascinating inference in the context of counter-extremism - that to defend oneself from extremism, one should labour within neoliberal economic models.

This discursive production of the ‘liberated’ individual as someone who is independent, has rights and responsibilities and whose success is then framed within the context of labour appears a fascinating example of how neoliberal logic has found itself embedded within the context of national values, and a counter-extremism strategy. Davies and Bansel argue that ‘it is primarily this reconfiguration of subjects as economic entrepreneurs, and of institutions capable of producing them, which is central to understanding the structuring of possible fields of action that has been taking place with the installation of neoliberal modes of governance’ (2007, p. 248). The field of visibility that is produced by these discourses cuts off from students the possibility of other forms of subjectivity that might be more communally focussed, and limits them to understanding freedom through the individualised and competitive mode of success in the labour market. This is reminiscent of the call to Americans after the attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 to ‘shop, spend, buy’ (Brown, 2006, p. 102) - where boosting the economy became part of a ‘war effort’.

Within the discourse, capitalist neoliberalism becomes inevitable, unchallenged, and timeless, and individual success becomes of moral value; the more you succeed in the neoliberal job market, the more you are doing to counter extremism. Interestingly, in exploring the implications of neoliberalism, Davies and Bansel cite Chantal Mouffe, and argue ‘through discourses of inevitability and the installation of moral absolutes, democratic debate and discussion are obviated, rendering a kind of moral-economic totalitarianism’ (2007, p. 251); the authoritarianism of a de-politicised system of democracy, overseen by a protective rule of law is supported by a permitted mode of freedom through which escape from an economic mode of individualised success becomes impossible. The exceptional politics of suspending the value of democracy is apparent here. While the label of democracy is readily deployed, it appears a vacuous term.

### **Tolerance, Mutual Respect and the Racialised Subject**

The last values to be examined are ‘tolerance’ and ‘mutual respect’. Within these last two values, the construction of the British subject(s) is most clearly present. Whereas the first three values denote ‘things which we value’, the values of tolerance and mutual respect have a much more ethical framing - a sense of who the British are, and it is here that the notion of *Britishness* is rendered visible, and its racialised character most obvious. Britain itself, through the notion of ‘Britishness’, emerges as a tolerant and diverse character. Yet, two distinct subjects are produced: an original, white British subject who is being altered and challenged by a diverse, racialised Other. The diverse Other is tolerated, but only in ways which service and privilege the original white British subject. The discourse of diversity and tolerance within British values narratives constructs a sense of the host Briton and develops core rules by which the diverse Other must abide. As Hage notes in his discussion of whiteness in the context of Australia, multiculturalism retains a sense of white supremacy:

Both the ‘racists’ and the ‘multiculturalists’ shared in the conviction that they were, in one way or another, masters of national space, and that it was up to them to decide who stayed in and who ought to be kept out of that space. (Hage, 2000, p. 17)

As such, the section challenges this construction of a racialised governmentality. As shall be demonstrated, diversity and security, inclusion and exclusion, walk a tightrope. Through this, this section examines the modes in which diversity is permitted, and those modes through which it is not. This examination gives greater clarity therefore on the modes of subjectivity that are permitted and constructed through the values discourse.

### ***Britishness***

The concept of Britishness is hard to locate. It is a contested concept like so many examined in this thesis. Yet, examining the corpus of lessons that tackled the concept, certain themes emerge. In order to gain a greater understanding of the meaning of Britishness, I recorded all of the objects or concepts that were associated with being British within the teaching materials.

<b>Examples of ‘British’ objects or concepts</b>	<b>Number of appearances</b>
Nostalgic or touristic references (e.g. red phone box, Big Ben, cricket)	63
Flags (Union Jack, St George cross)	45
Negative stereotypes (e.g. hooliganism, binge drinking)	22
Examples of diversity (e.g. curry, world religions)	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>147</b>

*Table 6.1: What things are British? (source: author)*

The notions of Britishness evident within the corpus appear to mirror those isolated within a study on Britishness by the Commission for Racial Equality (2005) which found Britishness to be: a combination of geography (e.g. rolling hills); symbols such as the Union Jack; British people (this might be in terms of ‘white Britain’ or in terms of a diverse Britain); a set of values (e.g. human rights and the rule of law);



certain habits or behaviours like queuing; the English language; and the historical achievements of British people. The nostalgic references in the corpus, as well as the presence of the flags, chimes with the comment that Karlsen and Nazroo make, noting how as Prime Minister, David Cameron ‘sought to revert to ideas of Britishness based on particular representations of history... which reasserts a picture of Britain as superior, successful and dominating’ (2015, p. 763). This historical or chronological approach appears evident here in the ubiquity of nostalgic references to a Britain of old.

Yet, while the sum of individual mentions appears to suggest that diversity and negative stereotypes are far outweighed by flags and phone boxes with only 17 references to diversity, the classroom presentations themselves suggest that most classes are delivered to get students thinking somewhat critically about which images of Britishness most reflect their experiences. A number of classes introduce a stereotypically nostalgic impression of Britishness before immediately challenging this with either a negative image of Britishness, an image of diverse Britain, or perhaps questioning whether Britishness even exists. Below, for instance, are two slides from one presentation in which the stereotypical British ideas on the left are then challenged by images of diversity on the right (figures 6.7 & 6.8). Alternatively, in the example below, an understanding of stereotypical Britishness is challenged by images of punk rock, sex, and hoodies (figures 6.8 & 6.10):



Figure 6.7: T383, slide 9



Figure 6.8: T383, slide 10



Figure 6.9: T390, slide 2



Figure 6.10 T390, slide 3

Yet, it is important to note the order in which the slides, and the ideas of Britishness, are presented. The ‘traditional’ understanding of Britishness is presented first, before being challenged. In the slides above (figures 6.7 & 6.8), the whiteness of the Royal Family and the man in a bowler hat is then contrasted with the many colours of ethnic diversity. This appears to develop a narrative of an ‘original’ Britain that has been altered in the modern era. Moreover, this sense of originality develops a sense of the White British gatekeeper subjectivity playing host to the new diversity.

How should this discourse be understood – a discourse that presents this dual narrative between a national narrative scaffolded by nostalgic imagery, and a diversity that recognises the change that has occurred and the multiple ways in which Britons today celebrate Britishness? It is argued that this duality is mediated through developing two racialized subjectivities, the white host and the diverse Other. In so doing, diversity is co-opted within a national project. Writing about how Britishness was negotiated within the Parekh Report in 2000, Fortier argues that Britain was ‘developing its own version of what I call “multicultural nationalism”, that is, the reworking of the nation as inherently multicultural’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 560). Fortier notes that ‘this is a conception of Britishness that centres on ideas of inherent diversity and mixity that dissolves differences’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 560). This understanding of tolerance and pluralism curates a careful space for diversity to flourish: ‘Still primarily ethnicized, the new nation is now re-imagined as the result of a timeless mixing of cultures, in a typical melting-pot assimilationist stew where differences are dissolved and assimilated into a *palatable diversity*’ (Fortier, 2005, p. 561, emphasis added). While the production of a ‘palatable’ diversity restricts and inhibits the modes through which diversity is expressed, it also ensures that diversity is governed by the unshakeable threat that diversity continues to pose.

While diversity is championed as a positive, it never loses its twin, the threat of diversity, and it is this looming threat that mediates the boundaries of what diversity is permissible. The motivation for promoting shared values was, in part, promoted by what might be termed the ‘lost middle’ argument. As Prime Minister, David Cameron isolated the sense of shared values as being key:

This hands-off tolerance has only served to reinforce the sense that not enough is shared. And this all leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless. And the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology. Now for sure, they don’t turn into terrorists overnight, but what we see - and what we see in so many European countries - is a process of radicalisation. (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011)

Cameron appears to contribute to a ‘lost middle’ thesis where young Muslims in Britain today feel lost and trapped between a parental conservatism and a liberalism of their peers. The irony here is that this narrative contributes to a sense that there is an inherent antagonism between Islamic and British values (Karlsen & Nazroo, 2015). For many young Muslims in Britain, this boundary between permitted and outlawed diversity is something they experience profoundly. Reports by human rights and equality groups are full of case studies of young Muslims whose political activism, questions, jokes or art work has been misconstrued as having strayed across the boundary between the permissible and the threatening (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). As the JUST Yorkshire report on Prevent notes:

this narrative of British values was regarded by our respondents as problematising anything that is considered different, especially where the individual concerned also happens to be different. For many of our respondents, what they are being told by the Government is that it is not possible to be regarded as Muslim and British at the same time (JUST Yorkshire, 2017, p. 15).

Within the context of countering terrorism or extremism, not only does diversity provide a benefit, a richness, to the host, but it also produces threat and the need to practice security. Stephens notes this duality when analysing how difference and unity coincided in narratives after the London bombings in 2005: ‘this promotion of difference is curiously, and yet firmly, supported by an insistence on unity... difference appears as both something that can be valued *and* a threat’ (Stephens, 2007, p. 165, original emphasis). Stephens describes this sense of being invited in, but not quite, when discussing Blair’s narratives regarding Muslims in Britain in the wake of the 2005 bombings: ‘in a double move, while “bringing Muslims in”, Blair’s framing of terrorism also works to construct Muslims as another community - one that is not quite British, and not quite terrorist either’ (Stephens, 2007, p. 161). How diversity is accommodated by schools is explored below.

Diversity and integration appear to be at odds. One school's values audit appears to summarise this duality succinctly: 'While celebrating this diversity (indeed regarding the celebration of diversity as fundamentally British), we promote fundamental British values' (A 16, p. 2). The school appears to both place diversity as being other to British, as well as placing 'diversity' as a core component of the very same Britishness.

The main themes, narratives and metaphors that emerge through the discourse analysis specifically of where audits outline how schools promote the value 'mutual respect and tolerance' contribute strongly to this line of argument. In particular, three themes appeared to emerge. The first was an emphasis on difference rather than similarity. The second was a desire to bring the 'Other' into school. The third was a consumption of culture through celebrations and ritual. Such narratives and themes appear to suggest that cultural diversity remains something that has two purposes. One is to invite in the Other for the benefit of the host, and the second is to invite that Other in in order to keep a safe proximity for surveillance and control. The discourse around diversity produces a particular rationality of government in which racialised Other subjectivities can be conducted through particular modes.

### *Recognising difference*

One approach to promoting tolerance and mutual respect is for schools to ensure students are aware of differences. This was certainly one critique that has already been made by scholars examining the teaching of fundamental British values, bringing with it a fear that the values will do the opposite of teaching students about what we all 'share' (Farrell, 2016). Difference is a dominant theme within the audits. Schools are very keen to recognise difference and to share awareness of difference with students:

- Rosehill School 'Demonstrates the similarities and celebrates the differences' (A13, p. 2).
- Other school students leave 'Knowing that there are differences between each religion' (A11, p. 4).

- A third school states: ‘We develop respect for difference by celebrating events connected to different communities’ (A16, p. 2).
- In another school, ‘Students’ differences and ideas are celebrated in assemblies’ (A8, p. 2).
- Hope House School ‘encourage critical thinking and deeper understanding of difference and beliefs... we discuss differences between people’ (A1, p. 8).

Interestingly, some of these statements infer that these differences are evidence of different cultures, rather than different components within a British culture:

- ‘We enable students to appreciate different cultures and traditions, including their own’ (A17, p. 2)
- ‘Through music, pupils have an opportunity to explore aspects of their own culture and begin to recognise, and appreciate, differences in music from different times and places’ (A9, p. 5).

In both examples, it is unclear whether the students’ own culture may be British, but that there are distinct cultures appears important.

Yet, scholars have been keen to point out that this emphasis on difference may have negative consequences. Brown (2006, p. 16) makes a fascinating point about the way that tolerating difference renders those differences as fixed and natural, rather than exploring those differences as socially, politically and historically constituted:

When, for example, middle and high schoolers are urged to tolerate one another's race, ethnicity, culture, religion or sexual orientation, there is no suggestion that the differences at issue... are themselves the effect of power and hegemonic norms... Rather, difference itself is what students learn to tolerate.

The way of knowing the world as ‘similar’ and ‘different’ is cemented within the students’ imaginary, placing the ‘different’ at a distance from the norm. Semati (2010) makes a similar point regarding the production of difference in the context of Islamophobia, and the production of the Muslim Other. Semati notes that ‘the racist imagination does not appeal to “race” to posit the inferiority of an Other based on biology but to “cultural differences” and their insurmountability’ (2010, p. 257). The danger within the way that difference plays a key role in tolerance, is that once again, the political system which develops that sense of difference is never questioned:

The appeal to the category of culture to explain the Muslim Other takes two forms. In the first, the Muslim Other is seen as the embodiment of inferior civilizations and cultures. In the second, the attempt is made to embrace difference by trying to ‘understand’ the culture and religion of the Other. In either case, what is conveniently left out is the politics that has given rise to the category of the Muslim Other (Semati, 2010, p. 257).

Importantly for Semati, the power dynamic of those who wish to distance different cultures and those who want to understand cultural differences is remarkably similar. As Hage (2000) mentioned above, the power dynamic of the racist and the multiculturalist are not that different. For instance, schools are keen to explore the positives of what difference can bring: ‘We welcome difference and diversity and aim to create understanding of how this adds to the richness of our community’ (A8, p. 2). This word ‘rich’ is often linked to diversity. Yet, as shall be explored below, this enrichment must be met with caution, as bell hooks explains: ‘the over-riding fear is that cultural, ethnic, and racial differences will be continually commodified and offered up as new dishes to enhance the white palate - that the Other will be eaten, consumed, and forgotten’ (hooks, 2014, p. 39).

Within the discourse is the clear sense that there is an ‘us’ and a ‘them’. One school describes ‘Studying different religious and cultural attitudes to the British system’ (A9, p. 5). It is fascinating to note the inference within this statement that Britain itself holds particular religious or cultural attitudes of its own. Perhaps not *all* Britons are part of these religious or cultural attitudes? Often this sense of Otherness is quite apparent. Describing how globalisation is taught in Business Studies, one audit describes: ‘This includes in different areas of the UK as well as on a global scale as certain areas of the UK have pockets of different cultures/ religions’ (A3, p. 2). The Other is over there. As described below, the ‘Other’ can be brought in, but the behaviour that they must demonstrate is proscribed. One school explains that ‘Pupils consider how democracy, justice, diversity, toleration, respect and freedom are values by people with different beliefs, backgrounds and traditions within a changing democratic society’ (A9, p. 6). This school universalises Western values of democracy, justice, and freedom, and translates how ‘difference’ sits within such constructs. Here, the boundaries of diversity are clearly delineated. There are ways to be *different*, but the boundaries of what is (un)acceptable is clear. Falcous and Silk make similar remarks when discussing how Black and Asian British athletes were brought to the fore in the UK’s bid to host the 2012 Olympics. They note that ‘these figures are taken up as legitimate multicultural racialised subjects, but inclusion is contingent; they are “allowed” to be “racialised” but only in bounded ways’ (Falcous & Silk, 2010, p. 173). In this sense, the diverse ‘Other’ is allowed in, but only if they perform within certain bounds.

One manifestation of this boundary-setting for diversity can be seen in the way that the ‘Prevent duty’ has been implemented. The duty - as set out earlier in the thesis - requires teachers to inform authorities of any young person they see as being vulnerable to extremism. Yet, the duty has impacted most heavily young Muslim students, and particularly those who express political opinion. To give just one example, the report entitled *Eroding Trust* on the impact of the Prevent strategy in schools revealed a case study where a school student was interviewed by police for wearing a pro-Palestinian badge on their school uniform and



organising a fundraising event for Palestinian children affected by war (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2017, pp. 86-7). In this sense, diversity is permitted within the discourse on fundamental British values, but the combination of diversity and political participation appears toxic.

In a school setting, the ‘us’ entails the non-diverse and non-threatening majority, the ‘them’ can be brought in, but always as guests. This creates what might be termed a ‘hierarchy of belonging’ (Weymss, 2006).

The door remains perpetually able to be shut, as Fortier notes:

The formation of new multicultural subjects involves a movement between closeness and distance; that is, one which means that other is now integral to ‘our’ imagined community, while at the same time, their otherness, which is necessary to the project of multiculturalist Britain, keeps them distant and indeterminate (Fortier, 2005, p. 572).

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Other is voiceless within the audits. The school is the ‘us’, and the Other can be brought in. The important thing to note here is that there is a danger, even if the ‘us’ in this case wants to celebrate and embrace the Other. As Hage describes, ‘the way the voice of the “ethnic other” is made passive not only by those who want to eradicate it, but also by those who are happy to welcome it under some conditions they feel entitled to set’ (Hage, 2000, p. 17).

### ***Bringing the ‘Other’ in***

Exploring how schools interpret what promoting diversity means offers insight into how diversity is interpreted within schools. Often, diversity is perceived as about ‘bringing in’ those who are different to *expose* students to difference. One school for instance described that their ‘Curriculum [is] enriched with visitors from different cultures’ (A13, p. 2). Another school mentions also: ‘students are taught to appreciate the diversity and richness belief and faith can bring to the different artwork they see

around the world' (A3, p. 3). This school's approach is particularly interesting: 'We aim to do more than "tolerate" those with different faiths and beliefs. We recognise the extent to which our own traditions and history have developed side by side and the rich cultural heritage that different world religions bring... we encourage those in our school who hold different faiths and beliefs to share their experiences and *provide us with insight*' (A8, p. 3, emphasis added). What is particularly evident in this last quotation is that the 'richness' and the addition to the wealth is to the benefit of the host – the 'us' given insight. While there is some acknowledgement that toleration may not be an ultimately positive virtue, there is a real sense in this extract that not only is there a clear us and them, but that the Other must be brought in, for their presence is of benefit to the host community.

The purpose of 'bringing in' this Other to expose difference to students appears to be designed to benefit the 'host' students - and to offer those students knowledge and understanding. According to the Department of Education, schools should: 'Further tolerance and harmony between different cultural traditions by enabling students to acquire an appreciation of and respect for their own and other cultures' (Department for Education, 2015, p. 5). Yet, what is this tolerance attempting to achieve? How should we understand this idea of tolerance? Audre Lorde offers a warning here. Lorde was speaking to a conference on feminist thought and was criticising the conference for its lack of acknowledgement of the different experiences of black, poor and lesbian women in a conference programme that ignored difference. In her speech, Lorde argued that 'Advocating for mere tolerance of difference between women is the grossest reformism. It is a total denial of the creative function of difference in our lives. Difference must not be tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark as a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependence become unthreatening' (Lorde, 2010, p. 450). Lorde acknowledges what difference can offer, and suggests interdependence should be valued between those who are different. Yet, if that difference is only *tolerated*, then that Otherness will perpetuate. Yet, in these school resources

toleration is precisely what is being aimed for, cementing a sense of self and Other. Often, as the next section will examine, this involves offering diversity as something that can be *consumed*.

### ***Consuming culture***

It is fascinating within the audits how the celebration of diversity was described within the contexts of consuming cultural artefacts from around the world. This might be a cultural celebration such as:

- ‘Music from different cultures’ (A6, p. 5)
- ‘Visiting artists e.g. Indian dancer’ (A10, p. 2).
- ‘Promoting of diversity in resources - when possible the way of life, custom, traditions, festivals, literature, songs from other cultures are explored’ (A11, p. 4).

Or, it might concern a series of festivals:

- ‘We discuss different religious and cultural festivals and celebrations in French and Spanish speaking countries and encourage our own students to share their experiences of religious celebrations’ (A9, p. 4).
- ‘We develop respect for difference by celebrating events connected to different communities. Our Assemblies celebrate Eid, Diwali, Chinese New Year and other festivals’ (A16, p. 2).
- ‘Review and develop an understanding of cultures and customs around the world, identifying cultural festivals and methods of celebration, cultural differences regarding food...’ (A9, p. 4).

Often, this celebration comes through food:

- ‘Special meals and assemblies may celebrate events such as Chinese New Year’ (A4, p. 3).
- ‘This is even extended to the school catering where special food “theme” days are organised to celebrate both British and World events’ (A7, p. 2).

This is positive, as one school describes: ‘Life is more interesting with a greater variety of food, music and culture’ (A6, p. 18). Once again, the purpose is to benefit the ‘host’: ‘We welcome difference and diversity and aim to create understanding of how this adds to the richness of our community’ (A8, p.2). Diversity appears to be present in order to serve host communities.

This emphasis on consumption of diverse culture by a host community was heavily criticised by bell hooks in her essay, *Eating the Other*, in which she criticised how ‘ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture’ (hooks, 2014, p. 21). In her essay, hooks critiques the argument that the bringing in of the Other should signify a break between a discriminatory past and an inclusive present. Exploring the case of young white men’s sexual encounters with the racial Other, she explains:

Unlike racist white men who historically violated the bodies of black women/women of color to assert their position as coloniser/conqueror, these young men see themselves as non-racists, who choose to transgress racial boundaries within the sexual realm not to dominate the Other, but rather so that they can be acted upon, so that they can be changed utterly (hooks, 2014, p. 24).

The Other is brought in, be it in the sense of a sexual encounter in hooks’ example, or in the example of cultural consumption or ‘insight’ in a school encounter, precisely to change and benefit the host. In this sense, the white supremacist dynamic continues to operate - one in which the hierarchy of white self and racialised Other goes unchallenged. hooks does however offer a way out. Exploring a play, *Les Blancs*, in which a white character, Charles, tries to befriend a black character, Tshembe, hooks notes: ‘Again and again Tshembe must make it clear to Charles that subject to subject contact between white and black which signals the absence of domination, of an oppressor/oppressed relationship, must emerge through mutual

choice and negotiation' (hooks, 2014, p. 28). It appears particularly evident in this case of British values, that any sense of mutuality is entirely lacking.

These discourses present Britain as a country that holds onto a set of fundamental values. One of these values is tolerance. Yet, as this section has demonstrated, tolerance of diversity should not be confused with equality of diversity. Tolerance of diversity, as practiced within schools, produces an imbalanced dynamic of power relations in which the diverse, threatening Other is permitted narrow modes through which to express diversity, often for the benefit of the White, original British subject. This imbalanced power relationship was summarised succinctly by Winter and Mills who argue that while the values strategy

manifests itself as a 'new' curriculum policy, its underlying logic and rationale are symptoms of the much-older colonial education-security relationship, and thus, of white British supremacist subjectivity deployed by government to defend white privilege. (Winter & Mills, 2018, p. 2).

## **Conclusion**

This chapter set out to understand how, within the analogous depiction of Britain's counter-extremism education strategy as a castle under siege, the 'moderate' within the castle's walls is constructed. It examined the nature of the political and social realm envisioned within the discourses surrounding 'fundamental British values' in materials designed to promote these values in schools. Developing a governmentality approach, the chapter sought to examine how power, through discursive practices, is deployed to govern and shape the conduct of various forms of subjectivity. Through examining the discourse surrounding the fixed set of four values - democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and tolerance and mutual respect – the chapter has examined and critiqued this particular mode of racialised, neoliberal governmentality.

While the justification for the promotion of fundamental British values is built on a logic of shared values and promoting commonality, the opposite was found to be the case. Instead, through examining the modes of subjectivity that are deemed permissible within the discourse, the discourse is proven to be both narrow and exclusionary.

The chapter has focussed on three primary modes of subjectivity. First, the post-political subject was examined. Exploring the discourse through the theoretical prism offered by Chantal Mouffe's work on the post-political, the chapter examined the implications of reducing values of democracy and the rule of law to uncontested systems of governance. Such presentation of liberal democratic mechanisms as values provided narrow, and depoliticised, modes of political participation. The post-political subject is one that is submissive and non-challenging.

Second, the chapter focused on what it referred to as the entrepreneurial subject. Through examining how discourses around individual liberty were enveloped in neoliberal modes of framing liberty, and exploring how the world of work, careers and labour more broadly were swept up into understandings of what liberty entails, the chapter was able to examine the ways in which counter-extremism has become a practice of promoting neoliberal frames of logic.

Last, the chapter explored what it termed the racialised subject. Exploring discourses surrounding tolerance and mutual respect, the analysis uncovered a White, British 'host' subject, and a racialized Other. It then explored the ways in which these two subjects might interact within the discourse, arguing that a clear 'hierarchy of belonging' exists in which tolerance and respect are values in service to the host, White British subject. In Kundnani's words, 'the solution for liberals is to allow difference so long as it does not make a difference' (2015, p. 88). The chapter critiqued such exclusionary practices.

UNESCO notes the role of ‘fundamental values that help raise the defences of peace against violent extremism’ (2016, p. 15). Here, the role of values as defence has been challenged and critiqued. Chapter five demonstrated that the threat of extremism appeared to have become universalised, securitising counter-extremism education and engendering a realm of exceptional politics. Through examining how the exceptional politics necessitate the suspension of values for their protection, this chapter has explored how this exceptionality has governed the moderate centre. In particular, two challenges dominate. First, the nature of democracy, entrapped within these walls, appears narrow and exclusionary, offering only one conception of how democracy is to be done. Such a conceptualisation of democracy appears a direct challenge to more plural notions of democracy. Moreover, such exclusionary understandings of permitted democracy promote exclusionary modes of politics, rendering those excluded from the moderate centre in a realm of insecurity. Governmentalities of diversity set narrow modes of permitted diversity: the Other is only ‘allowed in’ under certain circumstances.

The thesis has now examined how the extreme and the moderate are conceptualised within the discourse. In the following chapter, the relationship between the two is examined, as the discourse around the skill of critical thinking is explored. Here, the thesis exposes how critical thinking is deployed as a *weapon* to protect the moderate from the extreme, and in so doing, both masks and perpetuates the modes of discrimination that govern this racialised, neoliberal governmentality.

# 7

## Selectively Critical

### Critical Thinking, Islamophobia and the Post-Racial

The values of democracy, tolerance and respect are not the only ‘motherhood and apple pie’ concepts promoted within counter-extremism education. Critical thinking appears to be another similarly incontestable idea. Celebrated in curricula documents from primary schools in Finland to tertiary level university papers in South Africa, critical thinking is a vital component of contemporary education. This chapter seeks to evaluate how the critical thinking component of the counter-extremism in schools strategy is developed within the teaching resources. In chapter three, I argued that there were a number of questions or issues that arose out of the deployment of critical thinking within the strategy. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine those questions. The chapter noted the lack of a secure definition of critical thinking, and how that definition might then relate to extremism. In particular, some definitions of critical thinking emphasise developing a relationship with the Other, in order to understand the Other’s perspective (Davies, 2008; Sieckelinck & de Ruyter, 2009). Within this framework, it is often argued that critical thinking is an important component of citizenship skills (Ten Dam & Volman, 2004). Yet, it was argued in chapter three that this understanding of critical thinking seemed to clash with other core components of the counter-extremism strategy, particularly, the importance of protecting and promoting liberal democratic values. Furthermore, the chapter noted the common assumption that scholars made, namely, that critical thinking skills automatically lead to the cultivation a particular set of (liberal) values. The question of how one might critically think towards a predetermined answer was raised.

This chapter explores how these antagonisms and contradictions emerge within the teaching materials themselves. In so doing, it seeks to go beyond an explanation of how things are not working, to try to



understand what is working through its not working: what are the political and ideological consequences of this particular deployment of ‘critical thinking’? The chapter explores how critical thinking has become *weaponised* - transformed into a tool or technique of defence. Critical thinking is deployed to protect the moderate centre from the extremes, but as the chapter will argue, such a weaponising function serves to both mask and perpetuate certain modes of discrimination.

