Unpacking the Militia Myth: The New Zealand Armed Intervention Force (NZAIF)

The New Zealand Armed Intervention Force (NZAIF) holds an outsized place in the history of anti-government entities in New Zealand. Fronted by Kelvyn Alp (hereafter KA) in 1996, shortly after his brief (c.one year) tenure as a New Zealand Army Recruit, the NZAIF claimed to be the “legally recognised Armed Force” of the [pseudo] Māori Government of Aotearoa. Its website asserted that the group operated with “complete lawfulness and legality” while pre-emptively rejecting characterisations of “extremist” or “terrorist”. Despite this it suggested that “civil war” with the state remained possible (“if it was requested to do so”). KA later claimed that the ‘unit’s formation stemmed from requests by unnamed individuals tracking his “military progress” and who believed he had the "psychological profile" they required. In later years he would say he was approached after “leaving the military in less than favourable circumstances”.

From its inception, the NZAIF’s relied heavily on military aesthetics and language to cultivate legitimacy. KA styled himself as “Raven 1”, with the rank of ‘Lieutenant Commander’ and advocated for the abolition of taxes, supported a sovereign currency, and the restoration of  ‘sovereignty to the people’. The website castigated NZ Police as misled and corrupt, claiming it was their duty…”to arrest the colonial government”. It denounced the financial system - "We can no longer sustain a “Debt Money' system”, arguing that the government should cease borrowing from private banking corporations and issue “its own coin, credit and currency”.

Financial credibility was tenuous. KA asserted he had personally invested  tens of thousands of dollars into NZAIF, supplemented by alleged earnings of members working as overseas mercenaries. The NZAIF placed advertisements in the New Zealand Herald seeking recruits, particularly those with military service. KA claimed his initial intake of 12 had undertaken overseas combat and ‘special ops’ with one fatality though no obituary or documentation substantiated these claims. The inherent opacity of legitimate operations creates fertile ground for figures to myth-make and embellish personas.

The NZAIF’s public profile peaked in July 2000, Jason Thompson (aged 26) appeared in court after firearms were found in his vehicle during a traffic stop. Representing himself, Thompson claimed that he had just finished NZAIF training and was engaged in “diplomatic exercises”, purportedly sanctioned by the [pseudo] Confederation of Chiefs of the United Tribes of Aotearoa.(CCUTA). This claim was legally baseless, and his small group of supporters disrupted proceedings by refusing to follow court room protocol, prompting their exit.  Thompson, who had no fixed abode, was remanded to custody until July 20. During the hearing, he was flanked by armed police to mitigate any potential NZAIF interference. 

KA attended wearing black, with an earpiece and a microphone which he claimed were necessary for communication with unseen ‘others’. To the media, he described Thompson as a “political prisoner”, and proclaimed that the NZAIF were allowed to carry weapons (though he himself was unarmed), that live ammunition was used for training, and that the group was “100 strong” , a figure that was never independently corroborated. He further alleged that the NZAIF had considered freeing Thompson from prison but refrained upon the advice of the ‘Maori Government’. KA portrayed  NZAIF as being a disciplined but domestically restrained force, presenting the motto, “withdraw is not a option”, as evidence of his resolve. 

Contemporaneous observers expressed scepticism. Dr Gary Clayton (Waikato University) noted it was not unusual for “small groups of  dissatisfied people to get together in camouflage gear”, “plan to take over the world”, and even give themselves “grand titles”, but such groups rarely translated into operational capability. 

In August 2000, KA escalated his rhetoric in a magazine article (Investigate), claiming that the NZAIF possessed over a 100  automatic military assault rifles, MP5 sub-machine guns, A2 grenade launchers, and rocket launchers. He boasted that 120 NZAIF members were from territorial and regular forces, with a ”edge of former SAS troops” He alleged “weapon caches all over the place” and if police moved against them, NZAIF “would come down on them like a ton of bricks” while hedging that there would “zero per cent” civilian casualties. His recruitment numbers also suddenly changed from 120 to over 1500 ‘troops’. The magazine uncritically echoed his claims via proclaimed vague sources and speculated, without any tangible evidence, that the NZAIF could be behind military weapons ‘purportedly’ disappearing from bases. In reality, no substantiated reports of such weaponry going missing (or being found) existed. Such uncritical coverage provided amplification that can serve as legitimisation for NZAIF myth-making. Police comments to media made it clear they were aware, had conducted risk assessments, and despite precautionary actions, NZAIF was suspected of being “hot air”. 