The chapter focuses on how the antagonism between critical thinking skills and liberal democratic values promotion emerges in the context of discussing Islamophobia, a common topic chosen when teaching critical thinking. In particular, it explores how three separate themes operate in conjunction with one another: the resources challenge the Islamophobia of others (in particular, the media and right-wing extremists); they produce an essentialised understanding of ‘True Islam’ as a form of Islam that is tolerant of and does not challenge or threaten liberal democracy; and lastly, the resources lack critical analysis of the Islamophobic and discriminatory structures of the counter-extremism strategy itself, while presenting itself as a ‘safe space’. Through examining literatures on the ‘Post-Racial’ and on ‘New Racism’, the chapter explores each of the three strands, and examines how they cooperate to mask from students the racialised and discriminatory structures of a counter-extremism strategy which deploys critical thinking in a defensive mode, designed to protect liberal democracy from challenge and critique. As such, the chapter further develops the argument made in the previous chapter that the defensive and securitised mode of education in the face of the extremist threat has engendered an exceptional politics in which values must be suspended for their own protection. While diversity, tolerance and mutual respect are fundamental British values, here the machinations of an Islamophobic strategy are exposed. The chapter begins by examining first how critical thinking is defined, and the ways in which it is deployed, before exploring the various common themes amongst the resources, and their consequences.

## Defining Critical Thinking

The first thing to note is how often developing critical thinking skills is cited as a core learning component of these materials. To give three examples:

- *Since 9/11* argues ‘this topic provides a meaningful and relevant context through which to engage students with the concepts of democracy and justice, rights and responsibilities, and identities and diversity, and to develop the skills of critical thinking and enquiry, advocacy and representation, and taking informed and responsible action’ (T285, p.2).
- *Extreme Dialogue* express ‘Developing the skills to think critically’ (T90, p. 4) as one of their key aims.
- The *PSHE Association* note the importance of ‘developing critical and flexible thinking’ (T252, p. 4) in teaching about extremism.

Yet, what does ‘critical thinking’ really mean? In chapter three, it was argued that literature on education and extremism offers little in the way of definition and fails to draw upon academic literatures on critical thinking itself. This left the question of the purpose of critical thinking in counter-extremism unanswered: did it refer to the deployment of a set of reasoning skills to disrupt the brainwashing capacity of extremist narrative, or was it designed somehow to catalyse the uptake of certain values through the improvement of a set of skills?

Rather symmetrically, it is important to note that the term is never defined within any of the teaching materials in the corpus. Instead, an understanding of what critical thinking entails can be deduced by exploring all the words and phrases that are used in association with the word ‘critical’ in the resources. They are collated here in the following table:

thinking	enquiry	skills
debate	question	investigation
issues	explore	weigh evidence
reasoned arguments	contentious issues	examine
resilience	independently	free enquiry
serious discussion	judgement	argument
deliberation	scrutiny	analysis
aware	evaluate	idealism
look	reflect	judging
assess	understanding	responding
informed	choosing	justifying
dialogue	moral reasoning	consumer
appraisal	rational	

Table 7.4: critical thinking's associated words (source: author)

The corpus appears to understand critical thinking skills as the set of skills one would use to take an idea and assess it, evaluating whether or not one would agree with it, whether it has justification and so on. It does not therefore imply any one particular arena for critical thinking, but instead a universal skill.

However, despite being presented as a universal skill, critical thinking is deployed in specific ways. This chapter will explore the mono-directional nature of the deployment of critical thinking within counter-extremism education. By this, it will be argued that critical thinking is always used ‘outwards’, away from the liberal democratic moderate centre. Critical thinking may be deployed towards those who challenge, those who are extreme, but the moderate centre is never itself critically approached. This ‘weaponisation’ of critical thinking has particular ramifications, in that it plays a key role in masking the discriminatory structures of the counter-extremism strategy.

This mono-directional nature can be immediately evidenced through an exploration of the topics within the teaching materials isolated above which describe themselves as somehow ‘critical’. The topics covered in the same teaching materials from which the above associated words were collated are as follows:

Extremism	Challenging extremist narratives	dictatorship
“Anarchic states in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt”	Meanings of extremism and terrorism	Signs of radicalisation
Immigration and right-wing extremism	Political and social issues	Contentious issues
Who is considered a terrorist	Terrorism in the context of apartheid	Challenges facing the UK
Complex problems	The “nature of democracy”	The role of laws
Social change	Violence in whatever forms	Media and current affairs
9/11 and its memorialisation	Beliefs and attitudes	Responses to 9/11
Violent extremism	Religious extremism	intolerance
Charismatic leadership	London bombings 2005	Learning dialogue

Table 7.5: Topics approached critically (source: author)

Within these materials, there are classes or presentations which challenge some of the orthodox narratives of discourses of terrorism (e.g. ‘who is considered a terrorist’ or ‘responses to 9/11’). There are moments where either the way in which terrorism or extremism is defined might be afforded critical attention (e.g. ‘terrorism in the context of apartheid’).<sup>15</sup> For the most part, however, the fact that critical thinking is being drawn very heavily in the direction of extremism and its associated terms is important to note. Aside from one instance of a resource appearing to approach British values with some level of criticality, the materials do not appear to acknowledge a need for a critical approach to the moderate centre. Critical thinking is a skill to *protect from* a threat, rather than a universally applicable skill in its own right.

<sup>15</sup> These moments of ‘resistance’ to the discourse are discussed in depth in chapter eight.

Marsden offers an interesting take on the purpose of critical thinking in the context of countering extremism: ‘to develop critical, informed, compassionate citizens able to engage constructively with those difficult questions that political violence is, at heart, concerned with: how to negotiate difference; how to “do” politics in an increasingly pluralistic society; what to do about injustice; and what counts as “extreme” and “moderate” and why’ (Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015). What is fascinating is how much emphasis appears to be poured into critically exploring why people might be drawn to extremism, but very little about ‘those difficult questions’ that extremists believe they have an answer to. This will be explored below when investigating the uncritical approach the corpus overall takes towards the production of counter-narratives.

Marsden finishes her commentary with a pertinent comment: ‘Young people sympathetic to “radical” ideas aren’t necessarily ideologically “brainwashed”, they have political agency, it’s rather that the scope of critical thinking is limited, confined to their opponent’s behaviour. The task of educators is to expand the object and direction of that thinking, to include the arguments of those to whom they’re sympathetic’ (Marsden, 2015). This chapter rather suggests that the same could be said for those sympathetic to ‘moderate’ ideas too.

### **Critically Examining an Islamophobic Media**

It is evident that a number of resources make clear attempts to develop their students’ critical skills. The majority of those resources focus on developing skills in critical reception of information and narratives. A dominant topic through which to develop the skills of critical thinking is the media. *Since 9/11*, for instance, explores the values with which media outlets evaluate which news stories to promote to their front pages (T293). *Extreme Dialogue* explores sensationalism in the media (T91). The *PSHE Association* ‘aims to help young people understand the impact of editorial choices in the media’ (T267, p. 1). A Stockton Council resource, using the example of how young people are represented in the media, ensures students

‘have considered how the media can misrepresent communities and how it can influence society’s perceptions’ (T353, slide 2). Academic study supports the importance of media literacy. For instance, Jerome and Elwick report a focus group with students: ‘The prevailing sense of these discussions was a feeling that the students were quite vulnerable to distorted media messages, but that this could be tackled, at least partially, through a more critical engagement with information’ (2017, p. 7). Likewise, Lenos and Krasenberg argue ‘critical thinking (media literacy) is the weapon that we should arm everyone with, so that they can avoid the forces that lure so many into polarisation’ (2017, p. 3).

One way in which this was achieved was, for example, through supporting students to be able to distinguish fact and opinion. A number of resources focussed on developing skills to distinguish between fact and opinion and to examine bias (figures 7.1 & 7.2):

## Fact and Opinion Exercise

1. From my bedroom window I can see a lamppost.
2. There are too many people on the planet.
3. If you have a tattoo you are from the working class.
4. Earth is the third planet from the sun.
5. A gay couple should not be allowed to have kids.
6. The richer you are, the happier you are.
7. Islam is not compatible with the West.
8. There are twelve eggs in a dozen.
9. The Bible suggests you should not have tattoos and body piercings.
10. The European Union Headquarters are located in Brussels.
11. The legal age of drinking should be lowered to 16.
12. A third of Britain is owned by 0.6% of the population?
13. The red squirrel is endangered because of the introduction of the American grey squirrel.
14. The names of all the continents end with the same letter that they start with.
15. Alternative energy exploration is an important endeavour.

Figure 7.2: T110, slide 5

LO: - Look at what we mean by fact and opinion/assess what constitutes 'good evidence'/analyse what techniques are used to create convincing propaganda

### Fact or opinion?

1. From the classroom window I can see a lamppost.
2. There are too many people on the planet.
3. Earth is the third planet from the sun.
4. A gay couple should not be allowed to have kids.
5. The richer you are, the happier you are.
6. There are twelve eggs in a dozen.
7. The Bible suggests you should not have tattoos and body piercings.
8. The European Union Headquarters are located in Brussels.
9. The legal age of drinking should be lowered to 16.
10. The names of all the continents end with the same letter that they start with.

Keywords: Fact, fiction, opinion, evidence, media, propaganda

Figure 7.3: T429, slide 8


The prevalence of Islamophobia in the media (and its potential impact to further alienate and radicalise young Muslims) was a common theme to emerge within the context of what one resource described as, becoming ‘critical consumers of information’ (T258, slide 10). The emphasis on Islamophobia in the media within the context of counter-extremism education is perhaps unsurprising, given the academic literature on the problematic portrayal of Muslims and Islam within print media (e.g. Saeed, 2007) and

racism in the media more broadly (e.g. van Dijk, 1995; 2000). In one large scale analysis of media content concerning British Muslims, it was found that ‘the idea that Islam is dangerous, backward or irrational is present in 26% of stories. By contrast, only 2% of stories contained the proposition that Muslims supported dominant moral values’ (Moore et al., 2008, p. 3). This report concluded that ‘Decontextualisation, misinformation and a preferred discourse of threat, fear and danger, while not uniformly present, were strong forces in the reporting of British Muslims in the UK national press’ (Moore et al., 2008, p. 4).

Perhaps reflecting this portrayal in the media, a number of resources cited instances of Islamophobia in print media (figures 7.3, 7.4 & 7.5):

### Key questions

- How might the media presentation of stories fuel divisions in our communities?
- How might this contribute to extremism?






Figure 7.4: T268, slide 9



Figure 7.4: T419, slide 23

### Stereotypes in the Headlines

- “He was a devout Muslim but he was a normal kid who loved Manchester United and played football and cricket.” (*The Mirror*, 1<sup>st</sup> April 2004)
- “Former classmates of Miss Belgium said she had gone from being a normal girl to a devout Muslim almost overnight (*Daily Mail*, 11 February 2006)
- “women are being forced to dress like daleks” (*The Sun*, 7 August 2009)




Figure 7.5: T111, slide 11

In these three presentations, the nature of Islamophobia in the media is described in different ways. In the first, it is offered as an example of propaganda; the second suggests that Islamophobia in the media is a contributing factor to extremism; and the third describes these essentializing attitudes as the use of stereotypes for particular agendas. While they all, therefore, diverge in some ways, the central narrative - that the media are Islamophobic - remains.

In many cases, these resources demonstrate a number of the features that Gardner et al. identify as key components of a ‘multicultural media competence’ (2008, p. 132). In particular, teaching materials attempt to develop ‘an ability to understand media reporting and its background’ and ‘a capacity to interpret the meaning of the lack of multiple perspectives in the media discourse on migration and multiculturalism, as well as on Islam’ (ibid.). Other resources contextualised Islamophobia by linking the issue to debates surrounding migration, and wider discourses surrounding terrorism. In the following images, one slide challenges media discourses on migration, while the second contrasts these discourses with the reporting of the death of Aylan Kurdi, a child whose body washed up on the Turkish shore having drowned in the Mediterranean sea (figures 7.6 & 7.7):



Figure 7.6: T45, slide 14




Figure 7.7: T425, slide 4



These resources do therefore attempt to help students to develop critical skills to challenge stereotypes and to read the media with a critical eye. Yet, it is important that this nod towards criticality is itself approached critically. McQueeney, for instance, in an article exploring Islamophobia and the media, argues ‘Critical media literacy is especially useful for cultivating equity and justice among today’s students, who... lack the ability to evaluate information and debunk stereotypes in the media’ (2014, p. 297). This begs the question, to what extent does the critical literacy teaching regarding Islamophobia, evident within these resources, cultivate some sort of justice? It has been argued that the teaching materials are quick to label the media as Islamophobic. Yet, for what purpose has this finger of blame been pointed?

### **The Post-Racial and New Racism**

The chapter will deploy the theories of Post-Raciality and New Racism to explore the implications of this critical approach to Islamophobia. These theories have been developed in the counter-extremism context before. Sian argues that we should see the Prevent strategy as a part of ‘the current hegemonic post-racial discourse’ (2015, p. 194), noting how teachers receive training to identify extremism, but do not receive training to promote anti-racism. Postraciality acknowledges a contemporary current through which racism is both dismissed and denied, while at the same time underlying structures of racial inequality continue to function. As Sayyid notes, ‘It is characterised by a sense that we have seen the “end of racism” and its expulsion from the public domain’ (2010, p. 3). Yet, importantly Sayyid continues by highlighting: ‘A black president, third world rock stars, and all the ethnic food you can eat does not change the violent hierarchies that remain in place grinding away at the souls of the dispossessed’ (Sayyid, 2010, p. 4).

The discourse of ‘post-raciality’ has parallels and commonalities with the literature on ‘new racism’ which explores a shift, as Saeed puts it: ‘from crude notions of biological inferiority and instead forged links between race, nationhood, patriotism and nationalism. It has done so by defining the nation as a unified cultural community, a national culture ethnically pure and homogeneous in its whiteness’ (Saeed, 2007, p. 445). Van Dijk adds, ‘In the New Racism, minorities are not biologically inferior, but different’ (van Dijk,

2000, p. 34). Or, as Semati writes, ‘The racist imagination does not appeal to ‘race’ to posit the inferiority of an Other based on biology but on “cultural differences” and their insurmountability’ (Semati, 2010, p. 257). The previous chapter explored criticisms of fundamental British values that argued these were ‘white’ values, or presented White people as *a priori* British. Fundamental British values appear to be an exemplar instance of new racism at play. One might see this also in the emphasis placed on cultural markers such as the hijab when exploring issues of extremism and security. Questions arise as to whether such choices indicate an inability for assimilation.

There are thus two complementary trends to take note of here. The first is the denial of racism while racial discriminatory structures persist. This is a trend shared by both post-raciality and new racism. Bonilla-Silva notes that new racism also refers to ‘the manifold subtle yet systemic ways in which racial privilege is reproduced’ (Bonilla-Silva, 2003, p. 272). The second is the shift in understanding race from one of biological inferiority, to unbridgeable cultural difference. Both trends shall be explored in this chapter as they emerge within the themes and narratives surrounding Islamophobia within the teaching materials.

This post-racial dismissal of Islamophobia is moreover key to the construction of the moderate centre; both distancing it from exceptional racism such as that of far-right movements, and also making any challenge to the powerful dominance of the non-ethnic moderate centre more difficult. As Sayyid notes, ‘By focussing on racism as something to be found in the mind of racists, it makes it difficult to understand a world in which there could be racism without self-ascribed racists... the solution to racism is individual reform rather than social transformation’ (Sayyid, 2010, p. 5). The chapter will thus explore the ways in which not only does the post-racial discourse produce a particular image of the ‘Other’, but also contributes to the virtuous moderate subject.

### ***They are the Islamophobes!***

It is interesting to note that within the discourse of the teaching materials, the media was so often depicted as the *source* of the Islamophobia. This discursive act appears to distance the moderate centre from the charge of Islamophobia itself, through identifying an ‘Other’ as Islamophobic. One resource asked students: ‘But who is responsible for Islamophobia? Any ideas?’ (T39, slide 6), before displaying the following image:




Figure 7.8: T39, slide 7

This material inferred, therefore, that the media *produce* Islamophobia. Similarly, another resource shared an example of a newspaper headline, noting: ‘However, headlines like this probably don’t help either. Some of the UK press does push young people away by being Islamophobic’ (T426, slide 5). Such expressions and depictions of the media present the production of Islamophobia as an isolated, agentic choice of the media. Such a depiction thus also distances the Islamophobic media away from the moderate centre, creating a binary distinction between the intolerant, Islamophobic subject and its opposite - the liberal moderate.

One way of understanding this discursive move is through Brown's use of the concept of 'depoliticisation'. Brown, in her work exploring the discourses of tolerance, argues:

Depoliticisation involves construing inequality, subordination, marginalisation and social conflict, which all require political analysis and political solutions, as personal and individual, on the one hand, or as natural, religious, or cultural on the other. (Brown, 2006, p. 15)

The discourse, I argue, in its blaming of the media for producing Islamophobia, thus individualises Islamophobia by providing isolated agents of Islamophobia rather than exploring it as a social phenomenon. This depiction of the problem can be contrasted with an exploration of the socially embedded nature of media outlets. As van Dijk writes: 'Media discourse is the main source of people's knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, both of other elites and of ordinary citizens. Of course, the media do this in joint production with the other elites, primarily politicians, professionals and academics' (van Dijk, 2000, p. 35). In van Dijk's research into racism within media institutions, he has concluded:

Analyses of ethnic affairs coverage show a remarkable alignment of the press with the dominant white power elites, as well as with the popular resentment among the white population at large, whose protests against further immigration or serious equal rights policies are prominently displayed in, and thus further exacerbated by, the news media. (van Dijk, 1995, p. 17)

In van Dijk's work, the dual role of the media is emphasised - as both a producer of discourse, and as reproducer. Instead of, therefore, seeing media as the *source* of racism or Islamophobia, media should be evaluated as an institution within a social context in which it operates. Thus, evidence of Islamophobia in the media is not just evidence of an Islamophobic media, but of the permissibility and pervasiveness of Islamophobia across society more broadly. Macdonald (2003) for instance, begins a chapter on discourses around Islam in the media by introducing Said's theory of 'Orientalism', locating contemporary

Islamophobia in hundreds of years of history during which European thinkers contrasted the West with the barbaric and exotic 'Other' (see also Saeed, 2007; Semati, 2010). Similarly, when discussing an example of racism expressed by a football commentator, Matheson writes: 'The way of thinking and the way of talking about black players which popped readily into this commentator's head did so precisely because it was socially shared knowledge' (2005, p. 138). This racism did not emerge from nowhere, but exists in a social context. As such, it is interesting to note that this discursive distancing from Islamophobia within the corpus, in fact operates to mask the audience of the social and political location in which Islamophobia takes place. Brown continues, 'Depoliticisation involves removing a political phenomenon from comprehension of its *historical* emergence and from a recognition of the *powers* that produce and contour it' (2006, p. 15).

A similar narrative process exists where corpus materials highlight instances of Islamophobia by right-wing groups such as the English Defence League. These instances serve to isolate right-wing groups as anomalies; at odds with, rather than the logical extension of, wider social forces. This serves to reinforce the distance between the moderate centre - the voice of these materials - and the racism or Islamophobia on show. So often, images of the English Defence League marching through British streets develop a menacing image of the threat posed by these Islamophobic groups (figures 7.9, 7. 10 & 7.11):



Figure 7.9: T42, slide 8



Figure 7.10: T109, slide 8

### Right Wing Groups

**Far Right Groups:**

- English Defence League
- British National Party
- National Front
- Democratic Nationalists
- English Democrats

**Extreme Right Wing Groups:**

- Britain First
- Blood and Honour
- Aryan Strike Force
- Combat 18
- Racial Volunteer Force
- British KKK
- November 9th Society
- British Movement
- White Nationalist Party
- British Peoples Party
- League of St George
- Knights Templar








Figure 7.11: T387, slide 4

This production of the evil and barbaric white nationalist figure appears akin to the production of the evil or threatening Orientalist Other produced by the media. It produces an essentialised barbarism that can be contrasted with a tolerant, moderate subject, producing clear delineations in what might otherwise be understood as a murky, complex and interlinked environment in which society as a whole allows Islamophobia to emerge and thrive. This discursive mechanism shifts the spotlight away from the moderate centre, and produces clear boundaries between the permissible and the unacceptable.

Moreover, within the teaching materials' handling of the topic of Islamophobia, a core antagonism of counter-extremism critical thinking is evident: the antagonism between thinking critically and the importance of promoting certain counter-narratives. Teaching materials are keen to provide counter-

narratives to compete with those coming from more extreme sources. For example, resources encouraged students to explore the false views held by those on the far-right (figure 7. 12):



**Far Right Views in Europe**

Read through the views of the far right on your **worksheet**.

- **Task One** – Create a summary of the main beliefs of Far Right groups and link them to keywords from the starter.
- **Task Two** - Work out a counter-argument or a way to challenge these racist and discriminatory views, and write this in the boxes provided.
- **Task Three** - Explain why each of these views is not acceptable in a democratic society, linking those explanations with keywords from the starter activity.

*Figure 7.12: T387, slide 6*

The material was designed with a clear sense of what was ‘wrong’ and what needed to be addressed. While many ‘extreme narratives’, such as those of Islamophobic media outlets, were being critically approached, the corpus also develops counter-narratives to these extremist narratives that are presented, not so much critically, as dogmatically. One resource on the topic of ISIS instructs students: ‘Imagine you found out a friend was planning on joining ISIS. Write them a letter persuading them not to go.’ The exercise laid out the success criteria, including: ‘Explains reasons why they might want to go are wrong; uses British Values to persuade them to stay in Britain; explains what is wrong with IS’ (T400, slide 13). Secondly, within guidance notes given to teachers, one teaching material offered the following warning: ‘You will need to be sensitive to opinions pupils may be expressing which come from home – do challenge these with factual information’ (T36, slide 8 notes). This appears to infer that the teacher or the teaching material are the holder of facts, and that facts can challenge ‘extreme’ opinions. Yet, it is important to expose certain discursive slips which demonstrate this may not be as simple as the resource

suggests. Under one image of the EDL, the teacher notes describe the ‘dangers’ of the group, including ‘rejects multiculturalism’ (T109, slide 8 notes). As was suggested in chapter six, it is interesting to note that as Prime Minister, David Cameron rejected ‘state multiculturalism’ himself (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011); it is not simply a view held by the ‘extremists’.

It is interesting within these examples that ‘moderate’ knowledge is presumed to be *a priori* to the class. This is not the first time that the dangers of attempting to teach counter-narratives have been examined. O’Donnell explores this style of learning, but offers concern as to the pedagogical implications:

I worry that the presumption that we must *challenge* extremist ideas in order to prevent terrorism precludes the far more important exercises that we engage in classrooms when we train our imaginations to go visiting... Rather than fixating on ‘challenging’ extremist ideas, which assumed a position of certainty in one’s own worldview, how would it be to imagine the world from the standpoint of another, indeed of many others? (O’Donnell, 2017, pp. 190-1, original emphasis)

It is noticeable that so many of these resources adopt a certainty in worldview, allowing what O’Donnell describes as ‘pedagogical injustice’, through framing the class in terms of defeating extremist narrative through the promoting of counter-narrative. The world that O’Donnell describes, one in which it is only extremist ideas that are ‘challenged’, appears at a distance from the one which Marsden (Jul. 9, 2015) envisaged in the quotation used earlier – one in which the ‘difficult questions’ that extremists tackle might be brought into the classroom. The consequences of counter-narrative production are evidenced within the next section. Here, the second dominant narrative of the discourse surrounding critical thinking and Islamophobia will be examined: the discourse of ‘true Islam’.



## ***These are the True Muslims***

A recurring example of these uncritical discourses is that regarding ‘true Islam’, a narrative through the resources which assumes that the author of the resource has access to *the* legitimate interpretation of Islam, and which is something that extremists evidently lack. One resource described a factor that might lead someone towards extremism as ‘lack of understanding of faith’ (T254, slide 7). The following slide gives another example in which the argument is clearly made that extremists lack an understanding about their faith, arguing they have a ‘very limited knowledge of Islam’ (T418, slide 8):

Look at the following headline.

**The Telegraph**

Home Video News World Sport Finance Comment Culture Travel Life Women Fashion Lifestyle  
Politics Work Family Sex Life Health Wonder Women Columnists Vitality

HOME - WOMEN - WOMEN'S LIFE

### Forget radicalisation in mosques - 'Sheikh Google' is the real threat to young Muslims

As British Muslim women speak up against the so-called Islamic State, Radhika Sanghani learns that their biggest concern is their children being radicalised online

Facebook 351 Twitter 100 Pinterest 8 LinkedIn 1 Stumble 410 Email

The real threat for young Muslim women is being radicalised online. Photo: Reuters

Some young Muslims rely on 'Sheikh Google' to ask complex theological and moral questions.

This is concerning as anyone can post online, and many radical posts originate from people who have a very limited knowledge of Islam.

Figure 7.13: T418, slide 8

Within the corpus, this narrative regarding ‘true Islam’ extends beyond a discussion of Islamophobia, and regularly emerges when materials discuss Islamic extremism more broadly. One presentation slide writes: ‘ISIS, ISIL or Islamic State want to create a new caliphate, an area run by **their own** understanding of strict Islamic society. This is widely rejected by the vast majority of Muslims and especially by Islamic scholars’ (T426, slide 3, original emphasis). The following slide attempts to

demonstrate to students how ISIS' campaign fails to fulfil the necessary criteria for a legitimate Jihad (figure 7.14):

Who is the opponent who started it? ISIS kill anyone in their path who doesn't submit to them, including Sunni Muslims.

A military jihad has to follow strict rules in order to be legitimate:

- ☞ The opponent must have started the fighting
- ☞ It must not be fought to gain territory
- ☞ It must be launched by a religious leader
- ☞ It must be fought to bring about good – something that Allah would approve of
- ☞ It must be a last resort – all other ways of solving the problem must have been tried
- ☞ Innocent people should not be killed or hurt
- ☞ Women must not be raped or abused in any way
- ☞ Enemies must be treated with justice
- ☞ Wounded enemy soldiers must be treated in exactly the same way as one's own soldiers
- ☞ The war must stop as soon as the enemy asks for peace
- ☞ Property must not be damaged
- ☞ Poisoning of wells is forbidden (chemical or biological warfare might be a modern analogy). ? So far they haven't used chemical weapons

“ Hate your enemy mildly; he may become your friend one day.  
*Hadith*

“ But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace, and trust in Allah; for He is One that hears and knows all things.  
*Our'an 8.61*

Figure 7.14: T426, slide 8

In this slide, a series of criteria of a legitimate military Jihad are outlined, and a cross and accompanying explanation are placed next to each one, explaining how ISIS' current campaign in Iraq and Syria fails to comply with the criteria.

The narrative of 'true Islam' sits within a wider societal discourse that adjudicates between true and false forms of Islam. These concepts operate within academic discourses. Rosyad, for example, framed divisions between fundamentalist and moderate movements in Islam in terms of groups arguing for their interpretation of 'True Islam' (Rosyad, 2007). Trevino et al.'s research on the portrayal of Islam within American media highlights what the authors see as the presence of lots of misconceptions 'and lack of understanding of true Islam' within the media (2010, p. 3), something that the authors apparently hold.

Academic literature also emphasises the contestation around the notion of ‘Jihad’ as much as the slides within the corpus do. Macdonald, in a chapter on the demonisation of Islam within the media writes, ‘*Jihad* is not, however, an aggressive concept within Islam’ (Macdonald, 2003, p. 156). Jihad is often mentioned in relation to misunderstanding, and an emphasis is placed on ‘struggle’ rather than violence (see for example, Armstrong, Sep. 23, 2001). Oftentimes it is the concept of Jihad that attracts the most attention from the teaching materials, with resources affirming that Jihad has been misunderstood and Islam is a religion of peace, such as in the following slide which clearly affirms that an extremist interpretation of Jihad is incorrect (figure 7.15):

### ARE THEY WRONG?

- ◉ The majority of Muslims will say that these groups’ interpretation of Jihad is **wrong**.
  - The Jihad is a spiritual war, not a military one.
- ◉ The killing of people is strictly prohibited in Islam, just as with all world religions.
  - “...and do not kill a soul that God has made sacrosanct, save lawfully.” (6:151)
- ◉ Islam is not against people of other faiths/no faith at all:
  - “There shall be no compulsion in religion” (2:256)
  - “Say to the disbelievers [that is, atheists, or polytheists, namely those who reject God] “To you, your beliefs, to me, mine” (109:1-6)

Figure 7.15: T398, slide 6

The following two slides also demonstrate discursive attempts to dismiss the idea that ISIS, or ‘Islamic extremists’ more broadly, follow a legitimate Islam (figures 7.16 & 7.17):

**WHO ARE THESE GROUPS?**

- The Taliban
- Al' Qaeda
- Islamic State or Isis
- Al-Shabab
- Boko Haram

What do they all have in common?

**They all claim to be Muslims!**

Figure 7.16: T398, slide 4

**ISIS = False Muslims**



- Abdul Rahman Kassig or Peter Kassig had been providing help in the Middle East
- He retrained to be a medic after being a soldier he set up his own agency, training Syrians to administer first aid.
- He became a Muslim whilst imprisoned.
- He was killed by ISIS for no reason at all.
- Similarly, a Sharia Court in Syria found Alan Henning not guilty of any crimes and ordered his released. ISIS ignored their own judges.

Figure 7.17: T397, slide 17

What is troubling here, is not a question of whether or not these claims are accurate; the purpose here is not to begin a search for the true Islam. Instead, it is important to note the implications of this narrative: how it places the authors of these resources as the arbiters of what true Islam consists of, and how this true/false dichotomy fits within other discursive binaries and produces a particular form of True Islam. It is here where the anti-Islamophobic message of these resources is endangered in that they begin to produce the very same essentialization of Islam as Islamophobia does - albeit through producing a legitimised, and tolerated, form.

Teaching materials regularly produce an idea of a ‘true Islam’ in the face of a false or misinterpreted extremist Islam. While it is undeniably true that the theological foundations of ISIS divert enormously from the majority of Muslims around the world, this argument faces numerous dangers. Mahmood Mamdani wrote of this in the years following the attacks in the US in 2001, under what he termed ‘Good Muslim, Bad Muslim’: ‘We are told that there is a fault line running through Islam, a line that separates moderate Islam, called “genuine Islam”, from extremist political Islam’ (Mamdani, 2002, p. 767; 2005). The danger here is twofold. The first is that the discourse is in danger of creating a very narrow remit for true Islam.

The second is that the discourse fits within and supports other problematic discourses around Islam, and the discourse between moderate and radical Islam in particular.

Regarding the first danger, the discourse falls into what Mamdani calls ‘culture talk’: ‘the predilection to define cultures according to their presumed “essential” characteristics’ (Mamdani, 2002, p. 766). In this case, the danger is that the resources create a uniform sense of what ‘true Islam’ entails, painting over the inevitable diversity between interpretations of Islam within a population of over a billion people (Semati, 2010, p. 258).

Moreover, the narrative places the teaching materials in an unsettling position of being the arbiters of what counts as ‘true Islam’. In this sense, the resources act in a way to set the parameters through which Islam is rendered knowable. In particular, the materials produce a particularly *passive* understanding of true Islam, as demonstrated in the following slides (figures 7.18, 7.19 & 7.20):

**DON'T BE PART OF THE PROBLEM!**

- Many people have ideas about Muslims and people of other faiths and cultures that are **WRONG**.
- These extremist and terrorist groups are **NOT** part of Islam; they are **NOT** Muslims.
- Islam teaches its followers to be kind, caring and peaceful to everyone, regardless of what their beliefs or backgrounds are.
- Not all terrorists link themselves to Islam...

Figure 7.18: T398, slide 10

**LO:** Know what prejudice and discrimination mean/ Evaluate what discrimination is/ Explain where prejudice is still prevalent in our society

**What do religions say about prejudice and discrimination?**

Christianity	Islam
<p>I give you a new commandment, that you love one another. Just as I have loved you, you also should love one another. <i>John 13:34</i></p> <p>You shall love your neighbour as yourself. <i>Matthew 22:39</i></p> <p>There are also two important teachings in the writings of Paul about this:</p> <p>From one man he made every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he determined the times set for them and the exact places where they should live. <i>Acts 17:26</i></p> <p>There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus. <i>Galatians 3:28</i></p>	<p>Of His Signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the diversity of your tongues and colours. <i>Surah 30:22</i></p> <p>O mankind, We have created you from male and female; and We have divided you into tribes and sub-tribes for greater facility of intercourse. Verily, the most honoured among you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most righteous among you. Surely, Allah is All-Knowing, All-Aware. <i>Surah 49:14</i></p> <p>Therefore there is no reason to treat people of different races differently. The Prophet Muhammad showed how important this teaching was in his last sermon, when he said:</p> <p>All mankind is descended from Adam and Eve, an Arab is not better than a non-Arab and a non-Arab is not better than an Arab; a white person is not better than a black person, nor is a black person better than a white person except by piety and good actions. Learn that every Muslim is the brother of every other Muslim and that Muslims form one brotherhood.</p>

**Keywords:** Prejudice, discrimination, stereotype

Figure 7.19: T430, slide 13

We can educate people about the message of equality religions teach.

- O mankind, We have created you from a male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may get to know one another. (Surah 49:13)
- "All people are equal...as the teeth of a comb" (Hadith)
- Do to others as you would have them do to you. (Luke 6:31)
- Love your neighbour as you love yourself (Matthew 22:39)

Figure 7.20: T412, slide 24

Within these slides, true Islam becomes defined through common themes such as ‘equality’, ‘peacefulness’, and ‘tolerance’. Within these three examples, the resources in particular give emphasis to quotations from the Koran which promote tolerance. These quotations function to paint true Muslims as passive individuals when one considers the role of this narrative within a counter-extremism strategy that emphasises the threats from an intolerant extremist Muslim population. The message appears to become, ‘a true Muslim is one who tolerates us’.

What is fascinating about these examples is that, in combination, they appear to be re-presenting Islam within linguistic frames that are themselves heavily embedded and located within Eurocentric discourses, and the discourse of tolerance in particular. Brown’s (2006) work on tolerance offers helpful insight, particular where she notes that discourses of tolerance exist in ‘a Euro-Atlantic political imaginary within which the nation-states of the West are presumed always already tolerant’ (Brown, 2006, p. 3). This co-option of Islamic scripture is deployed to mask the inequalities and discriminatory practices of the social and political context in which the resource was written, in the context of a counter-extremism strategy that impacts different communities so differently. Citing the Koran, ‘All people are equal’ (T412, slide 24), claims one presentation slide. Yet, in contemporary society, this is plainly not the case.

Here, one can begin to see how the two narratives thus far examined in the chapter operate within a post-racial framework: a duality in which certain forms of discrimination are criticised, while others go unnoticed. The first narrative highlighted Islamophobia and produced clear counter-narratives to challenge it. Yet, the second narrative, in producing such a counter-narrative evidently serves to mask students from the persisting inequality.

The second danger is that the discourse between true and false Islam sits neatly within the troubling discourse between so-called moderate and radical Islam. While Rabasa notes that the terms ‘are often used in a subjective and imprecise way’ (2005, p. 1), Schwedler notes that the distinction between moderate and radical Islam is very often between ‘supporting and opposing liberal democratic reforms, respectively’ (2011, p. 348). Rabasa (2005, p. 2) adds to this typology by including the willingness to use violence to achieve political change as a component of radical Islam. As was explored in chapter six, the danger here is that the discourse securitises any Muslim voices that challenge liberal democratic norms, painting them as a violent threat.

Underneath the narrative of ‘True Islam’ therefore is a sense of loyalty: True Muslims are those who do not critique or challenge liberal norms. Maira writes of this distinction between moderate and extreme Islam: ‘These distinctions form the core of imperial thinking about “loyal” citizen-subjects and “enemy aliens”’ (2009, p. 633). Later she adds: ““Good citizenship” is performed by Muslim American individuals and organisations in a variety of ways, testifying loyalty to the nation and asserting belief in its democratic ideals, often through public testimonials that emphasise that Muslims are peaceful, loyal US citizens’ (Maira, 2009, p. 634). The importance of distinguishing the true from the false within Islam places an enormous burden on Muslims themselves, as Mamdani warns: ‘This could not hide the central message of such discourse: unless proved to be “good”, every Muslim was presumed to be “bad”’ (Mamdani, 2005, p. 15).

It is a concern that this true/false binary contributes to a much wider civilising narrative that places the West in a position of enlightened privilege. One presentation describes the execution of Alan Henning, an aid worker in Syria, and argues that ‘it clearly exposed how evil, unislamic [sic] and barbaric ISIS were and exposed the lies that they told about being a “Muslim state”’ (T397, slide 10). The discourse surrounding a false/true binary of interpretations of Islam is thus incorporated into a much wider binary between good/evil, civilised/barbaric. It upholds an idea that there are two sides to the Islamic coin; one, assimilated within the civilised individualism of Western society, the other, a looming terrorist threat (Maira, 2009). Such narratives are in danger of contributing to the legitimisation of imperialist arguments which seek to invade Islam from outside (be that Islam within Britain, or any other country), and transform it from within for the benefit of Western interests. The narratives of ‘True Islam’ thus then become a form of a new Orientalism. Semati summarises ‘Orientalism as a discursive and textual operation through which the Occident renders the Orient knowable’ (Semati, 2010, p 258), and that appears to be precisely the operation occurring here. At the same time, this binary functions to mask the barbaric practices of ‘liberal democratic’ nations. Examples of human rights abuse from Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib prisons can be either ignored or decried as ‘bad apples’ of an otherwise civilised population.

Thus far, two competing and contestable trends regarding Islam and Islamophobia have emerged through examining how critical thinking is depicted and deployed in the corpus. The first explored how Islamophobia was critically approached in the discourse. The second was to examine how Islamophobia was being challenged with an equally essentialising interpretation of a True Islam that appeared as imperialistic as any other. The chapter now turns to a third narrative, and explores how the critical approaches to Islamophobia within the teaching materials operate to mask from students the underlying discriminatory and Islamophobic structures of the counter-extremism strategy itself.



### **An Islamophobic Prevent Strategy**

It is fascinating to examine how the argument for the importance of critical thinking skills in order to be resilient to the Islamophobic messages of tabloid newspapers appears within a counter-extremism strategy itself criticised for being Islamophobic. The Prevent duty is a core component of a counter-extremism strategy that, it has been argued, contributes to discourses that link Muslims with the notion of threat and increases instances of Islamophobia (e.g. Awan, 2012). This spreads to British schools too. Mirza, for instance, writes of how ‘Powerful, unrestrained Islamophobic discourses of risk, surveillance and fear now freely circulate in our educational spaces’ (Mirza, 2015, p. 40). A circularity of teaching about Islamophobia appears to exist. It is a component of an Islamophobic counter-terror strategy which also cites Islamophobia as a catalyst of the radicalisation it aims to prevent.

The introduction of an Islamophobic Prevent duty in 2015 was not the first instance of Islamophobia in school counter-extremism. Sian describes the emphasis on Muslims within the cornerstone government document, *Learning to be safe*, published in 2008: ‘the focus on Muslims shapes the document from beginning to end in which all concerns raised are centered upon the Muslim “problem”’ (2015, p. 186). Later, regarding the unspecific reference to a lack of evidence of an ‘extremist profile’, Sian argues that ‘the lack of clarity and speculation enables assumptions to flourish and both amplifies and perpetuates an Islamophobic discourse which treats Muslims as suspects’ (2015, p. 187). Similar evidence exists within the corpus materials themselves. In the following slide for instance, a slide designed to teach students more about the backgrounds of the bombers who attacked the London transport network in 2005, the religiosity of the individuals was heavily emphasised (figure 7.21):

<p>Images of the four men who carried out the 7 July 2005 bombings</p>	<h2>Knowing more about those who carried out violent extremism</h2>
	<p><b>Mohammad Sidique Khan, 30, Edgware Road bomber</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A married father-of-one and teaching assistant, Mohammad Sidique Khan was the oldest of the bombers and is thought to have taken the lead role. <b>Raised in Beeston, Leeds</b>, he was the youngest of six children born to Pakistani immigrants who had taken British citizenship.</li> <li>• Friends from his teenage years recall a highly Westernised young man who insisted on being called "Sid".</li> <li>• Khan was known to the MI5, but officers assigned to investigate him were diverted to another operation.</li> <li>• Following the attacks a video message recorded by Khan emerged in which he said he was a "soldier" at "war".</li> <li>• His bomb, detonated on a westbound Circle Line train, killed seven people.</li> </ul> <p><b>Shehzad Tanweer, 22, Aldgate bomber</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shehzad Tanweer was <b>born in Bradford but lived most of his life in the Beeston area of Leeds</b>. Neighbours described the sports science graduate as a "nice lad" who could "get on with anyone". Friends said he was very religious, but did not express an interest in politics.</li> <li>• In 2004 he travelled to the Pakistani city of Karachi along with Khan.</li> <li>• The two became known to the security services, but were on the periphery of other surveillance operations.</li> <li>• <b>Tanweer</b> detonated his bomb on the eastbound Circle line, killing seven others.</li> </ul> <p><b>Germaine Lindsay, 19, Russell Square bomber</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Jamaican-born British resident Germaine Lindsay <b>spent his childhood in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire</b>, not far from the other bombers' homes. He converted to Islam in 2000, took the name Jamal and, at around the same time, started to associate with troublemakers.</li> <li>• At school he was disciplined for handing out leaflets in support of al-Qaeda.</li> <li>• In many ways Lindsay's life was unsettled, but in 2002 he married a white convert to Islam, with whom he had a young boy. A daughter was born after his death.</li> <li>• Lindsay carried out the most deadly of the bombings, killing 26 on the Piccadilly line train.</li> </ul> <p><b>Hasib Mir Hussain, 18, Tavistock Square bomber</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Teenager <b>Hasib</b> Hussain was known as a quiet student with few friends whose life attracted little outside attention during his early teens. Hussain was a second generation British citizen whose parents were of Pakistani origin. <b>He grew up in Holbeck, on the outskirts of Leeds</b>, and was the youngest of four children. He was still living with his parents when he died.</li> <li>• While still at school, he went on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.</li> <li>• His family said they were "devastated" to learn he was the bus bomber who claimed 13 lives on 7 July.</li> </ul>

Figure 7.21: T19, slide 3

The slide is titled ‘knowing more about those who carried out violent extremism’, implying a general introduction to extremists and their backgrounds. Yet, the four examples all focus on the 2005 London bombers, and emphasis is given to a binary in which religiosity is placed in opposition to Westernisation. For instance, Khan is described as ‘a highly Westernised young man’. Tanweer is described as ‘very religious’. Lindsay’s biography details that ‘in 2002 he married a white convert to Islam’. Hussain, we are told, ‘while still at school... went on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca’. While these facts may well be the case, it is certainly noticeable that the religiosity (or lack of) of these individuals is presented as being of importance with regard to their actions, despite there being little empirical evidence to support such assumptions.

Indeed, Sian argues that ‘PVE [Preventing Violent Extremism] is stitched together by the logics of Islamophobia’ (Sian, 2015, p. 189). In order to make this argument, Sian argues for a re-shaping of understanding Islamophobia which ‘shifts the focus from daily incidents of name calling and harassment

to a wider critique of structural operations of power which govern and regulate Muslim bodies' (Sian, 2015, p. 189). Here Sian distances this definition from others such as Zempi and Awan who describe Islamophobia as 'fear and hostility against Muslim communities' (2016, p. 2).

Sian's article goes on to explore some instances of this Islamophobia. While this includes examples of direct acts of Islamophobia by teachers (such as the spraying of air freshener at students 'who smell like curry'), Sian also includes more subtle examples such as two neighbouring schools where only in the school with a majority of Black minority and ethnic students was Prevent training undertaken by staff (Sian, 2015). A report released by the Home Office reveals that in the 12 months following April 2015, 65% of referrals through the Prevent programme concerned Islamic extremism. As Versi (Nov. 10, 2017) noted, 'this means that Muslims have an approximate 1 in 500 chance of having been referred to Prevent last year, approximately 40 times more likely than someone who is not a Muslim'. That educational resources should be deploying narratives countering Islamophobia in these contexts is particularly fascinating. Furthermore, it is interesting to note within this context the prevalence of narratives concerning the importance of 'safe' educational spaces for critical thinking, and the challenges facing ethnic minorities, and young Muslims in particular, in seeking to experience those educational spaces as 'safe' in the context of the Prevent strategy.

### ***This is a Safe Space***

The materials often draw upon a core narrative, namely, that a 'safe space' is a necessary condition for critical thinking to take place. The resource *Essentials of Dialogue* argues: 'It is critical to establish a safe space at the start, so that all participants are aware that they can feel safe about sharing their ideas' (T406, p. 8). The Centre for Urban Education argues 'Schools also help learners develop the skills to critically evaluate controversial issues. They provide safe places for learners' (T67, p. 5). The PSHE Association lays out advice for how to develop a good 'climate for learning' by, for example, encouraging teachers to 'establish or reinforce existing ground rules' (T275, p. 2).

The term 'safe space' originates in feminist literature, referring to the safety offered to women within women-only spaces (Hunter, 2008; Ludlow, 2004). Hunter (2008) offers a useful typology of four common ways in which the term 'safe space' has since been deployed: in terms of physical safety; 'metaphorical safety... in which discriminatory activities, expressions of intolerance or policies of inequity are barred' (ibid., p. 8); familiarity; and lastly, creative risk. Within counter-extremism education, safety is often discussed within the second context - safety from discrimination. Sieckelinck et al. argue that a 'battle of ideas requires a specific "safe" environment, here understood as an educational setting that could help students find another, more inclusive and less rigid expression for their ideals' (2015, p. 338). Davies argues that safety is a core component of what she refers to as turbulent classrooms to counter extremism: 'Interruptive (turbulent) democratic classrooms are places where offensive views can be aired and picked apart in a relatively safe setting' (Davies, 2014, p. 454). Davies' inclusion of the word 'relatively' here indicates a key caveat that Davies incorporates - that 'safety' should not prevent offense, as all ideas and views should be open to criticism. This argument hints at a tension within safe spaces and their enactment. This tension regards the limits of permissible ideas to ensure a realm of safety within. It is often argued there is a need to ensure that not every idea is permissible to be heard. A Stockton Council commissioned resource expresses the inevitable challenge here: 'Each participant should be encouraged to express their opinions freely, however, discussions must be objective and no sessions should become a platform for personal, racist or offensive remarks' (T382, p. 2). The slip of suggesting that some opinions may be 'objective' reveals an inevitable challenge regarding who or what governs the realm of the permissible opinion or view. Whose ideas inhibit whose safety?

The safe space literature has faced substantial criticism. Paradoxically, considering that safe spaces are often presented as a necessary condition for critical thinking to take place, safe spaces have been argued to in fact endanger critical thought (Barrett, 2010; Boostrom, 1998). Boostrom conceptualises safe spaces as

‘a place without stress. In a “safe space” classroom, students are not isolated, alienated, threatened, intimidated, or “stressed-out”. Teachers who create “safe spaces” care about their students, and because they care, they eliminated the pain from education’ (1998, p. 405). While this sounds unerringly positive, Boostrom presents this comfort of a space of safety as inimical to critical thought, and the clash of ideas in particular: ‘If critical thinking, imagination and individuality are to flourish in classrooms, teachers need to manage conflict, not prohibit it’ (1998, p. 407). Current research on the implementation of the Prevent strategy in schools suggests that this construction of a safe space is challenging indeed. As mentioned in chapter three, Muslim teachers fear discussing such topics in case they themselves are labelled as ‘extreme’ (Ahmed, Apr. 28, 2015). It has also been reported that many teachers are nervous to introduce such topics for fear of the extreme attitudes held by the students in the class that might be shared (Quartermaine, 2016).

Second, a number of authors examine the dangers of presenting classroom spaces as safe when, in fact, it is impossible to remove the inequalities and power disparities which permeate experiences of (a lack of) safety outside the classroom, when students enter that classroom space (Frusciante, 2008). As Barrett notes, ‘The classroom is not (and cannot) be constructed as a community of equals, as students enter the space with different degrees of power and privilege based on their membership in privileged (or oppressed) social categories’ (Barrett, 2010, pp. 6-7). Ludlow (2004), sharing experience from her own classroom, examines how creating a safe space might in fact entail ignoring difference or privilege in order to protect the safety of the privileged. Ludlow notes how ‘Students who identify with privileged groups often perceive a threat to privilege and suspension of safety in the very construction of feminist/diversity classes’ (2004, p. 41). The protection of their safety would thus entail the protection of privilege. The question of how to create safe spaces within the structurally Islamophobic Prevent strategy presents an immense challenge. To suggest that all should be presented as equal in class, when Muslim students are evidently under greater levels of scrutiny, appears a profound injustice. This appears akin to the cherry-picking of Islamic scripture to suggest we are all equal as examined above, or the deployment of ‘colour-blind’ racism more broadly.

They share a core narrative of post-racial governance: an overt rejection of inequality and tandem inability to examine evident structural inequality.

Third, safe spaces are often criticised for being contrary to spaces in which people can take risks (Ludlow, 2004). While some authors argue that safe spaces are in fact spaces ‘in which to have risky conversations’ (Marsden, Jul. 9, 2015), others oppose this. As bell hooks writes ‘Unlike the stereotypical feminist model that suggests women best come to voice in an atmosphere of safety (one in which we are all going to be kind and nurturing), I encourage students to work at coming to voice in an atmosphere where they may be afraid or see themselves at risk’ (hooks, 1989, p. 53).

If students are bringing their relative levels of ‘safety’ with them into a class that tackles the issues of extremism and radicalisation, then it appears evident that those students from ethnic minorities or Muslim backgrounds will bring with them a great deal of insecurity to these conversations. Moreover, the lack of critical appraisal of liberal democratic norms (the privileged within this context) suggests that any safety that is being produced within counter-extremism education, is being produced to protect the privileged majority. The role of safe spaces within the Prevent duty appears heavily contested. While Ramsay (2017) offers one argument - that the safeguarding role of the Prevent strategy offers students a ‘safe space’ in that it prevents them from the harm of radicalisation – many authors are keen to point out the dangers of the strategy for student safety. Reed (2016), for instance, argues that Prevent’s surveillance component inhibits the ability of teachers to create spaces of safety. Similarly, Marsden (Jul. 9, 2015) argues that Prevent has a ‘chilling effect’ on the ability to have free discussions, and reduces levels of trust between teachers and students. The prevalence of messages encouraging reporting and peer surveillance further appear to undermine any level of safety that might be afforded to students of colour.

Counter-extremism education's 'safe space' appears endangered by the number of times that a learning resource ends with a slide reinforcing the importance of reporting to staff if a student has any concerns or sees any signs of radicalisation or extremism. Four examples are given below (figure 7.22):

**Signposting**

- If you want to talk to someone about today's lesson:
  - Tutor
  - Head of year
  - Childline 0800 1111 [www.childline.org.uk](http://www.childline.org.uk)
  - Police 101
  - Report online content: <https://www.gov.uk/report-terrorism>

**What should I do?**

**If you think someone may be trying to groom or radicalise you or someone you know ... Get advice..**

**Its ok to ask... Speak to adult for advice if you're not sure**  
Talking can help keep you and/or your friends safe from extremist behaviour and help prevent future acts of terrorism

**Teacher**  
**Parent or Carer**  
**Police Officer**  
**Youth Worker**  
**Family Member**  
**Social Worker**

**The fight against terrorism is everyone's responsibility**

**Report online terrorist material**

**Report harmful material you find online to help protect others**

**http://report-it.org.uk/your\_police\_force**

**STOP HATE CRIME...**

**The police don't tolerate hate crime**

**Finally....**

All of us have a moral and religious DUTY to tell a person in authority such as a teacher or police officer if we come across anything relating to extremism or radicalisation.

If you would like to speak to somebody about this topic or seek support we have created a "safe space" for private and confidential discussions with Heads of Year or our two Student Liaison Officers. Come and see us and we will help.

Figure 7.22: clockwise from top left - T254, slide 12; T112, slide 18; T397, slide 36; T426, slide 15

It is particularly interesting to note that in the bottom-right example (T397, slide 36), the safe space that has been created has been to protect the safety of the person disclosing fears or concerns about a peer - 'for private and confidential discussions' - rather than it being a safe space created for the expression of difficult ideas. Perhaps this is the perfect example of how the safety envisaged here is born within a post-racial paradigm.

It is a concern that this emphasis on reporting undermines and contradicts the ability of classrooms to be genuinely safe spaces. The views and opinions that one is permitted to raise appear constrained by a desire to keep classrooms safe, and if one strays outside of this realm of permissiveness, one might be reported. Two reports, one entitled *Building Distrust*, the other, *Eroding Trust*, each examine cases of schools using an educational resource on extremism to monitor and collect the attitudes of their students. *Building Distrust* examines a project in a London borough which included a questionnaire within the educational programme apparently designed to monitor the effectiveness of the project, though the report argues it was really intended to assess ‘vulnerable’ students through a mode of ethnic profiling. The report examines how, instead of the survey being anonymous, students were asked to not only write their names, but also the names of their closest friends, and the religious faith of their friends too. The report writes, ‘it should be questioned why a counter-radicalisation program is asking children to name their best friends and to state their religious backgrounds. This further suggests that the questionnaire was in part about profiling and the identification of children considered suspicious’ (Belaon, 2015, p. 18).

The case within the report, *Eroding Trust*, also concerns the misuse of an evaluation questionnaire. In this ‘anonymous’ questionnaire to evaluate the effectiveness of the program, on which students were encouraged to write their names, students were asked whether they agreed with certain statements and views such as ‘It would bother me if a family of a different race or religion moved next door’ (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016, p. 66). The report also notes ‘the questionnaires were from the Home Office, and the responses would go back to the Home Office for a report’ (ibid.). This conflation of practices of education and of surveillance undermine both the safety of students, and the ‘safe space’ of the classroom, as well as the ability for critical thinking to emerge. As O’Donnell notes: ‘this will have a bearing on the capacity for deep and critical understanding of content knowledge because it undoes the conditions for trust and criticality that enable us to think and enquire together in shared educational spaces’ (2017, p. 184). On a wider scale, Rizwaan Sabir notes how the UK’s surveillance (Pursue) and counter-radicalisation strategies (Prevent) operate in tandem with one another, and that any notion of a clear distinction between the two is



false (Sabir, 2017). Sabir raises the question of the role of prevention strategies more broadly, concluding: ‘the use of “soft-power” or “hearts and minds” activity is also less about the persuading and “safeguarding” of Muslims and more about disciplining and controlling those individuals choosing to exercise a distinct Muslim agency’ (Sabir, 2017, p. 219). ‘Safe spaces’ thus appear little more than a discursive mask, hiding the reality of insecurity beneath a veneer of liberal value.

### **Conclusion: A contested and contradictory strategy?**

This chapter began by noting a core antagonism that appears in the counter-extremism in schools strategy, namely, that between critical thinking skills and fundamental British values promotion. The chapter was framed within an examination of what the implications might be of attempting to promote a fixed set of values ‘critically’.