KA/NZAIF emerged again in October 2000, during a small civil occupation at the old Meremere power station in the Waikato.  While NZ Police and Genesis Power attempted a peaceful resolution, one occupier (Robert Tukiri) suggested they were armed and ready to act against police. Other occupiers insisted the action was peaceful and asked KA, described as a friend of Tukiri’s to leave multiple times. KA claimed he was there to give “technical advice on security matters”.

In 2001, KA gained attention after leading a campaign targeting Peter Thodey, the Managing Director of the  Bank of New Zealand (BNZ).  On Christmas Day 2000, Thodey discovered a threatening Christmas card/letter written in military jargon in his garden accusing the BNZ of financial crimes, and that he was being surveilled by “units”. Thodey was also subjected to KA’s uninvited appearances at his home in military-styled attire. This harassment was tied to KA acting behalf of a conspiracist businessman, Philip Verry, who held a long-standing grievance following the collapse of his company in 1996. Police evidence included letters declaring: 

"This will not carry on any longer, you will complete negotiations expeditiously, fairly and without deviation from moral values. If those negotiations are unsuccessful a range of other actions will trigger automatically. If there is a nightmare in the future it will then be yours and your colleagues”

Despite the threatening rhetoric and intimidation, no evidence has ever really surfaced that NZAIF or KA actually possessed the weaponry or capabilities KA claimed.  The BNZ’s costly security measures for close personal protection was precautionary rather than reflective of actual threat, nonetheless the safety concerns and feelings of insecurity for Thodey and his family were tangible. Criminal harassment charges were brought against KA, but Thodey chose not to proceed, citing concerns for his already frightened children and requirement for them to testify. Verry later distanced himself, stating that while KA offered to act as an intermediary with the bank, he was not aligned with KA’s  “militaristic” methods.

On 11 April 2001, Thompson appeared in court again, alongside Henare who had been in the vehicle when police conducted the traffic stop. Thompson again claimed they were training and carrying out “diplomatic missions” for NZAIF. Items seized from the vehicle included an imitation pistol, a sawn off shotgun, ammunition, alongside a balaclava, binoculars and masking tape. In pre-trial submissions, from Eru Manukau invoked the 1835 Declaration of Independence and the Confederation of Chiefs’ as grounds for their defence. Judge Thorburn dismissed these argument, stating he could not acknowledge a defence based on an unrecognisable source. Henare was discharged for lack of evidence, while Thompson was sentenced to two years imprisonment. In July 2001, KA styling himself again the Commander of the NZAIF, accompanied Mark David Hulse (41 years old) to Timaru Court as Hulse faced driving charges, including a reliance on a licence issued by the ‘Maori Government of Aotearoa’. In court, Hulse advanced standard pseudolaw arguments: 

"I would like to see the jurisdiction that demonstrates that you have the right to override a contract between myself and the government of Aotearoa. It's a sovereign government, it's like you people saying you have the right to override a contract from another country."

The court rejected these arguments. Hulse later explained he used an alternative licence to resist the introduction of new state-issued digital photo licences. For some time NZAIF and the ‘Maori Government’ campaigned against photo driver licences as both unlawful and a form of surveillance. In response, they produced and sold their own branded non-digital licences. In addition,  fraudulent ‘Maori Government of Aotearoa’ passports also circulated.  KA claimed to have used such documents to travel twice to the Solomon Islands during 2001, alleging the practice was curtailed only when the New Zealand Labour Government as they “threatened to pull aid” from the Solomon Islands.  In April 2002, KA appeared on a current affairs programme displaying a restricted-licence M14 semi-automatic rifle and delivering anti-government statements as a ‘disgruntled’ former soldier  [NZ Army circa 1 yr].  He articulated a willingness to escalate to violence if necessary and eluded to broader ideologies: 