Throughout this exploration, a running theme has focussed on the apparent contradiction in the role of critical thinking between an outward rejection of Islamophobia, and the perpetuation of systems of power that continue to privilege white majorities and discriminate against ethnic minorities and Muslims in particular. Three particular narratives persist through the corpus to support this theme. One argues ‘*they* are the Islamophobes!’, a narrative that presents a series of Islamophobic subjects - the media and right-wing extremists in particular - but fails to acknowledge its own Islamophobia. A second narrative expresses ‘*these* are the True Muslims’, a narrative which offers a narrow channel of permissibility through which Muslims are allowed to perform ‘authentic’ Islam - an imperialistic approach towards knowledge of Islam which can be traced through historic and contemporary Orientalism. The third narrative argues ‘*this* is a safe space’, masking the lack of safety for Muslims in such Islamophobic spaces.

From here, the chapter asked: how then could this apparent contradiction, or Orwellian *doublethink*, where an Islamophobic strategy decries Islamophobia, function within the counter-extremism strategy? Through the literatures on New Racism and Post-Raciality, it was argued that the development of critical thinking

skills plays a key role in producing clear boundaries between a virtuous moderate centre and the threatening extremist Other. Through masking students from the Islamophobic and racist discriminatory structures of the liberal democratic present, the mono-directional deployment of critical thinking strengthens an understanding of the virtue of the moderate centre that must be protected and defended from external threat.

Through examining all three discourse analyses in combination therefore (chapters 5, 6, & 7), the thesis argues that the corpus of teaching materials presents a defensive mode of thinking, painting the world of moderates and extremists akin to that of a castle under siege. Each of the three strands operates together in a siege mentality. While such a siege mentality offers a strong mode of defence, this thesis has also sought to explore the problematic consequences of this securitised thinking, noting the exceptional politics that such a securitisation engenders, and the need to suspend values for their protection.

Chapter five explored how extremism is defined in the corpus, arguing that the extremist threat had become universalised - the moderate centre was under attack from all directions. The castle was under siege from extremism of all forms, and anything that strayed too far from that moderate centre was portrayed as a threat. Such a construction of a universal extremist threat poses profound challenges to pluralism, minimising levels of permitted diversity in values or beliefs. This construction of a threat led the chapter to argue that education - deployed as a tool to manage this threat - had become securitised. The danger here is that securitisation engenders exceptional politics, rendering the lives of those deemed threatening to be profoundly insecure.

Chapter six explored how the castle itself was imagined within the corpus, exploring how the discourse of fundamental British values constructed a particular vision for how Britain *should* be. The moderate centre is narrow, vulnerable and incontestable. Through adopting a governmentality approach, the chapter identified three subjectivities through which moderate Britishness can be governed: a 'post-political' subject, an entrepreneurial subject, and a racialised subject. Not only does such a governmentality reveal

the homogenising quality of a discourse that promotes such a moderate consensus (again revealing challenges for pluralist democracy), but also reveals that membership of the moderate centre is profoundly more difficult to achieve for ethnic minorities. Through exploring examples of the insecurity engendered by a discourse that places a particular burden on ethnic minorities, the virtues of the moderate centre were challenged.

This current chapter has then examined how these clear delineations between extremist and moderate are perpetuated and taught. Through exploring how critical thinking is deployed as a weapon ‘outwards’, away from the castle walls of the moderate centre, and towards the threatening extremist other, the chapter has explored how the distinction between extremist and moderate is *practiced* as skill. While the knowledge taught to students about extremism constructs a clear understanding of the threat they face, and the promotion of fundamental British values constructs a clear sense of what it is that is worth protecting, it is the deployment of critical thinking that allows for the continuation of the masking of the falsity and imperfection of this discursive binary. Furthermore, the chapter has examined how the deployment of these skills functions to mask from students the discriminatory, Islamophobic practices of the counter-extremism strategy, which place such a burden on young British Muslims.

The thesis argues therefore that the construction of a securitised mode of counter-extremism education is deeply problematic. The levels of insecurity, and exceptional political practices engendered by such threat constructions, pose profound risk to both those labelled as threatening, as well as the values of democracy and pluralism more broadly. It is at this stage that the thesis shifts gear, and begins to ask how else the problem of extremism could be constructed, and how else education could be deployed to address it.

It is important to note that not all of the examined teaching materials follow the majority of the flock. As has already been noted in these three chapters, materials offer modes of resistance, shards of light peeking through the cracks in a wall when the discourse does not all sing from the same hymn sheet. The following

chapter opens up these cracks, and explores how else counter-extremist education could be constructed. Through exploring these modes of resistance or these moments of acknowledgement of the political nature of these discourses, the next chapter begins to ask: instead of building walls between an 'us' and a 'them', and arming students with defensive skills rather than inquisitive ones, how else could a mode of education approach the question of extremism?

# 8

## Exploring Agonism

### From Countering Extremism to Encountering Extremism

Think of any example of a peace agreement in history - the Good Friday agreement in 1998 or the Oslo Agreement in 1993. The image in your head - if it is at all like mine - might consist of some sort of podium or stage, and a number of individuals standing on it. There is an intermediary figure - in 1993, this role was played by Bill Clinton, in 1998, Tony Blair - standing between the two former foes. They sign a document, make a speech, and they shake hands. Violence is rejected, and politics is embraced.

What is fascinating in both of the examples mentioned above is that both agreements included former terrorist leaders. The old adage remains repeated to this day: ‘we will never negotiate with terrorists’. The reality, of course, is that states have regularly and repeatedly done exactly the opposite. Back-channels are set up, intermediaries found, and off-the-record meetings are set. Negotiation with terrorism is as old as terrorism itself. These agreements demonstrate time and time again that political solutions to violent problems are not only possible, but indeed the only option for a sustainable peace (Powell, 2014).

It is curious, then, that in the case of extremism, these lessons are not being learned. There are few attempts to approach extremism politically; negotiating, discussing, finding solutions or compromise. While there is evidently conflict, the field of conflict resolution is ignored. Instead, the approach is: once we remove extremism, then there will be peace. Counter-extremism education, as this thesis has demonstrated, entails a process of the elimination of, and protection from, extreme ideas.

What if, instead of trying to remove extremism, we try to work with it?

This chapter engages with scholarship in the field of critical peace research, alongside the theoretical work of Chantal Mouffe, in particular, her critique of consensual liberal democratic politics, and her promotion of agonistic pluralism. While not a scholar of conflict resolution *per se*, I argue that Mouffe's critique of the promotion of liberal democracy demonstrates that a consensus-based model of counter-extremism is doomed to failure. The chapter locates itself within critical peace research, as opposed to other sub-fields of Peace Studies such as conflict transformation. Agonism offers a theoretical opportunity to engage with, and encounter, the ideas, discourses and hegemonic structures surrounding extremism. Other approaches, such as Contact Theory (e.g. Pettigrew, 1998), focus more on encounters between individuals.

An attempt to eliminate extremism is not only a never-ending task, but one that plays an active role in producing the same extremist violence it seeks to reduce. Mouffe's agonism offers a way forward. At its heart, agonism attempts to construct institutions and practices that, instead of attempting to find one agreeable consensus for all to abide by, allows disagreement and pluralism to flourish. It is, I argue, one way of transforming education surrounding extremism.

This chapter offers both theoretical and, using examples found within the corpus of teaching materials, practical opportunities to create an approach to the problem of extremism that does not seek merely to remove the problem, but to engage with it in an agonistic encounter. While acknowledging the limiting parameters and constraints of being just one chapter of a thesis, it argues that there is an alternative to 'countering' extremism, and offers directions for further study and practical investigation. This approach is what I call *encountering* extremism.

### **Mouffe, The Political and Extremism**

Chantal Mouffe has, in a career spanning four decades, produced a potent critique of contemporary liberal democracy. Her work examines the core foundations of political conflict at the heart of communal life, a

critique of the dominance of contemporary liberal democracy, and the development of agonistic politics as a radical approach to addressing the challenge of such dominance. I argue that Mouffe's body of work offers ripe opportunity to both examine the problematic ways in which the problem of extremism is framed, as well as examine new ways of conceptualising an agonistic approach to countering extremism.

Mouffe's democratic theory is inextricably entwined within her theory of 'the political' developed with Ernesto Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). In chapter four, I examined how Laclau and Mouffe argue that language is constitutive of the social realm, and that all language is thus an 'articulation': an expression of power which brings the social realm into being, locating objects and individuals in relation to one another (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 91). As such, language is political. By this, Laclau and Mouffe argue that expressing certain ideas in a particular way, or using a particular label, is a claim to place certain objects in certain relations to one another. For instance, describing an individual or an idea as 'extreme' is an act of delegitimization, in relation to the legitimacy of the articulator. Importantly this linguistic choice is only one of innumerable options. Those excluded options remain to contest the articulation, and it is this perpetual contestation that Laclau and Mouffe refer to as 'antagonism' (Mouffe, 2013, p. 130). Mouffe refers to the realm in which antagonisms perpetuate to be 'the political' (ibid.). Political life cannot escape the presence of such antagonisms.

While in chapter four I argued that Laclau and Mouffe's theory offers a helpful ontological foundation for a methodology of discourse analysis, chapter six examined how Mouffe's critique of the hegemony of liberal democracy offers a helpful framework to critically examine the notion of fundamental British values. Mouffe described a 'post-political' hegemony, wherein the bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democratic politics repress the political (Mouffe, 2005). I argued that the promotion of fundamental British values developed a 'post-political' form of subjectivity. In this chapter, I examine how Mouffe's conceptualisation of the political is also helpful for framing a core, foundational problem regarding countering extremism more broadly, namely, a need for consensus, and the elimination of disagreement.

Countering extremism is framed around the idea of bringing people ‘away’ from the extremes, and into the moderate centre. Scholars such as Lake (2002, p. 18) argue that extremism is often framed within a bell curve, with the moderate in the populous centre, and the extremist at the edges. The UK’s definition of extremism as the opposite of a set of ‘moderate’ values, which should be promoted, is a perfect example of this conceptualisation of counter-extremism. As Theresa May argued in a speech in 2015:

If we want to put British values at the heart of the counter-extremism strategy, we need to make sure that every single person living in the UK is fully aware of the rights and responsibilities of living in a pluralistic society. We will therefore develop a positive campaign to promote British values and show clearly the opportunities they bring. (May, Mar. 23, 2015)

Counter-extremism entails a task of values promotion, building that centrist consensus. The task of countering extremism is only complete once the last individual is brought inside the moderate walls.

Scholars other than Mouffe have also wrestled with this need for consensus in a world of ever-present conflict. While in the chapter’s introduction I shared the frustration that a conflict resolution approach to extremism appears marginalised (especially in a UK context), the field of conflict resolution is not immune to this desire for consensus either. Ramsbotham (2010) begins his enquiry into conflict resolution by noting that the primary factor in intractable conflict is what he terms ‘radical disagreement’. Each side holds a view which is entirely incompatible with the other. Ramsbotham’s frustration emerges in his investigation of how the field of conflict resolution tackles this chief component of conflict. Conflict resolution, he argues, seeks to, in varying degrees, dismiss it, sideline it, and ignore it. Rather than placing radical disagreement at the heart of conflict resolution practices, radical disagreement is presented as a barrier to the real purposes of conflict resolution: compromise, mutual understanding, and consensual agreement. For conflict resolution scholars, the first step in overcoming conflict is to put aside disagreements. Ramsbotham



chides this approach to radical disagreement as ‘what must be overcome, not learnt from’ (2010, p. 93). What is interesting about the case of extremism is that, rather than in the world of conflict resolution, where consensus is sought through compromise, consensus here is sought for through imposing one side’s view onto the other.

The violent imposition of peace is an irony that has not escaped the gaze of critical peace scholars. Shinko, for instance, acknowledges the dangers of models of liberal peace in imposing particular norms of global politics in conflict resolution interventions. As Shinko puts it, it is a norm ‘where peace slides all too comfortably back into familiarised hegemonic iterations of disciplinary order’ (Shinko, 2008, p. 475). Cremin explores the Eurocentric ontology underpinning the concept of peace, as orthodoxly conceived, and notes the ‘modern concepts of peace that promote suffocating homogeneity, security, assimilation, false ideals and limited horizons’ (Cremin, 2016, p. 3). Calls for a ‘post-liberal peace’ (Richmond, 2009), and the inclusion of pacifism in post-liberal peacebuilding (Jackson, 2018), have emerged in response to the criticism that imposing a liberal peace involves imposing Western cultural and political norms, including the legitimacy and monopoly of state violence over a sovereign territory.

Ilan Gur-Ze’ev explores how such a consensual understanding of peace emerges in contemporary peace education. His conclusion is critical and provocative: ‘The real aim of peace education is revealed as the fortification of the existing order and the preservation of the invisibility of hegemonic violence’ (Gur-Ze’ev, 2001, p. 331). His writing focuses on one particular mode of violence - epistemic violence - the violence inherent within processes which assert the dominance of one ontological perspective over another:

Epistemic violence is realised in the formation of conceptual apparatuses, knowledge, consciousness, ideological orientations, and consensus or self-evidence; it is the aim of normalising education, in the service of the self-evident and hegemonic order of things. Epistemic violence

plays a part in producing the subject and her self-evidence, as well as the horizons of her predetermined consensus. (Gur-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 331)

Counter-extremism education, it can be argued, is an excellent example of epistemic violence. It imposes a particular 'moderate' ideological orientation and consensus onto a population through a normative mode of education promoting certain values and perspectives. This scholarship provides profound critique of the mode of consensual peace that appears to dominate the logic of countering extremism. While in different contexts, and with different emphases, Shinko, Gur-Ze'ev, Cremin, Jackson and Richmond all coalesce in exposing the violence of imposing a particular consensus onto a population, and how such an imposition contributes to the further global colonisation of Eurocentric conceptualisations of peace.

While not focusing specifically on the violence of imposing consensus, Mouffe's writing contributes to this critique, indicating that conceptualising counter-extremism around consensus is problematic for two further reasons. One is that it is an impossible task, as a strategy built on inclusion cannot rid itself of its opposite, exclusion. The other is that it is an approach that would, in fact, promote rather than reduce violence.

Mouffe repeats at regular intervals throughout her writing the impossibility of overcoming the political (2013, p. Xii; 2005, pp. 10-11; 2000, p. 101). Her critique centres around the contemporary trend which seeks to universalise liberal democracy as the best mode of governance around the world, and its desire to produce a public space of consensus. This consensual space would eliminate the political, in that the core antagonisms of political community would have been consigned to the realms of history. Politics, and its bureaucratic mechanisms of liberal democracy would, Mouffe argues, have repressed the political (Mouffe, 2005, p. 87). Francis Fukuyama's (1989) description of 'the end of history' is an oft-cited example of this claim for liberal democratic consensus, a claim that clearly states that the time of political antagonism is over.

Mouffe argues that this desire for consensus is an attempt to produce an ‘us’ without producing a ‘them’ (2000, p. 101): once everyone is within the ‘us’ of liberal democracy, or the ‘us’ of British values, there will not be a ‘them’ to speak of. Once everyone is brought within the realm of the ‘moderate’, there will no longer be an ‘extreme’ to counter. Yet, Mouffe argues that this is an impossibility: ‘there is no consensus without exclusion, no “we” without a “they” and no politics without the drawing of a frontier’ (2005, p. 73). At a linguistic level, labelling something as ‘extreme’ is only possible if one can conceive of the ‘moderate’ to which it is being compared. As Mouffe notes, ‘the very condition for the constitution of an “us” is the demarcation of a “them”’ (2013, p. 6). The label of ‘British values’ clearly demarcates the non-British, and so on. Mouffe’s claim that antagonisms cannot be repressed comes to life in Britain’s counter-extremism strategy, a strategy that, while focussed on inclusion, cannot escape its simultaneously exclusionary nature.

The Prevent duty and the Channel system appear symptomatic of this type of thinking. If an individual is referred to Prevent officers for being at risk of radicalisation, and their case is considered substantial enough to require intervention, then that person can (voluntarily) enter the Channel programme (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 9). At this stage of intervention, a panel of experts will decide as to the best intervention required for that individual, and will monitor that individual for a period of time, until a point at which they are no longer deemed vulnerable to extremism or radicalisation. This process, cloaked in the language of safeguarding, epitomises the idea of a counter-extremism strategy desiring to ‘bring in’ the extremes into a consensual centre.

Yet, at each and every stage of this process, the ‘them’ can never be shaken from the ‘us’. There is first an identification process, based on a set of ‘indicators’. Research demonstrates how this identification process transforms certain individuals into *potential* threats. As Martin writes, such a process operates through ‘producing new subjects of risk’ (2018, p. 14). Heath-Kelly (2013) has examined how discourses of radicalisation turn British Muslims into perpetually potentially risky subjects. Chapter six of this thesis

explored the narrow modes of diversity permitted within the moderate centre, and the threat associated with diversity that deviates from this, again transforming difference into a problem. This production of risky subjects demonstrates that at the heart of a consensus-based counter-extremism strategy is a paradox: one cannot include the extreme until one has identified their difference.

Moreover, the counter-extremism strategy never escapes from a need to be able to exclude those deemed to be extreme, and in particular, those *too extreme to be able to be included*. As a House of Commons Briefing Paper makes clear, a key counter-extremism task for government is ‘making sure organisations have the support and advice they need to confront and *exclude* extremists’ (Dawson & Godec, 2017, p. 13, my own emphasis). Theresa May’s political rhetoric matches this inability to rid the exclusion inherent to a policy of inclusion. Speaking in 2015 she argued:

For too long we have let the extremists define the ‘them and us’... I want this partnership to reclaim that debate. We, the ‘us’, will form a new partnership and show ‘them’ that we want nothing to do with their hatred, bigotry and ignorance... to those who choose consciously to reject our values and the basic principles of our society, the message is equally clear. The game is up... we will defeat you. (May, Mar. 23, 2015)

While the counter-extremism strategy is apparently based on *inclusion*, there are in fact two options offered to those deemed extreme: play by our rules and we will include you, play by your rules and we will exclude you. It is here that Mouffe’s second criticism of consensus-based attempts to quell antagonisms emerges. Mouffe makes note of how these consensus-making processes have the opposite of their desired effects. Rather than produce a peaceful consensus, attempts to eliminate the political, in fact, produce violence.

In the current climate, counter-extremism is predicated on making a distinction between a ‘friend’ and an ‘enemy’. One cannot counter extremism until one has delineated the extreme enemy to be countered, from

the moderate friend to be defended. Furthermore, this friend/enemy distinction is then predicated on the importance of excluding the extreme from the consensual realm. It is this act of exclusion that Mouffe argues increases the likelihood of violence occurring:

We should be aware that envisaging the aim of politics - be it at the national or international level - as the establishment of a consensus around one single model eliminates the possibility of legitimate dissent, thereby creating a favourable terrain for the emergence of violent forms of antagonisms. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 20)

If there is not the space within the political consensus for legitimately expressing ideas deemed to be 'extreme', then a violent approach may appear the only option for those who wish to express such ideas (see also: Mouffe, 2005, p. 21).

Consensus-based models of counter-extremism are failing. Rather than producing a peaceful, consensual harmony, they engender violence through imposing particular ontological models of peace, and produce modes of exclusion which both produce the extreme that they attempt to counter, and the likelihood that those extremes might turn to violence as a mode of political participation. How else then, aside from through consensus, could one frame counter-extremism? Mouffe offers agonism as her solution. Mouffe challenges scholars to re-frame the us/them distinction from something to eradicate, to something to work within. The need for elimination is predicated on seeing the 'them' as a threat. The 'us' and the 'them' need not be enemies. Mouffe argues that 'the friend/enemy distinction can be considered as merely one of the possible forms of expression of the antagonistic dimension which is constitutive of the political' (2005, p. 16). The purpose of agonism is to offer an alternative to the role of 'enemy', that of 'adversary'.

## **Agonistic Alternatives**

Mouffe focuses on producing ways of transforming what, within a consensus-based model, might be an ‘enemy’ into an agonistic ‘adversary’. Mouffe argues that agonism ‘helps us to envisage how the dimension of antagonism can be “tamed”, thanks to the establishment of institutions and practices through which the potential antagonism can be played out in an agonistic way’ (2005, p. 21). Kundnani makes a similar argument:

The role of communities in countering terrorism is not to institute self-censorship but to confidently construct political spaces where young people can politicize their disaffection into visions of how the world might be better organized, so that radical alternatives to terrorist vanguardism can emerge. (Kundnani, 2015, p. 289)

I argue that this is a key step that must be taken within the context of extremism. While currently extremists are seen as ‘enemies’, the challenge is to provide an educational model through which one can see extremists as ‘adversaries’. How then, might agonism offer a theoretical approach to transform current counter-extremism approaches from models which exclude extreme ideas into models which engage with them? Moreover, what might the ‘institutions and practices’ need to look like in order to help this agonism emerge?

Mouffe is a political theorist. As such, her work is fantastic at providing the theoretical framework for understanding the challenges and problems of the contemporary context, and ways of developing a different future. Where Mouffe’s work is less helpful is that she does not offer a model for how to develop such ideas within an educational setting. Some scholars have taken these ideas further within an educational context (Ruitenber, 2008; Todd & Sastrom, 2008). This scholarship is examined later in the chapter. First, Mouffe’s work is examined to develop the foundational principles required by the agonistic approach.

At the heart of Mouffe's agonism is a commitment to pluralism: there may be more than one way of living justly. Mouffe promotes 'breaking with the very deeply entrenched conviction in Western democracies that they are the embodiment of the "best regime" and that they have the "civilising" mission of universalising it' (Mouffe, 2005, p. 83). This conviction was evident in David Cameron's 2011 speech, as the then Prime Minister, on countering extremism. Cameron argued that 'Frankly, we need a lot less of the passive tolerance of recent years and a much more active, muscular liberalism... this is what defines us as society: to belong here is to believe in these things' (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). Similarly, four years later, the then Secretary of State for Education Nicky Morgan justified promoting British values 'because these British values are fundamentally a good thing' (Morgan, Jan. 27, 2015). In a speech of the same year, the then Home Secretary Theresa May proclaimed: 'the reality of those [fundamental British] values is far superior to anything the extremists have to offer anybody... the extremists have no vision for Britain that can sustain the dreams and ambitions of its people' (May, Mar. 23, 2015). This desire to promote a set of liberal values then manifested itself in the requirement for schools to promote such values. It is promoted in classroom teaching about the Fundamental British Values when, as in this example, a presentation argues: 'Democracy is a key British value. The British Democratic System has been copied by countries around the world' (T401, slide 3).

Instead, Mouffe argues that one should see the world, not as a universe, but as a pluri-verse (2013, p. 22; 2005, p. 87). There is more than one way for a just society to operate. Importantly, Mouffe does not descend into a form of relativism. She does not argue that all ways of conducting political life are equally just or ethical. Instead, Mouffe is keen to delineate the parameters within which agonistic conflict can take place:

For the agonistic perspective, the central category of democratic politics is the category of the 'adversary', the opponent with whom one shares a common allegiance to the democratic principles of 'liberty and equality for all', while disagreeing about their interpretation. (Mouffe, 2013, p. 7)

Here, Mouffe concedes that agonism cannot operate without some sort of consensus - what she refers to as 'ethico-political principles' based around liberty and equality in order to produce a 'conflictual consensus' (2000, p. 103). There must be a foundational consensus, a common allegiance of some sort for agonism to materialise. As Wenman writes, the 'crucial distinction between agonism and antagonism [is] between conflict played out within a shared symbolic universe and an uncompromising conflict between those who share no symbolic unity' (Wenman, 2003, p. 167).

It is at this point that Mouffe's theory of agonism comes face-to-face with alternative visions of agonistic politics. Shinko (2008) explores how central an idea of *respect* is to agonistic politics. 'As much as agonism refers to adversarial competition and contestation, it also incorporates various dimensions of relationality and intersubjectivity' writes Shinko (2008, p. 478). Respect is a core feature of the transformation from enemy to adversary. Yet, Shinko critiques Mouffe's suggestion that respect, and the foundations of a conflictual consensus, should precede the encounter: 'It seems to me that democratic agonists paradoxically presume the existence of that which can only emerge from within the terms of the agonistic encounter' (2008, p. 481). Mouffe is faced with a 'chicken and the egg' type scenario: is the enemy to adversary transition a precondition for, or result of, agonistic politics? Ramsbotham appears to sit on the other side of the fence to Mouffe, describing agonistic encounters as 'dialogue between enemies' (2010, p. 93). Ramsbotham continues in his description: 'Agonistic dialogue is an admittedly unruly borderland of human dialogue, a "wild west", where many of the "federal rules" that govern polite conversation and orderly verbal exchange do not run' (2010, p. 93).

Mouffe is frustratingly unclear throughout her writings on what such a foundational consensus might entail, aside from the idea of 'liberty and equality for all' as cited above, nor on how such a consensus should be reached. In Todd and Sastrom's words, 'What constitutes this movement from antagonism to agonism is something about which Mouffe is not particularly loquacious' (2008, p. 5). It is not outlandish to suggest that currently there is little shared symbolic unity between the moderate and the extreme, and that to demand



the existence of one before engaging in agonistic dialogue would prove fruitless. The remainder of the chapter sets out to examine first, what that foundational consensus might consist of in the context of extremism, and second, to explore how educational encounters could build a path towards that conflictual consensus. The educational challenge then, is in exploring options for beginning to build what Shinko refers to as ‘hard-earned recognition and respect’ (2008, p. 490). In attempting to produce an agonistic form of encountering extremism, I shall argue that an ‘ethico-political’ consensus can be developed through (rather than preceding) an agonistic encounter - one based on the principle of non-violence.

### **Non-violence, Ideology and Extremism**

It is clear that currently a shared consensus between the moderate and the extreme appears non-existent. In particular, that extremism brings with it a threat of violence excludes it from any negotiating table. Seemingly, violence sits at the root of Western states’ fear of extremism. For example, the introduction to the 2008 toolkit, *Learning to be Safe*, clearly states: ‘Dealing with violent extremism is nothing new... A small minority seek to radicalise young people with an ideology which justifies the use of violence through a distorted interpretation of a peaceful religion’ (Balls, 2008, p. 3). The Prevent strategy draws clear links between terrorism and extremism. It argues that extreme ideas often provide the ideological basis for terror attacks to occur (HM Government, 2011a, p. 11). On this basis, to claim that extremism can be engaged with through a shared principle of non-violence appears absurd. To counter terrorist violence, the orthodox logic follows, extremist ideology must be stopped. Yet, what if the emphasis here is incorrect? What if, instead of attempting to counter the *ideology* of extremism, it is *violence* itself that is countered?

Chapter two examined the development of narratives concerning radicalisation. These linear processes have come to define the journeys individuals take before committing themselves to engaging in a violent attack. Along such journeys, are a number of stages that individuals reach. At the end is ‘terrorism’, but before that there is ‘violent extremism’, and before that ‘non-violent extremism’. While these terms remain heavily contested and unclear (JCHR, 2016), the UK’s interpretation suggests that a violent extremist supports or

legitimises the use of violence to further extremist ideas. A non-violent extremist simply believes in the extreme ideas themselves (HM Government, 2011a, p. 19).<sup>16</sup> The crucial implication of depicting the problem within such linear processes is that non-violent extremism and violent terrorism become inextricably linked. As Theresa May said in a speech:

Not all extremism leads to violence and not all extremists are violent, but there is without doubt a thread that binds the kind of extremism that promotes hatred and a sense of superiority over others to the actions of those who want to impose their beliefs on us through violence. (May, Mar. 23, 2015)

The fear is that those ideas might later manifest themselves in a violent act. As such, ideas become threatening in and of themselves. It is this future threat of violent ideologies that then leads to a counter-ideological counter-extremism strategy. It is important also, of course, that it is not the threat of violence *per se*, but the threat of the wrong kind of violence that is of interest. A violent moderate, a member of the armed forces, has not been radicalised according to the dominant paradigm. The importance of acknowledging the foundational delineation of legitimate and illegitimate violence in discourses around terrorism and extremism in educational encounters will be explored in more depth below.

At this stage, it is worth examining whether countering ideas, rather than countering violence, is the best way forward. It certainly seems intuitively far easier to think about promoting non-violent ways for people to express certain ideas, than it does to think about changing the ideas that somebody holds (Richards, 2015). Non-violence in counter-terrorism has gained some recent traction with critical terrorism scholars. Lindahl (2017) argues that non-violence should be a key principle of a critical model of counter-terrorism.

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<sup>16</sup> As highlighted in chapter 2, whether or not this category merits the term ‘non-violent’ is a matter of debate (Schmid, 2014). In supporting the violence of others, it is clear that these individuals would not merit the term non-violent or pacifist according to literature on non-violence and pacifism.

He argues this for a number of reasons, including that violence is constitutive of further violence, and that non-violence is predicated on protecting the dignity of the other (2017, pp. 7-8). This latter aspect becomes particularly relevant for an agonistic approach where developing respect for the other is key. Similarly, Jackson (2017) laments the lacuna of scholarship examining non-violent approaches to countering terror (noting Lindahl's paper as one exception). One reason for his promotion of non-violence is simply that violent approaches to countering terrorism have evidently failed (2017, pp. 358-361). In my own writing (Ford, 2017a), I have examined how current ways of conceptualising extremism engender violent modes of counter-extremism - modes which inhibit the promotion of a positive, sustainable peace.

Such an emphasis on non-violence in countering extremism would, however, turn current counter-extremism strategy on its head. It is certainly evident within this thesis that the approach of the past ten years has been to emphasise countering ideology, not promoting peace. In contrast, the promotion of peace and non-violence is evidently neglected in counter-extremism strategy.

To explore how peace and non-violence are embraced (or dismissed) at a strategic level, I collated together key texts produced by the UK Government on countering extremism in schools: seven advice or strategy documents published by the government; six speeches given, or articles written, by either the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for Education on extremism; two reports by, and one government response to, select committee sessions on radicalisation and counter-extremism, and two House of Commons briefing papers on the issue. I also included in the analysis a key UNESCO document on countering extremism in schools. I examined these texts for every mention of 'peace', 'nonviolent', 'non-violent' and 'non-violence'. While I cannot claim that such a set of texts is comprehensive and inclusive of all texts on the topic, the analysis is nonetheless revealing.

Within these documents, peace appears a number of times. There were instances referring to terrorists undermining peace (HM Government, 2011b, p. 40), the Northern Ireland peace process (HM Government,

2011b p. 41; HM Government, 2011a), or the description of Islam as a peaceful religion (Dawson & Godec, 2017; HM Government, 2013). However, only two documents made mention of *promoting* peace. Only one of these was written by a UK Government department. The other was written by UNESCO.

Peace is mentioned twice in the 2008 UK Government advice, *Learning to be Safe*. This document offers tools to teachers to counter extremism in schools. The toolkit suggests one such tool, the idea of ‘a school theme to model how peaceful action has achieved results at local, national and international levels’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 29). It also offers a second suggestion: ‘promoting active citizenship to model how perceived injustice can be peacefully challenged’ (DCSF, 2008, p. 23). UNESCO makes greater mention of peace. There are references to ‘peaceful approaches to change... peaceful collective action... active participation in the peaceful and sustainable development of their societies’ (UNESCO, 2016, p. 15). While UNESCO expends more energy promoting the idea of peace, it is of note that it was last in 2008 that the UK Government appeared to even mention promoting peace within the context of countering extremism.

Mentions of non-violence (aside from the numerous mentions of the threat of non-violent extremism) are even rarer. Two mentions appeared within the texts. In a speech, David Cameron made the argument that ‘radical ideology... has often sucked people in from non-violence to violence’ (Cameron, Jul. 20, 2015), thus emphasising the importance of countering the ideology, rather than promoting non-violence. The only other mention appears within a 2006 strategy document on countering terrorism, which asserted that the true meaning of *Jihad* was non-violent struggle (HM Government, 2006, p. 7). The UNESCO document makes one reference to non-violence, promoting ‘non-violent action against extremist arguments’ (2016, p. 32). It is interesting to note here, however, that the non-violence is deployed *against* extremist ideas. The argument made in this chapter is that such ideas must be engaged with, not defended against.

The rare instances of peace or non-violence being mentioned in the texts can be placed in context by exploring the other ways in which extremism is discussed in the same texts. While *Learning to be Safe*

discusses promoting peace twice, there are sixteen occasions when the text speaks of challenging ideas, beliefs, narratives or ideologies (DCSF, 2008). The cornerstone review of the Prevent strategy in 2011 - the document in which the notion of fundamental British values is first introduced - makes no mention of peace, yet deploys the word ideology 103 times.

In this chapter, I want to make the argument that the promotion of non-violent, agonistic modes of engaging with 'extreme' ideas offers a far more sustainable and peaceful framework for thinking about educational responses to the problem of 'extremism'. However, three key questions remain. The first is: do ideas threaten? The second is: how are violence and non-violence defined? A third is whether extremists themselves are capable of debate.

Regarding the first question, it is my claim that, where violence is used instrumentally - as a tool to achieve a goal, or to further a set of values or ideas - it is the violence, not the ideas, that threatens. Where perhaps there are instances of individuals or groups who see violence as an end in itself - what Selma Gregg calls 'apocalyptic warriors' (2016, p. 348) - an educational approach across society would not offer a suitable response.<sup>17</sup> Yet, importantly, this is one of three types of religious violence according to Selma Gregg. In most other contexts, violence is used instrumentally. For these cases, the following maxim appears solid: while one may not agree with the 'extreme' ideas that someone holds, it is possible to imagine a context in which those ideas could be presented, and engaged with, as ideas that do not come with the immediate threat of direct violence.

The second question regarding the nature and definition of both violence and non-violence adds complexity to this claim however. What the 'threat of violence' might entail should be examined carefully. Violence

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<sup>17</sup> This is not however to argue that there are not non-violent ways of approaching such groups or individuals (see Jackson, 2017, pp. 363-365). It is however, an argument to suggest that educational responses are not, in the first instance, the right approach in this case.

comes in many forms. Johan Galtung (1969) explored multiple forms of violence. Galtung delineates forms of ‘direct violence’, which involve an agentic actor inflicting harm on another individual, from ‘structural violence’, a form of violence in which harm is inflicted, but where no identifiable actor exists. Galtung offers the example of starvation as a result of poverty. Individuals are here harmed by human causes, though the cause is systemic. Earlier in the chapter, Gur-Ze’ev’s conceptualisation of epistemic violence was also mentioned, adding further complexity to the matrix of violence.

It is easy to imagine an ‘extreme’ idea that might not threaten direct violence, but that would threaten structural violence. The idea that white people should be paid more than other ethnicities, for instance. As an idea in itself, it may offend, but it does not *threaten* direct harm.<sup>18</sup> Were the idea enforced across society, the harm caused by the structural violence within the idea would be enormous (and would likely result in a great deal of direct violence too). Moreover, discourses on countering extremism appear unable to incorporate contexts in which individuals or groups may hold onto reasonable or non-extreme ideas, but choose to promote these ideas through violence; examples such as the use of violence in opposition to values themselves considered extreme - the use of torture, denial of rights to children, or political repression. Many ‘non-extreme’ ideas have also inflicted structural and epistemic violence, such as ideas or ideologies that normalise or naturalise military intervention, poverty, or imperialism for example. Adopting a non-violent approach demands all forms of violence - the extreme and the moderate - to be critically examined.

Galtung (1969) not only delineates forms of violence, but also forms of peace. He distinguishes a negative peace, which seeks to halt direct violence, from a positive peace, which seeks to eliminate all forms of violence and install social justice. An agonistic approach to positive peace, one that accommodates a desire to also eliminate epistemic violence, would not seek to impose a blueprint model of a positive peace. Such an idea would engender the forms of violence critiqued by Shinko and Cremin above. Instead, the principle

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<sup>18</sup> Of course, the idea itself is often presented in conjunction with other ideas that do threaten direct harm, such as inciting people to violently attack counter-protestors, or Islamophobic attacks on individuals wearing the niqab.

would be to seek an agonistic, pluralistic approach to positive peace through a critical approach to all violence.

Such a discussion taps into a whole series of debates pertinent to the contemporary era: free speech and hate speech, the right to not be offended, the legitimacy of state violence, and the links between ideologies and violence, to name just a few. When one considers Galtung's later (1990) inclusion of 'cultural violence' into the mix, the issues are further complicated. Here, Galtung argues that the rituals, cultural artefacts and other communicative acts that normalise or legitimise acts of violence in society are themselves violent. The question of whether or not a speech act, in which violent ideas are expressed, is an act of cultural violence is incredibly important here when laying out the parameters of a non-violent agonistic encounter. Should these ideas be excluded for being violent?

It is evident that within the realm of extremism there exists a complex web of competing claims over violence - what violence is legitimate, natural, permissible, desirable and so on. The moderate claims the legitimacy of state violence, while rendering all other forms of violence as 'extreme'. The extremist then attempts to challenge that de-legitimacy through acts of violence. It can be said therefore that at the heart of the challenge regarding extremism is a set of radical disagreements: disagreements over the way society should be run, the values it holds, and the role violence should play within that. Ramsbotham's (2010) frustrations at the field of conflict resolution stem from the desire of conflict resolution practitioners to overcome, or sideline, radical disagreements. Ramsbotham seeks to learn from them instead, and to place these disagreements at the heart of agonistic encounters. One way for such a set of disagreements to examine opportunities for non-violence is through their inclusion within an agonistic encounter. As such, an agonistic approach perhaps sends a challenge to Galtung's desire to eliminate or exclude these forms of culturally or structurally violent ideas. If the battle between moderation and extremism is re-framed as a disagreement between competing ideas of what violence is legitimate, *all* these claims must be heard equally.

A foundational ethical principle of agonistic non-violence at the heart of a counter-extremism strategy presents a very different approach to the contemporary model, in that it avoids pre-determining certain forms of violence as legitimate. Furthermore, rather than seeing non-violence as a precondition of an agonistic encounter (as perhaps Mouffe's agonism might), non-violence is seen as a principle to be achieved through rigorous debate and encounter with difficult, violent ideas - through their very inclusion rather than exclusion. As Shinko notes, 'We should strive to re-envision peace as a cacophonous and cluttered terrain of political struggle, denoted by multilayered and discontinuous sites of emergence' (Shinko, 2008, p. 490). It should be acknowledged that there is not the space here to afford the depth of debate deserved by such complex ideas and contestations. Instead, I have attempted to sketch and highlight the various ideas at stake within this arena, to begin an examination of how to overcome the issues raised within the thesis. In so doing, I argue that an inclusive, agonistic encounter searching for non-violent solutions through the debate between ideas some deem extreme and others moderate, would radically transform current counter-extremism approaches.

Here, one is led to the third question raised above: whether extremists are capable of such debate. Immense work has been completed at a discursive level to produce a discourse which dismisses the possibility of extremists engaging in debate. Chapter five examined how often extremists would be dismissed as irrational, ignorant or simply stupid. The following slide offers a similar example, demonstrating common narratives regarding extremism (figure 8.1):






Figure 8.5: T389, slide 13

Described as ‘unwilling to compromise’ and ill-informed, it is hardly surprising that at a strategic level, little attention is given to the idea of engaging with extreme ideas, and with ‘extremists’ themselves. Yet, it is readily apparent that this discourse which excludes the possibility of engagement with extreme ideas, plays a vital role in the exclusion of extremism, leaving extremists with few options, other than violence, to express themselves and their ideas.

It is important to acknowledge that such complex and far-reaching debates regarding the role of violence in society cannot be comprehensively tackled within the remit of a thesis chapter. Instead, it is hoped that such a discussion lays out the concepts and ideas at stake, acknowledging their complexity. The remainder of this chapter hopes to bring such ideas back down to earth. It does this through examining those examples in the corpus of teaching materials which appear to offer instances of agonism at work. Through the interplay of conceptual discussion, and practical endeavour, new ways of approaching the problem of extremism can be explored.

### **Building Agonistic Principles of Encountering Extremism Education**

The educational approach put forward in this chapter is one focused on transforming the antagonism surrounding extremism into an agonism. In particular, it is focused on putting the political back into the discussion regarding extremism, so that, as Todd & Sastrom argue, ‘views are conceived on the register of we/they instead of on the register of good and evil’ (2008, p. 9). This educational approach is based on the principle of allowing extreme *ideas* the greatest opportunity to be debated openly, within the parameters of an education that promotes and engenders non-violence. The corpus in fact offers plenty of examples of how to begin. Incorporating relevant examples from the corpus, I offer (a not definitive) list of ways to bring to life an agonistic, educational approach to the problem of extremism.

### ***Promoting a Positively-framed Peace***

It is fascinating to see that the teaching materials within the corpus begin to offer insight into how an agonistic education based on promoting peace through a critical approach to violence can be constructed. The corpus of teaching materials offers many more signs of educational approaches to promoting peace, than were evident at a strategic level. A keyword search for ‘peace’ within the teaching materials brought up a substantial amount of resources. While some of these examples appeared to fall into the problematic frameworks examined in previous chapters, others offered a greater level of deviation from the strategic emphasis on challenging ideology.

Some resources offer concerted attempts to promote peace. A resource pack developed by the *Tony Blair Faith Foundation* includes a set of activities geared towards examining the importance of dialogue in building peace (T406, p. 12). A resource by the *Association for Citizenship Teaching* asks students to watch a dramatised video in which a meeting between two people helps them challenge their own views. After watching, students are asked to explore, ‘how do they go about making peace?’ (T12, p. 5). The organisation *Since 9/11* developed a resource which examines the justifications of the UK, the US and Al-

Qa'ida for declaring war. Students are asked to critically examine whether the actions of the three parties was done with the intention of restoring peace (T332, p. 2). The resources produced by *Extreme Dialogue* have all been written with a peacebuilding approach. These resources are described as being 'based on equality, engagement and understanding' (T89, p. 12). *Miriam's Vision* offers a set of resources, which amongst other objectives, seeks to promote the 'democratic process as a non-violent alternative for dealing with conflict and adversity' (T171, p. 1).

The promotion of non-violent modes of political participation is to be celebrated if an agonistic education based on non-violence is to be constructed. To some extent, this promotion is already present. After all, chapter three noted how the current counter-extremism strategy promotes the teaching of ways of (non-violently) engaging politically. However, a tension remains. The enthusiasm for the counter-extremism strategy to see much in the way of *change* should be approached sceptically. Promoting modes of non-violent political participation while also promoting a fixed set of liberal values presents the virtue of political participation more in terms of a pressure valve than a change agent. It appears that these modes of participation become ways of 'letting off steam', often expressed in terms of freedom of speech (T365, p. 5), rather than as modes of catalysing change. After all, as chapter six explored, little room is left for altering the fixed, fundamental values, when those values are themselves promoted.

It is noticeable for instance that the word peace often appears in the context of describing Islam. A number of resources write that Islam is a peaceful religion. 'The word "Islam" means "peaceful submission"', writes one example (T395, slide 6). Another argues that many Muslims see Islamic extremism as 'a warped ideology (belief system) that "betrays Islamic values of peace"' (T333, slide 4; see also, T41, p. 2;, T426, slide 14; T398, slide 10). Such a narrative appears to fall well within the discourse of 'True Islam' which I critiqued in chapter seven, which associated a 'good' form of Islam with one that was submissive and unchallenging to the status quo. Peace appears to be translated in these examples in a similar way.

Furthermore, where peaceful protest was promoted, there was often a caution that is also offered. There is a curious sense here that peaceful marches never lose their threat of violence. One example speaks of a march passing off ‘relatively peacefully’ where ‘fifteen arrests took place’ (T109, slide 8). Another asked students to reflect on the relative moral virtues of various ways of attempting to effect change, including ‘someone [who] joins a large and peaceful march’ (T288, slide 11), or a ‘peaceful demonstration’ (T285, p. 8). A fourth example offers ‘protests, strikes [and] demonstrations’ as peaceful alternatives to terrorism and violence (T253, slide 4). Yet, these peaceful marches might turn violent. Discursively, these examples of ‘peaceful marches’ never shake off their opposite. Such a linkage appears particularly present in one presentation entitled ‘Balancing the right to protest’ (T49), which explores cases where protests have turned violent, and asks how the right to protest needs to be balanced with the needs of others who might be affected by the violence. Peaceful protest is promoted, but with some level of hesitancy.

At the heart of this tension is an antagonism cited earlier in the chapter - of the reliance on military violence at the heart of liberal notions of peace (Jackson, 2018). While these resources appear to embrace peace, they do so only if they do not challenge the idea that the state should retain a monopoly of legitimate violence. The questions surrounding the (il)legitimacy of state violence are noticeably absent. Such an inability to loosen the grip on liberal notions of legitimate violence poses a profound barrier to agonistic encounters. A positively-oriented conceptualisation of peace within an agonistic framework must approach all violence with equally critical vigour.

Some resources stand out as examples here. The above cited example in which the justifications for war of the US and UK are critiqued alongside Al-Qaeda, creates a sense of parity in terms of whose violence is to be critiqued. Furthermore, a resource produced by *Miriam's Vision* briefly explores how counter-terrorism

laws might be used ‘to spy on peaceful protestors’ (T149, p. 1). Another explored a case where police unlawfully refused to allow a coachload of protestors to drive to an RAF base where they planned to hold a peaceful protest (T145, p. 2). These two examples hint at the idea that peaceful protest might actually pose a threat - not to individuals - but to those in authority.

Such a tension reveals a core dynamic of agonistic approaches. As Mouffe writes, ‘The fundamental difference between the “dialogical” and the “agonistic” perspectives is that the aim of the latter is a profound transformation of the existing power relations and the establishment of a new hegemony’ (2005, p. 52; see also Ruitenberg, 2008, p. 278). Peace, and non-violent modes of political participation and resistance cannot be promoted agonistically, unless hegemonic change as an idea is fully embraced. This demands, as the next section explores, that the framing of counter-extremism around the defence of values needs to be profoundly reshaped.

### ***Being Critical of the ‘Moderate’***

In this sense of embracing change, agonistic models of education must be vulnerable. As Rosemary Shinko notes, ‘In its most comprehensive sense agonism provides for reflexivity and fallibility within a pluralistically dynamic political setting where difference and contestation are hallmarks of an engaged and democratically active citizenry’ (Shinko, 2008, p. 479). Without being vulnerable to fallibility, an agonistic engagement with ‘extreme’ ideas is impossible. Similarly, Sharon Todd writes of a need to ‘relinquish the security of those universals into which so much political trust is placed’ (Todd, 2010, p. 217). As such, it is the fundamentality of Fundamental British Values that first must be extinguished, should an agonistic approach to a counter-extremism education be embraced. It is impossible to conceive of an agonistic education that has preordained the correct answers.

Some examples within the corpus appeared to embrace this vulnerability. The use of humour, such as in the following example, can aid teachers to introduce the notion of fallibility to students. Here, a presentation

introducing Fundamental British Values does not hide the fact that they were not universally supported (figure 8.2):


**LO: Identify and discuss 'British values' / Explain why the government thinks these are important / Evaluate whether British values are better than an alternative**

**Not everyone agreed with Gove though, and many people took to social media to ridicule him.**

**Being wary of foreigners while having a Belgian beer with an Indian curry in your Spanish villa wearing Indonesian clothes  
# BritishValues**

**#BritishValues tackling homelessness, one spike at a time**

**#BritishValues Never looking, speaking or eating on the Tube.**



The image is a presentation slide with a blue background. At the top, it features a Learning Objective (LO) in white text. Below this, there are several text boxes in white and yellow. On the left side, there is a vertical green bar with the word 'Information' written vertically. The central part of the slide contains a collage of images: a mobile phone screen showing a notes app with a list of times and activities, a brick wall, a red phone box, and a subway entrance. A small logo is visible in the bottom right corner.

Figure 8.6: T413, slide 5

In this example, students are not uniformly expected to take on the values without some evaluation. Instead, they are offered the opportunity to themselves think of any funny British values that were missing from the list in the Prevent strategy (T413, slide 5). A different presentation introducing to students the values, teaches about the notion of Britishness, and incorporates ideas such as hooliganism and binge drinking alongside cups of tea and red phone boxes (T390, slide 3). One resource asks the question ‘How tolerant is the UK?’ (T285, p. 12). The simple inclusion of the word ‘how’, transforms the fundamentality of the British value. Similarly, a different presentation offers the chance for fallibility, and asks students: ‘Are these sensible suggestions? Are there any problems with them? Should anything be taken away or added?’ (T414, slide 4).

While a critical approach is thus developed, a tension with the fundamentality of British values persists. This criticality in questioning the values is undermined two slides later within the same presentation, where the fixity of the values appears to have been reinstated (figure 8.3):




Figure 8.7: T414, slide 6

The fixed nature of the values has returned. Whether through accountability measures, such as the need to prove to school inspectors that your school is promoting Fundamental British Values, or through some other mode, it appears that resources struggle to challenge the values in their entirety.

As Ruitenberg (2008, p. 278) notes, Mouffe's agonism has at its heart a desire to transform current hegemony. It is hard to imagine a group of civil servants within the Department for Education at a conference table tasked to develop an educational policy to transform the hegemony. However, agonism relies on a level of equality and parity between ideas that are engaged with. This cannot happen if certain ideas are *a priori* privileged over others. The fallibility of the 'moderate' is key.

### *Embrace Complexity and Contextuality*

A third component of an agonistic educational framework is complexity. Chapter five explored the damaging impact of presenting ‘simple’ definitions of extremism that shy away from the complexities of the topic. Fortunately, not all resources introduced these definitions or ideas in such a way as to mask the complexity and contestation surrounding the terms.

For instance, a number of resources drew upon the question of ‘what does a terrorist look like?’ to explore how not all terrorists ‘look like Muslims’ (figures 8.4, 8.5 & 8.6):



### What does a terrorist look like?

				
<b>Younes Tsouli</b> Aka: Terrorist 007 Cyber- Jihadist Moroccan born Developed virtual terrorist networks to radicalise the young online and help them carry out terrorist attacks	<b>Neil Lewington</b> Right-wing white supremacist Developed a bomb-making factory at his flat in Reading with the intent of carrying out acts of terrorism against Asian families	<b>Mark Colborne</b> Aryan right-wing extremist from Southampton Felt victimised for his ginger hair. He plotted a cyanide attack; also to kill Prince Charles and William so red-haired Harry could be king	<b>Hasib Hussain</b> 7/7 suicide bomber (2005) Aged 18, the youngest of 4 suicide bombers who detonated bombs in the underground; his detonated on board a bus in Tavistock Square	<b>David Copeland</b> London Nail Bomber Right-wing white supremacist From Yateley in Hampshire, he made and detonated a bomb in Brixton and a nail bomb in Soho

Figure 8.4: T112, slide 7

### What does a Terrorist look like?



### Where do our impressions of a terrorist come from?

Figure 8.8: T24, slide 2

### What does a terrorist look like ?

Figure 8.6: T263, slide 2



This narrative appears to have a number of consequences. One of these consequences is that these resources contribute to the discourse spoken of in chapter five - the universalisation of the extremist threat. The narrative that a terrorist does not have a visual profile contributes to the idea that *anyone* can be a terrorist, and as such, the threat appears to come from many directions. A second consequence, however, is that these resources do appear to counter some of the dominant narratives of the contemporary orthodox terrorism discourse.

A common criticism is that counter-terrorism strategies have for the past decade and a half focussed disproportionately on young, Asian men (e.g. Lynch, 2013; Spalek & Lambert, 2008; Thomas, 2009). Lynch describes the discursive process where discourses had transitioned ‘from speaking of a small number of violent Muslims, to suspecting radical sects of Islam, to suspecting all Muslim youth as potential radicals, [which] had completed a process whereby Muslim youth in the United Kingdom were constructed as threatening, different, untrustworthy and dangerous’ (Lynch, 2013, p. 242). These resources, through their inclusion of many examples of white terrorists, and the inclusion of some examples of women involved in terrorism, challenge this narrative.

Alongside being a young Muslim, the contemporary stereotypical terrorist is also ‘evil’. Unpacking the discourse surrounding the attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, Jackson argued that ‘Perhaps the most frequent rhetorical construction of the terrorist enemy is that they are “evil”’. A subplot of the civilisation-barbarism meta-narrative’ (Jackson, 2005, p. 66). Through the inclusion of the example of Nelson Mandela, the resources challenge dominant understandings that terrorists are ‘evil’. It appears jarring to include an example of what some would consider ‘terrorism’ that was supported by such a large proportion of global society (figures 8.7 & 8.8):

## Questions

1. What is apartheid? (explain with examples)
2. What are the goals of the ANC?
3. Can the labelling of terrorism/terrorists change with time?
4. Can terrorism be understood as a "*weapon of the weak*"?
5. Is it possible to distinguish between a terrorist and freedom fighter?

Figure 8.7: T32, slide 4

## Free Nelson Mandela!

- In the 1960's Nelson Mandela was accused of being a terrorist. He was found guilty and imprisoned for 27 years and later released in 1990.
- During his years in prison Nelson received huge global support. In 1988 music artists organised a massive music concert called the **Nelson Mandela 70th Birthday Tribute**.
- The aim was to put pressure on the South African Government to release him. It was watched all around the world. He was released two years later.



Figure 8.8: T263, slide 5

Furthermore, other resources appear to concede Jackson's argument that 'terrorism is just one among several repertoires of political conflict' (2012, p. 11). In particular, the somewhat cliched expression that 'one person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter' was deployed regularly within the materials (figure 8.9, 8.10 & 8.11):

## Political Extremism

### Starter

*"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."*

What does this mean?

Project: Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry. School: Addey and Stanhope School, London. Date: September 2016

Figure 8.9: T31, slide 1




Figure 8.10: T263, slide 15



Figure 8.11: T389, slide 8

Narratives of good and evil are nice and simple. They are easy to learn, and aid policymakers. They do not, however, make good agonistic narratives. As Todd argues: ‘The transformation of antagonism into agonism therefore involves understanding my opponent not in terms of moral categories (good and evil, for instance), but in specifically political terms’ (Todd, 2010, p. 218). Embracing, rather than shying away from, complexity aids students to approach the world afresh, re-politicising apparent simplicities.

One example does this through offering reflective questions for students to explore. This resource explores terrorism as one example of a series of ways of looking to effect political change, and then examines historical cases of its ineffectiveness. From here the resource asks ‘If it is not effective, then why do people still commit acts of terrorism?’ (T285, p. 9).

Complementarily to complexity, not only should students learn that these issues are complex, but also they should understand that they are situated within an historical context. Ruitenberg (2008, p. 278) argues that political literacy is vital for agonistic politics. In particular, she argues that ‘students must learn to read the social order in political terms, that is, in terms of disputes about the interpretation of liberty and equality and the hegemonic social relations that should shape them’ (2008, p. 278). To do this without historical context would surely be impossible.

*Since 9/11* is an organisation particularly focused on contextualising terrorism within their resource, ‘*Out of the Blue - When did 9/11 Begin?*’. It is interesting how, in developing an historical context, the resource challenges the discourse surrounding ‘new terrorism’. The ‘new terrorism’ discourse refers to a common narrative which frames the terrorism after the attacks of September 2001 as being distinct from, and more threatening, than older forms of terrorism. This discourse has been challenged by terrorism scholars (Crenshaw, 2008). Within their ‘*Out of the Blue*’ resource, the organisation developed an information booklet entitled ‘*What caused 9/11?*’. In this booklet, a narrative traces this question of the causes of 9/11 back through the entire 20th century. It covers early imperial expansion in the region searching for oil, Zionism, Arab Nationalism, through to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the Gulf War. On the final page of the booklet, it states: ‘*By now, you should be convinced that the roots of 9/11 go very deep, very wide and are very complicated!*’ (T318, p. 10). *Since 9/11* certainly does not shy away from complexity. Such a principle resonates with Lindahl’s plea for terrorism scholars to ‘dare to know’, a principle which ‘marks a commitment to explore and question the knowledge and assumptions we already hold about terrorism’ (Lindahl, 2017, p. 6).