‘to preserve what’s inherently ours, I’d take it right to the end =, if that means picking up arms , if it means a confrontation the oppressors, in a heart beat”

It was however, the repeated prosecutions of drivers using the pseudo-licences that triggered the most visible agitation.  In July 2002, the two sovereign-pseudolegal entities escalated their rhetoric by declaring war on the New Zealand Government. This licence initiated ‘war’ was revealed during a traffic-related court hearing for Steve Tarrant when a ‘Maori Government’ spokesperson Graham Fain quietly handed over a written “declaration of war” before the group departed peacefully. The declaration was later published on the NZAIF website. 

Soon afterwards, KA publicly postured that the NZAIF was preparing for a nationally significant operation that would take out the governments “enforcement arm”. In parallel media communications, NZAIF ‘Lieutenant’ John Maddox claimed the war declaration was justified on the basis that the government was a private bankrupt entity “controlled by foreign powers”. Maddox issued warnings to journalists- “if you manipulate it [the story], prepare to be arrested. You will definitely be arrested, Make no mistake about it”. Even in its most extreme declarations, NZAIF hedged a farcical caveat:  that action would only be taken “when ordered to do so” by the Māori Government.

On the 8 July 2003, KA appeared in court, not as NZAIF leader, but as a  “Maori Government” representative supporting  Edward John Sullivan as his Mackenzie Friend.  Sullivan had already been convicted for using a pseudo-licence and, after an unsuccessful appeal he was again convicted in February 2003 for repeated offences. The following year, in March 2004, the police raided KA’s  home in Auckland. He claimed this was prompted by his purchase of a pistol holder from Trade Me, and by allegations he intended to “over throw the government”. 

Whether coincidental or consequential, after March 2004 the NZAIF appears to have effectively evaporated. Its legacy persists primarily in retrospective news reports and academic analysis. In this respect, the NZAIF illustrates how militia-mimicry thrives not through capability but through narrative endurance. The militia myth of NZAIF survives in retellings, which ideally should function to demystify and critically contextualise, rather than perpetuate, an invented history.

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Brief Note: Patterns of Collapse and Myth-Residue

The story of the NZAIF followed a familiar pattern. It made loud declarations of strength, staged dramatic public moments, and then quietly disappeared. At first glance, there are echoes of small U.S. militias ior militant sovereign strains like Posse Comitatus , which also relied on exaggerated claims, pseudo-legal arguments, and militaristic imagery before collapsing under scrutiny. Yet the similarities are only superficial. NZAIF’s trajectory was rooted in New Zealand’s own context , and unlike in the United States, citizen militia-style groups here never really developed, let alone maintain a sustained movement.

It is also important not to conflate New Zealand’s sovereigns/pseudolaw groups with militias. While some U.S. figures straddled both spaces, in New Zealand sovereign spaces have not been similar armed formations. Their emphasis has been on pseudo-legal tactics, the creation of parallel authorities, criminal acts, and symbolic challenges to the state’s legitimacy, rather than paramilitary organisation.

What does endure, however, are the narratives,  its mix of military mimicry and sovereign rhetoric became part of New Zealand’s anti-government landscape. These militia myths and attempts at identity often outlast the groups that create them, recycled as symbols by later identities. In this sense, the NZAIF was less a fighting force than a performance. Its myth survives as a resource that continues to blur the lines between performance, grievance, and resistance.

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Note: The Queen Vs Jason Reece Thompson 2001 NZCA 236 (3 Oct 2001). A jury at Hamilton district court found him guilty on three charges relating to ammunition and firearms and sentenced him to two years imprisonment. He represented himself with the support of a Mackenzie Friend, and later unsuccessfully appealed his conviction.  During his appearance he claimed  he was justified in carrying the firearms as he was a “member of a Private Army” –a claim the Judge refuted.