### ***The importance of grievance***

Ruitenbergs (2008) exploration of agonism as a mode of ‘radical democratic citizenship education’ offers useful assistance in developing an agonistic mode of extremism education. Thus far, Ruitenbergs suggestions of the agonistic desire to change the hegemony, and of the need for political literacy have been incorporated. One further suggestion from Ruitenbergs is incorporated here, namely, the inclusion of emotion in politics (2008, p. 276).

Ruitenbergs argues that ‘the emotional education required for political education based on agonistic pluralism would focus not on seeing the emotions as a private site of control or means to personal success

but rather on understanding the cultural significance and significations of emotions' (2008, p. 276). In this regard, I argue that the role of political grievances within the question of extremism must return from the sidelines, and play a central role in agonistic education.

Political grievances are currently dismissed when exploring why individuals turn to political violence. At times, as David Cameron did in 2011, it is argued that violence is so endemic to extremist ideology that even were grievances explored, violent extremism would still occur (Cameron, Feb. 5, 2011). At other times, the grievances themselves are dismissed. Extremists are described as irrational, or ignorant. They do not understand the politics of their 'grievances'. The word 'perceived' often prefixes the word grievance in strategic literature (DCSF, 2008, p. 13).

Yet, putting those grievances centre stage is vital. Understanding this component of why someone engages in political violence should be seen as equally important as any other. Even more importantly, as explored further below, examining emotions and grievances promotes empathy and mutual understanding.

Teaching resources offer ways of incorporating grievances into extremism education. In one example, students are asked to watch a video in which a character, Khalid, becomes radicalised. Later students are asked: 'What sort of current issues in the UK or elsewhere could have made Khalid angry? Think of things that you might have seen on the news over the last few weeks or months' (T100, p. 5). Another presentation examining the reasons why someone might become radicalised suggests: 'British Foreign Policy in Iraq and Afghanistan' (T400, slide 10). A resource produced by *Since 9/11* speaks of bin Laden's disgust at the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia after the first Gulf War (T318, p. 8).

Putting political grievances back into the debate not only contributes to the re-politicisation of extremism and the insertion of emotion into educational processes, but also, as the next section examines, allows for greater empathy and mutual understanding.

### *Understanding the Other*

A core component of mediation and conflict resolution - from playground scuffles to geopolitical disputes - is to 'see the world through the other person's eyes'. Such a component seems vital if the friend/enemy distinction is to be broken down. This does not require agreement. The purpose of an agonistic understanding of respect is not consensus, as it might be in more deliberative modes of democracy, but the building of a foundation for disagreement. To achieve this, to recognise, and respect the other, this understanding is vital. Respect is a key component of Rosemary Shinko's conceptualisation of 'agonistic peace':

It is not merely that I see the other's face, but that the other puts her face in my face and refuses to make way, refuses to not let me see... it occurs again and again, over and over until out of this struggle emerges a begrudging recognition, a begrudging acceptance, the begrudging admission of a nod towards recognition and the acknowledgement of a respect earned in a struggle borne out of the refusal to submit (Shinko, 2008, p. 489).

Once again, the corpus offers examples of how to begin to build this. *Since 9/11* incorporates an activity asking students to 'empathise with people directly affected by 9/11' (T322, p. 6). The examples offered demonstrate a conscious desire for students to engage with a variety of perspectives: parents of soldiers killed in the resulting invasion of Afghanistan, parents of suicide bombers, victims of the attacks in New York and Washington themselves, a Muslim living in New York at the time, and an Afghan villager whose livelihood has been destroyed by the invasion (T322, p. 6). *Extreme Dialogue*, in resources designed to help students understand the causes of right-wing extremism, incorporate activities to simulate discrimination. This might include splitting a class according to eye colour, and asking them to make judgements about a

different group. This aids students to understand how easily discrimination can occur, and what it feels like (T92, p. 15).

*Extreme Dialogue*'s resources emphasise trying to understand the Other. One of the aims of the resources is 'Increasing contact with individuals and their stories, building empathy and association' (T90, p. 4). The resources do this using interviews with former violent individuals (or family members), recorded in short videos, exploring why they became involved with violence, and the impact of that. The next step for an agonistic approach would perhaps be to develop resources with those who have not rescinded their 'extremism'.

A different resource from *Since 9/11* examines life in Britain as a Muslim and asks 'How might [students] feel if people supposed they were terrorists because of what they looked like, or because of their age, gender or ethnic background?' (T285, p. 5). It is interesting actually, how these 'understanding the Other' examples quite often fall into the category of challenging Islamophobia. *Miriam's Vision* has a similar exercise, asking students how they would feel one month after the bombings if they were, for instance, 'a Londoner of Asian appearance' (T140, p. 5). Such resources are in danger of falling into the trap examined in chapter seven of pinpointing certain modes of Islamophobia while propagating another form of Islamophobia by working within an Islamophobic counter-extremism strategy. Yet, developing these narratives in an agonistic counter-extremism strategy, which does not promote a fixed set of values that engender Islamophobic practices, should help avoid this.

### *A Question of Language*

As noted in chapter five, one organisation, *Miriam's Vision*, rarely mentions the words 'extremism' and 'terrorism' during any of their 37 teaching units. Instead, they refer to the 2005 London bombings as '7/7, an indiscriminate act of violence against ordinary people: people like you and me' (T229, p. 4). The

terms are not entirely eliminated. In their guidance notes, they describe how their teaching materials are developed ‘to contribute towards minimising the incidence and scale of violent extremism as part of a vision of a safer, more inclusive society’ (T229, p. 1). Moreover, they use the word ‘terrorism’ when referring to a coroner’s report of the 2005 bombings. However, this sensitive approach to terminology appears to be a vital component to developing a more level playing field - a vital balancing act should enemies become adversaries.

This organisation is not alone in displaying a sensitive and critical approach to the terminology in question. Above, examples demonstrate the politically complex nature of the term ‘terrorism’. A critical approach to the terminology is a far cry from the examples in chapter five in which students were encouraged to copy down definitions into their books with no opportunity for questions. The simple act of teaching students that the terms terrorism, extremism and radicalisation are contested, subjective terms, will go a long way to developing an agonistic framework.

Alongside the importance of approaching the language offered by the discourse with a level of criticality, another core question regarding language must be examined. In its current form, regardless of the content of the strategy, it is a *counter*-extremism strategy. At its very foundation therefore, the principle behind this strategy is one of defence. Yet, agonism cannot operate under siege, defending something from extremism. As such, I argue that an agonistic approach to the problem of extremism must shift from countering extremism to *encountering* extremism – critically encountering not only the various ‘extremisms’ as examined in this thesis, but the very shaping of extremism as a political problem, and the exclusion of various forms of violence as the non-extreme. What I have hoped to do in this chapter is to develop an approach to ‘the problem of extremism’ through an agonistic framework. This thesis has demonstrated that the problematic elements of this issue extend beyond the ‘extremism’ itself to the ways it is currently being countered. One cannot openly approach this problem if the core principle is to merely ‘counter’ extremism.



## **Conclusion**

This chapter has deployed a theory of agonism, as predominantly developed by Chantal Mouffe, to offer a theoretical foundation for an educational approach to extremism that takes into consideration the critiques highlighted throughout this thesis. Agonism has offered a prism through which to critique the current consensus-based model of counter-extremism education. It has shown a consensus model to be both an impossible never-ending task, and a catalyst of violence. It is a mode of countering extremism that seeks to defend its friends, and eliminate its enemies.

Agonism offers a way of transforming those enemies into adversaries. The chapter has attempted to build a platform for doing just that. Yet, as Mouffe argues, a level of consensus is required to achieve this. I have argued that through decoupling ideology from violence, and seeing extremist violence, not extremist ideas, as the source of a violent threat, a consensus built around non-violence, and a critical, pluralist approach to all forms of violence, can be developed. This consensus would then allow the once-excluded ‘extreme’ ideas to engage agonistically with the moderate, and for new forms of peace to emerge. Kundnani recognizes an irony here in that radicalisation, rather than the problem, might in fact pose a solution:

Radicalisation – in the true sense of the word – is the solution, not the problem. Al-Qaeda’s violent vanguardism thrives in contexts where politics has been brutally suppressed or blandly gentrified. Opening up genuinely radical political alternatives and revisiting the political freedoms that have been lost in recent years is the best approach to reducing so called jihadist terrorism. (Kundnani, 2015, p. 15)

The chapter has not attempted to provide a comprehensive theory for the implementation of such a theory, but instead to highlight a number of the debates, dilemmas and contestations that such an approach would need to tackle.

The remainder of the chapter sought to examine the corpus of teaching materials for pragmatic insight into how to build an agonistic framework. Six principles (as described in the following table) were put forward for how this could be achieved.

***Principles of Agonistic Education to Encounter Extremism***

<b>Promoting a Positively-framed Peace</b>	Agonism relies on foundational, consensual principles to sustain debate. It is built from a principle that education should promote a positively-conceived peace, focused on the elimination of all forms of violence, and an openness to change and transformation.
<b>Being Critical of the ‘Moderate’</b>	Debate built on principles of non-violence cannot be conceived should one set of ideas be privileged over another. Key to agonism, and to the inclusion of the Other, is demonstrating the fallibility and impermanence of the current hegemony.
<b>Embrace Complexity and Contextuality</b>	Simple narratives lead to depoliticised understandings of good/evil. Educators must not shy away from exploring the complexity of these issues. Including the historical context helps to place issues of extremism and terrorism in a political, rather than moral, context.
<b>The Importance of Grievance</b>	Violence is typically motivated by a sense of injustice. To be included, ideas once excluded must be heard. Grievances should be engaged with, not dismissed outright. This allows emotion to re-enter the political sphere.
<b>Understanding the Other</b>	Simplistic, exclusionary narratives of good and evil, not only depoliticise, but dehumanise. Putting the human back into debates regarding extremism allow for greater levels of understanding. Educational approaches can allow students to ‘experience life in someone else’s shoes’.
<b>A Question of Language</b>	Approach the terminology of the discourse with criticality and openness. Build the strategy from a principle of encountering, not countering, extremism.

*Table 8.1: Principles of Agonistic Education to Encounter Extremism (source: author)*

It is a hope therefore that this chapter can offer a hopeful and optimistic place for the thesis to conclude. While the bulk of this thesis has developed substantial critique, it is important to recognise that an alternative is possible. The strong, unbreachable walls developed in the UK’s counter-extremist castle have been shown for what they are: a sand castle, a product of human construction, and a siege mentality. This

chapter sought to present a way of embodying the ocean's tide that reshapes the sand from its castle form, into something more peaceful.

# 9

## Conclusion

### Looking Beyond the Castle's Walls

In June 2018, having commissioned a review of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, the UK Government released its most recent iteration of the strategy, given the name CONTEST 3.0 (HM Government, 2018). Within this document are numerous themes highlighted in this thesis, demonstrating the continued embeddedness of what have been argued to be deeply problematic narratives: the promotion of ever 'earlier intervention' (ibid., p. 10); a promotion of 'the values that are the foundation of our society' (ibid., p. 23); and the constant emphasis on countering 'ideology' (ibid., p. 23).

The definition of extremism within the document appears as confused as ever. Without offering a specific definition, the strategy argues 'there is no precise line between what we have described above as terrorist ideology, and what we consider extremist ideology', adding that 'extremists of all kinds use malevolent narratives to justify behaviour that contradicts and undermines the values that are the foundation of our society' (ibid., p. 23). As such, the government appears to offer little to address the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights who two years earlier reported that, 'the Government gave us no impression of having a coherent or sufficiently precise definition of either "non-violent extremism" or "British values". There needs to be certainty in the law so that those who are asked to comply with and enforce the law know what behaviour is and is not lawful' (JCHR, 2016, p. 32). Instead, it seems extremism can cover any behaviour contrary to the fundamental values. Countering radicalisation is one part of what the strategy describes as 'a wider effort to counter broader extremist messages and behaviours' (HM Government, 2018, p. 23). Countering extremism now appears to have broadened out beyond the realm of countering violence to 'wider social harms beyond terrorism', such as 'the erosion of women's rights' and

‘the isolation of communities’ (ibid.). The strategy’s publication in many ways confirms the centrality of a consensus-based orientation within British counter-extremism, and the creeping securitisation of various areas of communal life.

The document also shared statistics regarding Prevent duty referrals. It reports that 6,093 referrals were made in 2016-17. 36% of these were deemed to require no action at all, and 45% of these cases were referred to alternative services, outside of the Channel system. Thus, only one in five referrals (19%) led to a Channel intervention panel, suggesting that four in five attempts to ‘spot signs of radicalisation’ were incorrect. Such a low ‘success’ rate in the identification of individuals requiring support regarding extremism and radicalisation clearly indicates the importance of scholarly attention to the murky and misunderstood concept of extremism as deployed in public discourses. According to the strategy, of the 6,093 referrals, only 5.5% ever required intervention specific to extremism or terrorism (ibid., p. 39).

This thesis has focused critical attention onto such discourses, examining the nature of the realms of extremism and counter-extremism through the prism of the education sector. This chapter seeks to provide a brief summary of the findings and arguments central to this thesis. Furthermore, it hopes to shed light on the implications - both theoretical and practical - of the research, to indicate its limitations and to draw together suggestions for future directions of research.

### **Summary of the Research**

The thesis began with a concern regarding an increasing emphasis being given to ideology in terrorism discourses since 2001, and in particular, since the attacks on the London transport network in 2005. It also began by noting the expanding burden being placed on schools to counter extremism. The investigation began to explore what appeared to be a foundational antagonism between the objectives of an education system promoting free debate, pluralism and critical thinking, and the need to counter an ideology in order to patrol the boundaries of what values and ideas were to be acceptable within a liberal democracy.

Chapter two undertook a deeper, conceptual investigation into the nature of extremism and counter-extremism, the impact of radicalisation discourses on these conceptualisations, and the reasons behind education's centrality in the fight against extremism. Here, I argued that the various components of countering extremism appeared in conflict with one another. How could one promote both a fixed set of moderate values as well as pluralism? How could one promote non-violence when the legitimacy of state violence is at the heart of liberal democracy?

Chapter three's focus was to examine how this web of contradictory and antagonistic claims, of inconsistent empirical support, and of conceptual uncertainty, had materialised at a strategic level. It argued that the UK's counter-extremism in schools strategy is contested and contradictory. Three core educational components to the strategy were isolated: the development of skills, the promotion of values, and the dissemination of knowledge. Not only was it argued that each is contested in that substantial scholarly research brings into doubt the claim that such strategies were likely to have any impact on extremism at all, but also it appeared that the educational strategy was being dragged in three competing directions. I raised the pertinent question of how one was meant to teach the skills of critical thinking while concurrently promoting a fixed set of fundamental values. Moreover, I explored the danger of developing a paradigm of 'us' and 'them' through promoting a sense of the values that 'we' share, while also teaching students about 'them', the extremists. Such a paradigm undermines the promotion of a shared, common foundational framework of values at the heart of the logic of values promotion, seemingly excluding the very people to be 'brought in'.

Chapter four developed the research approach to examine the implications of this contested and contradictory strategy on classroom teaching. I decided to answer such a question through examining a set of teaching materials that had been designed to meet the requirements of the counter-extremism strategy. A diverse range of PowerPoint presentations, lesson plans, and student worksheets was compiled. A method

of critical discourse analysis was developed. Through examining the strategy at a textual level, the political consequences of the various competing discourses within the strategy could be exposed and critiqued. From here, the thesis was able to share its findings.

The analysis within these three findings chapters uncovered a 'siege mentality' which frames the counter-extremism strategy. Through taking the three components of the strategy in isolation - the development of skills, promotion of values, and dissemination of knowledge - one could examine how each operated in coordination with one another. It was argued that each contributed to build an image of a castle under siege. Chapter five examined the loose and unclear definitions and examples of extremism within the teaching materials. Through examining the vast array of examples of extremism given within the materials, the dangers of such a lack of clarity were soon realised. The chapter argued that the threat of extremism appeared to have been 'universalised' and securitised; there were many threatening extremisms that appeared to come from every direction. The chapter raised a fundamental concern resulting from this securitisation - the apparent suspension of democracy and pluralism for its own protection.

Through disseminating a certain knowledge regarding extremists, the enemy attacking the castle was depicted. Through promoting fundamental British values, the population to be protected within the castle walls was envisioned. Chapter six examined the teaching of fundamental British values. Through deploying a governmentality approach, the chapter was particularly concerned to examine the various modes of British subjectivity deemed permissible within the discourse. Such analysis challenged a central component of the justification for the promotion of these values, namely, that it promotes inclusivity. Instead, the chapter argued that the values promoted the precise opposite. I argued that the narrow modes of permissible subjectivity - the post-political, the entrepreneurial, and the racialised subjects - present a profound challenge to the idea of pluralism.

Lastly, through developing critical thinking skills as a mode of protection, these skills were weaponised to be deployed in the direction of the attacking extremists. The thesis examined both how the castle was to be defended, and how the distinction between the moderate and the extreme was to be constructed. Chapter seven focused on the regularity with which materials developed critical thinking skills to challenge Islamophobia in particular. The chapter noted how these skills were designed to challenge Islamophobia ‘out there’ in others, away from the moderate centre. As such, the chapter examined how a critical thinking approach to Islamophobia in fact functioned to mask from students the structures of discrimination and Islamophobia that underpin the counter-extremism framework itself.

The thesis argues that such a siege mentality and defensive depiction of the problem of extremism as an existential threat has two major implications. The first is that it appears to undermine or suspend the very values it is hoping to defend: democracy is suspended for its own protection. The second is that the strategy relies on a foundational model of consensus which is deeply problematic.

The final major chapter, chapter eight, examined this notion of consensus in depth, and in particular deployed the theoretical work of Chantal Mouffe. It argued that a consensus-based model was structurally flawed in its attempts to draw the entire population into the realm of the moderate. It argued that such a model of inclusion, was in fact predicated on a principle of exclusion. The chapter then deployed the theory of agonism to begin to examine how counter-extremism could be done differently. Agonism rests on the principles of the accommodation, not removal, of disagreement (Ramsbotham, 2010) or conflict (Mouffe, 2005), and the promotion of pluralism not conformity. The chapter argued that such an approach could radically change the way extremism is problematised. Through promoting a mode of agonism that seeks to allow for ‘extreme’ and ‘moderate’ ideas to do battle in debate, the chapter raised a series of profound questions regarding the role of violence in discourses of extremism. The chapter presented extremism as being a ‘radical disagreement’ (Ramsbotham, 2010) over the legitimacy of certain forms of violence.



Within an agonistic approach to extremism, the pre-set boundaries of what violence is legitimate, and what is illegitimate would inevitably be challenged.

### **Contributions of the thesis**

This thesis contributes important findings to a small, if growing, field of study into the implications of the recent increase in responsibilities of schools with regards to countering extremism. In so doing, the thesis has offered insightful contributions to an understanding of each component of schools' counter-extremism responsibilities - the dissemination of knowledge, promotion of values, and development of skills. It has noted the profound dangers of a poorly understood definition of extremism, of an exclusionary mode of values-promotion, and of an inability to approach the moderate centre with the same criticality as that which is deployed towards the extremes. Furthermore, while chapter five's findings regarding definitions of extremism contribute to a growing field of criticism regarding its uncertainty (e.g. JCHR, 2016), and chapter six's findings regarding values contribute to an established research area on citizenship, belonging and Britishness (e.g. Falcous & Silk, 2010; Habib, 2018; Miah, 2017), chapter seven's examination of critical thinking asks searching questions yet to be examined, and make original contributions to an understanding of what critical thinking entails in the context of counter-extremism education. No study has yet to examine how critical thinking is taught within counter-extremism education.

Yet, this thesis aimed to go beyond these isolated examinations, and offer a holistic examination of the impact of Britain's counter-extremism strategy in schools, when each component is addressed together. It was highlighted in chapter three that the vast majority of the work that has been published thus far on this issue has focused on either the Prevent duty (e.g. O'Donnell, 2016, 2017; Davies, 2016) or on Fundamental British Values, (e.g. Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Revel & Bryan, 2016) and predominantly in isolation from the remaining components of the strategy. As such, this thesis has attempted to not only critically examine each component in turn, and offer original perspectives drawn from the analysis to an understanding of

each component, but also to raise a series of pertinent questions regarding the foundational purposes and underlying assumptions regarding the counter-extremism strategy as a whole.

Furthermore, while critical discourse analysis is a very well-established research method within Critical Terrorism Studies, this thesis presents an original methodology in the examination of counter-extremism education. To date, this method has not been applied to explore the question of the implications of the Prevent strategy in schools. As such, this thesis also contributes to the wider body of critical literature on terrorism and radicalisation. Chapter five contributes to the now substantial body of work critically deconstructing discourses on terrorism as they persist throughout various areas of society (Jackson, 2005; 2007b; Jackson & Hall, 2016), expanding this work into the conceptual realm of extremism. Furthermore, this research supports and strengthens the concerns raised by scholars regarding the poorly-understood notion of ‘radicalisation’ and the dangerous implications for individuals wrongly deemed to be vulnerable (Baker-Beall et al., 2015). Complementary research has recently been conducted examining the impact of such knowledge and discourses on health workers and their safeguarding responsibilities regarding Prevent within the NHS, providing similar results. In particular, an extensive study exploring the attitudes and opinions of health workers found that ‘the line between mental illness and radicalisation is becoming increasingly blurred’ (Heath-Kelly & Strausz, 2018, p. 3). While in an educational setting, becoming politically active appears to be increasingly blurred with radicalisation (see chapter five), these murky lines at the borders of understandings of radicalisation are being rendered more visible in various sectors of society.

Chapter six offers insight into the racialised nature of terrorism and extremism knowledge. Scholars have highlighted how discourses of radicalisation transformed British Muslims into ‘a subjectivity that is simultaneously “at risk/risky”’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013, p. 411). My exploration of the construction of the racialised subject within discourses of Britishness and British values complements this theoretical work,

offering empirical examples of the implications of the transformation of British Muslims into ‘suspect communities’ (Breen-Smyth, 2014) within terrorism discourses.

Through examining questions regarding inclusion, exclusion and consensus, the thesis offers insight and pertinent contributions to work in a number of related fields outside of terrorism studies. It supports and strengthens work critical of models of multiculturalism, citizenship and inclusion that emphasise a rise in what has been termed ‘multicultural nationalism’, the power dynamics that co-opt diversity and difference for national gain, transforming it into what Fortier describes as ‘palatable diversity’ (2005, p. 561; see also Falcous & Silk, 2010; Hage, 2000). Taking a governmentality approach, and examining the construction of different forms of exclusionary subjectivity within the British Values discourse in chapter six, the thesis is able to offer a critical perspective of the implications of the introduction of ‘Fundamental British Values’ to critical literature examining the question of belonging in contemporary Britain (e.g. Habib, 2018).

Through exploring the work on agonism, and exploring extremism through a lens of agonistic peace, this thesis has also offered important questions for consideration within Peace Studies. It contributes to a growing critical (postmodern) literature exploring violence within the promotion of ethnocentric forms of peace (Cremin, 2016; Shinko, 2008; Gur-Ze’ev, 2001), and challenges models of liberal peace which rely too heavily on consensual modes of peace. The thesis questions the central logic to countering extremism: that when everyone agrees with the moderate, there will be no more extremism. In this sense, it builds on the post-liberal peace literature (Richmond, 2009), which explores the violence caused in liberal peace promotion. When the (il)legitimacy of certain forms of violence is at the heart of the conflict in question, how else can this dispute be resolved?

Through such an endeavour, through exploring the siege mentality at the heart of Britain’s counter-extremism strategy, and critiquing the consensus-based understanding of what the world after extremism should look like, the thesis has been able to offer both an original, fundamental critique to the underlying

logic of countering extremism, as well as an original and innovative approach for doing education around extremism differently. The introduction of an alternative, agonistic approach not only offers a constructive, possible resolution to an otherwise critical and deconstructive thesis, but also an opportunity for further study, and a positive contribution to the work of practitioners.

### **Wider Theoretical and Policy Implications**

While attempting to answer a specific question regarding the implications of the UK's counter-extremism strategy in schools, this thesis has also tapped into a series of lively wider philosophical and political debates, touching disciplines ranging from political sociology to peace studies to education studies. It is of value to make a brief note of these.

The thesis has raised questions regarding what Mouffe (2005) refers to as the post-political promotion of liberal values as the benchmark for political participation. Contemporary debates surrounding migration, security and citizenship often circulate around the question of shared values. Healy (2018) notes how a lack of belonging or cohesion is so often blamed when problems occur. Such a question was recently raised in the case of a couple who were denied Swiss citizenship on the basis of the decision of the couple to not shake hands with individuals of the opposite gender officiating the citizenship process (BBC News, Aug. 18, 2018). One official justified the decision arguing that 'The constitution and equality between men and women prevails over bigotry' (ibid.). This decision to not shake hands was evidence for the citizenship panel of a lack of the couple's integration into Swiss society (ibid.). Similar cases have occurred recently also in France, where an Algerian woman was also denied citizenship for the same reason. The ruling was evidence, according to French government officials that she 'had not assimilated into the French community' (BBC News, Apr. 20, 2018). In Sweden, an individual won her appeal against a company who ended her job interview at the point at which she refused to shake hands with the interviewer (BBC News, Aug. 16, 2018). The prevalence of such cases demonstrates a contemporary antagonism between shared values and pluralism. This thesis has attempted to contribute to this debate through exploring how the

promotion of a fixed set of values endangers pluralism, as well as setting out new frameworks for embracing pluralism, within the context of encountering extremism. It would be fascinating to examine, for instance, how agonism could offer a helpful framework to embrace a pluralistic understanding of gender relations (within a framework that seeks to reject the structural violence of gender discrimination) to accommodate a diverse understanding of gender equality evident in these cases.

Such debates materialise also within education studies, and in particular, debates regarding education, values, ideology, and extremism. As Mary Healy (2018) recently noted, national education systems have always played a role in the construction and dissemination of norms in the construction of a citizenry. Differences emerge here between thinkers who value the sense of loyalty and belonging to a community that arises in such an education, and those who see loyalty as potentially endangering critical citizenship and the accountability of leaders. Healy notes that the discourse around Fundamental British values ‘may be seen by some as suppressing legitimate critique or as justifying arguments that the aim of the policy is indeed to create the “uncritical attachments” often associated with patriotic education’ (Healy, 2018, p. 4). This thesis adds weight to this critique, and through examining the values in particular, contributes to a growing concern of the impact of promoting a fixed set of values on active participation in politics. Furthermore, the thesis extends this debate beyond the philosophical realms concerned with citizenship education to incorporate postcolonial critiques. Through examining the enforcement of homogeneity in such an education, critical voices such as that of Gur-Ze’ev (2001) have been aired, examining counter-ideological counter-extremism education as a form of epistemic violence, or as what Biccum (2018, p. 7) has recent called ‘epistemicide’.

Secondly, the thesis has touched on the question of violence in society, and has critically examined what peace might mean. While such debates have sat at the heart of peace studies since its inception with Johan Galtung (1969), these debates, while central to questions around terrorism and extremism, have not been fully explored in this context. At various moments throughout the thesis, from examining counter-

extremism as the promotion of non-violence, through to exploring how many diverse forms of violence become wrapped up as examples of extremism (though state violence is persistently excluded), to finally exploring the question of extremism as a radical disagreement between competing claims over the legitimacy of violence as a political strategy, the question of violence is always there. Wrapped up within the question of violence is the question of the persistence of the Westphalian state system, and Weberian assumptions regarding state violence. This thesis has attempted to offer some supporting contributions to Jackson (2017) and Lindahl (2017) who have both begun to explore non-violence as a mode of countering terrorism. Through advancing agonism as a framework to build a non-violent mode of encountering extremism, the thesis has hoped to begin to critically explore such questions in more depth.

Aside from the various theoretical and political debates into which this thesis has hoped to deposit questions and challenges, the thesis has also raised challenges relevant to those who work in policymaking. The thesis has taken a critical, and at times quite radical, approach to the problem of extremism. As acknowledged in the previous chapter, it is hard to imagine the UK's Department for Education discussing a policy in which an alteration to the hegemony of liberal democracy, and of the current political system, was set as an educational objective. This raises, for me, two questions. The first concerns whether it is possible, or indeed desirable, to draw out any policy recommendations from the thesis for those in positions of power within the current counter-extremism apparatus. The second concerns whether or not a strategy of encountering extremism must, unlike the current strategy of countering extremism, simply look beyond the state in its implementation, and focus instead on the grassroots and a bottom-up approach.

Richard Jackson (2016b) has been outspoken in his rejection of the importance of policy relevance. Jackson argues that 'it is not too extreme to say that the global counterterrorism regime is, in its philosophy, practice, and effects, inherently violent, oppressive, and life-diminishing' (2016b, p. 121). He continues to argue that 'working directly with state counterterrorism is akin to medical professionals who collaborate with torturers in an effort to improve prisoner welfare' (ibid., p. 122). As such, Jackson rejects the importance of 'policy

relevance’, and instead sets alternative goals for critical research, such as contributing to the ‘anti-hegemonic project’ (ibid., p. 124). While counter-extremism may not be as violent as other aspects within the remit of counterterrorism, similar critiques have been levelled at the UK’s counter-extremism strategy in this thesis. For instance, it has been argued to be structurally Islamophobic and a profound danger to democratic pluralism.

In acknowledging Jackson’s rejection of the idea of working with(in) such violent structures, I would like to imagine that ‘policy relevance’ can be understood to be wider than the idea of mere reform. As such, in truth the policy relevant implication of this thesis is to suggest that certain aspects of contemporary policy are violent, harmful and counter-productive, and should be removed. While accepting Jackson’s rejection of attempting to *reform* current policy, this thesis does remain ‘policy relevant’ in its desire to *reject* and remove current policy. As I have argued elsewhere (Ford, Feb. 19, 2018), two aspects of Britain’s current counter-extremism in schools strategy, in particular, have been found wanting. The first is the Prevent duty, the second is the fundamentality of a set of British values. When it comes to implications for policy, the removal of both of these aspects would demonstrate positive steps to developing an agonistic approach, as explored in the previous chapter. Chapter seven noted how the Prevent duty endangered the ‘safe space’ in which critical thinking was to take place, if the voicing of an ‘extreme’ view might then leave a student at risk of being directed towards an intervention. Chapter six noted the dangers of fixing the boundaries of permissible values on the forms of subjectivity that would be deemed permissible within the fundamental British values.

The thesis has also developed a substantial critique of the centrality of a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence to understandings of extremism. It has been argued that an agonistic framework would thus need to address this distinction in its quest for more pluralist resolutions to the problem of extremism. As such, within the realm of policy or practical implications, this raises the question of the role of the state in doing agonistic education around extremism. If a state’s existence is predicated on the distinction

between that violence which is legitimate, and that which is not, it perhaps seems foolhardy to demand that the state's education system begins to break down such a framework. Furthermore, as Healy notes (2018), it is state-based education systems that have played such a vital role in the production of a set of norms and values within citizenship education. As such, this thesis hints at the idea that the spaces for agonistic approaches to extremism should exist outside of state institutions. Such an approach, I argue, would be most effective in changing current hegemonies on extremism. It is interesting to note for example, how many of the examples of agonism in practice highlighted in the previous chapter came not from local borough council resources, nor from those commissioned by police forces, but by independent, non-governmental organisations and community groups. The analysis suggests that looking beyond the state for new and innovative approaches would be the best way forward. As noted below under areas for future research, this is something that I have already begun to investigate.

There is evidently space for resistance against and critique of the counter-extremism strategy, which is reassuring. This work has uncovered various forms of resistance. For instance, unions like the National Union of Teachers voted in 2016 for a motion calling for a removal of the Prevent duty (Coughlan, Mar. 28, 2016). A series of human rights organisations have produced reports detailing the many problems with the strategy (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; Qureshi, 2016; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Rights Watch UK, 2016). Furthermore, the UK Labour Party has continued to call for a wide-ranging review into the strategy. More grassroots campaigns have emerged such as the 'Educators not Informants' campaign, a tertiary education campaign to remove the Prevent duty from universities. Alongside the examples of future areas of research below, further research could be done to enrich our understanding of how teachers, students and school leaders engage in various forms of resistance against the strategy.

### **Limitations and Areas for Future Research**

It is, of course, important to note what this thesis has been unable to achieve. A major limitation was the choice to focus purely on text. By limiting the research to a set of classroom materials in answering a



research question about the implications of a strategy for classroom practice, the gate of entry to the classroom was severely limited. While this offered certain advantages in terms of access to a wider array of resources, and access to multiple classrooms, certain drawbacks had to be conceded. Ide (2017) for instance, notes the contested understanding of the impact of school textbooks on the political outlook of school students. A debate remains as to whether teacher or text is the more influential. It is undoubtedly true that while examining the text has been a revealing and insightful practice, it has not told all that there is to tell.

In this regard, one area for future research could be a project that takes a more empirical approach to the question, and investigates the strategy in a classroom context through classroom observation, and research methods, such as interviews or focus groups, which seek to gather the teachers' perspective. Through this process of observing teachers engaging with these materials, that gap that Ide notes between text and teaching could be bridged.

This empirical research could, in fact, head in two directions. One would be to deepen an understanding of the critique developed within this thesis, through observing the practice of current approaches to extremism in classrooms. The second would be to develop a set of classroom materials that attempt to follow the set of principles developed in the previous chapter, and put in place an agonistic approach of encountering extremism. This could then be evaluated with teachers and educationalists putting such education into practice, examining not just how the problematic aspects of countering extremism are encountered by teachers while teaching, but exploring how to engage with the problem of extremism in the classroom more fruitfully. The development of such materials is something I have already begun. I have so far developed three teaching resources, each aiming to adopt an agonistic approach to the problem of extremism as outlined in the previous chapter (Ford, Apr. 28, 2018). The next step would be to evaluate such resources with young people.

A second aspect is to note that not all schools' counter-extremism responsibilities are met through resources specifically constructed to meet the requirements. As the school values of audits examined in chapter six reveal, a great deal of the education to counter extremism exists within existing curricular; it is taught as much in a citizenship class on the British Parliament, as it might be in a specific assembly on British values. As such, I have recently completed a project to address this limitation. Through exploring a set of school textbooks used in British secondary school history, citizenship, politics, and religious education classes, I have examined the discourses around terrorism and extremism within these texts (Ford, 2019). Further such research can aid in growing an understanding of the ways in which young people receive discourses regarding terrorism and extremism in schools.

Lastly, it is important to note the limitations within the scope of the last chapter to examine the theory of agonism more deeply. As the chapter hinted, the work of Shinko (2008), Ramsbotham (2010) and Mouffe (2005) is diverse, and challenges and contests with one another. As such, within the remit of an individual chapter, it was not possible to examine in appropriate depth the theoretical foundations that could underpin a new way of encountering extremism in the classroom. I have begun such a project through investigating the nature of right-wing populism in New Zealand, particularly in the context of the Christchurch mosque shootings in March 2019. In this project, I seek to map out an agonistic approach to the problem of the far-right in New Zealand, seeking to draw the lessons from this thesis into a new context.

### **Final Remarks**

At the heart of the thesis appears a warning: that the current approach to countering extremism threatens to endanger the very values it seeks to protect. Through writing this thesis, it has been fascinating and concerning in equal measure to see news stories emerge which seem to confirm the importance of examining questions regarding pluralism, values, democracy, and violence. One such example is the Swiss citizenship case cited above. Furthermore, as has been noted throughout the thesis, a series of human rights organisations have published reports (JUST Yorkshire, 2017; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016; Rights

Watch UK, 2016) detailing the vast array of ways in which young Muslims, some politically active, some making jokes, and some just being children, have become swept up in procedures regarding their apparent radicalisation. Moreover, it is not just young Muslims, but political activists who have become swept up with the extremism brush. The following example reveals for me the danger in which activism is placed in the context of countering extremism.

In July 2018, the Greater Manchester Authority released a report commissioned after the attack on the Manchester Arena the previous year. The commission was asked to investigate issues around social cohesion and extremism. The report included an example case of a fourteen-year-old boy who had been referred to the Channel programme because of his ‘extreme beliefs in relation to a form of environmental extremism... [and his] periphery to criminal behaviour’ (Greater Manchester Preventing Hateful Extremism and Promoting Social Cohesion Commission, 2018, p. 89). Due to the age of the individual involved, certain details were changed in the report to protect his identity. Yet, along with these details, the report also changed the nature of his actions, and cited that he was an anti-fracking activist. It later transpired that this was not the case (Pidd, Jul. 30, 2018). It is fascinating to note that the authors of the report, knowing that the individual was not involved in anti-fracking movements, felt that an instance of an anti-fracking extremist was a plausible example to use. Such a case is reminiscent of the earlier case of the MP Caroline Lucas’ arrest at an anti-fracking demonstration being cited as an example of extremism, and of the many cases of criminality or illegality that were drawn into definitions of extremism within chapter five.

It is without doubt that the counter-extremism strategy poses a greater risk to young Muslims, than it does to political activists. Yet, what I find so fascinating about the inclusion of such an example is that it indicates just how universal the threat to the shared values of the moderate centre appears to be. Such a securitised mindset poses profound risk to religious and political diversity, and needs careful and critical revision. In this sense, as someone who has engaged in civil disobedience myself, the UK Government thinks I am an extremist. Yet, it is not just that behaviour that might makes me an extremist. My support for those others

who continue to engage in civil disobedience is itself a reason for why I am an extremist. As I argued in 2017 (Ford, Jul. 26, 2017), it is not unlikely that you might be one too.

This writing began with a story about castles. Britain's counter-extremism strategy, I argue, develops a siege mentality, depicting moderate liberal values as being bravely defended from a marauding army threatening its walls and barricades. Such a siege mentality profoundly impacts the nature of the education done, when such analogous imagery infiltrates educational strategy. But the prologue also states that a siege mentality is more like a sand castle than a castle built of stone. That, while it may look like a castle, in reality it is merely a shaped form of sand. It is a hegemonic form of sand, built with political power as much as it is built with the glue made between sand and water. However, that sand can, and will, take many other forms yet. When it comes to building a counter-hegemonic project, it is refreshing to think that the shifting of the tides is perhaps all it takes.

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## Appendix: Primary Source Reference Table

In-Text Reference Code	Publishing Organisation	Material Type	Title of Material	URL	Date last accessed
<b>British Values Audits</b>					
A1	Hope House School	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Policy for The Promotion of Fundamental British Values	<a href="http://www.hopehouseschool.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Fundamental-British-Values-Policy-Oct.-2016.pdf">http://www.hopehouseschool.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Fundamental-British-Values-Policy-Oct.-2016.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A2	The Hathershaw College	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Modern British Values	<a href="http://www.hathershaw.org.uk/docs/Policies/Hathershaw_British_Values_Statement.pdf">http://www.hathershaw.org.uk/docs/Policies/Hathershaw_British_Values_Statement.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A3	The Jo Richardson Community School	Audit of British Values Promotion	Fundamental British Values at JRSC January 2015	<a href="http://jorichardson.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/British-Values-Audit-summary-201516.pdf">http://jorichardson.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/British-Values-Audit-summary-201516.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A4	The Godolphin School	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Fundamental British Values Policy	<a href="http://www.godolphin.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/British-Values-at-Godolphin-September-2017.pdf">http://www.godolphin.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/British-Values-at-Godolphin-September-2017.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A5	Dorothy Stringer School	Audit of British Values Promotion	British Values	<a href="https://gateway.dorothy-stringer.co.uk/public/DS/Documents/British%20values%20audit%202015%20(2).pdf">https://gateway.dorothy-stringer.co.uk/public/DS/Documents/British%20values%20audit%202015%20(2).pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A6	Broughton Hall Catholic High School	Audit of British Values Promotion	British Values Curriculum Audit 2016/2017	<a href="http://www.broughtonhall.com/public/Main_British_Values_Audit_2016_Master.pdf">http://www.broughtonhall.com/public/Main_British_Values_Audit_2016_Master.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A7	Queen Margaret's, York	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Policy C48: The Promotion of British Values	<a href="http://queenmargarets.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Policy-C48-The-Promotion-of-British-Values-Jan-2015-21.pdf">http://queenmargarets.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Policy-C48-The-Promotion-of-British-Values-Jan-2015-21.pdf</a>	29 January 2018



A8	The Marlborough Science Academy	Audit of British Values Promotion	<i>No Title</i>	<a href="http://www.themarlbroughscienceacademy.co.uk/attachments/download.asp?file=36&amp;type=pdf">http://www.themarlbroughscienceacademy.co.uk/attachments/download.asp?file=36&amp;type=pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A9	Wardle Academy	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Fundamental British Values Update Report	<a href="https://www.wardleacademy.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Fundamental-British-Values-Update-Report.pdf">https://www.wardleacademy.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Fundamental-British-Values-Update-Report.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A10	The Priory Ruskin Academy	Audit of British Values Promotion	British Values Audit 2015	<a href="http://www.prioryruskin.co.uk/attachments/download.asp?file=204&amp;type=pdf">http://www.prioryruskin.co.uk/attachments/download.asp?file=204&amp;type=pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A11	Ricards Lodge High School	Audit of British Values Promotion	British Values - Whole School Audit	<a href="http://www.ricardslodge.merton.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/British-Values-Audit-Complete-V2.pdf">http://www.ricardslodge.merton.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/British-Values-Audit-Complete-V2.pdf</a> ,%20 <a href="http://ricardslodge.merton.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/British-Values-Audit-Complete-V2.pdf">http://ricardslodge.merton.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/British-Values-Audit-Complete-V2.pdf</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>19</sup>
A12	Honley High School	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	Honley High School British Values Statement	<a href="http://www.honleyhigh.co.uk/images/files/14-hhs-british-values-statement.pdf">http://www.honleyhigh.co.uk/images/files/14-hhs-british-values-statement.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A13	Rosehill School	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	British values - where are they in our school?	<a href="https://primarysite-prod-sorted.s3.amazonaws.com/rosehill/UploadedDocument/eafe7fda99e7470c8a981bb56fe8390d/british-values-overview-2017.pdf">https://primarysite-prod-sorted.s3.amazonaws.com/rosehill/UploadedDocument/eafe7fda99e7470c8a981bb56fe8390d/british-values-overview-2017.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A14	Holte School	Audit of British Values Promotion	<i>No Title</i>	<a href="http://www.holte.bham.sch.uk/images/Documents/SMSC/2017/SMSC_development_Holte_School_2016_2017.pdf">http://www.holte.bham.sch.uk/images/Documents/SMSC/2017/SMSC_development_Holte_School_2016_2017.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A15	Weatherhead High School	Audit of British Values Promotion	Promoting Fundamental British Values as part of SMSC	<a href="http://weatherheadhigh.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Promoting-Fundamental-British-Values.pdf">http://weatherheadhigh.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Promoting-Fundamental-British-Values.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
A16	Perry Beeches II High School	Policy Document/Audit of British Values Promotion	British Values Statement 2016-17	<a href="http://www.perrybeechesii.co.uk/site.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/British-Values-Initiatives-2016-17-Audit2.pdf">http://www.perrybeechesii.co.uk/site.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/British-Values-Initiatives-2016-17-Audit2.pdf</a> ,%20 <a href="http://www.perrybeechesii.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/British-Values-Initiatives-2016-17-Audit2.pdf">http://www.perrybeechesii.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/British-Values-Initiatives-2016-17-Audit2.pdf</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>20</sup>
A17	The Cooper School	Audit of British Values Promotion	Promotion of British Values Audit of	<a href="http://thecooperschool.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TCSBritishvalues.pdf">http://thecooperschool.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TCSBritishvalues.pdf</a>	29 January 2018

<sup>19</sup> School website undergone change (updated: 29 January 2018)

<sup>20</sup> School since gone into administration (updated, 29 January 2018)

			Provision: April 2015		
A18	Marple Hall School	Audit of British Values Promotion	SMSC Audit on British Values in PSHEE	<a href="http://www.marplehall.stockport.sch.uk/force_download.cfm?id=2177">http://www.marplehall.stockport.sch.uk/force_download.cfm?id=2177</a>	29 January 2018
<b>School Counter-Extremism Policies</b>					
P1	Hillcrest School	Policy Document	Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation Policy 2017-2018	<a href="http://hillcrest.bham.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation-Policy-2017-2018.pdf">http://hillcrest.bham.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation-Policy-2017-2018.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
P2	Lingdale Primary School	Policy Document	Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation Policy	<a href="https://www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/lingdaleschool.nsf/01270f695f0f5383802578f8005281e4/\$File/PREVENT%20Policy%202016.pdf">https://www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/lingdaleschool.nsf/01270f695f0f5383802578f8005281e4/\$File/PREVENT%20Policy%202016.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
P3	Codsall Middle School	Policy Document	Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation Policy	<a href="http://codsall-middle.staffs.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation-Policy.pdf">http://codsall-middle.staffs.sch.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation-Policy.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
P4	Selby College	Policy Document	British Values & Challenging Radicalisation, Extremism and Terrorism Policy	<a href="http://selby.ac.uk/media/124815/british-values-and-challenging-radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-policy.pdf">http://selby.ac.uk/media/124815/british-values-and-challenging-radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-policy.pdf</a>	29 January 2018
P5	Hook Norton CE Primary School	Policy Document	Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation Safeguarding Policy	<a href="https://doc-00-ag-apps-viewer.googleusercontent.com/viewer/secure/pdf/6bc6jfm5o6olk7jafmj89qnb1idp78n1/ler2lj1v4p99n9g1d1836d19mmc03gal/1458700800000/drive/07507927727545520067/ACFrOgAT9c8hKYfY_bF50xBDYzyxelaViqoRPfjv9tONq2xfL_UB026YraM5he2OiB6CPkaS3GAdqxCO_1Qp82BhenuRwnwtG2hcOPC9mDyXSzxLpjvdderqtFX9w68=?print=true&amp;nonce=d9knvtdlon3u&amp;user=07507927727545520067&amp;hash=e81oql46s2nt6qts87old4q03b2p95n">https://doc-00-ag-apps-viewer.googleusercontent.com/viewer/secure/pdf/6bc6jfm5o6olk7jafmj89qnb1idp78n1/ler2lj1v4p99n9g1d1836d19mmc03gal/1458700800000/drive/07507927727545520067/ACFrOgAT9c8hKYfY_bF50xBDYzyxelaViqoRPfjv9tONq2xfL_UB026YraM5he2OiB6CPkaS3GAdqxCO_1Qp82BhenuRwnwtG2hcOPC9mDyXSzxLpjvdderqtFX9w68=?print=true&amp;nonce=d9knvtdlon3u&amp;user=07507927727545520067&amp;hash=e81oql46s2nt6qts87old4q03b2p95n,</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Alternative policy document now in use (updated 29 January 2018)

P6	The Wildern School	Policy Document	Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation	<a href="https://www.wildern.hants.sch.uk/assets/Uploads/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation.pdf">https://www.wildern.hants.sch.uk/assets/Uploads/Preventing-Extremism-and-Radicalisation.pdf</a>	2 February 2018
<b>Teaching Materials</b>					
	Association of Citizenship Teaching	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Community People	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/community-people-act-building-resilience-project">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/community-people-act-building-resilience-project</a>	30 January 2018
T1			What is a community - Lesson 1 - Community People FINAL.pptx		
T2			Challenges of diversity - Lesson 2 - Community People FINAL.pptx		
T3			School uniform rules information sheet - Lesson 2 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T4			How do we deal with controversial issues - Lesson 3 - Community People FINAL.pptx		
T5			Animal Liberation Front information sheet - Lesson 3 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T6			Drawing the line card sort - Lesson 3 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T7			PETA information		

			sheet - Lesson 3 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T8			Debating a controversial issue - Lesson 4 - Community People FINAL.pptx		
T9			The Rules of Debating guide sheet - Lesson 4 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T10			Tips on Writing a Speech - Lesson 4 - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T11			Guarding against extremism - Lesson 5 - Community People FINAL.pptx		
T12			Lesson plans - Community People FINAL.pdf		
T13	Association for Citizenship Teaching	Guidance document	Deliberative Classroom General Guidance	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/deliberative-classroom-general-guidance">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/deliberative-classroom-general-guidance</a>	30 January 2018
T14	Association for Citizenship Teaching	Set of lesson plans	Deliberative Classroom: Religious Freedom teacher briefing paper and lessons	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/deliberative-classroom-religious-freedom">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/deliberative-classroom-religious-freedom</a>	30 January 2018
	Association for Citizenship Teaching	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Exploring Extremism	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/exploring-extremism-act-building-resilience-project">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/exploring-extremism-act-building-resilience-project</a>	30 January 2018
T15			Extremism - Lesson 1 -		

			Learning Mat - Exploring Extremism FINAL.pptx		
T16			Extremism - Lesson 1 - Worksheet A5 - Exploring Extremism FINAL (1).docx		
T17			What are extremism and terrorism - Lesson 2 - Exploring extremism FINAL.pptx		
T18	Connecting Cultures	Set of lesson plans	What is Extremism?	<a href="http://www.universityofthedesert.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/lesson08-what-is-extremism.pdf">http://www.universityofthedesert.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/lesson08-what-is-extremism.pdf</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>22</sup>
T19			Case studies - lesson 3 - Exploring extremism FINAL.pptx		
T20			Handout - Lesson 3 - Exploring Extremism FINAL.pdf		
T21			Opinions handout - Lesson 4 - Exploring extremism FINAL.pdf		
T22			Extreme education - Lesson 5 - Exploring extremism FINAL.ppt		
T23			Scheme of work - Exploring extremism FINAL.pdf		
	Association for Citizenship	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations,	Exploring Extremism and Radicalisation	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/exploring-issues-extremism-and-radicalisation-through-enquiry-act-">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/exploring-issues-extremism-and-radicalisation-through-enquiry-act-</a>	30 January 2018

<sup>22</sup> This resources is included as the URL to this resource was included in the teaching notes with resource T17. As of 2 February 2018 this URL no longer worked, but the resource can be found at <https://www.noexperiencenecessarybook.com/axV97m/lesson-title-what-is-extremism-causes-and-examples-age-range.html>

	Teaching	lesson plans and worksheets	Through Enquiry	building-resilience	
T24			Terrorism - Lesson 1 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T25			How are we dealing with Terrorism - Lessons 1-2 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T26			How are people radicalised - Lesson 2 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T27			Young British and radicalised BBC article - Lesson 2 - How are people radicalised.pdf		
T28			From Brighton to the Battlefield Guardian article - Lesson 2 - How are people radicalised.pdf		
T29			Case study of religious extremism - Lesson 3 - Exploring extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pdf		
T30			Are all terrorists the same - Lessons 3 and 4		

			- Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T31			Case study of political extremism - Lesson 4 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T32			Is a Terrorist always a Terrorist - Lesson 5 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pptx		
T33			South Africa timeline - Lessons 5 and 6 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pdf		
T34			How helpful is govt advice to schools in meeting challenge of radicalisation - Lesson 6 - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry - FINAL.pptx		
T35			Scheme of work - Exploring issues of extremism and radicalisation through enquiry FINAL.pdf		
	Association for Citizenship	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations,	Extremism and Terrorism as Reported	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/extremism-and-terrorism-reported-media-act-building-resilience-project">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/extremism-and-terrorism-reported-media-act-building-resilience-project</a>	30 January 2018

	Teaching	lesson plans and worksheets	in the Media		
T36			Extremism - Citizenship - Lesson 1 - Extremism and terrorism as reported in the media FINAL (1).pptx		
T37			Extremism - Citizenship - Lesson 2 - Extremism and terrorism as reported in the media FINAL (1).pptx		
T38			Extremism - Citizenship - Lesson 3 - Extremism and terrorism as reported in the media FINAL.pptx		
T39			Islamophobia Assembly - Extremism and terrorism as reported in the media FINAL.pptx		
T40			Lesson plans - Extremism and terrorism as reported in the media FINAL.pdf		
T41			Transcripts of Clips 1 and 2 by Anonymous.pdf		
	Association of Citizenship Teaching	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Immigration and Protest	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/immigration-and-protest-case-study-dover-2016-act-building-resilience-project">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/immigration-and-protest-case-study-dover-2016-act-building-resilience-project</a>	30 January 2018
T42			Images for Lesson 1 - Immigration and		



			protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pptx		
T43			Intro presentation - Lesson 1 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL		
T44			Starter image for Lesson 1 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.docx		
T45			Media - Lesson 2 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pptx		
T46			Media - Mail Online article - Lesson 2 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016.pdf		
T47			Media - questionnaire - Lesson 2 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pdf		
T48			When does Protest Cross the Line - Lesson 3 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pptx		
T49			Balancing the right to protest - Lesson 4 -		

			Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pptx		
T50			Newspaper articles for police and protest - Lesson 4 - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL.pdf		
T51			SoW Resilience and Prevent - Immigration and protest - a case study of Dover in 2016 FINAL		
	Association for Citizenship Teaching	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Political Ideologies	<a href="https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/political-ideologies-act-building-resilience-project">https://www.teachingcitizenship.org.uk/resource/political-ideologies-act-building-resilience-project</a>	30 January 2018
T52			Ideologies Introduction - Lesson 1 - Political Ideologies FINAL.pptx		
T53			Democracy - Lesson 2 - Political Ideologies FINAL.pptx		
T54			Democracy handout - Lesson 2 - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T55			Dictatorship - Lesson 3 - Political Ideologies FINAL_0.pptx		
T56			Theocracies pros and cons - Lesson 3 - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T57			Theocracies sample		

			answer - Lesson 3 - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T58			Anarchy - Lesson 4 - Political Ideologies FINAL (1).pptx		
T59			Anarchy in Africa statements - Lesson 4 - Political Ideologies FINAL		
T60			Speech planning - Lesson 6 - Political Ideologies FINAL.pptx		
T61			Speech planning sheet - Lesson 6 - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T62			Speech drafting - Lesson 7 - Political Ideologies FINAL.pptx		
T63			Teacher notes - Lesson 8 - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T64			Group task and table to complete - Political Ideologies.pdf		
T65			Person outline for paired task - Political Ideologies.docx		
T66			Scheme of work - Political Ideologies FINAL.pdf		
	Centre for Urban Education	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Learning Together to be Safe	<a href="http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=47">http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=47</a>	31 January 2018

T67			mmu-learning-together-to-be-safe.pdf		
T68			Identified extracts from John Boyne The Boy in the Striped Pyjamas.pdf		
T69			Resource Pack 1 - Unicef Rights for Every Child.pdf		
T70			Resource Pack 1 - 1 - UNCRC-CRC1989.pdf		
T71			Resource Pack 1 - 1a - UNICEF - UNCRC document.pdf		
T72			Resource Pack 1 - 6 pictures.pdf		
T73			Resource Pack 1 - Child Rights06.pdf		
T74			Resource Pack 1 - Every Child Matters.pdf		
T75			Resource Pack 1 - Orphans and Vulnerable Children.pdf		
T76			Resource Pack 1 - What have I learnt today.pdf		
T77			Resource Pack 1 - Worksheet 1 - UNCRC Rights of the Child.pdf		
T78			Resource Pack 2 - Johari window.pdf		

T79			Resource Pack 2 - Philip becomes the devil in a hoodie.pdf		
T80			Resource Pack 2 - Worksheet 3 - Who am I.pdf		
T81			Resource Pack 2 - Worksheet 4 - Who do you think you are.pdf		
T82			Resource Pack 3 and 4 - Information sheet 2.pdf		
T83			Resource Pack 3 and 4 - Information sheet 3.pdf		
T84			Resource Pack 3 and 4 - Worksheet 5 - Differences and Similarities.pdf		
T85			Resource Pack 3 and 4 - Worksheet 6 - Consequences.pdf		
T86			Resource Pack 3 and 4 - Worksheet 7 - Similarities.pdf		
	Extreme Dialogue	Set of lesson plans		<a href="http://extremedialogue.org/educational-resources/">http://extremedialogue.org/educational-resources/</a>	31 January 2018
T87			Extreme-Dialogue-Adams-story-1.pdf		
T88			Extreme-Dialogue-Billys-story-1.pdf		
T89			Extreme-Dialogue-		

			Facilitator-Guide.pdf		
T90			Extreme-Dialogue-Jimmys-story.pdf		
T91			extreme-dialogue-resource-pack-christianne-en.pdf		
T92			extreme-dialogue-resource-pack-daniel-en1.pdf		
T93			Extreme-Dialogue-Szabolcs-story.pdf		
T94			Fowzia-Educational-Resource_En.pdf		
	Geography Association	Lesson plan and worksheets	British Values, Moving Stories	<a href="https://www.geography.org.uk/British-values-and-geography">https://www.geography.org.uk/British-values-and-geography</a>	31 January 2018
T95			GA British values Lesson1-Fig1.pdf		
T96			GA British values Lesson1-info1.pdf		
T97			GA British values Lesson1-info2.pdf		
T98			GA British values Lesson1-info3.pdf		
T99			GA British values Moving_Stories_Lesson1.pdf		
	Gloucestershire Safeguarding	Lessons Plans		<a href="http://www.gscb.org.uk/i-work-with-children-young-people-and-parents/issues-affecting-children-and-young-people/radicalisation-and-extremism/">http://www.gscb.org.uk/i-work-with-children-young-people-and-parents/issues-affecting-children-and-young-people/radicalisation-and-extremism/</a>	1 February 2018
T100			DOABM_Facilitator_N		

			otes.pdf		
T101			DOABM_Lesson_Plan.pdf		
T102			Lesson_plan_for_Smart.pdf		
	Hammersmith and Fulham Council	Lesson Plans and Presentations		<a href="https://www.lbhf.gov.uk/children-and-young-people/schools-and-colleges/school-staff-zone/prevent-and-schools/prevent-and-schools-resources-and-lesson-plans">https://www.lbhf.gov.uk/children-and-young-people/schools-and-colleges/school-staff-zone/prevent-and-schools/prevent-and-schools-resources-and-lesson-plans</a>	1 February 2018
T103			ks4_conspiracy_theories_v2_july_2015.doc		
T104			ks4_extremism_lesson_plan_v4_july_2015.doc		
T105			ks4_internet_digital_awareness_lesson_plan_july_2015.doc		
T106			ks4_persuasion_and_influence_lesson_plan_v3_july_2015.doc		
T107			ks4_stereotyping_in_the_media_lesson_plan_template_july_2015.doc		
T108			ks4conspiracytheories_july_2015.ppt		
T109			ks4extremismpptv2_july_2015.ppt		
T110			ks4persuasionandinfluence_july_2015.ppt		
T111			ks4stereotypinginthedia_july_2015.ppt		
	Hampshire	Complete set of resources -		<a href="https://www.safe4me.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/S-">https://www.safe4me.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/S-</a>	1 February

	Constabulary Safe4Me Project	powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets		Prevent-Main.zip	2018
T112			Safe4me Prevent Ppt..ppt		
T113			PREVENT - PPT OPTION 1 - Facilitator Guide Notes.pdf		
T114			Prevent - PATHWAYS CHARACTER EXERCISE TEACHER SHEET.pdf		
T115			PREVENT - Cycle of Discrimination and Radicalisation Chart.pdf		
T116			Prevent - BYSTANDER TASK SHEET.pdf		
T117			Prevent - IMRAN TASK SHEET.pdf		
T118			Prevent - LIAM TASK SHEET.pdf		
T119			Prevent - MATT TASK SHEET.pdf		
T120			Prevent - POLICE OFFICER TASK SHEET.pdf		
T121			Prevent - SHAADA TASK SHEET.pdf		
T122			Prevent - SOL TASK SHEET.pdf		



T123			Prevent - TARIQ TASK SHEET.pdf		
	Miriam's Vision	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Art Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/art">http://miriamsvision.org/art</a>	1 February 2018
T124			MV Art Resource 1.1 Intro to Pipili Applique PP.pptx		
T125			MV Art Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T126			MV Art Resource 1.1 Intro to Pipili Applique.pdf		
T127			MV Art Resource 2.1 Student feedback form.pdf		
T128			MV Art Resource 2.2 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
			Business & Enterprise Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/business-and-enterprise">http://miriamsvision.org/business-and-enterprise</a>	1 February 2018
T129			MV B&E Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T130			MV B&E Resource 1.1 Role of the MHMT PowerPoint.pptx		
T131			MV B&E Resource 2.1 Intro PowerPoint		
T132			MV B&E Resource 2.2 Student skills.pdf		
T133			MV B&E Resource 2.3		

			Mindmap activity.pdf		
T134			MV B&E Resource 3.1 Decision Making worksheet.pdf		
T135			MV B&E Resource 3.2 Market Research Grid.pdf		
T136			MV B&E Resource 4.1 4Ps PowerPoint.pptx		
T137			MV B&E Resource 4.2 Price Setting Worksheet.pdf		
T138			MV B&E Resource 5.1 Event Planning Checklist.pdf		
T139			MV B&E Resource 7.1 Opinion Spectrum.pptx		
			Citizenship Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/citizenship">http://miriamsvision.org/citizenship</a>	1 February 2018
T140			MV Citizenship Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T141			MV Citizenship Resource 1.1 Intro to Human Rights.pptx		
T142			MV Citizenship Resource 1.1 Intro to Human Rights.pdf		
T143			MV Citizenship Resource 1.2 Human Rights Act Articles.pdf		

T144			MV Citizenship Resource 1.3 You Be the Judge student sheet.pdf		
T145			MV Citizenship Resource 1.4 You Be the Judge teacher sheet.pdf		
T146			MV Citizenship Resource 1.5 Human Rights case studies.pdf		
T147			MV Citizenship Resource 2.1 Human Rights and Surveillance.pptx		
T148			MV Citizenship Resource 2.1 Human Rights and Surveillance.pdf		
T149			MV Citizenship Resource 2.2 How far should surveillance go.pdf		
T150			MV Citizenship Resource 2.3 Writing a speech.pdf		
T151			MV Citizenship Resource 3.1 Making change.pptx		
T152			MV Citizenship Resource 3.1 Making change.pdf		
T153			MV Citizenship Resource 3.2 Tools of		

			change images.pdf		
T154			MV Citizenship Resource 3.2 Tools of change images.pptx		
T155			MV Citizenship Resource 3.3 Tools of change sheet.pdf		
T156			MV Citizenship Resource 4.1 Heathrow case study.pptx		
T157			MV Citizenship Resource 4.1 Heathrow case study.pdf		
T158			MV Citizenship Resource 4.2 Plan an action.pdf		
T159			MV Citizenship Resource 4.3 No third runway.pdf		
T160			MV Citizenship Resource 4.4 Online research sheet.pdf		
T161			MV Citizenship Resource 6.1 Class case study plan an action.pdf		
T162			MV Citizenship Resource 6.2 Module plenary.pdf		
T163			MV Citizenship Resource 6.2 Module plenary.pptx		
T164			MV Citizenship		

			Resource 6.3 Student feedback form.docx		
T165			MV Citizenship Resource 6.3 Student feedback form.pdf		
T166			MV Citizenship Resource 6.4 Teacher feedback form.docx		
T167			MV Citizenship Resource 6.4 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
			Dance Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/dance">http://miriamsvision.org/dance</a>	1 February 2018
T168			MV Dance Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T169			MV Dance Resource 5.1 Student feedback form.pdf		
T170			MV Dance Resource 5.2 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
			Geography Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/geography">http://miriamsvision.org/geography</a>	1 February 2018
T171			MV Geography Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T172			MV Geography Resource 1.0 Background info for teachers Economic Survey 2014-15.pdf		

T173			MV Geography Resource 1.1 Intro Powerpoint.pptx		
T174			MV Geography Resource 1.2 Odisha maps.pptx		
T175			MV Geography Resource 1.3 Caste stats.pptx		
T176			MV Geography Resource 2.1 Venn diagram slide.pptx		
T177			MV Geography Resource 2.2.1 Orissa Development Indicators.pdf		
T178			MV Geography Resource 2.2.2 GDP Odisha Sudan.jpg		
T179			MV Geography Resource 2.2.3 Literacy rates Orissa.jpg		
T180			MV Geography Resource 2.3 Sectors of industry information card.pdf		
T181			MV Geography Resource 2.4 Odisha's industries slide.pptx		
T182			MV Geography Resource 2.5.1 HDI worksheet.pdf		
T183			MV Geography		

			Resource 2.5.2 HDI worksheet extension.pdf		
T184			MV Geography Resource 2.5.3 HDI Graph answer slide.pptx		
T185			MV Geography Resource 3.1 A Day in the Life Of.pdf		
T186			MV Geography Resource 3.2 Odisha's Story about Pollution, Mining and the Environment.pdf		
T187			MV Geography Resource 4.1 Impacts of mining card sort.pdf		
T188			MV Geography Resource 4.2 Dongria Khond tribe.pdf		
T189			MV Geography Resource 4.3 Word mat.pdf		
T190			MV Geography Resource 4.3 Word mat.pptx		
T191			MV Geography Resource 5.1 Niyamgiri v Avatar.pdf		
T192			MV Geography Resource 6.1 Stakeholder roles.pdf		

T193			MV Geography Resource 6.1 Stakeholder roles.pptx		
T194			MV Geography Resource 6.1 Stakeholder_roles.pdf		
T195			MV Geography Resource 6.2 Opinion spectrum.pptx		
T196			MV Geography Resource 6.3 Dongria v Vedanta timeline.pdf		
T197			MV geography Resource 6.4 Vedanta article TNC.pdf		
T198			MV Geography Resource 6.5 Alternative solutions.pdf		
T199			MV Geography Resource 6.6 Assessment Guide.docx		
T200			MV Geography Resource 7.1 Link to Miriam's Story.pptx		
T201			MV Geography Resource 7.2 Structure your debate.pptx		
T202			MV Geography Resource 7.3 Student feedback form.pdf		
T203			MV Geography Resource 7.4 Teacher		



			feedback form.docx		
T204			MV Geography Resource 7.4 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
			History Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/history">http://miriamsvision.org/history</a>	1 February 2018
T205			MV History Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T206			MV History Resource 1.1 Summary 7th July 2005 London bombings.docx		
T207			MV History Resource 1.1 Summary 7th July 2005 London bombings.pdf		
T208			MV History Resource 1.2 Presentation.pdf		
T209			MV History Resource 1.2 Presentation.pptx		
T210			MV History Resource 2.1 Presentation.pdf		
T211			MV History Resource 2.1 Presentation.pptx		
T212			MV History Resource 2.3 Summary sheet Who was involved in 77.pdf		
T213			MV History Resource 2.4 Info Pack 1 Who was involved in 77.pdf		

T214			MV History Resource 2.5 Info Pack 2 Who was involved in 77.pdf		
T215			MV History Resource 2.6 Info Pack 3 Who was involved in 77.pdf		
T216			MV History Resource 2.7 Info Pack 4 Who was involved in 77.pdf		
T217			MV History Resource 3.1 Presentation.pdf		
T218			MV History Resource 3.1 Presentation.pptx		
T219			MV History Resource 4.1 Coroner's verdict.pdf		
T220			MV History Resource 4.2 Families' recommendations.pdf		
T221			MV History Resource 4.3 Coroner's recommendations.pdf		
T222			MV History Resource 4.4 Presentation.pdf		
T223			MV History Resource 4.4 Presentation.pptx		
T224			MV History Resource 5.1 Consequence cards.docx		
T225			MV History Resource 5.1 Consequence cards.pdf		

T226			MV History Resource 6.1 Student feedback form.pdf		
T227			MV History Resource 6.2 Teacher feedback form.docx		
T228			MV History Resource 6.2 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
			PSHE Course	<a href="http://miriamsvision.org/pshe">http://miriamsvision.org/pshe</a>	1 February 2018
T229			MV PSHE Resource 0.1 Scheme of Work.pdf		
T230			MV PSHE Resource 1.1 Miriam's Story.pdf		
T231			MV PSHE Resource 1.1 Miriam's Story.pptx		
T232			MV PSHE Resource 1.2 Situation report table.pdf		
T233			MV PSHE Resource 1.3 Miriam's Story video notes.pdf		
T234			MV PSHE Resource 1.4 7-7 Information search.pdf		
T235			MV PSHE Resource 1.4 7-7 Information search.pptx		
T236			MV PSHE Resource 1.5 7-7 Info search		

			questions.pdf		
T237			MV PSHE Resource 1.6 Diary writing frame.pdf		
T238			MV PSHE Resource 2.1 Responding to 7- 7.pdf		
T239			MV PSHE Resource 2.1 Responding to 7- 7.pptx		
T240			MV PSHE Resource 2.2 Definition match A4.doc		
T241			MV PSHE Resource 2.2 Definition match A4.docx		
T242			MV PSHE Resource 2.2 Definition match A4.pdf		
T243			MV PSHE Resource 2.3 React respond sheet A4.doc		
T244			MV PSHE Resource 2.3 React respond sheet A4.docx		
T245			MV PSHE Resource 2.3 React respond sheet A4.pdf		
T246			MV PSHE Resource 2.4 React respond word sort A4.doc		
T247			MV PSHE Resource		

			2.4 React respond word sort A4.docx		
T248			MV PSHE Resource 2.4 React respond word sort A4.pdf		
T249			MV PSHE Resource 2.5 Student feedback form.docx		
T250			MV PSHE Resource 2.5 Student feedback form.pdf		
T251			MV PSHE Resource 2.6 Teacher feedback form.docx		
T252			MV PSHE Resource 2.6 Teacher feedback form.pdf		
	Prevent for Schools	Presentation and Worksheets	Act Now	<a href="http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=17">http://www.preventforschools.org/index.php?category_id=17</a>	1 February 2018
T253			were_living_it_so_we_might_as_well_learn_about_it.ppt		
T254			Lesson_1_resource_1a.pdf		
T255			Lesson_1_resource_1b.pdf		
T256			Lesson_1_resource_1c.pdf		
T257			Lesson_2_resource_2a.pdf		
T258			Lesson_2_resource_2b.		

			pdf		
T259			Lesson_2_resource_2c.pdf		
T260			Lesson_4_resource_4b.pdf		
T261			Lesson_4_resource_4d.pdf		
	PSHE Association	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Addressing Extremism and Radicalisation	<a href="https://www.pshe-association.org.uk/system/files/Extremism%20lessons.zip">https://www.pshe-association.org.uk/system/files/Extremism%20lessons.zip</a>	1 February 2018
T262			Extremism Teachers Notes.docx		
T263			Lesson 1 - Lesson Plan - Understanding and preventing extremism.docx		
T264			Lesson 1 - Presentation - Understanding and Preventing Extremism.pptx		
T265			Lesson 1 - Resource 1 - Key Concepts.docx		
T266			Lesson 1 - Resource 2 - Wanted Poster.pdf		
T267			Lesson 2 - Lesson Plan - How can language divide us.docx		
T268			Lesson 2 - Presentation - How can language divide us.pptx		
T269			Lesson 2 - Resource 1 -		

			Perceptions Table.docx		
T270			Lesson 2 - Resource 2 - Article.docx		
T271			Lesson 2 - Resource 3 - Photo Plenary.docx		
T272			Lesson 3 - Lesson Plan - Influence.docx		
T273			Lesson 3 - Presentation - Influence.pptx		
T274			Lesson 3 - Resource 1.docx		
T275			Lesson 4 - Lesson Plan - Community.docx		
T276			Lesson 4 - Presentation - Community.pptx		
T277			Lesson 4 - Resource 1 - Pupil script.docx		
T278			Lesson 4 - Resource 2 - Teacher script.docx		
T279			Lesson 4 - Resource 3 - Then and now self-assessment.doc		
	Since 9/11	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Art Course	<a href="https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/art-design/memoralisation">https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/art-design/memoralisation</a>	1 February 2018
T280			A&D_Images_of_911_memorials_0.pptf		
T281			A&D_Images_of_memorials_to_the_heroic_and_ordinary_0.ppt		

T282			A&D_Images_of_monuments_warfare_0.ppt		
T283			A&D_Images_of_more_recent_memorials_0.ppt		
T284			A&D_Lesson_planning_0.pdf		
			Citizenship Course	<a href="https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/citizenship">https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/citizenship</a>	1 February 2018
T285			C0 Citizenship overview_4.pdf		
T286			C1 What does terrorism look like_0.ppt		
T287			Citizenship_What_does_terrorism_look_like_0.ppt		1 October 2017 <sup>23</sup>
T288			C2 Why do people commit acts of terrorism_0.ppt		
T289			C3 How do countries respond to terrorism_0.ppt		
T290			C4 How tolerant is the UK.ppt		
T291			C5 How free are citizens of the UK.ppt		
T292			C6 How can we respond to terrorism in the UK.ppt		

<sup>23</sup> Since compiling my analysis, Since 9/11 altered this presentation. Some quotations taken from the original presentation have since been removed.



			English and Drama Course	<a href="https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/english-drama/english-breaking-news">https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/english-drama/english-breaking-news</a>	1 February 2018
T293			ENG Comparing news values.pdf		
T294			ENG Different responses to 911.pdf		
T295			ENG How the story develops.pdf		
T296			English&Drama_BBC_editorial_guidelines_0.pdf		
T297			English&Drama_Factsheet_about_911_1.pdf		
T298			English&Drama_News_values_0.pdf		
T299			English&Drama_Worksheet_Different_responses_to_911_0.pdf		
			History	<a href="https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/history">https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/history</a>	1 February 2018
T300			HIS E1 Experts invitation list.pdf		
T301			History1_Artefacts.ppt		
T302			History1_Lesson_planning_0.pdf		
T303			History1_Shockwave.ppt		
T304			History1_Timeline_creator.xls		

T305			His E2 Mindless terrorism.pdf		
T306			History E2 Teachers guide.pdf		
T307			History2_Al-Qaeda_motives.pdf		
T308			History2_Arab_lands_role_play.pdf		
T309			History2_Booklet_Min dless_terrorism.pdf		
T310			History2_British_Empire_trade_routes_map_0.ppt		
T311			History2_First_World_War_Arab_allies_0.ppt		
T312			History2_Flash_cards_What_caused_911.pdf		
T313			History2_I've_heard...pdf		
T314			History2_Images_Causes_of_911.ppt		
T315			History2_Lesson_planning_0.pdf		
T316			History2_Palestine_Israel_maps_activity.ppt		
T317			History2_Tree_roots_digram_0.pdf		
T318			History2_What_caused_911_VersionA_0.pdf		

T319			History2_What_caused_911_VersionB_0.pdf		
T320			His E3 Richards blog.pdf		
T321			History_Enquiry3_Survey_sheet.xls		
T322			History3_Lesson_planning_0.pdf		
T323			History3_Possible_consequences_of_911_0.pdf		
T324			History3_Robert_Fisks_reaction_to_911.pdf		
			RE Course	<a href="https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/re">https://since911.com/resources-schools/lessons/re</a>	1 February 2018
T325			RE 0 Curriculum Overview.pdf		
T326			RE 1a Stage 1 The nature of conflict.ppt		
T327			RE 1b Stage 1 Activity Sheets.pdf		
T328			RE 2a Stage 2 Human rights.ppt		
T329			RE 3a Stage 3 Religious attitudes to conflict.ppt		
T330			RE 3b Stage 3 Activity Sheets.pdf		
T331			RE 4a Stage 4 Justified conflict.ppt		

T332			RE 4b Stage 4 Activity Sheets.pdf		
T333			RE 5a Stage 5 Different responses to 911.ppt		
T334			RE 5b Stage 5 Activity Sheets.pdf		
T335			RE 6a Stage 6 Forgiveness and retribution.ppt		
T336			RE 6b Stage 6 Activity Sheets.pdf		
	Stockton Council	Complete set of resources - powerpoint presentations, lesson plans and worksheets	Prevent - Teaching and Learning Resource	<a href="https://www.stockton.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/prevent-teaching-and-learning-resource/">https://www.stockton.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/prevent-teaching-and-learning-resource/</a>	1 February 2018
T337			01-britishness-cards.pdf		
T338			01-classroom-powerpoint (1).pptx		
T339			01-lesson-plan.pdf		
T340			01-what-people-say.pdf		
T341			02-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T342			02-globingo.pdf		
T343			02-immigration-timeline-cards.pdf		
T344			02-immigration-timeline-teacher-reference.pdf		
T345			02-lesson-plan.pdf		

T346			02-multicultural-signs.pdf		
T347			03-lesson-plan.pdf		
T348			04-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T349			04-lesson-plan.pdf		
T350			04-possible-sentences.pdf		
T351			04-response-sheet.pdf		
T352			04-teenage-headline-cards.pdf		
T353			05-classroom-presentation (1).pptx		
T354			05-lesson-plan.pdf		
T355			05-muslim-headline-cards.pdf		
T356			05-traveller-headlines.pdf		
T357			06-additional-words-and-phrases.pdf		
T358			06-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T359			06-lesson-plan.pdf		
T360			06-pyramid-of-hate.pdf		
T361			07-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T362			07-elleanor-roosevelt-		

			quote.pdf		
T363			07-free-speech-scenarios.pdf		
T364			07-lesson-plan.pdf		
T365			07-picture-cards-and-statements.pdf		
T366			07-possible-sentences.pdf		
T367			07-universal-declaration-of-human-rights.pdf		
T368			08-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T369			08-lesson-plan.pdf		
T370			08-photo-cards.pdf		
T371			08-photos-and-information.pdf		
T372			09-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T373			09-lesson-plan.pdf		
T374			09-prevent-dvd-observation-sheet.pdf		
T375			09-word-definitions.pdf		
T376			10-classroom-presentation.pptx		
T377			10-lesson-plan.pdf		
T378			11-classroom-		

			presentation.pptx		
T379			11-lesson-plan.pdf		
T380			11-presentations-assessment-grid.pdf		
T381			12-lesson-plan.pdf		
T382			prevent-teaching-and-learning-resource.pdf		
	TES Resources				
T383		Presentation	What it means to be British	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/what-it-means-to-be-british-11074361">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/what-it-means-to-be-british-11074361</a>	1 February 2018
		Presentation and worksheets	Causes of Extremism	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/causes-of-extremism-11072115">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/causes-of-extremism-11072115</a>	1 February 2018
T384			3.-Causes-of-Extremism.pptx		
T385			3.-Terrorist-motivation-articles.docx		
		Presentation, Lesson Plan and Worksheet	Combatting Far Right Extremism	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/combating-far-right-extremism-prevent-phse-citizenship-11241877">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/combating-far-right-extremism-prevent-phse-citizenship-11241877</a>	1 February 2018
T386			PRE5-Combatting-the-Far-Right-Lesson-Plan-(Simple).docx		
T387			PRE5-Combatting-the-Far-Right-New.pptx		
T388			PRE5-Combatting-the-Far-Right-Worksheet.pdf		
T389		Presentation	Extremism	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/extremism-11169403">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/extremism-11169403</a>	1 February 2018

		Set of Presentations	British Values	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/british-values-11117639">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/british-values-11117639</a>	1 February 2018
T390			British-Values-Introduction.pptx		
T391			1-British-Values-Democracy.pptx		
T392			2-British-Values-Rule-of-Law.pptx		
T393			3-British-ValuesThe-tripartite-system-of-UK-democracy.pptx		
T394			4-British-Values-Freedom-of-Faith-in-the-UK.pptx		
T395			5-British-Values-UK-Religious-Belief-and-Practice.pptx		
T396			6-British-Values-Challenging-Discrimination.pptx		
T397		Presentation	ISIS and the dangers of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/isis-and-the-dangers-of-radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-11085624">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/isis-and-the-dangers-of-radicalisation-extremism-and-terrorism-11085624</a>	1 February 2018
T398		Presentation	Radicalisation and the threat of terrorism	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/islam-and-terrorism-11075284">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/islam-and-terrorism-11075284</a>	1 February 2018
		Presentation and Lesson Plan	Radicalisation	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/citizenship-lesson-on-radicalisation-11088118">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/citizenship-lesson-on-radicalisation-11088118</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>24</sup>
T399			radicalisation-lesson-plan.doc		

<sup>24</sup> Since removed from TES website



T400			radicalisation-lp.pptx		
		Set of Presentations	British Values	<a href="https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/british-values-week-resources-11022438">https://www.tes.com/teaching-resource/british-values-week-resources-11022438</a>	1 October 2017 <sup>25</sup>
T401			bv-monday-democracy.pptx		
T402			bv-tuesday-The-Rule-of-Law.pptx		
T403			bv-wednesday-individual-liberty.pptx		
T404			bv-thursday-mutual-respect.pptx		
T405			bv-friday-toleration-of-different-faiths-and-beliefs.pptx		
T406	Tony Blair Faith Foundation	Resource document	Essentials of Dialogue	<a href="http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundationus.org/projects/supporting-next-generation/supporting-next-generation-essentials-dialogue-0">http://www.tonyblairfaithfoundationus.org/projects/supporting-next-generation/supporting-next-generation-essentials-dialogue-0</a>	1 February 2018
	Tower Hamlets	Set of Presentations	Prevent Resources	<a href="https://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/1gnl/education_and_learning/Prevent_resources/Secondary_Prevent_resources/Secondary_Pr event_Resources.aspx">https://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/1gnl/education_and_learning/Prevent_resources/Secondary_Prevent_resources/Secondary_Pr event_Resources.aspx</a>	1 February 2018
T407			1. Propaganda and conspiracy lesson.pptm		
T408			2. Conspiracy theories lesson.pptm		
T409			3. Extremism lesson.pptm		
T410			4. Extremism lesson 2.pptm		

<sup>25</sup> Since removed from TES website

T411			5. E-safety lesson.pptm		
T412			6. Faith and hate crime lesson.pptm		
T413			British values and state building lesson.pptm		
T414			British_values.pptm		
T415			Citizenship test tutor session.pptm		
T416			Cyber_bullying_and_e_safety.pptm		
T417			Democracy tutor session.pptm		
T418			E_safety.pptm		
T419			Extended_assembly_1_hour_tutorial.pptm		
T420			Extremism_and_the_far_right.pptm		
T421			Faith tutor session.pptm		
T422			Faith_and_hate_crime.pptm		
T423			Homophobia lesson.pptm		
T424			Homophobia_assembly_1.pptm		
T425			Immigration tutor session.pptm		
T426			Isis_Daesh_assembly.pptm		

T427			Islamic_extremism.pptm		
T428			London tutor session.pptm		
T429			Media and resilience lesson.pptm		
T430			Prejudice lesson.pptm		
T431			Propaganda tutor session.pptm		
T432			Propaganda.pptm		
T433			Stereotypes and sexism lesson.pptm		